Search

This article discusses the educational sociology of sociologist Émile Durkheim. It is the purpose of this paper to outline some ideas of Durkheim on education and to show how they are closely linked with his sociological thought. It can be no more than an introduction to a subject upon which the writer is preparing a more substantial work. None of the educational writings of Durkheim has yet been published in England. In fact most of them were only published posthumously in France. Some notes on the most important of them are given at the end of this paper. The majority of them were prepared in the form of lectures and are listed in order of the dates on which the course was first given and not according to the date of publication which is separately recorded. There are many lectures still existing in manuscript form. It was thought best to give quotations in the following pages in English and the translations are those of the writer except where otherwise noted as coming from existing translations. Moreover, this paper will conclude with a brief outline of four major functions of educational sociology which are based on practical principles in line with Durkheim's methodology. These functions are the determination of the present social facts of education and their sociological function, determination of the relation of education to social and cultural change, comparative sociology of education and the study of the school itself as a social group and in relation to other social groups.

The article focuses on sociologist Emile Durkheim. The death of Durkheim has a peculiarly melancholy interest for the Sociological Society. The second of two papers he promised at the inception of the society remains unwritten. The first appeared in the printed volume of the society's transactions in 1905. It was a paper dealing with "Method in the Social Sciences," and from that standpoint made a survey of the whole sociological field. As the years rolled on Durkheim's busy life became more and more filled with the activities, not only of the thinker and the teacher, but also with those of the active citizen.

The article presents comments on the paper titled "Sociology and Political Science," by Seymour M. Lipset, published in a 1964 issue of the journal "American Sociological Review." According to the author, in a recent review essay Lipset called attention to "the increasingly close theoretical and methodological identity between political science and sociological orientations," The concept of anomie is a special substantive instance of this trend toward inter-disciplinary convergence. Some 15 years ago, two eminent political scientists accorded that concept particular emphasis in their work. Sociologist Harold Lasswell transmogrified the term into a Freudian version. Sociologist Sabastian De Grazia in an earlier monograph made it clear that he was adhering to sociologist Emile Durkheim's strictly sociological formulation of anomie. De Grazia also observed in passing that sociologists themselves have not used the Durkheimian concept much in their writings. In the intervening years, of course, sociologists have measurably corrected this defect. The opening section of the article offers a critique of a "single model" version of anomie theory, a version perceived as implied works of Durkheim, Merton, De Grazia and other unnamed sociologist, to "clear the ground" for presentation of a new and "more adequate" psychological model.

In this paper I attempt to clarify Durkheim's theory of suicide rates. He maintains that two social variables, integration and regulation, jointly determine rates of suicide. A high rate is caused by an extreme condition of integration (egoism or altruism) or of regulation (anomie or fatalism), or by some combination of extreme conditions. A closer look at Suicide suggests, however, that altruism and fatalism really do not belong in Durkheim's scheme, and that egoism and anomie are identical. Thus, his four causes of suicide can be reduced to one, so that all variation in suicide rates is attributed to a single cause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present state of our knowledge dictates an eclectic explanation of social integration, coupled with careful specification of the conditions under which the various integrating mechanisms operate. There seems no good reason to follow Durkheim blindly, asserting categorically that value conflicts must disrupt social patterns. The present paper takes the position that any set of value commitments can act directly to promote social integration and explores the conditions under which these effects will occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary sociological writings abound with references to anomie, and the topic is fast becoming a major theoretical vogue. Yet many users of the concept fail to define it adequately or to place it in any larger theoretical context. As originally coined by Durkheim, the term anomie is a French translation of the Greek anomia, which means "no laws." The commonly used English equivalent of "normlessness" catches the literal meaning of anomie, but it fails to convey any single clear idea to many sociologists. We glibly use the concept without bothering to clarify its meaning. Furthermore, the simple notion of "lack or norms" is relatively worthless, since such a condition rarely if ever exists in any society. Durkheim discussed the idea of anomie at some length both in The Division of Labor in Society and in Suicide. Because the same term is used in both works, and because the concepts presented are similar in many ways, most sociologists have assumed that they were identical. In fact, however, Durkheim gave us two quite distinct conceptions of anomie. This paper is an attempt to separate and clarify these two meanings of anomie, and to relate both of them to more inclusive theories of social organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Emile Durkheim, a theorist, views on kinship and relationship systems. It is the contention of this paper that some of what he wrote has been undeservedly neglected. Anthropologists have comparatively recently been given credit for ideas which he had already set out in columns of various sociological journals in France. The concept of consanguinity is a good example. Durkheim laid considerable stress on a point which is fundamental to the study of relationship systems, viz. that relationship systems are not the same thing as kinship systems, or even as systems of consanguinity and affinity. Admittedly he was by no means the first person to have perceived the distinction between the biological facts of consanguinity and the sociological facts of relationship. He noted that in certain societies a man's kinsmen were not necessarily consanguineally related to him and that clanship might similarly have little to do with actual consanguinity. Though, once Durkheim had clarified the concept of matriliny, he resorted to it as a sort of universal solution to all puzzles in the study of relationship systems. His explanations

