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This article investigate the comparative history of political ideologies by content analysis of twentieth century communications. It sketches some central aspects of the research problem confronted, some techniques worked out, and some results obtained. It also focuses, under what circumstances and to what extent are changes in the locus of political power accompanied by changes in the symbolic vocabulary of ruling groups. By applying statistical techniques to the flow of symbols recorded in the "prestige papers" of France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States over the past half century, the authors found that conditions of war and totalitarianism tend to restrict the range of political symbolism, and that the time factor is less related to variety in symbols than is the influence of events. Three other researches with this purpose, but independently executed, have been completed or are nearing completion. Full reports on each of these studies will be published in the "Symbol Series" of the Hoover Institute in Alabama.

Cybernation is defined as the combination of the computer and the automated self-regulating machine. Enthusiasm for cybernation is likewise giving rise to myths, which may harden unless they are given critical attention. The new myths are somewhat reinforced by technocratic thinking which is often ill informed along economic and sociological lines. As myths, some of the newer convictions, which are developing, are also an outcropping of what has come to be called the Triple Revolution. In evaluating the assumptions of cybernation here the author is not declaring either that they are in error or that they are beyond the bounds of possibility. What the author wishes to maintain in this paper is that if these assumptions remain untempered by institutional realities and by some new and necessary conceptual considerations of an economic nature, they will not prove very serviceable for the task of managed social change. Furthermore, if these assumptions remain unguided by an appropriate social philosophy, a cybercultural credo will remain at best programmatic. Unless detailed blueprints for various forms of needed devotees of cybernation can work out social change, the cybercultural revolution will never enter the realm of Realpolitik. The excuse for this paper, then, will be the effort to examine critically the excesses of enthusiasm, which characterize those who are now marching under the banner of cybernation, and to suggest some critical remedies, which are in order.

In the past several years, many psychiatric establishments have come to express an ideology often referred to as the "therapeutic milieu." While the distinctions between such a credo and an ethic of "custody" are well understood, the differences between the two types of arrangements in terms of organizational structure are less clear. In general, however, the former tends to take the shape of a bureaucracy, while the latter more closely approximates a diffuse and flattened authority system. Such a trend appears to be related to changing relationships between hospitals and the larger community as well as to increased autonomy on the part of the clients such institutions serve. Within the debureaucratized milieu, however, important processes of change seem to take place which importantly affect the content and functions of communication channels, the processes of decision making with respect both to clinical and administrative matters, the attitudes that staff have toward themselves and toward patients, the strategies which staff employ to articulate appropriate conduct for the clients, and the meaning of the institution for both patients and staff. This paper attempts to describe the historical forces shaping recent innovations in hospital administration, to set forth the organizational features of the "therapeutic milieu," and to trace the interpersonal consequences of the debureaucratized establishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a tendency among economists and others who have concerned themselves with writing about labor movements to establish the ideological factor as the starting point from which their generalizations about labor organizations have proceeded. The purpose of this paper is to develop in broad terms the thought that ideological labels do not fairly epitomize trade union activity although they may have some relevance to what may be called the welfare aspects of union functioning. A corollary purpose of the paper is to outline those elements of trade union behavior that are considered to be underlying in any general understanding. If this presentation constitutes a noticeable departure from prevailing ideas about unions it is in the approach to this problem rather than in the development of any startlingly new facts. In the initial organizing stages, the ideologies of union leaders and union organizers will no doubt influence, though not necessarily determine, union structure. The influence of ideology on structure is more marked when the whole issue of structure appears to be in dispute in the labor movement and when there are strategic considerations of group alignments underlying the issue of structure.

