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This article presents the reply of the author to the comments made by professors Raymond A. Bauer and J.S. Coleman, on his article "On the Concept of Influence," published in March 1963 issue of the periodical "Public Opinion Quarterly." Professor Bauer has related the theoretical argument of the author's paper in an illuminating way to some of the problems, frames of reference, and data of opinion research with which both he and many of the readers of this issue of the Quarterly are certainly much more familiar than the author. He has thereby contributed importantly to making the main analysis the author has presented intelligible to many readers. Second, he has carefully elucidated one theoretical point that is especially important because of the emphasis Professor Coleman places on it. This is that the basic conceptual scheme with which the author has been working attempts consistently to think in terms of reciprocal interaction and not of a one-way schema of one actor "having an effect on" others. The author presents his views on three themes that Coleman refers to as blind alleys. The first of these is the assertion that money, power, and influence are essentially linguistic phenomena. The second is the classification of institutional components in an interaction system of the type dealt with. This again is an essential part of the frame of reference in which the analysis is placed. The third is the paradigm of ways of getting results.

In this article, the author presents his comments to the paper "On the Concept of Influence," by Talcott Pearson. The author confines his remarks to an expansion of what he takes to be the major thesis of this seminal paper. Communications in Western society is a transactional process, a major element in which is a widespread sense of trust. This notion, on the one hand, crystallizes a lot of what one has learned from communications research but have not fully articulated, and it adds, on the other hand, an ironic twist to the pervasive concern with "manipulation" and deception. For the author, the most novel insight offered by Parsons' paper is so simple that, once stated, it sounds trivial: Deception is based on trust. The Parsonian "channel variables" may seem like needless verbal distinctions. But if social scientists had firmly implanted in their skulls the distinction between affecting a man's intent and controlling his situation, much less nonsense would have been written about "brainwashing." The intention of this commentary is to reinforce the reader in the belief that it is worth the effort, and to encourage him to return to it for additional mulling.

This paper is an attempt to show that distinct dimensions of political alienation are reliable predictors of variations in political behaviour, independently of factors such as level of government and kinds of situations. In other words, there is a direct relation between the type of alienation and the mode in which it is expressed. The paper also calls attention to the functions served by the alienated as agents of political change. Variations in the modes of expression result from the following four types of political alienation: powerlessness, distrust, meaninglessness and isolation. Political powerlessness refers to the "perceived expectancy of an individual that his own behaviour cannot determine the occurrence of political outcomes that he seeks." The incentive to take part in politics is weak among the powerless who consequently elect to express their alienation through non-participation. Distrust is a person's feeling that the occupants of political roles systematically and consistently violate specific political norms or the "rules of the game" when dealing with certain publics.

This paper replicates an earlier study of faculty status and tolerance of political dissent by Abramson and Wences. The data support the hypothesis that length of residence on a university campus is inversely related to faculty tolerance of student dissent. The expected relationship between academic rank and tolerance was eliminated by controlling for longevity, but the predicted relationship between academic field and tolerance was unaffected. The effect of longevity appears to be independent of political orientations, and the data suggest that peer group influence is operative among faculty members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces papers published in the March 1963 issue "Public Opinion Quarterly." Political opinion polling represents one of the most highly developed applied fields of the so-called "behavioral sciences." While manpower and financial expenditures for such research do not approximate those for mental health, they are indeed considerable. In the light of the difficulties of financing political campaigns, the totals spent for political research are especially noteworthy. Moreover, in terms of social and political policy, the scientific, professional, and moral issues involved in utilizing polls for political purposes present some of the most profound problems in the applied social sciences. Nevertheless, writing and discussion of these issues has been extraordinarily meager and limited. For a time the popular media contained intemperate outbursts against the use of polling. The main arguments were that polling threatened to transfer the mandate from the electorate at large to professional specialists, and that polling ran the risk of becoming a device for manipulating election results by controlled exposure of selected findings. With the institutionalization of public opinion polls by both national parties and many state and local groups in the U.S., as well as by political groups in Western Europe, these attacks have disappeared from the press. In the popular view, opinion polling has become another hazard for the democratic process and for election campaigners.

