Search

The article presents a critical discussion of the papers by George H. Hilderbrand and William Fellner on long-run policies of the U.S. government. The author comments that with respect to long-run period both the economists correctly imply that full employment is assured only if we act right. There is among economists a vast amount of agreement bearing on what constitutes right action. Still, there remains a conflict of advice which is crucial when we come to specifics. The conflict is such that we dare not gloss it over but must, if we are to arrive at a stable consensus, keep it well to the fore. When it comes to selecting means for the control of aggregate demand, it notoriously may make a great difference, in what devices one will espouse, whether he does or does not believe that changes in the real value of cash balances exert significant force. If we turn to the problem of selecting a guide to action upon aggregate demand, we find again disagreements which the author doubts will be cleared up unless we frequently leaf through a well-kept record on the sources of disagreement, which goes back to and includes the argument over the automaticity of full employment.

This paper analyzes the empirical utility of consensual and conflictual theories in explaining the social cohesion of the liberal democracies of Britain and the United States. After clarifying conceptual problems of value consensus theory and Marxist theory, it examines the forms and extent of value-commitment in these countries. The conclusion is that both theories grossly overstate the amount of both value consensus between individuals and value consistency within individuals that actually exists. Cohesion in liberal democracy depends rather on the lack of consistent commitment to general values of any sort and on the "pragmatic acceptance" by subordinate classes of their limited roles in society. Suggestive evidence is also found for the existence of some "false consciousness" among subordinate classes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines sociologist Talcott Parsons' political sociology by focusing exclusively on "voting." First, "voting" is one of Parsons' rare attempts to relate his theory of social systems to a set of empirical findings and interpretations dealing with contemporary political processes in the United States. Second, a careful perusal of the paper provides enough information from which to illustrate Parsons' general orientation to the study of politics. Third, the paper illuminates the value implications of Parsons' position on such important problems as political stability and change, power, conflict and consensus, leadership, citizenship, and democracy. Fourth, Parsons' later writings in this area tend to support and further elaborate the perspective developed in "voting." For these reasons, "voting" is representative of the bulk of Parsons' work in political sociology. The paper affords a useful inroad toward understanding Parsons' conception of politics in particular and, owing to his pervasive influence, pluralist theory in general.

This paper analyzes the perceptions of county executive committee members and county extension agents as to role expectations of county executive committee members in eight Pennsylvania counties. It also attempts to determine role-learning opportunities associated with role definition consensus and satisfaction among committeemen. Extension agents expected committee members to assume more responsibility than the members wanted in planning and executing the program. Committee members generally wanted more responsibility than the agents defined for them in establishing administrative policies and evaluating the program. Relatively high consensus was found for only one-third of the 32 role expectation items. Access to several role- learning opportunities was associated with agreement among committeemen on their role definition and also with satisfaction with the functioning of their committee. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One main reason the Great Society never took off was that its programs were not buttressed by a thorough bargaining process with the appropriate interests. While innovative programs can be ‘sold’ to the voters, a consensus among the myriad interest groups and publics that comprise the American polity, such as supported federal aid to education, is vital if they are to survive. To this end, a mechanism that would function outside our relatively ineffectual representative structure, one used successfully in France, is proposed: participatory planning. Existing components of such a plan and others that would be required, such as more sophisticated social data, are outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A community can be considered a group of people interacting on formal, semiformal, and informal levels within a spatial referent. As a result of this interaction, some degree of consensus concerning community boundaries should exist. An approach to community delineation through a community-member-group method should thus be feasible. A consensus index can be developed to measure the amount of agreement. Such an approach, applied in Pennsylvania, gave preliminary evidence of validity and a higher rate of boundary-placement agreement than a comparable trade-area delineation. Rural sociologists have typically expressed concern over the community as a unit for scientific study, an area for facilitating local action, and a theme for sociological theory development. They have explored its composition, its internal functions, its relations to institutions, and the interaction patterns in and between communities. The wide use made of trade-area delineation does not indicate complete acceptance of it as a method incorporating all the essentials of community life.