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In his book "Collected Papers," sociologist Alfred Schutz offers a thorough going critique of the discipline of sociology as it is usually conceived, and attempts to re-found sociology on the basis of a theory of consciousness. Schutz begins his reasoning with a brief examination of what sociology is and does. Sociology, in contrast to philosophy, is ordinarily conceived to have as its subject how men act. Sociology, then, must examine the empirical rather than the logical, possibilities open to men. Instead of asking how well a certain sociological theory relates to other theories in the field and instead of trying to gauge how well statements of theory relate to the data, Schutz focuses on the relation of both theory and data to the phenomenon itself, the phenomenon of man in a social world. In this way, Schutz challenges both the theory of sociology and its supportive data. But, there is an ironic turn in Schutz's argument. The problem of sociology is not that its empirical methods are incorrect, but rather that its theorizing is faulty. In other words, sociological data are inadequate not because sociologists are unable to "get at" the data of everyday life with scientific methods, but because they do not think properly.

Tins paper is intended as an effort at taking-stock of the reference group concept after nearly three decades of use, the latter two of which have been marked by its more than ample employment. Its popularity indeed has so frequently led to its serving as an all-purpose post hoc explanation of behavior that it has led to the wry definition, "Your reference group is a group that you behave like and you behave like them because they're your reference group" (Cohen, 1962: 104). The inconsistencies, lack of clarity, but also areas of agreement which have marked the varied formulations of the concept, will be apparent from the following review and commentary. The Final discussion indicates some of the matters still to be considered in the use of thin important but perhaps overworked concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents discussions by economists on some papers that are published in the May 1, 1953 issue of the journal "American Economic Review." The author states that all papers in their concluding analysis focus upon long-term changes in economic life. This is reflected in their growing preoccupation with economic development. But beyond this new interest is the recent impact of sociology upon economics. Sociological theory, whether that stated in terms of values or the less subjectively oriented concepts of social organization and process, derives from broader cross-cultural comparisons. Economists have been forced to acknowledge that much of their analytical framework is of specific rather than generalized applicability and as a result they are virtually compelled to view problems of economic development and change as intertwined with other aspects of a social system. Economist Joseph J. Spengler relates sociological value theory to economics with his usual sound and broad perspective. The author disagrees with Spengler's main conclusions.

Ordinarily an anniversary occasions the reification of an artificial period. In this case however, there is a certain juncture in the history of the point of view which makes of the past quarter-century something worthy of consideration for symbolic interactionism as well as for our celebration of the founding of the Midwest Sociological Society. The year 1937 lies virtually in the middle of a four-year period which saw the publication of Mind, Self, and Society, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, and The Philosophy of the Act. It would represent the greatest naiveté to suggest that thus the year 1937 represented the introduction of symbolic interactionism. We are all aware of the long development: from James, Baldwin, and Cooley to Thomas, Faris, Dewey, Blumer, and Young. Even the Tardean imitation and suggestion which underlay Ross's Social Psychology contributed a good deal ordinarily not credited to him in the development of interaction theory. Nor is it the fact that Mead represents the fullest development of the orientation that makes so significant the posthumous publication of his works (for which we may conveniently take 1937 as an anchoring point). Mead's ideas had been known for a very long time. He had taught University of Chicago students from 1893 to 1931. His notions were bruited about in classes and seminars wherever there were professors conducting them who had studied at the University of Chicago—not least in the great heartland included in the Mid-west of our Society. Some of Mead's students had published their versions of his ideas or quotations from some of his philosophical papers—Kimbali Young's Source Book in Social Psychology of a decade earlier contained a paper by Mead, and his Social Psychology bore the strong imprint of Meadian interactionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to the belief of many who have read George Homans' recent works, he is not the first sociologist to make explicit use of the concept of exchange. From 1883 to 1885 Albert Chavannes published in The Sociologist a series of papers titled "Studies in Sociology" which treated "The Law of Exchange" and three other social laws. Chavannes' use of the exchange concept was very similar to Homans'. Also, Chavannes emphasized the importance of a systematic empirical sociology but did not contribute to it as Homans has done. This comparison of the two men fills a gap in the history of American sociology and puts Homans' recent contributions in historical perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper began with an attempt to formalize the Davis-Moore functional theory of social stratification. It was found that the theory could be represented by a static model consisting of two algebraic equations with appropriate constraints on the functions. Then the tools of path analysis were used to evaluate the empirical adequacy of the Davis-Moore and Parsonian functional theories of social stratification as representations of cultural beliefs about stratification. Because of the likely presence of measurement and sampling errors, it was impossible to reject definitely either of the models. However, the estimated path coefficients were more consistent with the Parsonian theory than the Davis-Moore theory. This led to an inquiry into the conditions under which one model would be a better representation than the other. It was argued that the Davis-Moore scheme would provide a more accurate representation of cultural beliefs under conditions of high organizational interdependence whereas the Parsonian framework would give a better representation under conditions of low interdependence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the book "Sociology Today, Problems and Prospects," edited by Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom, Leonard S. Cottrell. Twenty-six different authors wrote the book. Each contributor's chapter is assessed independently. These twenty-six papers discussed in the book will serve many generations of graduate students as sources of topics for theses and dissertations. No matter from what vantage point a problem has been sighted first and no matter what philosophy has suggested the hypotheses first that tentatively answer them, if they are going to be investigated along the lines of an empirical methodology, they will necessarily contribute to the store of scientific knowledge. One can, however, hardly help wondering whether the structural-functional theory, which many of the authors try to embrace, does really lead them to a deeper penetration of the various fields. The reading of the book leaves one with a feeling of the woeful inadequacy of our factual information. That the papers were intended to clarify problems rather than to summarize factual knowledge can only in part account for this impression. The book is a must in the sociologist's library.