This paper is the earnest consideration of what students of international affairs have thought the role of public opinion is and should be in the international arena. It emphasizes the importance of raising the competence of the public in order to make it a vital force for supporting progress in international institutions and organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study indicates that public opinion formation tends in large part to be a product of the activation of previous experiences and attitudes. The controversy at the University of California, in Berkeley, California, over the requirement that all faculty members sign an oath affirming that they were not members of the communist party created an opportunity to study the opinion forming process in a comparatively closed environment. University students reacted to a crisis situation largely according to their group affiliations and other background characteristics. Students operating within the intellectual atmosphere of the university may react in more rational ways than the general population. Student members of underprivileged groups may be more inclined to make rational identifications between their own group and other groups under attack, an identification, which underprivileged groups outside the campus may not make. Attitudes toward academic freedom are related to the same variables, which influence attitude formation in other areas of life.

In Part I of this article (Spring Issue), Dr. and Mrs. Gabel analyzed the editorials, in ten Texas newspapers, dealing with selected national issues. In Part II they turn their attention to several key international issues. The ten newspapers studied (see Part I, Table I; and also Part II, Table I) "appear to be the dominant metropolitan newspaper influences of Texas." They have a combined circulation of nearly 1,000,000, and cover geographical areas representative of both industrial and agricultural divisions of the state. Eight are independently owned, while the Houston Press is part of the Scripps-Howard chain and the San Antonio Light is Hearst-owned. The period covered by the study is mainly early September through December 15, 1945, with a few additional editorials from the latter half of December, 1945. The technique of analysis includes (a) noting the frequency of comment, and (b) indicating the favor, disfavor or the lack of a position, together with something of the manner in which editorial positions were urged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on the influence of social and technological changes since 1787 upon the role of public opinion in the U.S. and undertakes to appraise the role of public opinion today in the light of these changes. The history of the "degree of uniformity" is the history of an important and neglected idea in American politics. The role assigned to public opinion by various departments in the federal government is something vastly different from the part given to it by founding fathers. The American Revolution was an open manifestation of a desire for a responsible government, and implicit in this idea of responsible government was the idea of responsibility to influential public opinion. The new significance of public opinion is that public information can keep pace with the facts-and along with this transformation there has followed a broadening of the base of the political pyramid. The importance which has been attached to the power to control opinion within the past few years is a result of the increased number of persons whose opinion is politically consequential.

A vital weapon in the present struggle is censorship, intelligently handled and justly applied. Yet public misunderstanding of its function has often caused resentment. Censorship is a vital weapon in national armory. The present paper attempts to do is to play lightly around the notion of what the enemy wants to know and to point up the various ideas or remarks with a few illustrations devised for the occasion on the basis of real dispatches which have been intercepted. Public resentment of censorship grows out of two main facts, ignorance of what it is and a deep-seated misconception of its functions. In the U.S. censorship is honorably used for the purposes for which it was originally intended, that is, to prevent the dissemination of any information which conceivably might benefit the enemy and as a corollary to this, the subtracting from the air, from the cables and from the international mails of whatever he may be unwise enough to say that can be fitted into the jigsaw puzzle constructed of martial activities.

This paper investigates black political efficacy and political cynicism in an attempt to glean insight into the level and antecedents of developing support for the political system. The black adolescents are found to be low on political efficacy and high on political cynicism. Five explanations suggested by the literature for black political efficacy and cynicism are tested. Both psychological and political variables are found to correlate with the dependent variables but the best predictor seems to be black students' perceptions of the realities of their position vis-a-vis the political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Details a study which explored the local political participation in a Canadian municipality. Activities and characteristics of a municipal electorate; Theory and concepts of local political participation; Results and conclusions.