This paper reports findings of a study dealing with some factors associated with religious and political affiliation in a college population. Specifically, relationships between religious affiliation, belief and participation, political orientation and socio-economic status are examined. The influence of religion on secular activity has long been of interest to sociologists. The classical works of sociologist Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Among college populations, the study provides the most comprehensive body of empirical data on students' religious values and their correlates. The article reports that religious belief is widespread but that commitment is rare. Substantial differences are found among major religious groups. Catholic students score highest on a scale of religiousness and Jewish students score lowest with Protestants falling in between. This article also deals with the relationship between parents' religious orientation and the students' religious beliefs.

Contemporary definitions of anomie and alienation have confused, obscured, and changed the classical meanings of these concepts. Alienation for Karl Marx and anomie for Emile Durkheim were metaphors for a radical attack on the dominant institutions and values of industrial society. They attacked similar behavior, but from opposing perspectives. Marx assumed an immanent conception of the relationship between man and society and the value of freedom from constraint; Durkheim, a transcendental conception and the value of moral constraint. Marx was interested in problems of power and change, Durkheim in problems of the maintenance of order. Paradoxically, contemporary definitions accept what was most problematic for these classical theorists–the dominant institutions of society. The paper author speculates if contemporary definitions of alienation and anomie actually value-free, or are sociologists witnessing a transformation from radical to conformist definitions and values under the guise of value-free sociology.

Many of Durkheim's ideas regarding the function of religion in modern society are to be found in his works on education, since he viewed the public school as an alternative structure to perform the integrative function that religion had in traditional society. This paper suggests first, that the "dogma" of Durkheim's secular ethic consists of national values; second, that the public school teacher has a "priestly " role in the transmission of the secular ethic; and third, that the "true believers" of Durkheim's civil religion are patriotic citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the possibility of a theory of sociocultural processes without referring to civilizational complexes. The concept of civilization is a concept used by anthropologists in opposition to the notion of primitive and folk culture. Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss affirmed that social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a determinate social organism exist and they extend into areas that reach beyond the national territory or develop over periods of time. The term civilizational complex has been proposed to be given to those paradigmatic cultural patterns in the sphere of expressive and instrumental productions which have the remarkable property of expanding beyond national borders.

Aspects of two general problems in Durkheim's sociology are treated: the concept of society and the problem of its persistence. Under the influence of Robertson Smith, Durkheim came to conceive of social activity as a form of ideation, and society as a complex of shared ideas. He specifically held society to be those ideas by which men define who they are and how they are organized. Group formation is therefore a variety of idea formation. The tendency for these ideas to persist in men's consciousnesses was attributed by Durkheim to the ritual activity to which they give rise; men express their ideas of themselves by acting them out and putting them on exhibition. In turn, these actions reinforce and sustain the original ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a reply to the article "Comment--Durkeim and Legal Evolution: Some Problems of Disproof," by Upendra Baxi. It focuses on French sociologist Émile Durkheim's hypothesis on legal evolution. According to the author, several questions have been raised concerning the conceptual and operational meaning of Durkheim's "Division of Labor" hypothesis and there is an increasing requirement to adopt a new index for repressive sanctions that may meet the criticism of Durkheim. Secondly, Durkheim did not state the hypothesis in clearly testable form. Ambiguities are to be found particularly between the concepts and their operational specification. While there has been a sustained implication, throughout the hypothesis, that restiutive sanctions could occur in very unspecialized societies, operationally this exercise of such sanctions seems to be limited to specialized organs such as consular tribunals, councils of arbitration and administrative tribunals of every sort. Further, even in the most general part, pertaining to the civil law, it is exercised only through particular functionaries like magistrates and lawyers, who have become apt in this role because of very special training.