In this paper the conventional treatment of family harmony and conflict, in a consensus-equilibrium framework, is discussed and judged inadequate. Instead a view of the family as a system in conflict is suggested as an alternative and more fruitful theoretical approach. The major premises underlying such a frame of reference are briefly outlined. Its theoretical implications for the study of the family are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article replies to David L. Hull's article entitled "Systemic Dynamic Social Theory". It was observed that Hull deplores the assertion that underlying processes cannot be inferred from single overt performances. Overt performance is a small part of total behavior, thus, process-performance relations are not invariant. Contentiously, Hull transfers complexity-intensity relations, posited for psychological phenomena, to societal phenomena. Wave length is related to color - for light waves, but not for radio waves. Similarly, complexity applies to societal and psychological, intensity only to psychological phenomena. Constancy of societal complexity, given invariance of biological base, is a theoretical conclusion.

This paper suggests possible implications of a study of clothing fashion leadership for current sociological theory in regard to the process of fashion diffusion. Theory of the diffusion of innovations was chosen as the framework for the investigation. Fashion innovativeness and fashion opinion leadership were studied in relation to selected social, psychological, and economic variables. Since the test of collective selection occurs in the local social system it would seem appropriate that theories regarding the operation of the fashion process account more fully for the rate and degree of acceptance and rejection of innovations in the local social system, and for the functions of local participants in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses two methods for making a sociological theory untestable. The term theory stands for the symbolic dimension of experience, as opposed to the apprehension of brute fact. However, not only do theories go beyond fact but they do so by virtue of their use of universal categories. Scientific theories are a special type of theory defined in terms of a set of normative criteria to which scientists seek to conform and in terms of which their theories are evaluated. Central among these is the principle that scientific theories should be empirical. That is, they should have an empirical referent and be capable of being tested by experience. Because scientific statements are universal and empirical observations are of particular events, if a theory is to be refutable there must be some agreement whereby theoretical statements can be linked to ordinary propositions about empirical particulars. The first method for making sociological theory untestable, that is for making it unscientific, make certain that no empirically refutable statements can be deduced from the theory. A second method for making theory untestable is to ensure that the theory is internally inconsistent. That is, to take steps to ensure that one's theory does not take form a deductive system where all the propositions of the theory can be deduced from a set of axioms.