In this paper, the authors will critically examine a central, though neglected, aspect of political socialization research--the learning concept. Following a discussion of the current status of the learning concept, they propose a research strategy towards the operationalization of the concept in political socialization research and exemplify the approach with a specific learning paradigm adopted from experimental psychology. In a field such as psychology which evidences a long history of research in the study of learning as a general concept, there is a sharp disagreement as to what precisely is meant by "the learning process." Since psychologists differ with regard to the learning process, the unqualified utilization of the concept within political socialization research is highly questionable. Moreover, the failure to explicate clearly the meaning of the learning process in political socialization research has precluded the establishment of the "empirical import" of the concept. Inclusion of the term "political learning" as an integral element in a synthetic mode of discourse requires that the empirical import of the term be established.

As Marvin E. Olsen points out in the preceding article, a number of studies of political alienation have shown it to be related to "negativism toward issues that are strongly supported by the majority of the community." In this paper the author attempts to test empirically the proposition that the proportion of protest votes in elections, especially referendum elections, varies directly with turnout. Because his findings do not support this proposition, based to a large extent on the alienated voter concept, he presents a revised statement of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a psychological as distinguished from a Marxian sense the state in the United States seems to be withering away. The basic reality is a shift in the psychological environment in which the state, like other institutions and organizations, must function. This transformation in the psychological environment is generating a conflict in perceptions and values. This paper suggests that the state is withering away in a psychological sense because of an increase in awareness in contemporary society and a growing questioning of all authority. It also suggests the state is withering in a technological sense because of a failure to use organized knowledge to satisfy expectations and values. While noetic men have always existed, noetic man a! a major social type distinguishable from religious man, economic man, and legal man is primarily a product of 20th century technologies of communication and production. The withering of the state in the psychological order has an objective correlative in the withering of the state in the technological order, the use of organized knowledge.

The article throws light on the treatment of problems of political behavior in hands of modern politics students. It also emphasizes on activities of large bodies of voters. The formation and expression of what is loosely called public opinion has been treated generally as a function of an indefinite and ill-defined entity referred to as the "electorate" or the "public." It is the simple thesis of this paper that the significant part of the political process will be observed in the minute portions of it and not in the process "viewed as a whole," and that the chief contributions of the future will be made as a result of studies of these small portions. Indeed in any proper sense it is impossible to view the process "as a whole." Finally, the article presents the leader-follower relationship which includes: 1) the character and technique of the leader; 2) the relation of the leader to his lieutenants; 3) the relation of groups to their immediate leaders and immediately to the principal leader; (4) the relation between various groups interested in the situation; and 4) the relationships between individuals within groups and across group lines.

The article focuses on last minute changes in voting intention and its effects on public opinion in Australia. Errors in prediction on the part of public opinion surveys are usually ascribed to faulty sampling, unexpected turnout of voters, or changes in voting intention between the date of interviewing and the date of election. This article suggests that in certain types of elections last-minute changes may present a serious problem for forecasters. The article describes the predictions and the steps taken to trace the cause of errors. Political set-up in Australia has been described. The Australian Gallup Poll accurately predicted the vote for the House of Representatives and one of the referendums. It had discrepancies, however, of plus 8.6 per cent and minus 4.6 per cent on the other two referendums. All four predictions were based on interviews with the one cross-section of 2,027 people, a week before polling day. Voting in Australia is compulsory, so an unusual turnout of voters could not have caused an error.

This article discusses the public opinion of Italian people, their thinking about the U.S. and the possible Russian strategy in this country. The appointment of Socialist Pietro Nenni as Foreign Minister of Italy in October 1946, the conclusion of a new pact between the Socialists and the Communists, and the success of the Left in several municipal elections had been interpreted by many as steps toward that goal. Then, in January 1947, came the spectacular break between the pro-and the anti-Communist wings of the Socialist Party. Two new parties were formed--the "Italian Socialist Party," led by pro-Communist Pietro Nenni, and the "Socialist Party of the Italian Workers," headed by Giuseppe Saragat. Less than half the deputies followed Saragat, the rebel; but no one knows whether the members of the Socialist Party, and those three-odd million non-members who voted Socialist in June 1946, will divide the same way in the Fall elections.