The article focuses on a comparative study of suicide. The objective of this article is to test cross-culturally a number of inter-related variables, in order to account for differences in suicide rates both within and between different societies. Perhaps the most firmly established generalization in the sociological study of suicide concerns its relation with the business cycle. Among many theorists Emile Durkheim was one of the first to propose an explanation of such a relation. With the causal relation between business trends and suicide that Durkheim and many others hypothesized, there should be not only this current-year correlation but also a lag correlation between the two time series. Although suicide is not limited to any particular age, studies have shown that the rate generally rises with advancing age, so that suicide achieves its culminating point only at the final limits of human existence. It seems to be well accepted that the traditional Taiwanese culture has placed great emphasis on stability of the social structure, in which seniority rather then ability is a primary guide to social values.

Parsons' commentary on Emile Durkheim's work, first set forth in The Structure of Social Action and later developed is undoubtedly the most influential interpretation yet to appear in English. Parsons attempts to document Durkheim's shift front positivism to the voluntaristic theory of action and to idealism. Neither attempt is successful. Parsons' interpretation often seems as much a function of his own perspectives as of Durkheim's. Examination of Durkheim's theory in light of his intentions and assumptions reveals serious errors in Parsons' analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is my impression that philosopher Edmund Husserl in his later years, and particularly in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, became increasingly aware of the intersubjective Constitution of consciousness or "pure transcendental subjectivity,"' which placed him on the threshold of sociologist Émile Durkheim's great insight, namely that human consciousness is grounded in or is presupposed by society as a "conscience collective," a moral community, or what is called as the "societal community." It is precisely at the limits of subjectivity that phenomenology encountered the social world; Alfred Schutz, student of Husserl, continued this important sociological direction of Husserl by undertaking to elucidate the complex structure of social reality. In this endeavor, he was not alone but was joined by others who had come into contact with Husserlian thought. The notion of the "transcendental Ego," does not have an otherworldly significance for Husserl, but refers to the subjectivity attained by transcending the "natural attitude."

The richness of Durkheim's sociological contributions is revealed in the variety of positions and movements with which he has been identified. Durkheim's conditional endorsement of historical research is described. Three dominant features of Durkheimian sociology are, first, its philosophical orientation; second, its scientific emphasis; and, third, its identification of the social as a reality sui generis. Note is made of the numerous studies inspired by Durkheim's sociological perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two years spent in editing Emile Durkheim's famous study, "Le Suicide," and translating it with the collaboration of John A. Spaulding, have led the author to seek to reconsider, in the light of the knowledge amassed in the last half-century, particularly in psychoanalytic psychiatry, how one can discover more about this tantalizing phenomenon. At the outset, the author disowns any claim to having solved the problem, and any cocksureness which may appear in the presentation here should be considered a sign of author's enthusiasm for trying to solve it and not a belief in the definitiveness of my statement. Since Durkheim's work in suicide, the chief advances in the knowledge of the subject have come from actuarial and vital statistics, and psychoanalytic psychiatry. The actuarialists have studied the over-all extent and trends of suicide, related it to race and color incidence, age and sex distribution, urban and rural areas, seasonality, economic conditions, religious affiliation, marital status. This type of approach is seen in Louis I. Dublin's and Bessie Bunzel's book "To Be or Not to Be."