This paper tries to show that both functionalism and the Hegelian-Marxian dialectic present one-sided, but complementary and reconcilable, views of society. The basic postulates of functionalism and the dialectic reveal strengths and limitations which suggest a reformulation of both approaches in minimal form. Basically, the problem is to arrive at a theory of society that achieves an adequate balance between stability and the various sources of endogenous and exogenous change, between consensus and conflict, and between equilibrium and disequilibrium. After examining Dahrendorf's efforts in that direction, we conclude that convergence and overlap between the two theories show promise of a fruitful synthesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All sociologists are aware that questionnaire responses are a function of more than the particular value, attitudinal, or behavioral systems being investigated. It is a truism that the wording of an item may have a marked effect on the responses obtained. It is also very likely that alterations in the wording of questionnaire items produce considerably different responses among persons having differential educational or socio-economic backgrounds, or among respondents from various sized communities. These observations are discussed in practically every social research methods textbook. However, it is not always easy to predict bias in wording of questionnaire items. Data are presented in this paper which show considerably different response patterns for slight variations in two questionnaire items. Differential responses associated with rural-urban residence areas were also studied. The rural-urban differences are consistent with differences which are generally predicted from social theory. Rural areas are generally considered to be more conservative than urban areas.

This paper is an attempt to examine the efficacy of the means-end schema, the conceptual core of a voluntaristic theory of action which, it is claimed, emerged from the positivistic tradition in the work of various researchers and from the idealistic tradition in the work of researcher Max Weber. Postulates which underlie the means-end schema may be enumerated briefly. Most of its apologists insist, as rigidly as any positivist, that social science use all of the observational and mensurational techniques available. They claim that they respect the necessity for the objectification of social data and that their results are derived in such a way as to be consistent with the most stringent methodological criteria. They resist attempts to indict them as opponents of whatever objective instruments have been developed for the advancement of sociological research, whether these instruments be observation, measurement, statistics, symbolic logic, or anything else. The conclusion seems inevitable that the means-end schema violates most of the canons and repudiates most of the criteria of objective scientific methodology.

The article focuses on the comment upon the new social philosophy which has emerged from the ruins of a noisily disintegrating and over-ripe sensate culture. The sheer magnitude of Social and Cultural Dynamics, together with the prodigious research Professor Sorokin displays in analyzing all the compartments of culture over a period of twenty-five centuries without overlooking any part of the contemporary civilization, demands that a critic proceed warily. It is unfortunate in one respect that these pontifical tomes cannot be considered in their entirety, for such a possibility would relieve the impression that a few weak points have been singled out for attack. The purview of this paper is stringently confined to an examination of the author's contribution to the methodology of sociology. After a cursory discussion and definition of "culture" Professor Sorokin classifies the interrelations of the elements and traits of culture into four basic types, spatial or mechanical adjacency, association due to an external factor, functional or causal integration, and internal or logic meaningful unity.

The article focuses on the nature of economic science and its relation to social philosophy. The subject of the present paper is such a peripheral study of the views expressed by famous sociologist Buckle. It is concerned with the nature of economic science and its relationships with some of its kindred social sciences, particularly of social philosophy. This two-fold nature of the present topic brings the writer face to face with a twofold difficulty. The first is that he is concerned with elucidating the nature of a science which even in these days of alleged enlightenment and educational progress is as much maligned as it is little understood. The second is that his subject lies on the borderlands of economics. For the misunderstanding of which this infant among the sciences has been a long-suffering victim, economists themselves cannot be held entirely free from censure. Certain incautious statements and poorly worded phrases, certain unnecessary and deprecable acerbities in professional controversy, have furnished material which their enemies were not slow to seize upon, to generalize and to use against economists as a class.

