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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the applicability of Parsonian "pattern-variables" in defining a constructed type. Specification of boundaries or cutting-off points of role relationships in Weber's three types of authority systems, while an intriguing problem, is a project too great in scope for a short paper. Instead, for this preliminary attempt, a social system has been selected in which a few crucial role relationships define its character. It is also a system familiar to sociologists. The setting selected is the educational institution at the university level. The type to be defined, "the seat of learning," is perhaps the most "ideal" of ideal types. A number of other constructed type educational institutions might be isolated, e.g., "marriage markets," "sources of status," "diploma mills," or, perhaps, "campus playgrounds." Sets of role relationships could be specified to define any of these types. For purposes of illustration, however, the definition of one type will be sufficient. Four steps are involved in defining the constructed type: (1) selection of the crucial role pairs; (2) the definition of the chosen role relationships by use of the pattern-variables; (3) measurement of the pattern- variable choices; and (4) establishment of boundary points for the pattern-variables themselves. The fourth step will not be completed in this paper; it is felt that the necessary methodological apparatuses are already available. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information about the journal "Sociological Focus." For the last 32 years the official publication of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society has been the "Ohio Valley Sociologist," which primarily carried news and notes of interest to sociologists in the region. In the last few years the membership has become aware of a need for a modified format for the Sociologist. This has been manifest in the increasing publication of occasional papers including the presidential addresses and the winning papers from the student competition. In 1967 the society's members voted to expand the function of the sociologist so that greater space would be devoted to the publication of scholarly papers while maintaining the usual information service. In line with this new emphasis the title and the format of the journal have been changed. The papers in this issue deal with the sociology of academia and higher education. The winter issue will be a special issue on the sociology of mental health, the spring issue will deal with political sociology, and a future number will be devoted to papers on the sociology of religion.

The article presents a discussion on values in family research. Professor Donald O. Cowgill has attempted to explore the influence of an individual's values upon the selection of a research problem, his research design, the presentation of data and his findings or conclusions. He has done this by a rather extensive examination of literature dealing with migration ranging from the sociologist to the novelist. By and large he exonerates the sociologist, particularly the contemporary sociologist, from this type of bias, although this may actually be an example of the influence of an individual's values or value judgments. it is really impossible to do justice to Cowgill's paper both because of its length and its exhaustive citation of sources. The author believes that two points are pertinent. First, is it ever possible to reduce the question of migration to such simple terms as "Is migration good or bad ?" The second point is the influence of social change on attitudes toward migration. The author holds that research does depend upon the personal predilections of the researcher, but increasingly larger projects seem to depend as much, if indeed not considerably more, upon the value judgments of large foundations which furnish research money.

This article discusses changing patterns of rural organization. There are many different approaches possible for a summary of a congress. The first design which will be used is to study a general hypothesis based on the sociologist R.K. Merton's comparison between European and American research technique in the sociology of knowledge. It seems as if one of the most important tasks in science is to study repeatedly the reliability and the validity of the empirical findings, in order to construct a coherent theoretical building. This means that the same hypothesis has to be tested several times at different places and at different points of time. It might be a very stimulating task for the European Society for Rural Sociology to further such a cumulative work. There has not either been very much discussion of how to study the consequences of a change. Especially the nonintended consequences are of great interest for a rural sociologist and have great practical importance. A final aspect in connection with change is the study of social processes. The necessity of analyzing the socio-cultural linkage has already been emphasized.

The article presents information about the June 1970 issue of the journal "Sociological Focus." The summer issue of Sociological Focus traditionally features the winner of the Student Paper Competition. The journal publishes the top graduate and undergraduate papers, by sociologist Michael R. McKee and Gary Allan Gereffi. All award winners are listed elsewhere in this issue. Norman F. Washburne is Guest Editor of the Spring, 1971 issue, which will deal with the topic of attitudes. In addition to the student papers, the journal has published in this issue sociologist Dwight Dean's presidential address and contributed papers.

This paper outlines the career of Maurice F. Parmelee, sociologist, government official, nudist, and author of thirteen books, including the first American criminology text (1918). The contents of the latter are examined and contrasts with contemporary textbooks are noted. Parmelee's career is an anomoly, for although he published abundantly, he faded into sociological obscurity. Some conjecture is offered about scholarly career paths generally, drawn out of the Parmelee case. Finally, the paper argues that historical accounts of the development of American criminology are incomplete, for they fail to mention a number of early figures, including Parmelee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

