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The assumption underlying most philosophical theories of science, that one can apply to any scientific theory the concept of 'truth', is, with its implication of absolute finality, a hangover from the period when Newtonian physics was regarded as an absolute end state. The hidden mourning about the passing of this ideal science gives present philosophical approaches to science and scientific method their common stamp. The alternative seems to be the retreat into a sociological relativism. The paper shows that it is possible to work out a science-theoretical paradigm which avoids the pitfalls of both philosophical absolutism and sociological relativism. It suggests that instead of discussing criteria of a fictitious absolute end-state of knowledge, one might try to discover criteria and conditions for the advance of knowledge, non-scientific and scientific. A theory of this kind has the added advantage that it can be tested by, and can serve as a guide for, empirical studies of sciences and of knowledge generally. The paper also suggests that discussions about 'value-freedom' should be abandoned in favour of enquiries into the use of scientific and non-scientific values in scientific work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The core problems of sociological and philosophical theories of knowledge remain insoluble and unrelated as long as both theories start from static models. The problems can be solved, and the respective theories related to each other, without undue difficulties if the acquisition of knowledge is conceptualized as a long-term process which takes place within societies also considered as long-term processes. This approach has the added advantage of being in closer agreement with the evidence. The paper indicates what needs to be unlearned and what to be learned in order to prepare the way for such a unified theoretical framework which can serve as a guide to, and which can be in turn corrected by, empirical sociological studies of all types of knowledge, scientific and practical as well as non-scientific or ideological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]