The central concern of this paper is to present a critical analysis of Professor Seymour Martin Lipset's contributions to political sociology, with special reference to his theory of working class authoritarianism. The general thesis is that Lipset's more recent orientations reflect a conservative bias which has come to dominate originally radical impulses. This conservative refraction, most apparent in the analysis of working-class political orientations, organizations, and leadership results in a somewhat strained eclecticism. The result is that Lipset forces the research data into confined support for a conservative view of working-class political process. It is suggested that this conservative ideology presently informs Lipset's general outlook toward the field of political sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to outline and examine a few basic functions which ideology performs for the individual and for society. In order to progress in this direction, it might help to agree on some basic conceptual definitions. To begin with, some effort must be made to arrive at a satisfactory definition of ideology, since that term occupies a rather central place in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the history of science it has often happened that a scholar's ideas are denied full recognition because of that scholar's real or assumed connection to some controversial ideology. The position accorded to Vilfredo Pareto is one illustration of such practice in present-day sociology. This scholar is often said to have been a "Newton of the Moral World," or altogether a fascist ideologist. So Faris informs us that "The book [The Mind and Society] formulates the implicit philosophy of Italian Fascism, advocating the right of the strong to take what they want without apology or appeal to moral principles." In tracing the development of social thought, Bogardus devotes an entire chapter to "Pareto and Fascist Thought," and authoritatively argues that "While fascism has some of its roots in Nietzsche's concepts and other roots in Machiavellianism, yet Pareto's ideas come even closer to giving an adequate basis." Zanden, in turn, interprets Pareto's sociology to be "a philosophy of society, a social creed, determined mainly by violent and ever purely personal passions. The logical fulfillment of this political manifesto is fascism." We need not continue further; analogous affirmations are bountiful in the literature. To be sure, not all sociologists accept this view, but to date little or no systematic effort has been made to resolve the controversy, with the result that many students of sociology are unwitting victims of one of the most cruel intellectual hoaxes perpetrated against their discipline and one of their kind. The present paper proposes to offer a clarification with respect to the alleged connection between Pareto's sociology and fascist ideology. Our approach takes us in two major directions: first, an examination of Pareto's Treatise, his chief sociological work, and second, an examination of a series of letters written to his great friend Pantaleoni during the period when fascism was a political reality in Italy. Before proceeding to present our argument, it may be useful to inquire briefly about the meaning of "fascism," as his critics tend to use that word. A rapid glance at the literature reveals that the following are generally believed to be among the chief characteristics of fascist ideology: distrust of reason, a code of behavior based on "race" and violence, belligerent nationalism, government by an elite, and totalitarianism. Characteristically, these then provide the basis for accusing Pareto of "antirationalism," "anti-intellectualism," "contempt for democracy," and approval of the use of force at all costs. The major portion of this paper will be concerned, therefore, with explicating Pareto's position on these four issues. We shall begin by considering Pareto's alleged antirationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concern of the present paper is both methodological and substantive. I will first deal with an approach to studying the relation- ships between the different forms in which a social phenomenon, such as kinship relations or political ideology, are expressed in a given society. Second, I will consider the relationship between political ideology, i.e., a set of stands on political issues, as represented in parties and as represented in the minds of the voters. The reader will soon perceive how these two concerns are related. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The press in communist China is essentially a political instrument with which the regime conducts socialist and communist education among the masses. During the last few years the regime has developed the press into a specialized apparatus with each of its parts designed to reach a specific audience and to serve a definite function. The author says that with a regular readership comprising a majority of the vast population, the press is indeed the most important instrument used by the regime in the conduct of socialist and communist education. The performance of the press, therefore, may well determine the pace and even the success or failure of the communists' adventure in remolding the Chinese people's ideology. To ensure maximum effectiveness and absolute political reliability, the regime has found it necessary to put this giant press apparatus under rigid control and close supervision. Through organizational control the regime determines the structural setup of the press. It is the regime that decides when, where, and how many newspapers should be founded.

The article focuses on crisis situations and ideological revaluations. Students of social change and practitioners attempting to predict human behavior have long been interested in changes in systems of belief. In this article the author describes the kinds of situations which have produced ideological changes as well as the mechanisms involved in these revaluations. It has repeatedly been noted that systems of belief tend to be conservative, in the sense of having their status and identity maintained by means of various psychological mechanisms such as suppression of incompatible cues, weighing of conflicting evidence, or rationalization. The present paper is concerned with circumstances under which these supporting mechanisms become totally or partially ineffective, leaving the individual with an invalidated or inoperative ideology. This type of condition is here referred to as a crisis situation. This paper has attempts to spell out the mechanisms involved in this process and their operation, with the premise that clear thinking about the ideology of individuals is a sine qua non for an understanding of the "why" and "how" of social movements.