in this area. A radical re-tooling of some of his earlier definitions and concepts seems to be needed, if these are to become more appreciated and useful in future research. In short, while he undoubtedly knew his empirical evidence very well, Weber, like many other scientists, experienced some painful difficulties in attempting to classify and label it. The major modification tentatively suggested in this paper is that it is necessary to pay close attention to an extremely sharp contrast between the two variants of the traditionalist concept of domination, patrimonialism vs. feudalism. This basic contrast, crucial in his scientific investigation of cultural differentiations, runs most consistently through an unbelievable wealth of research material accumulated by him. It is an empirical typology of two sets of contradictory historical experiences concerning the origin and development of domination and legitimacy. There is another rather significant and frequently overlooked scientific contribution of Max Weber within the context of this paper. Albert Salomon's witty comment from the 1930's on the Me-long dialogue of Max Weber with the ghost of Karl Marx is now very popular among many radical, establishment, and the-rest-of-us sociologists. In spite of being fashionable to refer to it through the 1960's, no serious attempts were made to account for this many-faceted dialogue. This paper will try to settle one of the very much alive aspects of the same dialogue— hopefully to the lasting satisfaction of all. One morning numerous and valuable conceptual tools suggested by Max Weber, a typological dichotomy of patrimonialism vs. feudalism, has not been sufficiently utilized in modem research and obviously for good reasons. But the theoretical potentialities of this dichotomy seem to be imperative and still go begging particularly in an ever-increasing number of fascinating comparative analyses of durable and large political systems in time as well as in space. A consensus seems to be growing that the former is indispensable for the understanding of the latter, because the durability of patterning, found only in the comparison of things in time, is one of the most crucial prerequisites for contemporary studies of comparing things in space. Wesson (1967) and Eisenstadt (1963) in their admirable generalizing sweep of great historical empires, Blum (1964) and Jacobs (1958) in their specialized areas, could have immensely facilitated their formidable tasks if Weber's dichotomy had been available to them, thus only increasing the welldeserved impact of their contributions. Indeed, this dichotomy of Weber's, similarly to some others, does need just about a total rescue if not resurrection, and no student should be blamed for not digging for it for his own needs. Patrimonial-feudal dichotomy is buried in Webers extremely rough-draft writings on the traditionalist type of domination. In addition to being by necessity a residual type—whatever did not qualify for charismatic or legal-rational types was hastily located here perhaps for the time being—the traditionalist type, as presented by Weber, is one of the most mettled and confusing segments of Ms writings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the kind of social organization necessary to bring about radical social change was raised by Marx in 1843-1844 in his essay on Hegel's philosophy of law. In this essay Marx specified the kind of social organization capable of bringing about the total, socialist revolution as the proletariat, a class, in society but not of it, conscious of itself and of its enemies, and organized as a party. (See also Marx and Engels, 1848). In the historical development of Marxism, Marx' answer was reinforced, but also narrowed and specified, by Lenin's classical (1902) formulation of the revolutionary cadre party. In a world in which many now talk of revolution, both in the "Third World," and even in modem industrialized countries, it may be of some use to re-examine the question of the kind of social organization involved in generating radical social change, and to reexamine the Marxist answer. My strategy in this paper is to attack the problem indirectly, by reexamining Max Weber's discussion of the role of certain kinds of Protestant groups in the rise of the capitalist world. I shall try to justify this indirect strategy at the paper's conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When sociologists discuss the analytical concept "integration" they use an implicit conceptual imagery which must be made clear if some of the most common confusions and misunderstandings in this area are to be avoided. The recent discussion of the concept has been vigorous, but a systematic appraisal of the issue is needed. It is attempted in this paper. Our analysis must have two parts: first, we must understand the formal meaning of the concept "integration" as such—its logical properties, as it were, which stem from its nature as a characterization of whole-part relationships; second, we must apply the formal insights gained to a brief review of the analytical uses of the concept in sociological theory; it may then be possible to specify at least some of the conceptual relationships between different types of "integration theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of science it has often happened that a scholar's ideas are denied full recognition because of that scholar's real or assumed connection to some controversial ideology. The position accorded to Vilfredo Pareto is one illustration of such practice in present-day sociology. This scholar is often said to have been a "Newton of the Moral World," or altogether a fascist ideologist. So Faris informs us that "The book [The Mind and Society] formulates the implicit philosophy of Italian Fascism, advocating the right of the strong to take what they want without apology or appeal to moral principles." In tracing the development of social thought, Bogardus devotes an entire chapter to "Pareto and Fascist Thought," and authoritatively argues that "While fascism has some of its roots in Nietzsche's concepts and other roots in Machiavellianism, yet Pareto's ideas come even closer to giving an adequate basis." Zanden, in turn, interprets Pareto's sociology to be "a philosophy of society, a social creed, determined mainly by violent and ever purely personal passions. The logical fulfillment of this political manifesto is fascism." We need not continue further; analogous affirmations are bountiful in the literature. To be sure, not all sociologists accept this view, but to date little or no systematic effort has been made to resolve the controversy, with the result that many students of sociology are unwitting victims of one of the most cruel intellectual hoaxes perpetrated against their discipline and one of their kind. The present paper proposes to offer a clarification with respect to the alleged connection between Pareto's sociology and fascist ideology. Our approach takes us in two major directions: first, an examination of Pareto's Treatise, his chief sociological work, and second, an examination of a series of letters written to his great friend Pantaleoni during the period when fascism was a political reality in Italy. Before proceeding to present our argument, it may be useful to inquire briefly about the meaning of "fascism," as his critics tend to use that word. A rapid glance at the literature reveals that the following are generally believed to be among the chief characteristics of fascist ideology: distrust of reason, a code of behavior based on "race" and violence, belligerent nationalism, government by an elite, and totalitarianism. Characteristically, these then provide the basis for accusing Pareto of "antirationalism," "anti-intellectualism," "contempt for democracy," and approval of the use of force at all costs. The major portion of this paper will be concerned, therefore, with explicating Pareto's position on these four issues. We shall begin by considering Pareto's alleged antirationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on various research work done by sociologist Johan Galtung. It is noteworthy, that Galtung's major contributions to sociology are to the theory and method of the field. Some of his important published contributions are: "Rank and Social Integration," "Social Theories in Progress," and "A Structural Theory of Aggression." Galtung has also done a lot of peace research work. His contributions to peace and conflict research during the past decade fall in these broad areas: large scale attitude research; spot studies; Norway's outside relations; the social structure and development of foreign areas; science policy for peace research. Galtung's study of attitudes includes attitudes toward disarmament, arms control, atoms for peace, visits by heads of superpowers, artificial satellites, etc. Galtung's contributions to the knowledge of foreign social structures come from papers containing a detailed study of three villages in Sicily, Italy, and an essay with a broad view of intercommunications in Latin America. He has also tried his methodological skills in refining the measurement of social economic development.