The theoretical orientation to the problem of local organizations, while not consciously and knowingly borrowed from sociologist Emile Durkheim and his latter-day apostles, coincides with his ideas regarding the relative roles of the individual, the state, and intermediate associations. His conception of the relationships may be summarized as follows: prior to the creation of the state, man is submerged in tribe, clan and association. The state, which war and commerce help to create, creates the idea of the individual citizen, and protects this individuality by the creation and protection of private rights. By this means, it can hold its constituent societies in check and prevent their complete and repressive dominance over the individual. However, there is danger in the tendency for the state to become increasingly dominant and in the tendency of atrophy of social groups. In this article, the author has particularly emphasized linkages and supports for initiating and establishing people's organizations with special reference to small farmers, and linkages to facilitate the generation and dissemination of useful information on agricultural improvements, management and the training of personnel.

About half a century ago Durkheim asserted that Protestants show a greater degree of anomie than do Catholics. Although Durkheim's assertion was based on limited studies, his statement has sparked considerable empirical research into the phenomena surrounding anomie. The social scientist interested in this topic today has numerous earlier studies and a selection of research instruments on which to draw in designing his own research. Among the most useful of the studies on anomie up to the present time are those by Srole, Nettler, Meier and Bell, Bell, Mizruchi, Dean, and Dean and Reeves. The study by Dean and Reeves is particularly interesting in terms of both questions answered and questions raised. Since this present study was conducted in response to the questions raised by the Dean and Reeves research, it will be necessary to review briefly their research procedures and findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologist Emile Durkheim's theory of politics and the state is undoubtedly the most neglected of his contributions to social theory. There are perhaps two main reasons why Durkheim's political sociology has not received the attention which it merits. One is that several of the standard expositions of his work were written before the publication of the series of lectures in which he most directly confronted the problems of political analysis. A second, although related, factor in this neglect derives from the "phases" through which the secondary interpretation of Durkheim's work has passed. The fundamental continuity between Durkheim's early and later works does not become fully apparent, however, unless considerable attention is given to his political theory. Far from being of peripheral significance to his sociology, Durkheim's political thought has an important role in his ideas. Durkheim's political liberalism and his sociological defence of republicanism played a major role in the promotion of his own academic career, and in facilitating the rise of sociology as a recognised discipline in the French academic system.

The article discusses the concept of subjectivism. It is fallacious to regard subjectivism as a special approach to sociological theory. It must be seen as an integral part of the sociological approach. Subjectivism, is neither a special method in sociology, nor a competing theory. It is an inextricable part both of the methodology and theory. It entails a recognition that men are aware or conscious of themselves, of others, and of being-in-society. One aspect of the subjective point of view is the recognition of the element of "consciousness" or "awareness" in man. To the extent that a sociological theory addresses itself directly to the notion that man is conscious of the world he lives in, is aware of the meanings and intentions of his actions, to that extent the theory presents the subjective point of view. The subjective aspect is contained in attitudes and definitions of the situation which affect the way the individual responds to social values. Max Weber is not simply interested in the fact of subjective awareness of the actor but much more in the specific historical content of this awareness. Weber took a pure case of a particular type of meaning, of definition of the situation, choosing on the basis of centrality for the socio-cultural system, thus the emphasis is on the centrality of rationality as a norm of action in modern, capitalist societies. Both E. Durkheim and Weber recognized the fact of subjective consciousness or awareness in human individuals.

The article examines the meaning of empirical law or generalization in sociology and distinguishes these from other kinds of findings. It recalls the elements of the hypothetic-deductive method and discusses how this may be used to explain sociological laws. Some examples of deductive theories from the spheres of small social groups and sociology proper are also discussed. The article also presents the author's arguments against the use of psychology in sociology put forward by sociologist Emile Durkheim in his book "Rules of Sociological Method." It is important in this connection to recognise the change, which has come about in psychology since Durkheim's day. Durkheim's first argument was that social facts were to be distinguished from individual states of consciousness and that therefore sociology, was irreducible to psychology. In terms of contemporary psychology the important difference between the two fields is that sociology is concerned with combinations and aggregates of people rather than with single individuals. In the second place, Durkheim maintained that social facts could only be explained in terms of causal relations with other social facts. The author disagrees with Durkheim by suggesting that the generalisations also require explanation and it is only at this point that there is any question of psychology entering in.