Throughout the history of Brazil as an independent country, it has been dismantled by inter-regional strife and jealousy. The Vargas régime in Brazil, in its current context, is an exceptional reminder of the Italian Fascism up to the middle 1920s. Brazil is a reminiscent of a partially completed syndicalist structure that has dominated Europe during the era. It has witnessed the evolution of an elaborate apparatus of propaganda and censorship. The article presents a discussion on the effectiveness of the Brazilian system of opinion management. The Vargas régime has been motivated by both negative and positive considerations in its attempt to design popular opinion. On the negative side, the principal objective has been to prevent the expression and spread of ideas prejudicial to the maintenance of the régime. Due to the possibility of an organized opposition undermining its foundations, the régime has not allowed the development of such opposition. Positive objectives of the control system are associated chiefly with propaganda, insuring the internal security of the régime. The propaganda has been build up an active support for its leaders and their policies.

Generally speaking, scientific propaganda analysis necessarily employs many types of criteria. These include criteria of objectivity, adequacy, generalization, interpretation, causation, prediction, and interest. Of these, criteria that are frequently taken too much for granted and that usually demand most careful statement, assessment, and restatement are those associated with interest, interest in the sense of the individual, group, and general societal objectives or purposes served. The article deals with these interest criteria. In propaganda analysis, it has been common to describe interest criteria in a general way by saying that purposes of analysts are "to help the intelligent citizen to detect and to analyze propaganda." This is not to be taken as a narrow, purely individualistic or individualism-promoting approach. On the contrary, the conception is thrown into a broader perspective, as the more clear-eyed and intelligent citizens are, the more they can detect and understand actual issues at stake in a social agitation or conflict.

This article presents the role of propaganda in history in the light of World War I. After the German army swept through Belgium, tales of horror appeared in the columns of the daily prints. Atrocity stories, such as cutting off the breasts of a nurse, crucifying colonial soldiers, castrating wounded men, and many other revolting yarns, were served to the people for months. The Allies were pictured as angels whose wings had been plucked by Huns, and the Kaiser was dubbed "the monster of Berlin." Indeed, before the war was over, Lloyd George promised that, when the Kaiser was captured, he would be hanged. It was an orgy of nonsensical vituperation, and several of the recognized historians of the universities made themselves ridiculous with a determination that bordered on lunacy. When the war was over, some of the principal newspapers apologized to their readers, and confessed that they had published lies because Great Britain was in danger. No one would pretend for a moment that during a war the man in the street would have time to think twice about the truth or fiction of a statement reaching him in the form of propaganda. But neither would anyone in his senses imagine that a historian would become a victim of a device necessary to keep the mass war-minded.

In their May 1963 article that appeared in the journal Social forces, Student Rebellion Against Parental Political Beliefs, writers Russell Middleton and Snell Putney discussed one aspect of political socialization, that of reaction of young adults to their parents political beliefs. Testing, as they did, a sample drawn from several public and private institutions in the four geographic regions of the United States, their results reveal this process of political socialization amongst the predominant white group in the society. The present article attempts to compare their results with a similar study undertaken at a primarily Negro institution, in order to suggest any differences that may appear in this process between the subgroup and the predominant group. The data for this study were collected by means of anonymous questionnaires administered to 396 students. The two authors, in their 1963 article, noted the lack of comparable data over time with which to view the direction of any rebellion. Author of this article hopes to help fill such a gap and to suggest some awareness of the political socialization process among students of a minority ethnic group.

While the corporation is hardly a microcosm of the state, study of the internal politics of universities and business concerns may develop insights contributing to the understanding of political action in general. Corporations are co-operative systems assembled out of the usable attributes of people. They are also social systems within which people compete for advancement; in so doing they may make use of others. Behavior is identified as political when others are made use of as resources in competitive situations. Material, or extra-human, resources are also socially organized. Additional resources, resulting from innovation or new types of personal commitment, alter the prevailing equilibrium and either instigate or release political action. Such action is a mechanism of social change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses trends in American political science, focusing on how the study of theory is impacting those trends. The author states that social sciences in the U.S. are transforming from focusing on traditional approaches to modeling itself to the methodology of natural sciences, and predicts that political research will be classified as behavioral research in the future. The article discusses the similarities and differences between traditional and behavioral methods of studying political science.

