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In this article, the author presents his comments to the paper "On the Concept of Influence," by Talcott Pearson. The author confines his remarks to an expansion of what he takes to be the major thesis of this seminal paper. Communications in Western society is a transactional process, a major element in which is a widespread sense of trust. This notion, on the one hand, crystallizes a lot of what one has learned from communications research but have not fully articulated, and it adds, on the other hand, an ironic twist to the pervasive concern with "manipulation" and deception. For the author, the most novel insight offered by Parsons' paper is so simple that, once stated, it sounds trivial: Deception is based on trust. The Parsonian "channel variables" may seem like needless verbal distinctions. But if social scientists had firmly implanted in their skulls the distinction between affecting a man's intent and controlling his situation, much less nonsense would have been written about "brainwashing." The intention of this commentary is to reinforce the reader in the belief that it is worth the effort, and to encourage him to return to it for additional mulling.

The article examines sociologist Talcott Parsons' political sociology by focusing exclusively on "voting." First, "voting" is one of Parsons' rare attempts to relate his theory of social systems to a set of empirical findings and interpretations dealing with contemporary political processes in the United States. Second, a careful perusal of the paper provides enough information from which to illustrate Parsons' general orientation to the study of politics. Third, the paper illuminates the value implications of Parsons' position on such important problems as political stability and change, power, conflict and consensus, leadership, citizenship, and democracy. Fourth, Parsons' later writings in this area tend to support and further elaborate the perspective developed in "voting." For these reasons, "voting" is representative of the bulk of Parsons' work in political sociology. The paper affords a useful inroad toward understanding Parsons' conception of politics in particular and, owing to his pervasive influence, pluralist theory in general.

Sociologist Louis Guttman has conceived of two methods for placing individuals into relative positions along an attitude continuum. One method, that which is conventionally used, makes use of the observed marginals of selected items from an attitude universe to obtain cutting points or scale ranks. The second method and the one with which this study deals, is that of utilizing bending points of the regressions of higher principal components of scalable attitudes to obtain the various cutting points. Of the two methods, the latter, utilizing measures of principal components, is thought to be superior because of its quality of "invariance," that is, the cutting points are not dependent on the sample of items used. This paper reports the findings of a study which proposed to re-examine Guttman's "closure" as an empirical third component of scalable attitudes, and to introduce another psychological variable, suggested by Talcott Parsons, the sensitivity of the human personality to the attitudes of others, and test its empirical fit to the mathematical model of the third component.

This article focuses on an article by Hugh Dalziel Duncan, which discussed the uses and misuses of Max Weber's types of legitimationin American sociology. The author of this article said that he delivered a critical paper on the social theory of Talcott Parsons, the substance of which was a rather stern injunction for him to realize that social action was better conceived of as symbolic interaction, and that man's propensity for selection and creativeness made social process out of what he thought was social system. Since the true breadth of Duncan's theoretical perspective may unwittingly have been obscured by a rather heavily developed critique of Parsons, it might be pointed out that at a time when the social organizational and social psychological dimensions of our field are increasingly subject to disparate analysis, Duncan's function has been to mount a campaign for their reintegration through an expanded and improved synmbolic interaction approach.

The theoretical schema of the sciences of action developed by the sociologist Talcott Parsons in "The Social System," is fundamentally inimical with the Christian tradition conceived almost as broadly as possible without reducing that tradition to a minority. In this article the ordering of the sciences according to the schema developed by Parsons has been outlined. In addition, the bases of the classification of types of belief systems have been examined, and the fundamental notions on the basis of which the schematism stands or falls will be suggested. Finally, these fundamental notions have been criticized from an alternative perspective related to a different conception of the social studies. The whole schematism that has been reviewed here is inextricably related to the classification of belief systems. Parsons develops a four-fold typology of belief systems and contrasts non-scientific types of belief systems with scientific belief systems. In conclusion, the author of this article turn to an external critique of Parsons. Formulations from an alternative perspective have been contrasted with those of Parsons.