The article informs that within recent times the contributions of sociologist Emile Durkheim to an understanding of social structure have become increasingly apparent. Yet his service to a clearer understanding of the origin of current economic onceptualizations remains to be appreciated. Outside of his book "Division of Labor," little attention has been paid by the student of economic thought to the contribution of Durkheim to an understanding of social phenomena. The student of standard economic theory has not been one to wander far a field into what to him appear to be the byways of social inquiry. As a result economic inquiry in its underlying social preconceptions remains essentially where Adam Smith delivered it. One of Durkhbim's major contributions was his demonstration that the idea of class arises from society itself. Members of societies are arranged and graded on a basis peculiar to that particular society. Durklieim also noted that these societies project this social stratification into a classification of the universe. All things of experience are so classified. Items of the universe take on the same complexion of grades and ratings that are peculiar to the social organization. According to Durklieim there is nothing in the universe itself to suggest such a system of classification.

The moral basis of advanced societies is the group basis of advanced societies. That was Durkheim's essential Insight and enduring contribution to the sociology of the moral order. He asked, in effect: (1) What is the basis of association or group formation which engenders moral rules? (2) What units of societal organization comprise "moral communities" on this basis? and (3) What ethos or ethical system formulates and regulates these relationships? The classic replies given in On the Division of Labor in Society and subsequent works-the division of labor, occupational associations, and professional ethics-are analyzed for conceptual adequacy and tested for empirical relevance. Although the diagnosis and prescription Durkheim offered are found to be deficient in crucial respects, nevertheless they provide strategic points of departure in the quest for values and the quest for community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologist Emile Durkheim emphasizes on the social problems created by the fact of professional, or occupational, differentiation and by the fact that there are different professional ethics. His essential concern is the integration of society, of the professions into society. This article is not concerned with special ethical problems of "professions." Durkheim uses the term in a sense much larger than what is customary in ordinary English usage; and thus the term covers all occupations in modern differentiated society. It appears, in fact, that his central concern is those occupations which are specifically not professional in the common English sense of the word, viz., business and industry; and even then one reads relatively little about the special ethical problems of these groups as such for example, about commercial ethics. The main content of the article is a plea for the organization of tile different occupational groups into corporations. That Durkheim's approach entails some views regarding the ethics of occupations is of course clear; but these views are of a rather general character, and people are far away indeed from a differential treatment of the different occupations, let alone of tile professions in the narrow sense of the word.

This article focuses on the magical world-view of human institutions as a classical issue in social sciences. According to the author, sustaining and serving to complicate resolution of this issue has been the negative value given to it. Its usual referents have been practices, rituals or notions, similar to those of the religions of the West, but judged inferior to them. Thus, magic has been defined negatively, by its inadequacy, rather than positively in terms of its role in human existence. In this regard, a typical instance is provided by the book "The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life," in which, having formulated a suggestive definition of religion, as serving to unite the participants into a single and moral community, Emile Durkheim could say of magic only that it was individualistic and opposed to religion. Quite often, magic and science are said to be both practical in intent, although this exhibits a lamentable ignorance of the history and sociology of science. In contrast with this "science," magic is said to be supernaturalistic in mechanism and, in contrast to religion, is said to be manipulative, rather than supplicative and worshipful.

This article comments on some sociological concerns about radical sociology as proposed by sociologist Albert Szymanski. The focus of concern with Szymanski's proposals fell upon their propensity for what following sociologist Emile Durkheim, called idol worship, the tendency of undisciplined research to discover little aside from preconceptions associated with its substantive values. Idol-worship seems to be exemplified by Szymanski's use of sociology of knowledge. It conveniently offers him means of avoiding methodological problems and setting aside all matters of objectivity while also impugning the quality and integrity of broad ranges of natural and social science. Aside from some general remarks applying perhaps to all science, Szymanski analyzes specifically the cases of the physical sciences, the biological sciences, economics, conditioning psychology, and Parsonian sociology. For each discipline, he finds that there has been little, if anything, other than sophisticated social partisanship and pursuit of self-interest through the provision of general legitimation or narrowly practical knowledge.