This analysis of changes in the party affiliations of American adults between 1952 and 1972 (1) assesses the stability of the relationship between party and a set of causal variables and (2) examines the extent to which the observed changes are attributable to changes in the electorate's demographic composition. We found that indicators of stratification position, race, region, religion, and political socialization have exerted a nearly constant causal influence on party throughout the twenty-year period. A model which assumed constant effects (equal regression slopes) across the six elections explained only 2% less of the variance in party than a model which allowed the dopes to vary across elections. Of the variables in the causal model, socialization-as indicated by father's party preference-has the largest effect on party affiliation. The addition to our model of the demographic variables, age and cohort, revealed that both factors influence individuals' party affiliations. Though age and cohort explain only a small portion of the variance in party, examination of the net differences in mean party affiliation between age groups and between cohorts showed that aging does produce a net shift away from the Democratic party and that the Depression has had lasting effects on the preferences of cohort members formulating their preferences at that time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Instances of political behavior which bear no rational relationship to maximizing a group's material and social self-interest may be explained as responses to subcultural factors. Religious groups in America, despite their generally high level of acculturation, still retain ethical and belief systems which influence basic conservative liberal political orientations. The criteria used to distinguish sect from church seem to be of less importance in shaping political predispositions than beliefs centering around revealed dogma, salvation, impulse life, intellectualism vs. faith, and the nature of evil. The cultural belief systems of the various denominations operate as independent variables within the social structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children have very low levels of response stability on many questions commonly used in political socialization studies, particularly those measuring attitudes. This article incorporates evidence from a three-wave panel survey into a discussion of some possible causes of low stability. The findings suggest changes in the established methodology of substantive studies of children's attitudes and a reevaluation of the generalizations arising from these stud. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most studies in the past have found substantial correspondence between the political beliefs of an "offspring" and a "parental" generation--a fact which has led many writers to locate the primary source of political socialization in the family. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article cohort analysis is used to study the impact of generations on changes in political behavior and to distinguish the effects of generations from those due to aging. Four variables from Survey Research Center polls conducted between 1952 and 1968 are examined. A generation effect is found to influence opinions on aid to education, but isolationism shows a generation effect and life-cycle (aging) effect predominating at different times. The expected importance of the life cycle for voter turnout is supported, but neither effect is found to influence party identification substantially. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study challenges the theory that adult political behavior is little more than an elaboration of patterns rooted in childhood. It is based on evidence from 421 state legislators in 4 states and 129 city councilmen from 23 cities. Comparing and contrasting those who entered politics early and late, the authors conclude that political experiences in childhood and adolescence are less important titan more relevant and pressing demands in orienting office- holders to their jobs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will increased knowledge produce greater agreement on foreign policy issues? Not necessarily, the authors state. It depends in part on a person's pre-existing attitudes and what the prevalent, "mainstream" policy is. The analysis of "enlightenment," mainstream, and cognitive consistency models with reference to opinion formation and knowledge is imaginative and provocative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a comment on the article "On the Concept of Influence," by Talcott Parsons. Parsons makes a fundamental distinction between influence in a Gemeinschaft relation, or between members of a collectivity oriented to the collectivity's goals, and those in a non-Gemeinschaft relation. The simplest way of putting this is that, in some situations, the influenced can assume that the influencer's goals are the same as his own, while in others the goals are different. Parsons' discussion of Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft influence intermixes with his discussion of four types of influence. The basic distinction he makes between influence where ends are shared involving action relevant to a common goal orientation and influence where ends are not often involving the allocation of scarce resources is quite important. He makes a serious mistake in identifying the first with political influence, while excluding the second from this area calling it fiduciary influence. Many, if not most, governmental decisions involve allocation of scarce resources. In continuing the analogy of influence to money, Parsons raises the question of whether influence can be considered a quantity subject to conservation, as money is often thought to be and in a strict sense is, at any moment of time. He then points out that there may be an expansion or contraction of money in circulation. There is a serious confusion here, for by relending its demand deposits a bank is not increasing the amount of money in the system. Its loans merely increase the velocity of the money's circulation through the system. In fact, by whatever proportion of its depositors' funds it fails to lend, it is decreasing the amount of money in circulation, that is, stopping the circulation of this portion of money.