Much research has been done in the past fifteen years on the effects of medical education, viewed as professional socialization. Although the significance of social origins, viewed as early sources of socialization, is recognized, there has been little empirical research on the effects of specific background characteristics on specific attitudes, behavior, and careers of professionals. This paper examines the effects of practicing physicians' socioeconomic and religious background on their concern with success values and on their political ideology, including their attitudes toward government participation in medical care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a discussion of the orientation of mental health professionals toward human services in the U.S. The author in this paper has traced the development of ideology among mental health professionals and has concluded that a more inclusive human service belief system is developing among mental health and other community caregivers. Growing out of the community mental health ideology which gained prominence during the nineteen sixties, the human service orientation is seen as potentially playing a major role in rationalizing and justifying an even more expanded pattern for organizing comprehensive integrated programs of service for the nineteen-seventies.

This paper resents a test of several hypotheses regarding the conditions under which publics will identify a collective disturbance as a social protest. Data consist of reactions of white respondents to the Watts Riot. An Index of Protest Definition is resented. Findings indicate that protest definition is most strongly predicted by credibility based upon a pre disposing experience or ideology. Forming subjective common cause with protestors appears to be related to protest definition only among those of higher SES. Protest definition is weakly related to belief in support from the group the protestors claim to represent. Perceiving the disturbance as an appeal for help is positively related to protest definition, white experience of threat does not independently predict protest definition. The relationship between conciliation and protest definition is inconclusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion that ideologies play an important part in contemporary social life seems to have penetrated into the sphere of popular discourse. Today even the newspapers occasionally refer to ideologies when they wish to allude to a complex of ideas, a body of doctrines, the programs of movements, the platforms of parties-in fact, to any creed or theory that takes on an intellectualized and rationalized form. It would be difficult to imagine a single social problem in the analysis and proposed solution of which one does not have to take account of ideological factors. They are an elusive but significant part of the contemporary social landscape. They serve as landmarks which help to find the way in what otherwise would be a chaotic social world, by providing with guidance in defining and evaluating situations. Ideologies enable a person to identify with social movements and groups which offer interpretations and solutions of problems which could only rarely be undertaken by each individual independently. They aid in reducing excessive individuation and indifference in respect to social problems by furnishing us with goals by which more or less articulate groups become integrated. It is the object of this paper to. elaborate the proposition that our contemporary social problems cannot be adequately treated and that the situations to which they refer cannot be understood without taking due account of, the role of their ideological involvements.

