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This paper is concerned with examining closely Kuhn's notion of paradigm, as expressed in the first edition of his book and in more recent writings. The implications of the paradigm notion for two different forms of falsification are considered, and it is argued that both Popper's and Lakatos' versions of falsification are subject to similar criticisms. Paradigms and falsification are then briefly considered in terms of their relevance for sociology. Finally, it is argued that sociologists must turn their attention to a serious consideration of the importance of language in the practice of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the research paper related to scientific objectivity by philosophers W.B. Weimer and D.S. Palermo. Scholarly debate cannot be conducted in a manner comparable with the antics of nose-thumbing children. The behavioural sciences have not yet attained maturity. Psychology is treated as paradigmatic and behaviourism as generating normal science. Philosopher Thomas Kuhn's theory is not devastated, because it is not at issue her, what is at issue is a judgment about the history and status of psychology, and thus where and how psychology may fit into Kuhn's theory of science. Kuhn would claim to be an expert on the history of psychology. Weimer and Palermo state or imply throughout that critics of Palermo, were necessarily arguing that Kuhn's theory is wrong.

In this article the author focuses on the controversy surrounding sociologist Thomas S. Kuhn's book entitled "The Structure of Scientific Revolution." The author here makes two points that are raised for sociology by Kuhn's argument. The first point will detail the non-radical and the radical responses to his account, both responses being characterized by a belief that Kuhn's argument about natural scientific development somehow legitimates the sort of sociology they are currently practicing. The second point is that it does not follow from this that Kuhn is of no interest to sociologists; on the contrary, he has an extremely interesting although limited sociology of natural scientific knowledge. What are the non-radical and radical sociological reactions that have developed or could develop in response to this thesis? Central to both and to Kuhn's argument is the notion of a paradigm. The none radical sociological reaction is the claim that if sociology is to develop it must transcend the present situation where there are multitudinous pre-pre-paradigms competing with each other, where work is done at all sorts of levels and significance, and where there is excessive methodological neurosis.