Interest in the diffusion of innovations has, in the last twenty years, produced a plethora of research findings, which have been summarized by a number of writers (e.g., Lionberger, 1960; Rogers, 1962, 1967 and 1968; Katz et al., 1963; Jones, 1967; Bohlen, 1064). However, these summaries are basically taxonomic and programmatic rather than theoretic in nature. As the paucity of theoretical work in diffusion studies has been well recognized (cf. Bogers, 1962:300; Robinson and Bailey, 1965:332), there exists a real need for us to search for a general theory pertinent to this field. The aim of the present paper is to discuss a recurrent theme running through many diffusion studies, namely the old concept of adopter-innovation compatibility, and to show how this concept looms as highly suggestive of its utility as a theoretical approach to the studies in the diffusion of innovations and social change. The notion of adopter-innovation compatibility has been utilized in recent diffusion research in two general ways: explicitly and implicitly. We shall therefore discuss first these two different modes in which it has been used and then its implications as a general theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is intended as an effort at taking stock of the reference group concept after three decades of use in sociological research. The inconsistencies and some areas of agreement shared by social scientists are presented. Throughout its history, the phenomena of the reference group have been described by the idea of social groups, namely in-groups and out-groups, primary groups and significant others. The crucial problem in the reference group theory is stated as that of "ascertaining how a person defines such a situation, which perspective he uses in arriving in a definition, and who constitutes the audience whose responses provide the necessary confirmation and support for his position." The value of the reference group concept in specifying the types of others "represents a vast simplification and fairly sharp specification of the idea of the other" and the idea that groups other than one's own may serve to shape one's frame of reference is economically articulated by the concept.

This article focuses on an article by Hugh Dalziel Duncan, which discussed the uses and misuses of Max Weber's types of legitimationin American sociology. The author of this article said that he delivered a critical paper on the social theory of Talcott Parsons, the substance of which was a rather stern injunction for him to realize that social action was better conceived of as symbolic interaction, and that man's propensity for selection and creativeness made social process out of what he thought was social system. Since the true breadth of Duncan's theoretical perspective may unwittingly have been obscured by a rather heavily developed critique of Parsons, it might be pointed out that at a time when the social organizational and social psychological dimensions of our field are increasingly subject to disparate analysis, Duncan's function has been to mount a campaign for their reintegration through an expanded and improved synmbolic interaction approach.

It has been almost twenty years since Davis and Moore published their famed theory of stratification. During this period, the discussions which it has engendered have been numerous and highly instructive. It is now time to address ourselves to problems which concern the testability of the theory and its experimental validity. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of one of the basic issues raised by Davis and Moore. A major proposition of their theory argues that in the final analysis, social stratification arises in a society because of differential rewards for performance in the social positions therein. These rewards can be of several types. For our purposes, two are of major importance: symbolic and economic rewards, hereafter referred to as "prestige" and "reward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the book "Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences," edited by May Brodbeck. The author gives attention to three topics discussed in this anthology. The first is the controversy over whether the account of explanation given by sociologist Hempel is applicable in the human as well as in the natural sciences. The second theme in the anthology obviously relevant to sociologist is that of methodological individualism versus holism. Many of the papers in this anthology characterize at one level the alternatives confronting a scientist whose theorizing confronts either empirical or conceptual difficulties. Just because actions are informed by intentions and purposes, and intentions and purposes presuppose beliefs, so a social role-which specifies and prescribes or permits certain courses of action for certain types of person presupposes certain beliefs. The matter of the philosophy of science may not only be regulative as regards the form of our theories and the lessons to be learnt here may well be one that the sociologist now feels have been conveyed to him almost too often-but suggestive as to their content.

This article overviews the historical and logical trends in the field of industrial sociology as of 1957. The field has been divided by J. B. Knox into three rather convenient areas. The locus of study may be human relations in the industrial plant, or relationships between industry and the community, or relationships between industry and society. The series of ideas relating to the concept of cooperative social process points to the growth of a general theoretical framework in industrial sociology. The development of the theory of industrial cooperation is partly due to the historical fact that social scientists chose progressively more complex social situations for examination. In addition to its sociological relationship, the concept of cooperative social process in industry has a relation to the goals of Catholic social philosophy.

