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This article discusses the educational sociology of sociologist Émile Durkheim. It is the purpose of this paper to outline some ideas of Durkheim on education and to show how they are closely linked with his sociological thought. It can be no more than an introduction to a subject upon which the writer is preparing a more substantial work. None of the educational writings of Durkheim has yet been published in England. In fact most of them were only published posthumously in France. Some notes on the most important of them are given at the end of this paper. The majority of them were prepared in the form of lectures and are listed in order of the dates on which the course was first given and not according to the date of publication which is separately recorded. There are many lectures still existing in manuscript form. It was thought best to give quotations in the following pages in English and the translations are those of the writer except where otherwise noted as coming from existing translations. Moreover, this paper will conclude with a brief outline of four major functions of educational sociology which are based on practical principles in line with Durkheim's methodology. These functions are the determination of the present social facts of education and their sociological function, determination of the relation of education to social and cultural change, comparative sociology of education and the study of the school itself as a social group and in relation to other social groups.

The article focuses on the Emile Durkheim, a theorist, views on kinship and relationship systems. It is the contention of this paper that some of what he wrote has been undeservedly neglected. Anthropologists have comparatively recently been given credit for ideas which he had already set out in columns of various sociological journals in France. The concept of consanguinity is a good example. Durkheim laid considerable stress on a point which is fundamental to the study of relationship systems, viz. that relationship systems are not the same thing as kinship systems, or even as systems of consanguinity and affinity. Admittedly he was by no means the first person to have perceived the distinction between the biological facts of consanguinity and the sociological facts of relationship. He noted that in certain societies a man's kinsmen were not necessarily consanguineally related to him and that clanship might similarly have little to do with actual consanguinity. Though, once Durkheim had clarified the concept of matriliny, he resorted to it as a sort of universal solution to all puzzles in the study of relationship systems. His explanations

This paper reports findings of a study dealing with some factors associated with religious and political affiliation in a college population. Specifically, relationships between religious affiliation, belief and participation, political orientation and socio-economic status are examined. The influence of religion on secular activity has long been of interest to sociologists. The classical works of sociologist Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Among college populations, the study provides the most comprehensive body of empirical data on students' religious values and their correlates. The article reports that religious belief is widespread but that commitment is rare. Substantial differences are found among major religious groups. Catholic students score highest on a scale of religiousness and Jewish students score lowest with Protestants falling in between. This article also deals with the relationship between parents' religious orientation and the students' religious beliefs.

Contemporary definitions of anomie and alienation have confused, obscured, and changed the classical meanings of these concepts. Alienation for Karl Marx and anomie for Emile Durkheim were metaphors for a radical attack on the dominant institutions and values of industrial society. They attacked similar behavior, but from opposing perspectives. Marx assumed an immanent conception of the relationship between man and society and the value of freedom from constraint; Durkheim, a transcendental conception and the value of moral constraint. Marx was interested in problems of power and change, Durkheim in problems of the maintenance of order. Paradoxically, contemporary definitions accept what was most problematic for these classical theorists–the dominant institutions of society. The paper author speculates if contemporary definitions of alienation and anomie actually value-free, or are sociologists witnessing a transformation from radical to conformist definitions and values under the guise of value-free sociology.

The theoretical orientation to the problem of local organizations, while not consciously and knowingly borrowed from sociologist Emile Durkheim and his latter-day apostles, coincides with his ideas regarding the relative roles of the individual, the state, and intermediate associations. His conception of the relationships may be summarized as follows: prior to the creation of the state, man is submerged in tribe, clan and association. The state, which war and commerce help to create, creates the idea of the individual citizen, and protects this individuality by the creation and protection of private rights. By this means, it can hold its constituent societies in check and prevent their complete and repressive dominance over the individual. However, there is danger in the tendency for the state to become increasingly dominant and in the tendency of atrophy of social groups. In this article, the author has particularly emphasized linkages and supports for initiating and establishing people's organizations with special reference to small farmers, and linkages to facilitate the generation and dissemination of useful information on agricultural improvements, management and the training of personnel.