Invariably the discussion about the function of religion centers around its integrative potential. However, this paper develops some hypotheses about the various ways Western religious institutions and ideologies compete. The author suggests that this takes place on at least three levels: (a) On the level of institutional loyalty- those religious organization which had to compete have invariably turned out to have a better hold on their membership; (b) On the level of identity formation, Western religious orientations of the sectarian type have generally successfully competed with other foci of identity; (c) On the level of ideology,. Western religious salvation doctrines have had the competitive advantage of a careful balance between emotional anchorage and comprehensive explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a great amount of criticism of structural-functional theory, particularly with respect to its supposed inability to deal with social change. Should structural-functional theory be unable to account for the sources of social change, then it is indeed guilty of an implicit ideological commitment to the status quo. If it can be shown that this theory is capable of dealing with social change, then we can accept Merton's statement: … it is the evaluations which permit the pouring of ideological content into the bottles of functionalism. The bottles themselves are neutral to their contents, and may serve equally well as containers for ideological poison or for ideological nectar. The position taken here is that Merton's statement is correct, provided that an important accommodation is made. This accommodation consists in the explicit incorporation of the dialectical process into structural-functional theory. The dialectical process implies a conflict model of society; it is in the tradition of Marx, who argued that without conflict there can be no progress. It adopts the proposition that conflict is empirically both a normal and an essential element in the social structure. In the simplest terms, the dialectic tells us something about the sources of a particular kind of social change. We are not content, as is Dahrendorf, with advocating a conflict model of society as an alternative to functionalism. The goal is nothing less than to reconcile the two approaches. Dahrendorf has himself recognized that the conflict model cannot provide all the answers since society is "Janusheaded." It is extremely difficult to talk about the prediction of empirical outcomes when one is required to look first at an integration model and then turn to the conflict model. It is necessary to construct one model which will qualify the integration model of society so as to give weight (the exact amount is an empirical question) to the disruptive elements in society. A considerable portion of this paper will be devoted to disengaging the dialectic from its ideological moorings and making it trim for sociological analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tries to give an answer to the question why the Neopositivist "Logic of Science" has not been able to cope with the peculiar interests and problems of the Humanities (i.e. Philologies, History and critical humanistic Social Science), - to speak more precisely: why Neopositivists conceive of "understanding" only as an heuristic auxiliary function in the service of "covering law explanation" and thus cannot account of Hermeneutics, that is the methodology of interpreting the meaning of symbols (texts, works, actions, institutions etc.). The answer given starts from the thesis that Methodological Solipsism-that is the assumption that, in principle, one person alone can practice science by objectifying the whole world without presupposing a complementary hermeneutic knowledge by communication with human Co-subjects - belongs to the secret metaphysical presuppositions of Logical Positivism. As an alternative a transcendental foundation of Hermeneutics (and of Critique of Ideology) is proposed which presupposes the Apriori of Communication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the central concerns of sociology is the study of ideology. In this paper I shall analyze the ways in which this notion is used by contemporary sociologists. This analysis will disclose a dual usage. I shall argue that this usage is restrictive and fails to do justice to all the aspects of ideology. Ideological phenomena include a minimum of three separate and distinct elements or factors. It follows that any two-factor conception of ideology is necessarily inadequate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perhaps the most significant characteristic of "totalitarian" regimes is the elevation to the status of the Germany's political faith. State-monopolized propaganda is substituted for the competition of ideologies to be found in the established pattern of representative government. This transformation requires the "coordination" of all instruments of opinion management, particularly the press, under the guidance of a central agency of the one-party state. The primary aim of government propaganda, however, is not so much to eliminate opportunities for direct and broadly effective criticism as to conquer the minds of the people. "Popular en-lightenment" seeks to produce demonstrations of civic approval, for "one cannot sit on bayonets." The task of staging manifestations of mass identification with the elite in power calls for expert handling of public opinion. The necessity of "dosing" propaganda "prudently" accounts largely for the fact that in Germany the former liberal press has not simply been stamped out by government decree.

The purpose of this paper is to consider how these political and ideological divisions at the national level are reflected among union officials at the local level. Such a question touches on some basic problems in the social psychology of ideologies in a developmental setting: whether individuals from very different socioeconomic backgrounds (e.g., urban vs. rural, upper working vs. lower working class) are differentially susceptible to various ideologies; whether present socioeconomic status and satisfaction with that status are related to accepting different ideologies; whether relations with management and perception of management or views of the purpose and functioning of the union are related to the acceptance of one or another ideology; etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some recent typologies of religious groups have taken as their basis the religious group's response to the world, implying that there exists a pattern of association between this response and the organization, which expresses it. This paper presents some of the findings from research into a group, British Israelism, is neither sect nor cult as these are usually defined; it asserts its own teachings neither as autonomous nor yet as necessary for salvation. It is tolerated, but not respected; anxious for recognition as divine truth and yet aware of its slight prospects of attaining it. To the outsider, British Israelism is a sect but this is a designation, which it has tried to resist; and, sociologically, it is not a sect. This ambiguous position has had important consequences for its organizational structure, its authority structure, its membership, and its ecclesiology. The modern British Israel movement has a short history, having begun in the final quarter of the nineteenth century. It has never had a very large following estimates of a worldwide membership of two million are usually considered high. British Israelites believe that the Anglo-Saxons are the descendants of the lost ten tribes of Israel; from this belief they have drawn a number of conclusions concerning the supremacy of the white race; the Divinely-appointed leadership role of the Anglo-Saxon nations; and the extent to which Protestant beliefs should enter into political and economic thinking.

