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The purpose of this paper is (1) to put the nature of disguised unemployment in the agricultural sector in a proper perspective by stressing the seasonal nature of the surpluses and shortages of agricultural labor supply, and (2) to pursue some policy implications of the seasonality of labor surpluses in underdeveloped agricultures. The writer's argument will rely heavily on the result obtained from the survey of six South Korean villages in 1962. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the growth of exports, capital goods imports and the increasing amount of foreign capital inflow in South Korea. Indication that a positive and significant relationship between private capital inflow and investment obtains while the influence of official foreign capital inflow on investment has been negligible.

The article discusses programming models of national economies planning with facts. The case of Korea is considered in the article. It states that Korean economic planning has been more a process of experimentation than the orderly, repetitive sequence of calculations usually associated with the term planning. This was almost inevitable in view of conditions in the South Korean economy in recent years. The rate of economic expansion has accelerated at a pace impossible to foresee and significant policy reforms have been undertaken in several areas. As a consequence, planners' assessments of constraints to development and to some extent goals of economic policy have changed. To briefly indicate the pace of expansion, the gross national product growth rate has been about 11 percent per year, in real terms, for the past seven years and commodity exports have expanded by 40 percent per year for the past twelve years. The most significant policy reforms were enacted in the four years, from 1964-67. These included an exchange rate devaluation of about 100 percent, a doubling of commercial bank interest rates, a restructuring of the tariff system on the principle of effective protection rates and a revision of the tax structure.

In recent years many people in the U.S. have learned that the task of giving advice to foreign countries is not easy. The principal difficulty is that foreign countries have economic and political systems that are different from that of the U.S. Not knowing the real situation in foreign countries, the U.S. sometimes assumes incorrectly the existence of their own institutions. The article illustrates the difficulty with a few examples based on American experience with the problem of inflation in South Korea from 1945 to 1954. Although many of these examples are unique, they may suggest similar situations in other countries and add to the general understanding of the problem of giving economic advice to other countries. From the beginning of the American occupation in 1945 to the present, the Korean people appear to have anticipated a very rapid rate of inflation. Although it is well known by Western economists that general anticipation of inflation will profoundly change the way in which a country's money system operates, few U.S. economists have had any acquaintance with a monetary system in which rapid inflation was anticipated. The strangeness of such a system has been the principal difficulty confronting U.S. advisors in South Korea.

The article focuses on the debate over the legality of the U.S. intervention in the war between North Korea and South Korea. It particularly looks at the congressional debate over President Harry Truman's authority to commit the American forces to Korea with regard to his power as Commander-in-Chief, bolstered by the resolutions of the United Nations' Security Council. The debate is noted to concede that the President could act to counter dangerous threat to American interest and security.