The people of the South are making a more intelligent effort to find answers to their social questions than have been possible heretofore. Both federal and state, including some nonagricultural, institutions are making important contributions to an understanding of these questions. Steps to be taken include: 1. Helping the rural people in particular and the public generally to understand their social problems. 2. Southern institutions must lead the way to rural social progress in the region. Research is the most serious business of these institutions. For research to be the most effective instrument for rural progress it must not be made a side line to teaching or other functions. Teachers who undertake research must have sufficient relief from teaching loads to do it aggressively. 3. The research specialist must bring to his task a cultivated, scientific mind, a mastery of scientific method, and a social philosophy. 4. The rural sociologist must maintain something more than a speaking acquaintance, an effective working relationship, with the physical and biological sciences, must help organize the forces of Science, help develop a Science of Man in which man is the master of a favorable ecological balance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of social anthropology or comparative sociology, as rests upon sociological conceptualizations and anthropological data. The problem is more than interdisciplinary: the sociologist's penchant for broad general theory is contrasted to the ethnologist's concern with detailed cultural data. The immediate need is for more modest theory on one hand, and more conceptualized comparative ethnography on the other. The purpose of the present article is to discuss this intermediate area with respect to one very crucial element, namely the analysis of values. This article attempts to show the two ways in which social anthropology should contribute to the development of general sociological theory. These are the establishment of (1) general social imperatives, and (2) requisite functional relationships between certain cultural forms in different departments of social life. To fulfill this broad purpose, empirically based examples are offered. This article introduces substantive theoretical analysis through the comparative examination of cultural systems.

For the purpose of the sociological theory it seems best not to attempt a critical survey of relatively recent contributions to sociological theory. This decision is further justified by the fact that there have been relatively few publication of first rate theoretical significance in recent years. This is of course, largely a consequence of the war and of the fact that so many people in the field have been preoccupied with work outside their normal professional interests. Rather than attempting such a critical survey, it seems more fruitful to present the outline of a positive orientation to the problem of sociological theory and a broad program for its development over the next few years. This is a wholly tentative attempt but can, it is hoped, serve as a focus for discussion and clarification of the fundamental methodological and theoretical problems involved. It seems possible to lay down a few fundamental propositions which can serve as general guiding lines for the more technical task of building a systematic treatment of sociological theory. Systematic theory itself is of fundamental importance to any science. There is, of course, no intention to deny that work which can be quite legitimately called scientific can develop without systematic theory. Morphologies, classifications and empirical generalizations of various sorts have played very important parts in the development of a variety of sciences.

Transition theory emerged about forty years ago. In the decades after 1930, the theory was elaborated and used by a wide variety of demographers and students of population. Some of the criticisms of transition theory have been widely quoted and apparently influential. One criticism of the theory questions the nature of the changes in birth and death rates during the early stages of modernization. Some critics have argued that population growth during the early years of modernization was caused more by an increase in fertility than a decrease in mortality. While particular historical demographers argue on both sides of the issue, their evidence is largely deduced from various social, economic, or medical facts. The demographic evidence for European countries is difficult to find, although in both Norway and Sweden—with good quality demographic data covering the early stages of modernization—the evidence points toward the prior decline of mortality as the more important factor in population growth. Japan is a non-European case that appears to support the same conclusion although critics of transition theory have used it as contrary evidence. They have done so by using official Japanese statistics and ignoring a more sophisticated analysis which has highlighted the biasing effects of under-registration during the early Meiji period. When these biases are corrected the Japanese case is quite consistent with the theory of the modem demographic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Roots of the increasingly close collaboration between sociology and medical care are to be found partly in a common interest in certain aspects of disease and therapy and partly in their similarity of approach to research problems. This article reports a study in the sociology of medical care that is characterized not only by the multiplicity of disciplines represented in it, but also by the cross-cultural comparisons which it introduces. It is concerned with the contribution that the study makes to the refinement and development of social theory, and especially to the theory of illness and sick-role behaviour given by sociologist T. Parson. The article presents data from three small-scale populations surveys, in different cultures to examine some of the components of Parsons' analysis of illness and sick-role behaviour. Central issues concern the criteria that define entry into and performance in the sick role, and they are both conceptual and methodological issues. The underlying objective is to examine sociology of illness and illness behaviour.

This article focuses on the theory of sociology given by sociologist Talcott Parsons. The fate of the functional requisites in Parsonian sociology can be regarded as happy or sad according to one's theoretical predilections. It has been shown that in many respects the development and changes that have taken place in and around the concept have reflected the development and changes in Parson's theory of society. The caveat on theory-building expressed in the book "The Structure of Social Action," has held good over the years as of March 1970. This is especially the case with respect to the universal imperatives. They are not subject to change for they are not empirical realities; they are, however, real in their consequences for social systems and for the structure of social organization in terms of all human societies. Parsons has made and elaborated the important distinction between social and personality systems in such a fashion that old notions of the individual versus the society have been seen to be inadequate. This is particularly relevant here as it paves the way to an understanding of individual and social requisites of human society, though Parsons himself has not taken full advantage of the possibilities in this context.