The article informs that within recent times the contributions of sociologist Emile Durkheim to an understanding of social structure have become increasingly apparent. Yet his service to a clearer understanding of the origin of current economic onceptualizations remains to be appreciated. Outside of his book "Division of Labor," little attention has been paid by the student of economic thought to the contribution of Durkheim to an understanding of social phenomena. The student of standard economic theory has not been one to wander far a field into what to him appear to be the byways of social inquiry. As a result economic inquiry in its underlying social preconceptions remains essentially where Adam Smith delivered it. One of Durkhbim's major contributions was his demonstration that the idea of class arises from society itself. Members of societies are arranged and graded on a basis peculiar to that particular society. Durklieim also noted that these societies project this social stratification into a classification of the universe. All things of experience are so classified. Items of the universe take on the same complexion of grades and ratings that are peculiar to the social organization. According to Durklieim there is nothing in the universe itself to suggest such a system of classification.

The moral basis of advanced societies is the group basis of advanced societies. That was Durkheim's essential Insight and enduring contribution to the sociology of the moral order. He asked, in effect: (1) What is the basis of association or group formation which engenders moral rules? (2) What units of societal organization comprise "moral communities" on this basis? and (3) What ethos or ethical system formulates and regulates these relationships? The classic replies given in On the Division of Labor in Society and subsequent works-the division of labor, occupational associations, and professional ethics-are analyzed for conceptual adequacy and tested for empirical relevance. Although the diagnosis and prescription Durkheim offered are found to be deficient in crucial respects, nevertheless they provide strategic points of departure in the quest for values and the quest for community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologist Emile Durkheim emphasizes on the social problems created by the fact of professional, or occupational, differentiation and by the fact that there are different professional ethics. His essential concern is the integration of society, of the professions into society. This article is not concerned with special ethical problems of "professions." Durkheim uses the term in a sense much larger than what is customary in ordinary English usage; and thus the term covers all occupations in modern differentiated society. It appears, in fact, that his central concern is those occupations which are specifically not professional in the common English sense of the word, viz., business and industry; and even then one reads relatively little about the special ethical problems of these groups as such for example, about commercial ethics. The main content of the article is a plea for the organization of tile different occupational groups into corporations. That Durkheim's approach entails some views regarding the ethics of occupations is of course clear; but these views are of a rather general character, and people are far away indeed from a differential treatment of the different occupations, let alone of tile professions in the narrow sense of the word.

This article focuses on the magical world-view of human institutions as a classical issue in social sciences. According to the author, sustaining and serving to complicate resolution of this issue has been the negative value given to it. Its usual referents have been practices, rituals or notions, similar to those of the religions of the West, but judged inferior to them. Thus, magic has been defined negatively, by its inadequacy, rather than positively in terms of its role in human existence. In this regard, a typical instance is provided by the book "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life," in which, having formulated a suggestive definition of religion, as serving to unite the participants into a single and moral community, Emile Durkheim could say of magic only that it was individualistic and opposed to religion. Quite often, magic and science are said to be both practical in intent, although this exhibits a lamentable ignorance of the history and sociology of science. In contrast with this "science," magic is said to be supernaturalistic in mechanism and, in contrast to religion, is said to be manipulative, rather than supplicative and worshipful.

This article comments on some sociological concerns about radical sociology as proposed by sociologist Albert Szymanski. The focus of concern with Szymanski's proposals fell upon their propensity for what following sociologist Emile Durkheim, called idol worship, the tendency of undisciplined research to discover little aside from preconceptions associated with its substantive values. Idol-worship seems to be exemplified by Szymanski's use of sociology of knowledge. It conveniently offers him means of avoiding methodological problems and setting aside all matters of objectivity while also impugning the quality and integrity of broad ranges of natural and social science. Aside from some general remarks applying perhaps to all science, Szymanski analyzes specifically the cases of the physical sciences, the biological sciences, economics, conditioning psychology, and Parsonian sociology. For each discipline, he finds that there has been little, if anything, other than sophisticated social partisanship and pursuit of self-interest through the provision of general legitimation or narrowly practical knowledge.

This article focuses on the concept of mental health and religious socialization given by sociologist Emile Durkheim. It seeks an alternative explanation, one which is couched at the socio-psychological level. Its method of approach is an analysis of religious socialization. In the analysis which blows, stress is placed upon differences in the content and function of the mythological reference group structure, i.e., the inventory of both divine and demonic personalities, with whom the religious confessant develops relationships. Such mythological reference groups may be thought of as independent of, but supplemental to, the real worldly reference groups to which the individual relates. The analysis proceeds from a conception of the ideal-typical rather than the modal form of the conscience manifest in New World Catholics and Protestants, specifically those raised in the Calvinistic tradition prevalent throughout English-speaking North America. The focus of this article, moreover, is with the type of conscience produced in members of the two respective religious communities during the historical period beginning in the Renaissance-Reformation.