Many of the fundamental ideas underlying studies of the effect of communications, persuasion, the shaping of attitudes, and the formation of voting intentions can be generalized in terms of a common idea: the concept of influence. The development of effective concepts of wide applicability, like establishing a formal garden in the wilderness, necessarily involves a great struggle to bring order out of obscurity and chaos, and a great deal of systematic planting and cultivation after the initial clearing and pruning have been done. The author makes it clear that phenomena analogous to deflation and inflation in the economic case should be found in the fields of power and influence as well. The article indicates the direction that deflationary trends would take in these fields. In the field of power it is toward progressively increasing reliance on strict authority and coercive sanctions, culminating in the threat and use of physical force. In the field of influence it is toward undermining the basis of trust in reputations and fiduciary responsibility through increasing questioning of broader loyalties and rising insistence on narrow in-groupism. Inflationary process, on the other hand, is, for influence, the extension of claims to authoritative diagnoses of situations that cannot be validated with solid information and, on the other hand, the declaration of praiseworthy intentions that will not be backed by actual commitments when occasion arises. Unfortunately, there is no space here to develop these themes as they deserve.

This article describes some prevailing public attitudes toward political communication as an instrument of foreign policy, and contrasts these attitudes with the approach to foreign propaganda that is suggested by social science research. It is argued that lack of widespread understanding of the capabilities and characteristics of propaganda has interfered with its use as an efficient foreign policy instrument. Social science research suggests that the principal target of propaganda should not be a mass of individuals whose attitudes are to be changed, but much more a set of groups and organizations that are to be assisted. This is not to say that the propagandist should be unconcerned with individual psychology. The opposite is the case. But he should think of individuals primarily as members or potential members of politically significant bodies. His task is to identify organizations that require certain types of information and then supply this to them. The information in question may not be political at all but its effects are likely to be political. He may be considered a persuader, in that he may ultimately affect attitudes, but it is more useful operationally to think of him as a purveyor of information that can be used to achieve both his goals and those of his audience. It should be apparent from the way the words "propaganda" and "propagandist" have been used in the article, that they are not intended to carry a pejorative connotation.

This article focuses on a paradox in the findings of public opinion research that those individuals who shift their political position from one election to another frequently have less information about the political situation and the issues than persons whose attitudes and positions remain relatively unchanged. The low level of public information about politics has been documented with monotony ever since sample survey techniques developed several decades ago. While most of the major investigations of voting behavior have converged on this finding in one vocabulary or another, the evidence mustered in support has not been striking. Of course any data would be disillusioning if one imagines that an electorate is definitively split into two portions, one made up of fairly informed voters who never shift parties, and the other of uninformed voters who account for any electoral change. Belief in the broad hypothesis has been stronger than actual evidence might warrant in part because of obvious measurement problems, all of which act in the direction of weakening positive results.

This article studies the voter attitude and behavior, especially that of the alienated voter. A public opinion study of those eligible to vote in the 1960 Democratic gubernatorial primary reveals an extremely high proportion of voters with a low sense of political efficacy. Forty-eight per cent of the respondents "agreed" with the statement, "Public officials in Massachusetts don't care what people like me think." Forty-seven per cent of the respondents disagreed with the statement, "The way people vote in Massachusetts is the main thing that decides how things are run in this state." Thirty-three per cent of the respondents disagreed with the statement, "Voting is the only way people can have any say about how things are run in Massachusetts." Forty-three per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement, "People like me don't have any say about what the state government does," while sixty-six per cent agreed that "Politics and government in Massachusetts seem so complicated that people like me can't understand it." At least one-fifth of those interviewed believed that the candidates were obligated to, and dominated by, small groups of self-interested contributors. These contributors are stereo-typed as buyers purchasing future political favors. They are alienated voters who believe that they are manipulated and exploited by forces that they cannot uproot or even influence. The feeling of being wrongfully excluded, powerless and cheated of one's political birthright is the essential component of political alienation.