This paper is intended as a contribution to the understanding of the ideological crisis into which American culture now seems to be moving. The emergence of the radical, death-of-god theology, therefore, is set within a cultural context of ideological crisis: in the absence of universals, of world-views and values-orientations, of sanctions for social arrangements, and of prototypes for individual motivation, the new theology acquires an empirical fit and significance far broader than its sources in academic theology would suggest. A major intervening variable which could offset the movement toward polarization, with all its implicit totalitarianism, is the capacity of the society to institutionalize the moratorium stage in ego-identity formation. Such an institutionalized moratorium is a prerequisite to the capacity of society to generate new myths and symbols, a new value-system which can give adequate support to collective and individual identity. It is clear, therefore, that the sociological model in which religion is conceived as being in creative tension with the secular values of society is inadequate in this new situation.

This paper concerns a study of a ghetto community group that has attempted to form itself on the basis of shared interpretations of their social predicament. The West Side Organization for Full Employment on Chicago, Illinois's near west side is distinct for several reasons. It was the first group, in Chicago at least, to organize explicitly as a brotherhood of unemployed. It has developed a union of welfare recipients wherein Negro men, who are facing in their own lives most of the classic problems of the ghetto male, are representing women recipients and their families in processing grievances with the welfare department. Such a phenomenon might quicken a variety of research interests. According to the author of this article, his concern has been to study that process by which a group of ghetto residents have attempted to formulate the cultural and social means by which poor Negroes can recognize themselves as a communal entity, with common interests, a common field of action, and a common destiny.

The article focuses on emerging nations and the ideologies of American social scientists. Confronting the rapidly expanding literature on political and social change in emerging nations, one finds it difficult not to ask the old question, never satisfactorily resolved, of the value implications of social science. The purpose of the author in this paper is to do just that by inquiring about some of the assumptions of American social scientists who have been studying political and social modernization in the world's new states and older poorer nations. These assumptions, though not usually stated as such are ideological in their implications in the sense that they involve normative views of the social order. Many discussions of the politics of emerging nations contain a redefinition of political democracy so as to include political systems within the term that by customary standards would be regarded as authoritarian regimes. Given the cultural heterogeneity and economic backwardness of the new states, non-democratic political systems are in some sense an inevitable outcome. Another characteristic is the denigration of the motives behind the nationalist or revolutionary movements occurring in the underdeveloped world. To the disadvantage of the emerging nations, invidious comparisons are drawn between their current strivings and the earlier ideologies of the West.

This paper discusses recent speculation concerning the normative bond which ties the lower class to the present structure of British society. It focuses on the assertions by some theorists that the normative opposition which can arise 'spontaneously' within the lower class is inherently limited in scope, and that any future class based movements of a radical kind depend on the action of agencies 'external' to the lower class. Some preliminary results are presented from a recent survey of council tenants in Barking, East London, some of whom were on rent strike. This evidence reveals the existence of attitudes 'deviant' to dominant values concerning the ownership and rights of property. In conclusion, the nature of lower class normative opposition is reassessed and it is suggested that the lower class are not as conceptually restricted as is often suggested, and that future possibilities of radical action do not necessarily depend on the activities of the Labour Party or trade unions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports on a participant observation study carried out at Stateville Penitentiary, a maximum security prison, during the summer of 1972. The social organization of the prison has been a topic of frequent sociological attention. Efforts have been made to explain "inmate culture" and the often referred to "inmate code." Contrary to the traditional structural-functional explanation for inmate organization which focuses upon situational variables, this analysis supports the Irwin-Cressey (1964) position that much of what has been termed inmate culture is actually imported from outside the prison. The most significant reality behind Stateville's walls is the existence of four lower class Chicago street gangs which have brought into the prison their street activities, hierarchies, rivalries, and ideologies. The purpose here is to describe the social organization which has emerged as a result of this phenomenon and to relate this development to the traditional literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a response by the author to comments of Rebecca S. Cohen, Janet Kohrman, Joseph Palombo and Joy Simon on his article "Social Work and Psychoanalytic Theory: A Historical Analysis," published in the January 1971 issue of the journal "Social Work." The author leaves it to his more orthodox psychoanalytically oriented colleagues to interpret for themselves why they react as they do to his article, which asks for redressing the balance between a treatment and a reform perspective. The issues presented by the author are not new, and times are now right for their publication. Many reviewers have additional information and perspectives about psychoanalytic predominance. He welcomes their views, facts, and corrections and suggest they write their articles. The writers attribute puritanism, scientism, and optimism as my personal creed, words that reflect how he believes the historians referred to in his article describe the basic tenets of American ideology. The author concludes by saying that he does not raise his voice against casework or against psychoanalysis.