Only a new, direct, systematic, and comprehensively envisaged effort to develop an appropriate terminology would seem to promise a thorough, effective removal of these defects. The proposals offered in this paper stem from an intensive study of Cooley's major works and the fields they represent, his own distinctive conceptual contributions, the basic assumptions pervading his general methodological and theoretic stance, and allied terminological differentiations embodying the same basic views in disciplines other than sociology. Stated simply and directly, the results of this inquiry indicate that Cooley's general sociological orientation is constituted of a configuration of ideas involving idealism, organicism, diversitarianism, nonrationality, the pervasiveness of conflict or opposition, and the constancy of change. Perhaps the best general designation for this configuration of ideas would be romanticism or romantic idealism, as Cooley's respect for and indebtedness to Hegel, Schaeffle, Emerson, and especially Goethe might suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widespread existence of political passivity and apathy among the citizens of the democratic nations is deeply disturbing to many people. The concept of an enlightened citizenry exercising its franchise in pursuit of its rights and interests is so basic to the theory of the democratic state that the flagrant failure of a sizeable portion of the electorate in Western societies even to take the trouble to vote appears to challenge the essential validity of the ideology of popular government. Most of what people know about the passive citizen comes from studies of the vote and most of this information comes from election statistics. Evidence from many different countries has given a general picture of the sociological characteristics. When people seek to understand the motivational situation, which underlies political passivity, they feel the need of information going beyond their knowledge of the sociological characteristics of non-voters. Knowing a person's social status, people can infer something about the political forces that may be acting on him, but this is only moderately satisfying. Psychological analysis requires an understanding both of the person and the psychological world around him. Sociologist Kurt Lewin originally stated the proposition that behavior depends on the state of the person and his environment. In order to understand or to predict behavior, the person and his environment have to be considered as one constellation of interdependent factors. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a consideration of those characteristics of the person and his environment, which may be thought to underlie political passivity.

This article presents information on sociologist Benjamin Franklin. Sociologist Julian Boyd once observed that authors during the next century approached Franklin, a figure of universal dimensions, with a preconceived view that reduced him to a symbol of thrift, which he never practiced, of frugality which he never enjoyed, and of prim virtues, which he transcended. Similarly, educational historians have narrowly conceived of him as a pedagogical theorist who rejected the false claims of tradition and custom. This approach has not only ignored the variety of Franklin's educational endeavors, including his efforts to establish German charity schools, but it leaves the student at a loss to understand the reactions of Franklin's contemporaries. Rather than belaboring his reputation as a forward looking educational thinker, it is much more helpful to see him as a doer as well as a planner, working within the limitations of his own times. According to this approach, Franklin, the educator, emerges as a Janus-faced man who peered in two directions.

The article discusses the various aspects of sociology as a profession and the attempts in the universities to exclude the sociologists from teaching positions, fellowships, and the attainment of doctorates. The modern university has regularized the procedures for accreditation and admittance to the profession of sociology. Thus, sociology has become a bureaucratic career. It is opined that the concern with activism within the realms of sociology has hardly anything to do with the intellectual arguments about sociology as a profession, but rather responds to the concern of the dominant forces in sociological associations and the hiring halls of the profession. It is opined that most sociologists, being moderately liberal, are politically conservative--they share a welfarist view, bureaucratic orientation to piecemeal administrative reform. Being partisans of neither capitalism nor socialism they favor the mixed welfare system--which is basically a pluralistic socialism for the subsidized rich.

This article examines the attitudes of white sociologists and black students in predominantly white colleges and universities in all geographic regions of the country. Respective attitudes are at sharp variance and produce several kinds of conflict behavior. Tile personal and professional crises experienced by white sociologists when challenged by black students are described, along with the principal grievances of black students against social scientists in the race relations field. Also examined are structural and organizational changes in sociology and in the academic institutions resulting from a particular form of black-white conflict. Attention is given to black-Jewish conflict in sociology as well as to the distinctiveness of black-white relations in Southern colleges and universities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An approach to the measurement of the self-concept, the "Who Am I Test," is presented. The theoretical rationale, administration, analysis, previous research, and clinical utility of the instrument are described. Case protocols are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This re-analysis has included additional community studies which meet the criteria of the original research. An attempt has also been made to re-examine the data while taking into account the fact of changing predominance of research methods in use during the period from 1953 to 1964. One conclusion by Walton that "… political scientists compared to sociologists tend to find less monolithic power structures …" (1966b:687) was not sustained by this re-analysis. When the data in Table 4A for the publishing period from 1960 to 1964 are examined, it can be noted that sociologists and political scientists equally found pyramidal power structures in communities. It appears that the use of the entire publishing period from 1953 to 1964 contributed to the erroneous conclusion in Walton's study. Some insights and conclusions which have emerged in this re-analysis are as follows: (1) Sociologists were substantially involved in the study of community power earlier than were political scientists (of the research reports published prior to 1960, eleven were done by sociologists and only one by a political scientist). (2) The decision making and the combined decision and reputational approaches to the study of community power were not represented in the literature before 1960. (3) There appears to be a tendency for use of the decision-only or the combined reputation-and-decision methods to result in finding a coalitional arrangement of community power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologist Seymour M. Lipset reports that a Swedish newspaper editor recently told him that politics in Sweden is boring. The transformation of politics from vivid clashes over ideology to what some people consider a dull, technical discussion about means for promoting goals questioned by none is reported to take place not only in Sweden but in the other Scandinavian countries as well. This process is often referred to as the depoliticization of politics. Depoliticization then seems to imply a transformation of political ideologies into a set of more or less distinct administrative technologies based on a widespread consensus as to what kind of goal one should try to attain. Even if ideological differences are not wiped out altogether ideological differences are de-emphasized in a depoliticized political community. A decreasing ideological saliency is an important aspect of so-called depoliticization. It is in this sense is often supposed to cause a decline of subjective involvement in political affairs. Subjective involvement in political affairs will probably not be reduced throughout the citizenry when ideological saliency becomes less manifest. Much will depend on the ideological style of individual citizens and of their immediate environments, and on the "goodness of fit" of individual and environmental ideological styles. Only if there is a less good fit between individual and environmental ideological styles do people suspect a decline of political involvement.