This study is an attempt to explore the development of orientations to part of the political structure. It utilizes such dimensions as personal and performance qualities of U.S. President's role. It indicates that important developmental changes do take place and raises questions about the development of attachments to the political structure through the President and about the nature of the process of this political attachment and its antecedents in the family. Theoretical and research interests in the process of socialization of the young child in American society are typically concerned with the child's acquisition of age-appropriate behavior and their attitudes associated with it. This traditional emphasis on the learning of behavior and attitudes which can be immediately applied to the child's experience has left relatively unexplored the process of socialization in areas of life which are is regarded as age-inappropriate. The socialization of political attitudes and behavior is one such area that has been studied at the adult level but neglected as a theoretical and research concern in the study of children.

The exploration of outer space has already begun with rocket-launched instruments, as of December 1, 1960. Within this decade, human observers may also adventure above the Earth's atmosphere to inaugurate a period of space exploration. Unlike the discovery of gold in California, these events and possibilities have been taken quite calmly by the public. Nevertheless "space" will profoundly affect lives and opinions of all people from now on. Opinions held by many Americans regarding this first step into space were sometimes inconsistent and frequently illogical. Also, these opinions did not indicate unanimous psychological shock or national girding, as the press and many issue makers have insisted. It has become common place in several pages of this journal to acknowledge that the press and its readership are frequently not as one, and these data are submitted in part as one more attempt to shatter the myth to the contrary. Speculations should hammer home once again the need to take advantage of situations which allow carefully planned before after studies.

The complex of political attitudes that has commonly been designated "isolationism" appears outmoded in the modern world but persists in many variations. This article follows and examine some hypotheses that have been offered to explain isolationism. Isolationism has been a force in American politics since the founding of the nation, and despite lessons of the two world wars, it offers a substantial opinion still consider this country a geographical and cultural "island" that is being contaminated by contacts with other nations of the world. Of various factors responsible for isolationism is Republicanism-conservatism. However, rural and ethnic populations do play a part, and the party differences with respect to the index of isolationism. The isolationism is a Republican rather than a Midwestern phenomenon, for while Midwestern Republicans score an isolationist rating of 85.2, Democrats from that section rate only 14.8, which is not significantly greater than the non- Midwestern members of that party.

This article presents an analysis of the public opinion reactions to the development of space technology. It would include studies of elite reactions as general opinion reactions, and would trace interconnections between these level. The opinion reactions to recent developments in space technology have affected or may affect policies and politics of the major participants in the international political system. Popular opinion may be viewed as "latent policy." It not only indicates potential changes in public policy and the political elite, it is a most significant component of that public policy and must be understood and appreciated if a proper estimate of the meaning of that policy is to be made. Thus public opinion is a part of the "performance" meaning of an alliance. The alliance calls for a particular set of allocations of resources for military purposes, and a particular set of military deployments, public opinion may affect the magnitude of these allocations and deployments within ranges defined by terms of the alliance.

This article reports some of the results of a study conducted for the organization National Association of Science Writers to determine how people react to the presentation of science in the mass media, and compares them with results of other studies. Science has rapidly become a dominant factor in national life and international relations. It is represented at top levels in government and supported financially on a grand scale. Still, the public remains in relative ignorance about science, and popular attitudes are naive and unrealistic. Science covers the advent of antibiotics, polio vaccine, and the notion of adaptation energy. Science includes electronics and its results in altered patterns of communication and entertainment, automation, and shifting patterns of job demand. Fusion and fission have changed the nature of the international threat and also formed a new basis for international cooperation. Child rearing, education, and human relations are also affected by science and are in the same state of flux that describes much of the present scene.