This article focuses on the theory of sociology given by sociologist Talcott Parsons. The fate of the functional requisites in Parsonian sociology can be regarded as happy or sad according to one's theoretical predilections. It has been shown that in many respects the development and changes that have taken place in and around the concept have reflected the development and changes in Parson's theory of society. The caveat on theory-building expressed in the book "The Structure of Social Action," has held good over the years as of March 1970. This is especially the case with respect to the universal imperatives. They are not subject to change for they are not empirical realities; they are, however, real in their consequences for social systems and for the structure of social organization in terms of all human societies. Parsons has made and elaborated the important distinction between social and personality systems in such a fashion that old notions of the individual versus the society have been seen to be inadequate. This is particularly relevant here as it paves the way to an understanding of individual and social requisites of human society, though Parsons himself has not taken full advantage of the possibilities in this context.

It has been argued elsewhere that the 1950's witnessed proximate consensus within American sociology over the orthodoxy of a systemic image of the nature of the subject matter and that this in turn was supported by a self-image in which the sociologist identified himself with the value-free stance he associated with the natural scientist. B.F. Skinner's life-long marriage to an austerely natural scientific epistemology is as self-evident as his fathering of an operant behaviorism that focuses immediately upon the change that can be brought about through positive reward. The very anomaly that was the fatal flaw of the "system" presumption - change - becomes operant conditioning's fundamental aim. Skinner's foremost advocate within sociology is, of course, George Homans, strategically placed as he has been of late as chairman of Harvard's Department of Sociology. No one can claim a more "systemic" methodology than the founding chairman of a graduate program specializing in the elicitation of models of complex and ongoing social interaction from sociology's beast of burden, the digital computer.

This article forms a rejoinder to the comments made by professor Talcott Parsons of the Department of Social Relations in Harvard University, in a thoughtful critique of the author's article "Images of Man and the Sociology of Religion." According to the author, the work of Parsons occupies an ambiguous position with respect to dominant socio-cultural determinism. On one hand there is, the affirmation that at some point and in some way, ultimate commitments are freely made, although they also become involved in processes of sharing and institutionalization. On the other hand, there is the conception of the personality system in which institutionalization, in the form of internalization and socialization, within biological limits, occupies and accounts for the entire self, and conformity along with alienation is created solely in terms of successful or unsuccessful socialization with consistencies or bridging mechanisms lying between parts of the institutionalized social structure. As further maintained by the author, in this conception of personality there is no possibility of free commitment.

This article is a comment on the article "On the Concept of Influence," by Talcott Parsons. Parsons makes a fundamental distinction between influence in a Gemeinschaft relation, or between members of a collectivity oriented to the collectivity's goals, and those in a non-Gemeinschaft relation. The simplest way of putting this is that, in some situations, the influenced can assume that the influencer's goals are the same as his own, while in others the goals are different. Parsons' discussion of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft influence intermixes with his discussion of four types of influence. The basic distinction he makes between influence where ends are shared involving action relevant to a common goal orientation and influence where ends are not often involving the allocation of scarce resources is quite important. He makes a serious mistake in identifying the first with political influence, while excluding the second from this area calling it fiduciary influence. Many, if not most, governmental decisions involve allocation of scarce resources. In continuing the analogy of influence to money, Parsons raises the question of whether influence can be considered a quantity subject to conservation, as money is often thought to be and in a strict sense is, at any moment of time. He then points out that there may be an expansion or contraction of money in circulation. There is a serious confusion here, for by relending its demand deposits a bank is not increasing the amount of money in the system. Its loans merely increase the velocity of the money's circulation through the system. In fact, by whatever proportion of its depositors' funds it fails to lend, it is decreasing the amount of money in circulation, that is, stopping the circulation of this portion of money.