The article discusses the emergence of various theoretical trends and their prospects in sociology. While it is not the author's purpose to trace the historical development of these trends, it is worthwhile noting that alt of them at some point were of central concern to the early history of sociology, either in classical European thought or in the body of theory which was promulgated at the University of Chicago, Illinois, early in this century. Indeed, if the ensuing prognosis were on target, it would be interesting to ascertain why contemporary sociology is just now "rediscovering its roots" and attempting to make a place for the very ideas, which give it its birth. The developments the author has outlined in this article, the movement toward a radical sociology, the codification of a theoretically humanistic sociology, the emergence of a sociology of self as the genesis for theory creation, the advocating of moral engagement vis-a-vis what it is sociologists study, and the need to develop a viable theory of meaning, all suggest one central underlying theme. This theme is a renewed emphasis on the study of the person as the central focus of social action. This is not to say that structural variables will no longer be vital to the sociological perspective. Rather, it is a matter of emphasis, i.e., the traditional emphasis on the system paradigm is rapidly yielding to a more dynamic "person paradigm", the main thrust of which is to more accurately tap the essence of the human condition.

The intent of this article is to examine a continuing problem of sociological inquiry, the uncritical mixture of common sense and objective perspectives in the formulation of sociological concepts and theory. The issue has been noted and conceived in a variety of different ways by various sociologists. The current controversy over phenomenology and positivism reflects, in part, the effort to disentangle naive sociology from analytic sociology. For clarification, the article draws, first, upon some of the conceptions and controversies from behavioral and phenomenological psychology. Next, a comparison is made of the assumptions and methods of positivism and phenomenology in sociology. Finally, some substantive examples of common sense and of analytic sociology are also discussed in the article. The concern of this article has been with the influence of common sense sociology upon the theories and data of analytic sociology. Their relationship, it should be noted, is apt to be reciprocal and not merely unidirectional. Sociological interpretations, which are congruent with the conventional wisdom, are likely to be adapted into it. Such mutual influences are not self-limiting. Serving like feedback systems, they may become scientific justifications for social participants and self-confirming hypotheses for professional sociologists.

The article discusses some sociological precedents and problems. This article presents an attempt to hold culture constant, exploring some of the nuances of language and social research within a given cultural context. It is devoted to the proposition that language is important, not only cross-culturally, but within the society as well, where it is assumed that everyone is speaking the same language. Linguistic research is increasingly providing clues for needed methodological innovations in social science field research. Researchers need to keep in mind the fact that communication styles do vary, for example among the social classes. There is empirical evidence that phonetic differences exist among social classes and among various speech contexts in the same city and furthermore, that these are influenced by interactional contexts. The sociologist when interviewing, cannot afford to treat his own language from the perspective of a native speaker, but must adopt the position of a cryptanalyst approaching a strange language.

The article presents information about the meeting of Ohio Valley Sociological Society Council. President of the society Delbert Miller extended the Council's thanks to Dean Signey Kaplan for making arrangements for the OVSS Council to meet at the University of Toledo. Miller announced that the Sociology faculty at the University of Toledo had been invited to join Council for lunch. Miller read the statement he had prepared for inclusion in the Autumn, 1967 issue of "The Ohio Valley Sociologist," the theme of which was the need to preserve a primary group atmosphere within the society as its size and complexity increase. To this end, along with the usual section meetings, a series of the roundtables will be used as a vehicle for providing interaction among sociologists with common interests. After discussion, it was agreed that instead of scheduling the roundtables for both Thurs- day and Friday noon at the hotel where luncheon costs are high, the roundtables will be held during and after the dinner hour on Thursday on the Wayne State campus.

The article presents a systematic analysis of the connection between structuralism and Marxism by sociologist Claude Lévi-Strauss. The terms "structuralism" and "Marxism" can be used to describe a variety of positions, so that any number of possibilities presents themselves for singling out points of divergence and agreement. The axiom of an "epistemological break," which first makes possible any analysis of the characteristic "episteme" of an epoch, constitutes the premise of "symptomatic" reading of scholar Karl Marx. Even if one thinks it possible to demonstrate that Lévi-Strauss interprets Marx "quite violently," an attempt must still be made to discover the foundations on which such an interpretation rests. Lévi-Strauss might have been able to counter attempts to attack his analysis of savage thought, attempts that nonetheless see in it merely the precursor of a later form of thought, with a consistent argument for the identity of the mind, which only appears in various finite forms a whose number and possible variations are, in principle, knowable.

Studies intellectual respectability within an epistemological perspective. Problem of establishing and defending intellectual respectability; Study of the problem of social legitimation by contemporary sociologists; Characterization of intellectual disciplines by theory of rational enterprises; Use of ridicule for intellectual challenge and defense.