This article discusses the problem of social control among sociologists which raises fundamental questions about the nature and organization of human societies. One important tradition of sociological thought, influenced by sociologist E. Durkheim has exa

The article focuses on the relationship between epistemology and sociology, for it is here that the general relationship between philosophy and science appears most obvious and direct. Although there is no necessary or logical connection between an epistemological doctrine and a sociological orientation, sociologists often use epistemology to support their sociological orientation. Using works of sociologists Emile Durkheim, William James, Charles H. Cooley and W.I. Thomas, this article will show how these men employed an epistemology to justify their conceptions of sociology. The author finds that understanding past theories and orientations can be made easier by examining philosophical issues. Being aware of philosophical assumptions should place endeavours in a wider context, perhaps alerting to unthought of implications and thereby helping to understand where the society have been, what the society is doing and where the society is going. Philosophical awareness may help us to see that existing controversies over the nature, scope and subject matter of sociology are fundamentally philosophical controversies that cannot be settled on empirical grounds.

The article presents information about the relation between sociologist E. Durkheim's concepts of anomie and egoism. While the obscurity of Durkheim's distinction has frequently been commented upon, it is implicitly assumed to be irrelevant for contemporary theorization in social pathology. Against this view, two theses will be advanced. Firstly, if Durkheim had pursued and attempted to clarify his distinction between the two concepts, he would have been forced to re-examine the presuppositions upon which his sociology had been based. Secondly, despite difficulties in Durkheim's theory in which concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part, a distinction between them still has to be drawn which in fact retains some elements of their original meaning. All contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the distinction between anomie and egoism with the result that social conditions, psychological states and processes which are entirely different from one another have been assimilated.

The article focuses on legal norms and social order with reference to sociologists Leon Petrazcycki, Vilfredo Pareto and Émile Durkheim. Petrazcycki's contribution to the philosophy of law has hardly permeated this field to which not only its subject matter, but also its methodology are relevant. His primary interest in the source of legal norms, reinforced by his practical concern for the problems of legal reform, resulted in an appraisal of the connections between law and social order. Prolonged and widespread political unrest increased the premium placed upon social stability, while emphasizing the latent contradiction between freedom and order. The simultaneous acceleration of economic development led to an awareness of the advantages inherent in industrialization and a desire for their planned extension. Unlike the Utilitarians, Petrazcycki did not represent law as the arbitrator of conflict. A similar rejection of the emphasis on external constraint distinguished both Durkheim and Pareto.

This article explores the problem involved in categorizing acts and beliefs as religious, or ritual, or magico-religious, with the purpose not only of clearing the way for subsequent treatment of the author's own empirical data concerning the LoDagaa of Northern Ghana, but also of clarifying certain aspects of the analysis of social systems in general. The article intends to examine the ranges of meaning assigned to certain basic concepts in the sociology of religion with a view to clarifying their use as analytical tools. The general conclusion is that it is impossible to escape from the fact that the category of magico-religious acts and beliefs can be defined only by the observer and that attempts to see either this or the sacred-profane dichotomy as a universal part of the actors perception of his situation are misleading. Any effectiveness which these terms may have in comparative studies depends upon a realization of their limitations and involves a return to the usages of earlier pre-Durkheimian writers in this field, anyhow as a starting point for further exploration.

This article presents the author's views on social researcher Theodore Steeman's work "Durkheim's Professional Ethics." According to the author Steeman devotes a great deal of his work in explaining what seems to be a gross ambiguity in sociologist Emile Durkheim's prognosis for modernizing society. This ambiguity, or contradiction, can be analysed when on the one hand, Durkheirn points to the rapidly increasing functional division of labor and a concomitant replacement of "mechanical solidarity" by "organic solidarity." Mechanical solidarity is generated by common, shared experience, organic solidarity by mutual interdependence. On the other hand, Durkheim points to the singular importance of "professional ethics" in modern, highly differentiated society. However, professional ethics have their binding force insofar as those in the same industry share in common interests, skills and experiences. Thus, mechanical solidarity characterizes that institution which Durkheim asserted was the uniquely appropriate source of integration in modern, differentiated and thus, presumably, organically solidary society.