Any serious student of politics who nowadays takes it upon himself to introduce new conceptual frameworks, new priorities, and new terms into the study of politics should tread carefully indeed. The proliferation of theory and speculation in political science defies our capacity to absorb, integrate, synthesize, and choose. Ideally, perhaps, ours should be a period more of consolidation and careful exploitation of what we already have than of mad dashes after yet more abstruse, more ambitious, and more doubtful formulae. It is therefore with apprehension that I approach the question of the relationships between the political process and notions of the drama. This unease is, however, not unmitigated. I do not propose that the considerations I put forth be taken as a theory; indeed, they have few of the characteristics of a theory. I merely mean to suggest, first, that in addition to its other characteristics politics incorporates specific dramatic characteristics because politicians use dramatic devices; that at some points in the political process these devices are particularly salient; that, therefore, it is useful to know some principles of dramatic construction in order to appreciate politics fully; and finally, that these dramatic devices must become part of the traditional categories we use to analyze politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Gerhard Lenski introduced his conception of "status crystallization" into the sociologist's lexicon a decade ago. This concept has continued to interest sociologists since then and has found its way into textbook treatments of social stratification. Beginning with Max Weber sociologists have recognized the multidimensional charaeter of social stratification and Lenski's contribution gave promise of being an important empirical breakthrough in this direction to a person's position or social status as though it were simple and uniclimensional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationships between drug use and drug-use attitudes on the one hand, and sociopolitical ideology on the other. The latter was assessed by the recently developed Authoritarianism-Rebellion Scale (ARS). It was found that more rebellious respondents are generally more permissive about drugs and more likely to use drugs, notably marijuana, than their more authoritarian peers. Some theoretical, psychometric, and social-policy implications of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaders often used all forms of art to mobilize public sentiments in favor of their ethics, as in the case of the French Revolution. During this dynamic period various propaganda techniques in use today were developed, and in some cases perfected to a degree not generally recognized. Successive revolutionary governments tried consciously and continuously, with all means at their disposal, to mould public opinion and to direct it into channels favorable to their policies and interests. Painting and sculpture were extensively used, but the greatest contribution of the revolutionary leaders to the art of propaganda lay in their development of the pageant or festival. In the absence of mass media, artists were able to reach and influence a large number of the population who were not otherwise accessible to propaganda. An account of activities of the most important artist of the Revolutionary decade has been published, but an overall survey of other significant aspects of art as propaganda during the French Revolution must still be made. It is the purpose of this article to contribute to the inauguration of such a synthesis by calling attention to some of the more important aspects of the problem on the basis of historical research.

There are several possible approaches to the study of these opinion-makers. One is the conventional historian's technique of gathering myriad facts about the subject, organizing this material into an acceptable pattern-topical, chronological, or both-and writing the most readable account the author's talents permit. Many great and important studies have employed just this procedure. But in recent decades this so-called anecdotal approach has been brought into question by a group of social scientists who deplore what they regard as a lack of objectivity inherent in the method. The conventional historian's area of discretion, they contend, is so vast that his selection of facts must be largely a subjective one. He is constantly harassed by questions of what to include and what to leave out; and how much one fact is worth as against another. All relevant data must then be tested against these points of reference.

The authors try to find out what a respondent's answer to a public opinion interviewer really means. To know this one must examine some of the assumptions behind opinion polling, and must also identify the different meanings which identical responses may have to different groups of people. Finally, one must find ways to relate these responses to character structure, if one has to attempt to predict political or other behavior. The authors test few assumptions, which underlie polling. The scientific study of public opinion is in the hands of neither the poll-takers nor the respondents: both are caught in an historical process, which has not only set the questions to be investigated but also the form of the answer. The authors attempt to describe some of the different ways people approach the problem of having and giving an opinion. While the article groups these different ways roughly according to class, the various types, the authors describe can probably be found, in varying degrees, in all classes. As one goes down the status ladder, one still finds an astonishingly high proportion of response on polls, both in permitting oneself to be interviewed and in having an opinion that can be fitted, without too much gerrymandering, into the dimensions of current polling work. Even the lower class participates in this "conversation between the classes." The authors probe if the elections change the things. Latent meaning may be understood if we grasp the socially structured interpersonal situation between poller and pollee, and search it for the residues, verbal and non-verbal, which flow in our haste we throw away.