This article discusses various issues related to the philosophy of education. Philosophy is currently usually defined in some such terms as "thinking about meaning", "the exercise of critical thought," or simply "rational thought." Its stock in trade is conceptual analysis. The article attempts to argue that acceptance of the view that one cannot demonstrate incontestably that certain moral propositions are valid has been taken to imply that one man's opinion is as good as another's. This has led to a fear of tackling value judgements head on, and a reluctance to argue for specific value judgements on the part of some philosophers in education. Once the role of guru has been firmly renounced by the philosopher, the result is, not surprisingly, that other gurus, perhaps less wise, perhaps less modest, step into the breach. The sociologist, psychologist and historian proudly display their wares and cheerfully evaluate by naturalistic or any other means to hand. The dethroned philosopher now has a role to play: he can sit on the touchline policing the match, clarifying other people's vagueness and exposing these gurus when they inadvertently display a little sleight of hand.

The article presents information on the making of the sociologist Newell Leroy Sims. At college the author's major study was history. However, he took the only course offered in sociology. That chanced to be the year the book "Social Elements," appeared, and that book was the text. Neither the book, the subject, the teacher, nor the three in combination seriously interested the author. Missions were not his only emphasis. World peace was also stressed. These themes were central in his preaching. The second idea had been derived primarily from the first. Motivated by a desire to convert the world to the gospel and peace of Christ, he interpreted the social role of the church not as a field but as a force. Its business was to establish a kingdom of righteousness and peace among the nations. After coming to Ohio the leading sociologists of the state got together and organized The Ohio Sociological Society, which made the author its first president. This society is, the author believes, the oldest state or regional group of the kind. The author joined the American Sociological Society in 1909 and has attended most of its meetings since. In 1932 the author was elected to the Executive Committee of the Society, and made chairman of the Committee on Publications. Through the work of this committee the journal "American Sociological Review," was launched as the official journal of the society.

The article discusses various issues related to signs, symbols and interaction theory. Symbolic interaction theory and sociology of understanding start from opposite points of departure but may be seen as moving toward each other. Their meeting ground is the concern with meaningful communication. However, symbolic interactionists' stress the means of communication, sociologists of understanding the content or meaning. The article argues that according to sociologist George Herbert Mead, this has led to equivocations in the use of the term, symbol. It designates a carrier of the connotation of words in everyday language as well as the use of such a carrier for indicating meanings, which are too esoteric to be expressable in the terms of any language. It is suggested to adopt the term, sign, for the first and the term, symbol, for the second connotation of symbolic in symbolic interaction. This would be in accordance with the clarification of the terminological issue achieved by sociologist Alfred Schutz. Mead stressed the central significance of vocal gestures in the development of significant symbols. On the elementary level of meaningful oral communication, his term, symbol, connotes the following relation between the physical process of speaking and the meaning expressed by the speaker: A combination of sounds is uttered which, by pre-established convention, stands for the object which is meant by the sound combination although, physically, the combination bears no resemblance to the designated object.

The article presents information on the social problems as discusses by sociologist Fred Cottrell. The proposition that technological change creates costs which change the order in which values are satisfied, and by extension that changes in the physical world may do the same, permits analysis to move beyond the older idea that technology and geography are merely static, limiting factors in the growth of culture. Organizations which fail to innovate and differentiate and survive as systems qualify as pathological.

The article presents information about sociologist Lawrence Milton Hepple. Hepple, professor of Sociology of Religion at Methodist National Seminary, Kansas City, Missouri, and formerly associate professor of Rural Sociology at the University of Missouri, died of a heart attack on November 22, 1960, in Kansas. He was born and reared in Missouri, attending high school at Moberly. He received an A.B. degree from Central College in 1932, and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Missouri in 1940 and 1946, respectively. His teaching career began in 1942 when he served as instructor in Sociology at the University of Missouri. He became assistant professor of Sociology in 1945, assistant professor of Rural Sociology in 1947, and associate professor of Rural Sociology in 1950. In July 1960, he accepted the position of professor of Sociology of Religion at the new Methodist National Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri. Hepple served as president of the Boone County Mental Health Association, and was chairman of the section on Religion and the Aged in the task force created by the state in preparation for the White House Conference on Aging.

The article focuses on the British industrialist and sociologist Robert Owen. It is clear from Owen's autobiography and subsequent biographies that the period from 1810 to 1813 was a particularly testing phase in Owen's business career. Owen had formed a new partnership to run New Lanark in 1810 and was in difficulties with his partners almost from the beginning. Relations steadily worsened, until in 1813 the partnership was dissolved. There is reason to believe that Owen's difficulties between 1810 and 1813 were, in fact, a great deal more serious than he himself would admit. Documents in the Campbell of Jura Muniments, held by H.M. Register House in Edinburgh, indicate that Owen's business career was almost brought to an abrupt and none too savoury end early in 1813. Before considering the Campbell of Jura documents, Owen's personal account of the events of 1809 to 1813 deserves to be examined in greater detail. According to this, the New Lanark Twist Co, which had taken over New Lanark from David Dale in 1799 and of which Owen was the managing partner, was dissolved in 1809.

The article presents a discourse on coping-succumbing attitudes toward physical and mental disabilities. The concept of coping succumbing was introduced by sociologist B. Wright to describe behavioral reactions toward disability on a positive-negative continuum. The focus of coping behavior was on the adjustable aspects of a disability with the individual realistically appraising his difficulties and endeavoring to arrange his life in accordance with his abilities. In contrast, succumbing behavior was associated with distortion (a focusing on negative situational aspects frequently accompanied by unrealistic appraisals of situations), stress on liability, and an all-pervasive sense of despair. Several parameters of disability were isolated for study. The description of disabilities in psychologically meaningful terms was considered appropriate here rather than the use of medical or diagnostic labels. It was speculated that the layman's interpretation of disabilities is typically associated with readily identifiable stimulus characteristics.

