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A central, element of modem professions is that they are organized around specialized bodies of knowledge over which they claim exclusive jurisdiction and control (Barber, 1963). Such specialized expertise is basic to the performance of the professional role, and the application of this specialized knowledge to client problems is the essence of professionalism for occupations such as medicine, dentistry, nursing, law, or engineering (Hughes, 1963; Gross, 1958:78-82). As Greenwood (1957) suggests, two other attributes of the professions— authority and autonomy—are based upon this expertise. The authority to advise, prescribe, direct, or limit client activity is grounded in professional access to superior knowledge of "causes" and "solutions" to the clients' problems. Likewise, freedom from lay control and evaluation of professional performance derives from the discrepancy between the expertise of the professional and the ignorance of the client. Only other qualified (i.e., knowledgeable in the same specialized area) personnel can evaluate the professional practitioner (Hall, 1969). In addition, professions also exhibit other characteristics which are not so intimately linked to expertise. These are such elements as codes of ethics, professional cultures or communities, and commitment (see Hall, 1969; Goode, 1957). The focus of this paper is, however, on the relevance of professional expertise. Expertise is inextricably involved with both the performance of the professional role, and the maintenance of professional status and legitimacy. Any increase in client access to the professional sphere of competence is therefore likely to result in skepticism, criticism, and may even threaten to reduce the professional to commercial status (Wilensky, 1964:150). The "mystification" of professional knowledge in the form of esoteric jargon, limitations on popularization of knowledge, and prohibitions against advertising may be seen as attempts to maintain the knowledge gap between professional and client. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper began with an attempt to formalize the Davis-Moore functional theory of social stratification. It was found that the theory could be represented by a static model consisting of two algebraic equations with appropriate constraints on the functions. Then the tools of path analysis were used to evaluate the empirical adequacy of the Davis-Moore and Parsonian functional theories of social stratification as representations of cultural beliefs about stratification. Because of the likely presence of measurement and sampling errors, it was impossible to reject definitely either of the models. However, the estimated path coefficients were more consistent with the Parsonian theory than the Davis-Moore theory. This led to an inquiry into the conditions under which one model would be a better representation than the other. It was argued that the Davis-Moore scheme would provide a more accurate representation of cultural beliefs under conditions of high organizational interdependence whereas the Parsonian framework would give a better representation under conditions of low interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Similar in scope and significance to the industrial and agrarian revolutions, the modem scientific revolution has been slowly developing for the past century bringing changes which are both obvious and obscure. In general, scholars have analyzed this revolution in terms of two major conceptions which have emphasized either the effect of science technology or the effect of science on the social institutions and social organization of society. More recently interest has focused upon the growth of power of science and its alienating effects. But one aspect of this revolution, perhaps the most important aspect, has been almost totally ignored. This paper is devoted to an examination of this aspect the effect of science on culture. From its early beginnings, when it was at war with theology, to the postindustrial period of widespread acceptance, science has made its mark upon culture first in the production of new information and thus a "new world view" and later in the rise of "scientism" where the uncritical adoration of science has produced a new value in society-that of science itself. Because of their historical development and confinement to certain types of analytical models, sociology and the sociology of science have been unsuccessful in dealing with this type of social change. In addition to sociology's neglect of the effect of science on culture, sociologists are producing fragmented information about science and the revolution which leads to the belief that science, because of its internal value structure and utilitarian relationship to other social institutions, can not develop unchecked to a position of overwhelming power. Without any manifest intentions, sociologists have produced a conservative evaluation of science and the revolution.ceptions of the revolution; (2) the reasons for the neglect of sociological analysis of the effect of science on culture; (3) a brief overview of the replacement, destruction, and accommodation theories of the effect of science on culture; and (4) the change from atomistic accommodation during the preindustrial period, when science was at war with theology, to the holistic accommodation of science in the rise of scientism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The general theory of symbolic interaction, specifically self theory, is focused upon the importance of language as an instrument of definition and communication. People are seen as responding not directly to a resistant outer reality but to meanings of objects which are defined within a cultural system and social organization. G. H. Mead, in his discussion of the way persons develop self concepts and the accompanying ability to take roles effectively, speaks of the degree to which persons develop a "general other." This general other is an organized structure of attitudes believed to be common to all and is defined in terms of a universe of discourse growing out of the symbolic interaction of a community of individuals. Replies to the Twenty Statements Test, described by Kuhn and McPartland, display this quality. Self-identifying statements which people make fall along a rough spectrum of reference which can be broken up in various ways. The distinction which Kuhn and McPartland have reported is between what they call consensual and nonconsensual statements. Consensual statements are defined as those statements which would be generally understood by persons in the larger society without explanation. Nonconsensual statements are defined as those requiring interpretation before their social relevance can be assessed. The consensual statement is language behavior directed to the general other, while the nonconsensual statement is language directed to a more limited audience. H. S. Sullivan's contribution in developing the notion of the "significant other" consists in accounting for the fact that persons often do not seem to internalize standards and norms from the whole society but from segments of it on some selective basis. In this paper, the number of consensual statements made in response to the Twenty Statements Test will be called the locus score. Respondents are assigned to "high" and "low" locus categories as they make more or less than the median number of consensual statements. Expanding upon this frame of reference, it seems reasonable to propose that the locus quality found in self-conceptions of a given person is also characteristic of his conceptions of other objects. This hypothesis is based on the assumption that the self is the core of a set of interrelated attitudes, and that the level of reference employed by the respondent in his attitudes toward the self would therefore be applicable to other attitudes as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A genuinely sociological theory of social change is lacking, but the literature of the social sciences abounds with the elements of such a theory. The present paper deals with one of these elements, namely the change from tribalism to urbanism as a major instance of social change. For this purpose the concepts of culture and civilization are examined, and a plea is made to restore the concept of civilization to its rightful place in the vocabulary of sociologists and anthropologists. In doing this, the intention is not to reduce social change to the process of urbanization, but rather to isolate the sociological element which makes for social change within the supersession of a familial by a territorial society, wherever it occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]