Since the impetus and design of research inevitably derive from a set of assumptions, whether explicit or not, the nature of fact—the categories in which something is captured out of the Deal world"—is dependent upon these assumptions. It is reason enough to suggest that in efforts to advance sociological knowledge at least as much care should be given to explicating the linkages of ideas as to empirical operations. The positivist traditions of sociology have, however, often meant that high-level, "general" or even "middle range" theorizing has been more of an avocation than a vocation for most sociologists, and that much more rigor, energy, and professional skill have in recent decades gone into the empirical aspect of research than into the theoretical. Though the bearings of theory and research upon each other have been usefully discussed and have, in fact, become a kind of credo, almost any published discussion lacking in figures and tables and involving some commentary beyond sheer description has been capable of definition as "theory." Where so little has been expected, relatively little by way of intellectual and other resources has been invested. Consequently, the returns have been small. Even when serious theoretical work has been attempted, it has often received something less than systematic consideration. Such work—some examples undoubtedly more scholarly and sophisticated than others—has been given more or less favorable receptions largely in accord with semantic preferences, generally unspecific "orientations," and degrees of sympathy for speculation as, hopefully and somehow, relevant to real research. Other than to note particular historical events and to cite research findings considered pertinent to some statement or other contained in a discussion, the supporters, sympathizers, and opponents of theorizing have rarely spelled out the criteria by which judgment was delivered. In short, the problems of theory construction have been neglected in favor of the more obviously empirical problems of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents critical analysis of the social theories of Talcott Parsons. The action theory of T. Parsons is now in the focus of the interest of social theorists, both in the U.S. and in Western Europe. The Cornell symposium offers a surprisingly clear presentation of Parsons' thought system. Parsons has asserted that the action theory is a common foundation upon which three theories must be built up, theories of the social, cultural and personality systems. Parson's work consists of definitions and substantive propositions. His earlier work consisted mainly of definitions, but since the formulation of the pattern variables it has been developing substantive propositions. Parsons relied on a kind of common sense psychology. As Black states it, the cognitive-cathectic contrast is hardly more than the layman's crude contrast between thinking and feeling while the cognitive sector of human mind becomes evaluation. For Parsons, organizations are collectivities characterized by a primacy of the goal attainment subsystem. They have their own substructures or institutionalized normative units, which contribute to over-all society and related to its functional exigencies.

This article discusses the sociology of religion based on the work of U.S. sociologist Talcott Parsons. Sociology was the product of two main currents of thought. The first was the growing ability to see social relations as objective structures and social movements as objective trends. In short, to see the uniformities of social processes as an objective of investigation. The second was the positivism of the nineteenth century, which elevated the methodological rules of the natural sciences into an anti-metaphysical metaphysic. These two currents met in Auguste Comte, the father of both sociology and nineteenth century positivism. The influence of this unbalanced genius and of others whose views were similar, especially Herbert Spencer, was considerable in early American sociology. Parsons constructs his sociology of religion on the basis of the work of four men: Pareto, Malinowski, Durkheim and Weber. Parsons starts with what he calls the rationalistic variation of positivism, the tendency to treat the actor as if he were a rational scientific investigator acting reasonably in the light of the knowledge available to him. From this point of view religion is a matter of superstition and ignorance, a survival of a more primitive past. Parsons is fully aware of the painful inadequacy of this view and has drawn extensively on his European predecessors to broaden it.

This article is a revision of the article titled "Principia Sociologica," which appeared in the third volume of "The British Journal of Sociology," which discusses theories of sociologist Talcott Parsons. In the pre-Bales era we have the action systems and the pattern variables. There has been some modification of both these sets of concepts. An action is a constituent of three systems: as a physical act it is a constituent of the organic system, as a purposeful piece of behavior it is a constituent of a personality system and if it is directed towards another person or set of persons it is a constituent of a social system. The pattern variables, are concerned with the way we apprehend the objects towards which we act and the way we orient ourselves towards them. An object may be apprehended as a member of a class or in its own right as having something of particular significance to the actor. In addition an object may be appraised for what it is or for what it does.

