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This paper describes a dynamic programming model that has been developed to determine an optimal expansion plan for the generating capacity of an electric power system. The optimization model determines the least-cost mix of capacity between hydro, nuclear, thermal and peaking turbine plants, the size of the plants to add to the system, and the timing of these additions. We show how the computational requirements of this four-state-variable, four-decision-variable problem can be substantially reduced, resulting in a computationally feasible model. The techniques developed are applicable to a large class of capital budgeting problems under uncertainty. Reference is also made to the actual application of the model and an example is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to a recent estimate, 20 per cent of the electric power producing facilities of the U.S. is now owned and operated by the federal and local governments. Heading the list of these public projects in point of national importance as well as in point of size are the Tennessee Valley Authority's power system and the Columbia River power system. Lumping together all power plants under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior, one learns that the department marketed during the past fiscal year 18 billion kilowatt hours of power, or nearly 9 per cent of the national output. Needless to say, when public enterprise reaches the scale thus already attained in the field of electric power, its policies of marketing and of rate making become a subject of high economic import. The subject of this paper concerns the rate-making policies of the most dynamic of these publicly-operated systems; namely, the federal projects operated as parts of multiple-purpose river developments.

More than a decade ago Leland Olds pinpointed the problem of private power companies in the cleverly phrased statement, "Rates are high because costs are high because consumption is low because rates are high." Presumably he meant that rates and costs of private power are high relative to those for public power, leading to lower consumption per potential consuming unit in areas serviced by private power. It is the purpose of this paper to elaborate on those aspects of cost and demand which support and enlarge the argument while leading to the same general conclusion. Private power companies have also been disadvantaged relative to public power in obtaining investment funds. First, they have needed to raise equity capital, which requires a greater return than does debt. Public power had no such problem. Government-financed river basin projects had many objectives only one of which was generation of electric power, and general taxpayers bore a large share of construction costs on that account.

The electric utility industry has experienced rapid growth in the United States since electricity was first introduced as an energy source. The net production of electricity increased at an average rate of 7-2 per cent per year over the period from 1912 to 1964 while over the same period, real GNP increased at roughly 31 per cent per year. The demand by all users of electricity has continued to grow over the last several years and has placed the electric utility industry in a precarious position. Utilities are experiencing increasing pressure on their generating and transmission facilities. Voltage curtailments and reductions attest to the difficulty in meeting current demand levels. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, St. Louis, and New York are among the important areas of the country that have experienced blackouts or power rationing, especially during the summer months as the result of widespread use of air conditioners. Based on estimates of future electricity requirements, the problem may become more serious. In 1968 the total generation of electricity was slightly over 1200 billion kilowatt-hours, while estimates by the Edison Electric Institute (1968) indicate that the generation of electricity will range from 6 to 10 trillion kilowatt-hours in 30 years.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the factors determining the demand for electricity by time of day and extend the level of disaggregation used in prior studies. The emphasis is placed on estimating the demand for electricity over the 24 hour load curve and, in particular, to ascertain the sensitivity of demand to price. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion on the effectiveness of regulation of state commission of power plants. With the simplification of the financial structures there is some reason to hope that attention will be focused on taking maximum advantage of advances in technology and those measures of integration which will result in lower cost. Certain private power interests have transferred all the time and energy formerly expended on financial manipulation to fighting for higher rates and lobbying in the United States. The author refers to practical experience, it is easier from the legal viewpoint to hang onto an excessive rate than to get a legitimate rate increase where a commission is very small. Utilities must be convinced of flexibility upwards in rates before they undertake flexibility downwards. Iowa State's electric rates are the highest of the group and Wisconsin's the lowest. The Wisconsin Commission is near the top in vigor and ability. The condition of plant and its maintenance are seldom given extensive consideration in rate proceedings.