The article discusses psychology of sexual attachment. Much has been written of human sexual behavior in its "physical" aspects. Countless volumes have dealt with the sexual act, with the processes and practices involved in it, and with the varieties and deviations of sexual activity. There is now a large literature, rich in information in this area. Very little, relatively, has been offered to those whose interest is not limited to the organic function and the mental states more or less directly related to it, and to whom the meaning of "sex" includes also the occurrence of exceptional attraction to one person, the growth of strong attachments, and emotional experiences which may seem to be quite different in quality from those which urge toward physical union. "Serious" students, a sociologist once remarked, have been peculiarly wary and even a little shy of approaching this subject, with the result that it has not been regarded as a matter for serious interest. From this comparative neglect it might also be inferred that these phenomena of sexual choice and attachment are but secondary and incidental features of the more fundamental "animal" desire. That there is much more to the matter than this is, of course, strongly suggested by the themes of countless novels, by endless screen portrayals, and by instances in daily living which anyone may observe.

This article presents some examples of creative achievement during later maturity and old age. An interval of some years seems to separate the last-named altar-piece from that of the church of artist San Zaccaria at Venice, which is perhaps the most beautiful and imposing of all, and is dated 1505. In 1883 scientist P.J. van Beneden of Belgium began the study of the early history of the animal egg. He reported reduction of the chromosome number in the egg cells to half that in the body cells and held that chromosomes have a genetic continuity throughout the life cycle. Researcher John Henry's ability in research developed early and grew with the years, and he published the results of his investigations in a series of carefully prepared studies, some of which can be noted. In 1814, before the site of this proposed institution had been chosen, sociologist Thomas Jefferson was elected a trustee, and under his influence the legislature, in February 1816, authorized the establishment of Central college in lieu of Albemarie academy.

The article focuses on social engineers and social engineering. The President of the American Social Engineering Association on the occasion of the Association's annual meeting in 1983, undertook to review a half-century of progress in the application of scientific techniques to guiding social adjustments. He began by characterizing the profession of social engineers as the most self-conscious of any of the professions. This profession alone has guided the processes of its own development and emergence by scientific study of the ways in which professions emerge in a society. The earlier callings, like those of the doctor and the lawyer, became professions without ever intending to do so. Some 40 years ago, pioneers in the field of the application of scientific methods to the control of social and psychological processes began their deliberate effort to make this profession a model. The code of ethics, for instance, was developed very early. This was necessary because sociologists are concerned not merely with influencing people, but with helping them formulate their own goals and objectives.

The revival of Soviet sociology in the post-Stalin era is indicative of the changes in that society made possible by de-Stalinization. In a real sense, academic sociology is not possible in a totalitarian society since the need to shed light on the distribution of privileges is inherent in the very nature of the discipline. The Soviet sociologists differ, publicly at least, from their American and other Western counterparts in assuming that their society and governmental regime are in a transitional stage which will lead increasingly and inevitably to the achievable goal of real equality, i.e., communism, a system without differentiated strata or variations in reward. Unlike most Western students of stratification, they do not link the existence of inequality in their country to the desire of the privileged to maintain their superior position for themselves and their kin. Their data are rarely presented in the context of an explicit critique of some major aspect of the society. And although quantitative comparisons with the results of comparable research in non-Soviet society are rarely made, there are frequent comments in Soviet academic journals that the research findings demonstrate that the Soviet Union is more egalitarian, offers more opportunity, than the United States or the West, or that the situation is steadily improving, i.e., becoming more egalitarian.

Sociologists need to recognize the distinction between objective and subjective status inconsistency. Objective inconsistency may be defined in terms of an arbitrary manipulation of an individual's status ranks, or it may be defined in terms of the normative expectations linking together the various status dimensions. Subjective inconsistency, on the other hand, involves asking the respondent to decide for himself whether or not he is inconsistent. When objective inconsistency is defined in terms of arbitrary mathematical manipulations, the relationship between these two components of inconsistency (i.e., objective and subjective) is basically an empirical question. However, when objective inconsistency is defined in terms of the normative expectations in a population, and when the respondent shares these expectations, we propose that these two components of inconsistency will be identical. Conversely, they will not be identical when the respondent does not share these expectations. Finally, the implications of defining inconsistency in terms of normative expectations are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists have become aware of the correlation between socio-cultural variables and the development of types of scientific knowledge. Until recently, the systematic study of the importance of these relations for knowledge in the social sciences has been more or less overlooked. To be sure, there was speculation about the impact of social and cultural factors upon the works of previous researchers. Some changes are taking place. Recently, the number of studies has increased and further evidence of increasing interest in the area has been reflected in the publications of several symposia which focus on sociological self-analysis. Furthermore, some lines of inquiry in the study of the discipline are examined.