This article examines a sociological theory of economic administration. Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser attempted to prove that economic theory is only a special case of the general theory of social systems. However, they have ignored the most highly formalized branch of economic analysis. They have concentrated on the less abstract area of applied theories which have a bearing, often remotely, on economic policy. The true achievement of the authors is that they showed how much phenomena can be treated as socially determined factors which are well inside the range of sociological theory. Nevertheless, the connection between economic administration and socialization is vague.

This article considers the propositions put forward in The Social System, by Talcott Parsons, which illustrate Parsons' analysis of social dynamics. For Parsons, the social system is a system of action. It is made up of the interactions of individuals. Of special concern to sociology is the fact that such interactions are not random but mediated by common standards of evaluation. Most important among these are moral standards, which may be called norms. Such norms structure action. Because individuals share the same definition of the situation in terms of such norms, their behaviour can be intermeshed to produce a social structure. That sociology should deal with a particular set of problems within the theory of social systems is the position taken by Parsons in his discussion of the division of labour between the social sciences. Here sociology is defined as having to do with the process of institutionalization of normative patterns : that aspect of the theory of social systems which is concerned with the phenomena of institutionalization of patterns of value-orientation in the social system, and of changes in the patterns, with conditions of conformity with and deviance from a set of such patterns, and with motivational processes in so far as they are involved in all of these. Parsons' concern with the normative and his definition of sociology as a discipline exploring the dynamics of the normative, is in one way an attempt, whether intentional or unintentional, to make the status of sociology less ambiguous by making it a special social science. But this confinement, which has a definite conceptual expression, seems to break down, both on a theoretical and an empirical level, when the problems of social stability and change are tackled.

Sociology today has many burdens and not the least of these is a persistent and somewhat humiliating question of theoretical excursions of sociologist Talcott Parsons. The issue is not so much intellectual disagreement over contrasting views of man and society. It is rather a case of the "Emperor's clothes." The problem of arriving at a reasoned assessment of Parsons' thought is greatly complicated by a remarkable obscurity of structure and style. Even those accustomed to abstract philosophical discussion find it a considerable chore to decide what is being said on any page, let alone also to assess its intellectual worth. Under these conditions, the book "The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination," edited by Max Black, is a welcome contribution. A large part of the book is devoted to a restatement of Parsons' central ideas. In some essays, Parsons is involuntarily guided to analyze mechanisms of social control and socialization by which a social system manages to hold deviance in check and enlist motivations of its participants.

The first business meeting of the American Sociological Society was held at 11:00 A.M. in the Gold Room, The Manhattan Center, on Thursday, December 29, with President Talcott Parsons presiding. Parsons summarized the activities of the Reorganization Committee of 1949 and the formation of the new Reorganization Committee of 1950 together with the grant from the Carnegie Corp. which makes possible the creation of an Executive Office. The minutes of the first three Executive Committee meetings, held in the past two days, were read by the Secretary, and were approved. The President then called upon Carl Taylor to report on proposed changes in the constitution and by-laws and to introduce motions for their acceptance. The first amendment pertaining to Article IV, Section I, was accepted by the Society after brief description by Parsons that such a measure would bring about better continuity in the official personnel of the Society. The second proposed amendment, Article VI, Section 2, had been divided into two parts, a and b, when it was considered by the Executive Committee. Taylor explained that these parts were to be considered separately.

Addresses criticisms and modifications of Sigmund Freud's theories of developmental identification and their derivatives. Overview of Freud's theory of identification; Psychological variants of Freud's theory of identification; Comparison from T. Parsons' sociological theory of identification.

This article focuses on professor Talcott Parsons' literary works on systematic sociology. According to the author, Talcott Parsons and his followers are pioneers in this recent theory in sociology and have won considerable recognition. Parsons' theoretical system comprises a series of postulates, concepts, and methodological formulations, which are mutually interdependent. The purpose of such a scheme is to develop sociology as a distinctive science with an appropriate conceptual scheme. According to the author, systematic theory is synonymous with scientific theory and is defined as "a body of logically interdependent generalized concepts of empirical reference" tending toward logical closure. Insofar as a body of theory is logically closed, it is systematic in fully explaining the relations between phenomena within a given frame of reference. If the explicit propositions of a systematic theory are not logically closed, it may be reasonably inferred that unstated assumptions or variables are involved in that system.