This article focuses on the concept of mental health and religious socialization given by sociologist Emile Durkheim. It seeks an alternative explanation, one which is couched at the socio-psychological level. Its method of approach is an analysis of religious socialization. In the analysis which blows, stress is placed upon differences in the content and function of the mythological reference group structure, i.e., the inventory of both divine and demonic personalities, with whom the religious confessant develops relationships. Such mythological reference groups may be thought of as independent of, but supplemental to, the real worldly reference groups to which the individual relates. The analysis proceeds from a conception of the ideal-typical rather than the modal form of the conscience manifest in New World Catholics and Protestants, specifically those raised in the Calvinistic tradition prevalent throughout English-speaking North America. The focus of this article, moreover, is with the type of conscience produced in members of the two respective religious communities during the historical period beginning in the Renaissance-Reformation.

The article presents an analytical study which determined the sociological elements in economic thought. Several socioeconomic theories which are concerned with the understanding of a society characterized by economic individualism are discussed. An example of which is the fundamental thesis of economist Emile Durkheim about the division of labor and his view that the principal factor of economic stability in a modern individualistic society is the common ethical valuation of individual personality. It also comments on the economic theory of free trade protection by economist Vilfredo Pareto.

This article discusses the problem of social control among sociologists which raises fundamental questions about the nature and organization of human societies. One important tradition of sociological thought, influenced by sociologist E. Durkheim has exa

The article focuses on the relationship between epistemology and sociology, for it is here that the general relationship between philosophy and science appears most obvious and direct. Although there is no necessary or logical connection between an epistemological doctrine and a sociological orientation, sociologists often use epistemology to support their sociological orientation. Using works of sociologists Emile Durkheim, William James, Charles H. Cooley and W.I. Thomas, this article will show how these men employed an epistemology to justify their conceptions of sociology. The author finds that understanding past theories and orientations can be made easier by examining philosophical issues. Being aware of philosophical assumptions should place endeavours in a wider context, perhaps alerting to unthought of implications and thereby helping to understand where the society have been, what the society is doing and where the society is going. Philosophical awareness may help us to see that existing controversies over the nature, scope and subject matter of sociology are fundamentally philosophical controversies that cannot be settled on empirical grounds.

The article presents information about the relation between sociologist E. Durkheim's concepts of anomie and egoism. While the obscurity of Durkheim's distinction has frequently been commented upon, it is implicitly assumed to be irrelevant for contemporary theorization in social pathology. Against this view, two theses will be advanced. Firstly, if Durkheim had pursued and attempted to clarify his distinction between the two concepts, he would have been forced to re-examine the presuppositions upon which his sociology had been based. Secondly, despite difficulties in Durkheim's theory in which concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part, a distinction between them still has to be drawn which in fact retains some elements of their original meaning. All contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the distinction between anomie and egoism with the result that social conditions, psychological states and processes which are entirely different from one another have been assimilated.

The article focuses on legal norms and social order with reference to sociologists Leon Petrazcycki, Vilfredo Pareto and Émile Durkheim. Petrazcycki's contribution to the philosophy of law has hardly permeated this field to which not only its subject matter, but also its methodology are relevant. His primary interest in the source of legal norms, reinforced by his practical concern for the problems of legal reform, resulted in an appraisal of the connections between law and social order. Prolonged and widespread political unrest increased the premium placed upon social stability, while emphasizing the latent contradiction between freedom and order. The simultaneous acceleration of economic development led to an awareness of the advantages inherent in industrialization and a desire for their planned extension. Unlike the Utilitarians, Petrazcycki did not represent law as the arbitrator of conflict. A similar rejection of the emphasis on external constraint distinguished both Durkheim and Pareto.

This article explores the problem involved in categorizing acts and beliefs as religious, or ritual, or magico-religious, with the purpose not only of clearing the way for subsequent treatment of the author's own empirical data concerning the LoDagaa of Northern Ghana, but also of clarifying certain aspects of the analysis of social systems in general. The article intends to examine the ranges of meaning assigned to certain basic concepts in the sociology of religion with a view to clarifying their use as analytical tools. The general conclusion is that it is impossible to escape from the fact that the category of magico-religious acts and beliefs can be defined only by the observer and that attempts to see either this or the sacred-profane dichotomy as a universal part of the actors perception of his situation are misleading. Any effectiveness which these terms may have in comparative studies depends upon a realization of their limitations and involves a return to the usages of earlier pre-Durkheimian writers in this field, anyhow as a starting point for further exploration.