It is now almost seventy years since Max Weber visited the United States and was inspired to write his delightful and significant essay entitled "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism." (Weber, 1946). I would like to comment on what Weber had to say in that essay concerning American Protestantism, and I would also like to assess Weber's predictions about the future of American Protestantism in the light of certain events since 1904, events that Weber himself might think important to reflect upon were he to come to life again and pay a second visit to this country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Max Weber's work is seldom beyond criticism, and a good deal of it is controversial. Some regard Weber's main contribution on Economy and Society as too aridly typological, even as they perhaps also concede its very considerable stature. There are those who do Weber less than justice because they are offended by a nationalism that repels them even after all qualifications, such as those suggested by Weber's political prudence and sagacity and impatience with political quackery, have been made. But Weber clearly suffers in part from the very massiveness of his achievement. No one could write so much and on so great a variety of matters as he did without making mistakes. And his nationalism, as has just been suggested in effect, did not inhibit great penetration and understanding of many political and social phenomena. In any ease, given Weber's limitations, given a variety of reservations about his performance, that performance in the end remains so outstanding that for many sociologists Weber is unequivocally the intellectual hero of their field up to the present time—the charismatic figure from the past of sociology. It is no doubt a pious thing to look back on him once again after fifty years, but the following observations are not motivated by piety, commendable as it might be if they were. They are rather motivated by a desire to take a somewhat unconventional look at the structure of Weber's sociological thought and to make some suggestions about wisdom and science in sociology today to which Weber's thought appears to give reinforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists often single out the family in our society as a prototype of the primary group. Many emphasize that the family best embodies the denotative properties of smallness, face-to-faceness, duration over time, non-specialized function, and intimacy stressed by Cooley in introducing the concept. The implicit notion is widely held that ties among kin are mutually binding, intimate, and more or less equal, even though casual inspection dictates that relations between most members of the family are not and cannot be equivalent. Husband and wife, for example, engage and share in intimacies that they are not permitted or are unlikely to share with other family members. The range and degree of intimacy and the quality of the ties that each spouse exhibits in his role as parent or that siblings show in relation to each other or to their parents, in fact, underscores that relations, even within the nuclear group, are highly varied. To complicate matters, the quality of ties and relations within the family must inevitably change over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science seems to be, among other things, part of man's quest for legitimate extrapolations beyond immediate sense impressions. Though some sociologists seem to think that "going beyond one's data" constitutes a scholarly sort of sin, the whole purpose of a sampling apparatus is precisely to enable a person to make claims regarding parameters from statistical knowledge. Further, the development of scientific theory appears to be of the same order. Science is not a mere cataloging of either true or verifiable statements. Scientific statements cohere in an organized body of interconnected propositions. The basic scientific act is to make a judgment regarding the acceptability of these statements (Kaufman, 1944; esp 39ff). Since a variety of different kinds of statements can be identified, the grounds for acceptance vary according to their nature (Francis, 1969). Further, criteria such as "elegance" and "pragmatic workability," though creating a certain degree of tension at times, rest on different grounds than, say, establishing a probability level for Type I statistical error. In any event, the strain is toward consistency such that neither the statement itself nor the grounds for accepting it are contradicted elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists are writing an increasing amount about various parts of higher education. Fundamentally and briefly, these can generally be described as topical, normative, discursive and frequently interesting. The total impact of this growing list must vary with the background of the reader. While each is informative and most contain shrewd insights, the list indicates only a personal and not a theoretical concern with higher education. We have finally begun the scrutiny of the complex organization where most of us are domiciled. That is to say, the publications seem to warrant the inference that more and more sociologists are concerned about higher education, but scarcely any have been cast in a framework commensurate with our state of knowledge and methodological sophistication. When the Academic Man (Wilson, 1942) first appeared, Wilson's style of research was appropriate to the task. It was scholarly, normative in places, insightful and carried the weight of the personal observer. At that time, the theories of organization which could be appropriate to research today were not available. Moreover, in the interim, the dash between theory and research—neither well defined—subsided, and general sophistication in both methods and techniques developed. Some volumes appeared between Wilson and the current crop. Typical of these was The Academic Market Place ( Caplow and McGee, 1958). While a certain effort at systematic research was revealed, most empirical observations seemed somewhat independent of the statistical or sampling design. Certainly more credance could be given to the typologies developed, however related they were to the role of the observant participant. Sociological theories were not particularly advanced during this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David J. Gray, in a recent issue of this journal (1968), expresses a number of value judgments about the current practice of sociology and its dominant ideology. I wish to expand some of Ms points and to issue a cautionary note. Mr. Gray urges sociologists to follow the example of Weber and Durkheim in addressing themselves to problems which are important and not refusing to make judgments about what needs to be done (1968:176-178). Sociologists who attempt to be value free, he maintains, do violence to their vocation in two ways: First, they bind themselves over to the values of others. At the least, they sell their service to those with the most power and money as distinguished from those with the greatest need. Mr. Gray mentions the flowering of lucrative specialties such as industrial and medical sociology and the withering of sociological theory, history of social thought, and the sociology of religion (1968:179). Mr. Gray raises the spectre that this relatively venal prostitution may so debase the profession that "value free" sociologists will come to serve any master no matter how vile, just as physical scientists and engineers served the Nazis (1968:179). In the second place, scientists who abstain from value judgments are prone to glorify method at the expense of substance (1968:182-183). Quantitative and experimental methods are best wherever they can be applied, but they cannot be applied to all the most important questions. To insist that only those inquiries are scientific which use ideal methods condemns sociology to triviality. Mr. Gray suggests that many sociologists, especially those who look upon their work as an occupation rather than a calling, deliberately choose minuscule problems because they are easy to solve by "scientific" methods ( 1968:184). They provide a quick road to advancement in the institutional hierarchy. The wages of sin are death—in this case, the death of a discipline, a death by irrelevance and triviality—the assassins of sociology its very body guards, the advocates of value-free detachment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the impetus and design of research inevitably derive from a set of assumptions, whether explicit or not, the nature of fact—the categories in which something is captured out of the Deal world"—is dependent upon these assumptions. It is reason enough to suggest that in efforts to advance sociological knowledge at least as much care should be given to explicating