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The assumption underlying most philosophical theories of science, that one can apply to any scientific theory the concept of 'truth', is, with its implication of absolute finality, a hangover from the period when Newtonian physics was regarded as an absolute end state. The hidden mourning about the passing of this ideal science gives present philosophical approaches to science and scientific method their common stamp. The alternative seems to be the retreat into a sociological relativism. The paper shows that it is possible to work out a science-theoretical paradigm which avoids the pitfalls of both philosophical absolutism and sociological relativism. It suggests that instead of discussing criteria of a fictitious absolute end-state of knowledge, one might try to discover criteria and conditions for the advance of knowledge, non-scientific and scientific. A theory of this kind has the added advantage that it can be tested by, and can serve as a guide for, empirical studies of sciences and of knowledge generally. The paper also suggests that discussions about 'value-freedom' should be abandoned in favour of enquiries into the use of scientific and non-scientific values in scientific work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common phenomenon in sociology (and in other disciplines presumably) is that of the 'taken_for-granted reference'. This is typically an original empirical study, the findings of which become accepted and thereafter acknowledged as valid evidence in support of argument or for the generation of new hypotheses or counter hypotheses without presentation of critical re-evaluation. The extent to which this occurs and how and why it does occur are largely uninvestigated. In this paper, one case of the taken-for-granted reference, which is widely used in studies of social mobility, is subjected to critical re-evaluation in the light of original empirical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]