The core problems of sociological and philosophical theories of knowledge remain insoluble and unrelated as long as both theories start from static models. The problems can be solved, and the respective theories related to each other, without undue difficulties if the acquisition of knowledge is conceptualized as a long-term process which takes place within societies also considered as long-term processes. This approach has the added advantage of being in closer agreement with the evidence. The paper indicates what needs to be unlearned and what to be learned in order to prepare the way for such a unified theoretical framework which can serve as a guide to, and which can be in turn corrected by, empirical sociological studies of all types of knowledge, scientific and practical as well as non-scientific or ideological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the first findings of a survey carried out in Melbourne, Australia. It attempts to test hypotheses based on the embourgeoisement thesis, and its variations, in a social system with a strong equalitarian ideology and compulsory arbitration for all sections of the work force. It assesses the economic differences between white collar and blue collar workers and also the difference between these groups and a middle class group. It also compares the Australian situation with America and Britain. It finds a significant difference between blue collar and white collar income rates, total income medians and career income medians, as against the apparent near parity of the situation in Britain and America. These differences are not mitigated by wives' earnings or income from other sources. There is an almost complete dichotomy between these groups and the middle class group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper begins by examining the typology of educational systems outlined by Earl Hopper m Sociology (vol. 2, no. I, 1968) and argues against the attempt to reduce the comparative study of education to varieties of occupational selection. On the other hand, accepting that a central part of the sociology of education must be with ideology and the generation and transmission of learning, it outlines a framework for examining this in Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses intelligence and student political activism. A positive correlation between intellectual ability and leftist ideology is an empirically well-established generalization. Almost all of the research on this interesting topic has utilized college students. In reviewing the literature on American student political behavior, sociologist Seymour Martin Lip set suggests that this correlation between intelligence and leftist ideology may be spurious. This study compares a sample of student political activists at the University of Minnesota with the general student population of which they are a part The original universe of activists consisted of all elected officers of all the student political organizations on the main campus of the University over a span of ten academic years, 1955-56 through 1963-64. Intelligence is one of a number of important social science concepts that elude precise definition. This paper makes no attempt to resolve the definitional problem but defines intelligence operationally in terms of standard measures of intellectual ability.

The article discusses the formation of concepts. The formation of concepts in science is subject to the same limitations and pitfalls as perception and observation in day-to-day living. The scientist, however, is distinguished from the man in the street by virtue of the additional lengths he will go in order to see more clearly, and so all manner of care is exercised through instrumentation and measurement in order to provide more precise facts. But whereas instrumentation and measurement procedures usually enhance precision, they do not necessarily guarantee accuracy. In his famous paper on the relationship between personality and conservative ideology, researcher H. McClosky partially describes procedures by which his measure of conservatism was developed, and more recently, researcher A.L. Kalleberg has pointed to that study as illustrative of how it is possible to form, through the development of scales, objective concepts of so-called subjective meaning-structures. McClosky's procedure consisted of presenting students with 43 items, culled without their knowledge from conservative literature, and asking them to supply a name or label characterizing all the items.

The relationship between social class, authoritarianism, and foreign policy attitudes has been re-examined in the light of evidence from a national survey and other studies. These data indicate that, contrary to the suggestion of Hamilton's recent paper, lower class people are not consistently more conciliatory on foreign policy issues than are those of higher social class. The attitudes of lower class people appear to be more consistently characterized by a preference for noninvolvement in foreign affairs. Such a preference for isolation from foreigners is congruent with the ideology which has been called authoritarianism. However, the preference for conciliatory over aggressive foreign policy actions which lower class persons sometimes show is not congruent with authoritarianism. This suggests that, although lower class persons may be more authoritarian, their foreign policy attitudes are determined mainly by other factors. The data reviewed suggest also that foreign policy attitudes can be understood best not in terms of a single orientation toward conciliation versus militancy but in terms of several basic orientations. It may prove useful to characterize specific foreign policy positions in terms of their position on the dimensions of (1) involvement-noninvolvement; (2) dominance-submissiveness; and (3) friendliness-hostility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]