This article focuses on the economics and the theory of social system. Other than social behavior theories based upon statistical decision processes, one of the few systematic attempts in recent years to integrate economic and sociological theories is presented in a study by sociologists Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser. These authors refer to those who employ the method of equilibrium analysis either stationary equilibria or moving equilibria and their path and rate of movement in the study of economic phenomena. The high degree of formal elegance and the relative empirical success of many economic theories probably contributed to a concentration on improvement of accepted technique. The normal procedure in economics is to divide all variables like prices, national income, savings, etc. into explained variables and explanatory' variables . Structural relationships express the explained variables as functions of the explanatory variables. These relationships may be mathematical equations or verbal statements which imply mathematical equations.

Social policies for the aged are examined in terms of the five action-dilemmas outlined by Talcott Parsons. It is observed that individual performance remains a dominant criterion in evaluating people and that one of the challenging social problems of the future is to devise new patterns of leisure activities. The study points out that the aged are receiving basic services, but are still deprived of a meaningful place in the family system, a measure of social authority, and activities that are functionally valuable and personally satisfying. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of change has been of continuing interest to rural sociologists. However, most of the concern for change has been directed toward specific topics such as family living, farm technology, rural institutions, and industrialization. There has been little attempt to relate change in these specific areas to general theories of social change. This has probably been due no less to failings on the part of students of rural life than to the inadequacy of existing theories of change. In a recent article, Wilbert Moore, attempts to show that social change is a respectable topic of concern for sociologists. He would move the chapters on social change from the end to a more central position in textbooks of sociology. Talcott Parsons, after dealing with the structural aspects of society, has become more concerned with its dynamic aspects. He is now teaching a seminar on "Societal Evolution," which is certainly an innovation in the curricula of sociology. These and many other efforts indicate a growing concern for the study of change on the part of sociologists.

This article deals with some problems of the conceptualization of the maintenance of stability and order in social systems which are raised by certain formulations of Talcott Parsons, a sociologist. The general problem of the social system schema to which the present research is addressed is that of the modes by which conformance with the demands of social roles may be secured. In the paradigm which Parsons constructs he views as the basic type of conformance that achieved via the internalization of value standards as need dispositions in the personalities of actors.' Parsons' formulation and his decision to focus on this mode of conformance as the basic type has important consequences for the view it tends to impose on the conceptualization of order in social systems. Scale I deals with universalism-particularism and was constructed on the basis of items focusing on a conflict between the demands of a familial role-that of brother-on the one hand, and an "economic" or bureaucratic role on the other hand. To score high on this scale means to rank high on universalism, and vice versa. The responses of Mexican and American students to the items on Scale I constitute part of the relevant empirical data which this study brought to bear on Hypothesis I.

The article presents historical perspectives in the development of the sociology of religion. As a researcher rightly says, those early days were exhilarating and stimulating. It was a gemeinschaft group of about a dozen that author recalls sitting around a table in one of Harvard's old Emerson Hall classrooms. There was Pitirim Sorokin at one end of the table, banging on it with his fists and calling for research in "Altruism and Brotherly Love," and Talcott Parsons at the other end discoursing on Max Weber. And sometimes the fur flew. For this listener it was purely enjoyable academic "fur." Jeffrey Hadden points out that the SSSR grew up in the 1950's in an academic climate that had a touching faith (since called in question) in role differentiation. The author shared this faith and remember being much annoyed when some members suggested that authors should in their writing and research label their denominational affiliations or lack of them. But times changed. Both academics and denominational personnel began to share common interests in social and ethical problems, notably in the area of Civil Rights.