The article focuses on wartime expansion in industrial capacities in the U.S. The industrial expansion brought about by the present war production effort has involved the greatest increases in manufacturing plant and equipment ever undertaken in the country. As a result, the industrial growth that might normally have occupied a decade is being compressed into a period of three years from the latter part of 1940 to the end of 1943. The cost of war plant expansion during this period will be roughly half the investment made in manufacturing facilities during the twenties and thirties. Through November 30, 1942, the cost of approved projects for war industrial facilities amounted to 16.9 billion dollars. This includes both public and private investments in manufacturing plant and equipment, but excludes investments in transportation, power plants and other utilities, which, as of the same date, amounted to about 1.5 billions. Unless the future developments in the war necessitate a shift in the production plans, it appears unlikely that there will be any large additional expansion in this program.

This article investigates some economic implications associated with atomic energy. Aside from atomic energy itself, there result from a fission process fissionable material capable of sustaining a chain reaction, radiations and radioactive materials. The primary interest attaches to the utilization of the energy given off in the fission process. Thus far it has not been found feasible to use this energy in any way other than in the form of heat. Technical considerations restrict the manner in which atomic power can be utilized. The necessity of having a pile as large as the critical size, or larger, in order to sustain a chain reaction, the requirements of the cooling mechanism, and most important of all the necessity of shielding against lethal radiations, make imperative an atomic power plant of large and bulky structure. Use of light portable units, in automobiles, for example, is thus precluded. It is conceivable that rockets and passengerless aircraft might be propelled by atomic energy. Political and security solutions of the atomic energy problem may well run counter to economic ones. If so, the former in all probability will override the latter.

In order that the coal resources of Great Britain may be utilised with the greatest advantage to the community, extensive changes in the technical methods of mining coal and of using it for the production of heat and power will be necessary. The direct burning of raw coal, now by far the most general means of obtaining heat or power from it, is to be condemned on many grounds. It is wasteful, since the by-products, which are so important to agriculture and to the chemical industries, are entirely lost when the coal is burned in furnaces or grates, whilst smoke is usually, and often unavoidably, produced. Carbonisation of coal at a low temperature has been extensively preached, and appears for the moment to have captured the fancy of the press and of a large part of the public, but it is not, in the opinion of most experts, practicable as a solution of the whole fuel problem. Experts have calculated that central coking plants at the collieries, free to dispose of their surplus gas and electric power, would be profitable, whilst they would relieve the railways of one of their heaviest burdens, and would facilitate the transition to healthier conditions, both of industry and of housing, in the manufacturing areas, where the evils of the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are still so prominent.

The results of this study indicate that a significant part of the variation in changes in performance not explained by the other variables in the model is explained by changes in productivity for the three firms studied. To the extent that the particular specification of variables is successful, this relationship indicates that the expected relationship between technical change and performance can be discerned empirically. Also, it appears that on the average the expected positive effects on earnings due to management decisions to make technical changes are being realized. While this favorable result is encouraging, it does not mean that this result can be extended to other firms even if they are drawn from the same industry. Several additional favorable replications of the experiment in the electric power industry chosen to include firms that used hydro-generated power, that are from other geographical regions, and that are of different sizes than the firms included in this study would be required to make generalized statements about the industry as a whole. An extension of this study that would make its results potentially useful for evaluating technical change decisions would be to develop a means of estimating the relationship between these decisions and measured technical change. This extension may be relatively difficult because of the likelihood of considerable time lags between the decisions and their physical outcome. If successful, a manager might then be able to evaluate on average both the effectiveness with which the technical change decisions are carried-out and the effect of that outcome on reported earnings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on experience with a number of operating nuclear power plants the author discusses fundamental aspects of the surveillance of nuclear plant activities, among them objectives and techniques, relationships of safeguard activities to public health and regulatory agencies, and discharge of radioactive effluents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the use of vicarious visits to industrial plants and laboratories as teaching technique by science teachers. According to the article, by visiting a power generating plant, students will know how water power is converted into electricity. It suggests borrowing a film from the U.S. Bureau of Mines which shows the energy of the falling water of Niagara is changed into electrical energy. Several purposes of the vicarious visits include clarifying the textual or verbal description and stimulating interest in a process.