This article presents information on the contributions of Vilfredo Pareto to U.S. sociology and his philosophy of the natural law. Pareto considered theories of natural law as among the most impressive exhibitions of his non-logical category of theories transcending experience. They are theories which use indefinite words corresponding not to things, but to sentiments. Natural law is simply that law of which the person using the phrase approves. What Pareto offers is an operational definition of natural law. In the sociological observation of legal behavior and the analysis of legal theory one may by progressive elimination of the items indicated arrive at a residuum which corresponds to what in other idioms is called natural law. Natural law is then what is left over when such operations are performed. Such an operational definition does not fulfill the highest ideals of physics that semantical rules and operational definitions be of a kind that can be stated in terms ultimately definable in physics. Such operational definitions are possible in the social sciences only upon the basis of extreme behaviorism.

This article presents views of the author on an article on social theory by sociologist Theodore Abel, that appeared in the April 1952 issue of the periodical "American Sociological Review." According to the author, Abel is well aware that his view of theory is uncommon and unpopular within a discipline now marked by a preponderant interest in specific empirical investigations where conceptualization is admitted only in the full-dress uniform of the "heuristic device" or the timid hypothesis bordering on a tautological statement about trivia. Respect is due the courage with which he undertakes a defense of theory in the "grand style." Abel's practical point of departure seems to lie in the observation that while current research interests are dictated largely by basic ideas inherited from several sociologists, insufficient attention is paid to the kind of theoretical activity in which such men were engaged and to the need for a continuation of that activity. While the debt to them is acknowledged, researchers fail to recognize their responsibilities in carrying on the kind of work they did.

This article presents the author's views on Social Theory. The author believe that sociological theory should henceforth be stricken from the list of subject topics of annual meetings. It doubtless served a purpose of sorts in the salad days of sociology when lip-service to the canons of science would legitimize many a soaring flight of philosophical speculation. But to continue to list theory as it is done today, simply as one more field of sociological interest and endeavor, ignores one of the crucial developments in sociology during the last generation. This is the accelerating tendency of theory to permeate all research that is worthy of the name. A growing recognition of the inevitable linkage between "fact" and "theory" has made sociologists realize that even the simplest descriptive statement has its quota of theory. Every sociologist worthy of the designation of scientist, no matter what may be the subject of his research, will shape his work in terms of the best and most relevant theory known to him and will then try to improve upon it.

The article analyzes the article "The Potential Impact of B.F. Skinner Upon American Sociology," by Robert Friedrichs. In his article, Friedrichs appears fully conscious of the possibility that his predictions will be self-defeating. Ironically, the anxiety which Friedrichs conveys about the prospects of a Skinnerian sociology is most evident at those points at which his argument is both the strongest and the weakest. On the one hand, Friedrichs, indulging in conspiracy theory somewhat, puts together seemingly disparate pieces of a puzzle to construct an essentially convincing image of a chamber of horrors-and one need not share his conspiratorial passion to grasp the integrity of his logic. On the other hand, his article seems particularly weak when he attempts to glue the puzzle he has constructed to the notion of the invisible college. Friedrichs attempts to show that the invasion of the body snatchers is in full swing based on his recitation of a number of individuals, perhaps conspiratorially linked together, but found in various departments. This does not seem totally convincing for two reasons. First, the assumption that the graduate departments he cites are monolithic research factories may be fallacious, and second, with a few notable exceptions those departments are not high producers of graduate students destined to leap into positions of power, prestige and moneyed research slots.

The article presents a study on communications as cultural science. The study of communications is regarded as a modern phenomena, which centers on the studies of language and its practical skills. The definition of the study of communication is said to be altered due to the importance of the size of the institutions of communications in modern societies and the series of technical developments in communication. A variety of description of communication scientists is given, including as a sociologist, engineer, and cultural analyst. The concept of cultural science and the significant part of modern sociology which arise out of the argument about the relation between practices is discussed.