the linkages of ideas as to empirical operations. The positivist traditions of sociology have, however, often meant that high-level, "general" or even "middle range" theorizing has been more of an avocation than a vocation for most sociologists, and that much more rigor, energy, and professional skill have in recent decades gone into the empirical aspect of research than into the theoretical. Though the bearings of theory and research upon each other have been usefully discussed and have, in fact, become a kind of credo, almost any published discussion lacking in figures and tables and involving some commentary beyond sheer description has been capable of definition as "theory." Where so little has been expected, relatively little by way of intellectual and other resources has been invested. Consequently, the returns have been small. Even when serious theoretical work has been attempted, it has often received something less than systematic consideration. Such work—some examples undoubtedly more scholarly and sophisticated than others—has been given more or less favorable receptions largely in accord with semantic preferences, generally unspecific "orientations," and degrees of sympathy for speculation as, hopefully and somehow, relevant to real research. Other than to note particular historical events and to cite research findings considered pertinent to some statement or other contained in a discussion, the supporters, sympathizers, and opponents of theorizing have rarely spelled out the criteria by which judgment was delivered. In short, the problems of theory construction have been neglected in favor of the more obviously empirical problems of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the kinds of data to which the term reference group has been applied in the sociological literature, we have traced the diverse criteria implied. We have bypassed an inventory of the definitions made in the name of the term to consider the empirical evidence used to indicate its existence. The initial application by Hyman was to data about a self evaluation due to a person's comparison of his characteristic to others of like or unlike category. The explicit hypothesis in this use was that a characteristic seemingly fixed at the time (e.g., income or personal appearance) might have subjective meanings differing according to the category of others used for self-evaluation. Other researchers have applied the term to data about attitudes or overt behavior of various kinds behind which may be interpreted to lie a comparison of self. Nevertheless, most studies have not established that the referent (whether a social category, group, or value) existed in the minds of the persons studied but have assumed it is measured by the categories associated with statistical differences in their attitudes, evaluations, or overt behavior. Consequently, initially a term to label data obtained by direct questions about the psychological mechanism of self-evaluation of the persons studied, reference group has had its meaning extended to cover interpretations of why persons differed in their attitudes, evaluations, overt behavior. In short, from a term to cover data about how the observed themselves defined the situation, it has become an interpretative term stating how an observer, the sociologist, believed the situation was defined by the observed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Academic sociologists and those trained in sociology have a long university tradition, and even though we are sociologists and professors, we often fail fully to appreciate this tradition in our daffy existence of teaching, research, and other roles. As professors we sometimes forget that we have a long and eminent tradition. We have positions of high status, a status reflected in an often-quoted Swedish statement that "the professor walks second only to the king, who walks next to God." Universities extend as far back as the ninth century, but they were largely specialized institutions dealing with medicine, law, and theology. As groups of schools, faculties, and colleges, universities date primarily from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, following the accumulation of knowledge largely derived through the rediscovery of Aristotle, Arabian commentaries, and the study of the broader liberal arts. Many universities from which we trace our traditions have existed for as long as nine hundred years: Bologna (1088), the universities of Paris, Oxford, and Cambridge from the twelfth century; Prague (1348); Vienna (1365); Uppsala (1477); Mexico and San Marcos de Lima (1551); and Harvard (1636). Universities today, as compared with the past, have developed well-established innovations, such as the preparation of theses in place of disputations, seminars, electives, laboratories, and separate graduate schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tug concert of class consciousness seems to mean many things to sociologists, perhaps because they have not always agreed on the meaning of one of its elements-class. In contemporary writing the term has been used in five different ways. These, in order of comprehensiveness, are: first, the manifestation of an awareness that a system of stratification exists in society; second, the willingness of a person to designate where he feels he belongs in this system; third, the manifestation of interests in common with others who feel they belong in the same aggregate; fourth, the possession of presumedly accurate knowledge of the interests of the class to which one feels he belongs, and as a consequence, a manifestation of interests similar to these; and fifth, a feeling of solidarity with those who are identified as belonging to one's self-assigned class, and a feeling of estrangement from those not identified as belonging to one's self assigned class. The first three usages are indicative more of class identification than of class consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An area of research in which sociologists and historians would seem to share a rather obvious concern is that of social change. In his presidential address before the joint meeting of the Canadian Historical and Canadian Political Science Association, S. D. Clark emphasized this. "We cannot become students of change," he said, "without becoming historians. It is only by looking at what has happened to societies of the past, and over time, that the sociologist can derive the data on which to build his principles of social change." That is to say that the study of social change requires recognition of processes in time and must deal, insofar as time past is involved, with evidence that is historical. The student of social change must become a historian and the historian, insofar as he is interested in understanding and interpreting general processes, must become a social scientist. When, however, one searches the literature for particular studies of historical social change, one's findings are meager indeed, especially if one's standards, theoretically and methodologically, are reflective of those of contemporary social science, and one's historiographical standards, of contemporary history. If, in addition, one is searching for social change studies of a particular national history, then the material is even more limited. For this reason I have expanded this review, which was originally concerned with the American nineteenth century only, to include two studies of English history, because these two studies include important theoretical and methodological contributions to the study of history and social change in America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on value assumptions in family research. Family researchers share the assumptions of the scientific profession. With science in general, the family researcher is committed to the assumption that the world a real, natural world exists; that one can know the world through senses; that to know is better than not to know, hence activity in pursuit of knowledge is good. Furthermore, family researchers are concerned that change should emerge from facts, knowledge, and wisdom, not from fear, hysteria or loss of rational behavior. In other words, it is assumed that the world exists, and that man as a part of that world exists, that the world can be known to man, that to know is better than not to know and to know accurately. But this is not the limit of the American family researcher's intellectual rapprochement with the intelligent and informed public. It goes beyond the sharing of assumptions underlying science. To take a closer look at the assumptions of science and social philosophy as they find expression in the work of American family researchers, especially family sociologists, it is found that students have focused their attention on two criteria of success or goals for marriage.