Although the concept of the community has received increased attention in recent treatments of general theory of social organization, community development as a theoretical concept has continued to be largely ignored except in applied literature. This article provides a conceptualization of community development within the general framework of social field theory and indicates critical areas of needed research as viewed from that perspective. Community is defined as a generalizing, locality-oriented social action field. Community development refers to action which is purposively directed toward altering community field structure in a positive way. The focus of this approach is upon attempts by actors to increase the generalization potential of their interactional relationships. Implications of this definition of community development are shown by discussions of practical issues which confront community development workers: value, capability, responsibility, and commitment. Research problems related to these issues are identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article was based on the fact that rural-urban behavioral differences have not been adequately conceptualized in terms of sociological theory. A relatively new approach is followed which defines roles as parts of social positions, which in turn make up situses, which in turn make up stations (the sum total of an actor's status positions within a community setting). Action systems made of roles dedicated to an institutional function are viewed as the key to behavioral differences. These systems are construed as varying in character depending on the structural qualifies of the roles. Seven of these qualities are identified, each providing a range of structural alternatives which account for patterns of social relations. Societies can thus be classified according to the structural alternatives to behavior which characterize their makeup. The role theory approach outlined may provide a more precise set of conceptual tools for delineating and understanding rural-urban differences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on methods and theory in sociology. Research problems can derive from many sources, but to state a view that is especially important in this context: If a science does not get its problems to a rather large extent from without, that is, from sources outside the research milieu itself, danger is in the making. Sociology, and especially those fields which are considered the most advanced in professional circles, is particularly prone to this danger, inasmuch as this form of sociology tends to raise primarily those problems that can be handled with a given set of methods. These methods, which In a certain sense are the best, to a large extent determine the way problems are formulated. If such methods had demonstrated, over a long and rich tradition, their capacity to answer questions originating from without, there would be no cause for any special concern. In physics and chemistry, not to mention mathematics, this is indeed often the case. These disciplines have an established system that both generates new problems and develops methods to solve them. But the most highly regarded sociological methods have largely been borrowed from the natural sciences.

The article focuses on Scandinavian sociology. Sociology in the Scandinavian countries that is Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden does not have its roots in national traditions of speculative theorizing about the nature of man and society. The absence of a long intellectual history of significant social philosophy and macrosociological speculation is a conspicuous feature of the four countries. This characteristic of both Scandinavian sociology and the Scandinavian societies can to some extent be explained sociologically. To state that Scandinavian sociology does not rest on national traditions of social speculation is not to say that sociology in these four countries is without national roots. It is, however, striking that the forerunners of present-day sociology belonged to a strongly empirical tradition. In all four Scandinavian countries there is a long and honorable record of studies in government, statistics, social welfare, and ethnography dealing with sociological problems. When sociology in its present form was established at the Scandinavian universities after World War II, it developed in an academic milieu with a strongly positivistic orientation.

This article presents information on the working of the U.S. government in relation to sociology and social progress. In political theory one thinks of the state as a sovereign unity, voicing itself through organized government in accordance with the law of the land. This law is itself supposed to be in harmony with the will of the people, who through law seek to enhance the general welfare. The essence of the whole matter is conveyed in the term general welfare. That is why sociology with its prevision of social betterment inclines always towards a republic; why it favors democracy because of the hope that the people really may determine the law of the land; and why the state is assumed to have sovereign power, under the supposition that government will be so organized that it may be the supreme arbiter in the determination of what, among many clashing interests, will prove to be in the long run pro bono publico. In other words there is no absolute science of the state capable of being thought out entirely apart from social situations or teachings. All political laws and principles have meaning only as they reflect the larger teachings of social philosophy. Politics and political theory can be appreciated only to the extent that their relations to sociology are clearly comprehended. Lacking this, the most logical possible explanation of political principles would likely prove to be one more system, to be buried in the limbo of worthless philosophies.

Though widely used in the literature of sociology ideal types have received little systematic explication. One of the difficulties is the ambiguity surrounding the usage of types as theoretical or definitional statements. Beginning with the types constructed by Weber and his contemporaries the discussion proceeds by analyzing subsequent revisions as they relate to the subject matter of the social sciences. Suggestions for improving the explanatory powers of typologies are made based on the kinds of knowledge deemed relevant for observer and actor at differing levels of the social world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a case for the usefulness of the concept of basic human needs. The author suggests that it is fruitful to assume that there is a universal set of basic human needs which have attributes of their own, not determined by the social structure, cultural patterns, or socialization processes. Ways are shown in which propositions which use the concept could be tested empirically. Restoration of the concept of basic human needs into sociological theory corrects the "over-socialized" conception of man, identifies a central distinction between the industrial and the emergent post-industrial society, and bridges two divergent traditions in sociology: structural-functional analysis and alienation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary American sociology, there exists no unified and comprehensive theoretical system that could serve as an instrument for coordinating and integrating existing sociological knowledge. Present-day American sociology represents a multiverse of theories and approaches. For the purpose of bringing at least some external order into a rather chaotic situation, the author suggests a classificatory system that distinguishes three main categories of sociological theory on the basis of general methodological criteria: positive or natural-science theories; interpretative sociologies treating sociology as a science sui generis, and non-scientific or evaluative social theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the role of the category of ignorance in the sociological theory. Concern with the category of ignorance, whether implicit or explicit, has constantly appeared in the work of sociological theorists. "Heuristic" bias towards exploring ignorance as "eufunctional" phenomenon leads to a tentative presentation of some conditions under which ignorance may be agreed to be eufunctional by the "democratically" inclined. Given the variety of concerns with ignorance, it is not possible to say that there is any unitary, highly self-consistent preoccupation with ignorance that points to the problem of ignorance in sociological theory. Some of the strongest intimations of the significance of the category of ignorance in sociological theory come from the tradition of functional analysis, particularly as that analysis has to do with religion and magic. Functional theory suggests a perspective on ignorance and a conceptual apparatus for its analysis in institutional context that have not been made explicit.

The measurement properties of indicators are shown to depend on the conceptualization of the constructs said to be measured by those indicators. The argument is developed that empirical statements about levels of measurement of an index cannot be sensibly made in isolation from the theoretical and substantive context in which the index is to be used. Assumptions that a variable is somehow "intrinsically" interval (ordinal, nominal) are analytically misleading. Grave inferential consequences are shown to attend such assumptions. Illustration is provided with a systematic discussion of conventional status variables and indices. The argument, however, is one of much broader application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a brief analysis of theory and of sociology as the explanation of patterns of social impact, the major forms of sociological theorizing are critically reviewed. These are identified as correlational theory, sequence theory, and grand theory or verbal model-building. The basic features of process theory- which is taken to be most faithful to the objectives of theorizing and to the fundamental problems of sociology-are sketched in terms of opportunity variables, motivation and social perception variables, and social reinforcement variables. Applications of process theory are suggested in the areas of internal migration, suburban ecology, and deviance in complex social systems. Finally, sociologists are urged to focus on key theoretical problems, rather than empiricism or blatant ideologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By asking the question "What is it that makes an experiment `realistic' ?" we seek to recast previous discussions focused on "realism versus artificiality." It is suggested that relationships between variables may vary under different experimental conditions. The degree of realism is used as a means of identifying experimental characteristics. This analysis of the concept of realism provides a meaningful alternative for future synthesis of small group research, both field and laboratory. Characteristics of a research method labeled "realistic simulation" are also identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Development of the field of social change has seriously lagged during the past generation. Retardation has been due to numerous forces, among them a structural and functional bias which in emphasizing the study of organizational adjustment to innovation has restricted the scope of change theory and research. Additionally, an emphasis upon cultural, as distinct from social, processes has obscured the interactional roots of change. Also the repudiation of 19th century evolutionary thought has tended to make suspect any directional, long range theorizing. A revitalization of social change analysis in the fullest develomental sense is required for the comprehension of change sequences and processes in the new nations. It is probable that our most feasible methodology for a "sociology of development" lies in the construction of a series of real models as refinements of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft, Sacred-Secular theoretical tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]