This article focuses on several books on sociology. In the book "Moral Education," by Emile Durkheim, Durkheim analyzes elements of morality and takes up the question of how to develop those elements in the child. He feels that the public school is best suited to the task of moral education, and that in the process of educating the child, it must create a new being according to the needs of the society. Durkheim argues that only by imposing limits can one free the child from the frustrations of incessant striving, and only as he is involved in his cultural heritage can he achieve a sense of identity and personal fulfillment. In the book "Conflict, Decision and Dissonance," by Leon Festinger, the author's theory of cognitive dissonance is here applied to three important aspects of the decision process that have previously been ignored in experimental work. In addition to supplying new data and outlining new areas for further study, several experiments provide what may be considered a fresh look at author Festinger's theory.

The article presents information on the Emile Durkheim School in France. Durkheim has himself pointed out the three vital steps in which he considered himself the instrument of progress. He wishes that sociology be a pure science, without a mingling of philosophy or politics. Sociology cannot remain a philosophy of particular social scenes, more general, more synthetic and more vague than each of them. It is the common name given to all the sciences which deal with man living in society. There is a religious sociology with is documented by ethnology, history, researches into contemporary societies, statistics, and, equally, there is a juridical sociology and a moral, an economic, a technological, a linguistic, and an aesthetic sociology. Durkheim's works almost all deal with juridical, moral and religious facts. He has only exceptionally touched upon the other social facts. His works are classified on basis of Method and general sociology, religious sociology, domestic sociology, juridical and moral sociology, sociological theory of education, social morphology and politics.

This article discusses the views of sociologist Emile Durkheim on education. He wrote a great deal on educational theory and practice, and in both his university posts, in Bordeaux and in Paris, he was engaged in the training of teachers. At the age of 29 a special post was created for him at the University of Bordeaux, where he taught the social sciences and pedagogie. In 1902, already noted as a sociologist, he was appointed to the Sorbonne in the chair of the Science de I' É'ducation. At this time sociology was not much in favour in the University of Paris, and was thus introduced under the cloak of education until 1913, when the position was re-named as the chair of the Science of Education and Sociology. The influence of Durkheim on educational thought in England has been practically non-existent. This is because nobody, until recently, not even the sociologists, seems to have read his books on education. Yet he could well be called the founder of educational sociology. The views of Durkheim on education must, of course, be considered in the context of his general approach to sociology. He used to say to his students that it was always as a sociologist that he spoke to them of education.

This article presents the author's views on social researcher Theodore Steeman's work "Durkheim's Professional Ethics." According to the author Steeman devotes a great deal of his work in explaining what seems to be a gross ambiguity in sociologist Emile Durkheim's prognosis for modernizing society. This ambiguity, or contradiction, can be analysed when on the one hand, Durkheirn points to the rapidly increasing functional division of labor and a concomitant replacement of "mechanical solidarity" by "organic solidarity." Mechanical solidarity is generated by common, shared experience, organic solidarity by mutual interdependence. On the other hand, Durkheim points to the singular importance of "professional ethics" in modern, highly differentiated society. However, professional ethics have their binding force insofar as those in the same industry share in common interests, skills and experiences. Thus, mechanical solidarity characterizes that institution which Durkheim asserted was the uniquely appropriate source of integration in modern, differentiated and thus, presumably, organically solidary society.

This article presents comments on sociologist Edward A. Tiryakian's comparison of the works of sociologists Edmund Husserl and Emile Durkheim, related to existential phenomenology and sociology. It is true that both men Husserl and Durkheim sought to eliminate psychological elements, and both were concerned with methodological rules as to how to do it, and so forth. Despite these and other similarities, however, there remained the important difference in regard to the ontological status of the phenomena they were studying. The Transcendental Ego of Husserl, "discovered" by a gradual reduction from the Empirical Ego, i.e., "bracketing" of psychological-empirical elements, reaches beyond nature. For Durkheim, on the other hand, the collective consciousness that transcends the individual consciousness was "partially imbedded" in nature. Similarities pointed out by Tiryakian are nevertheless of great interest to a student of the sociology of knowledge. Both Durkheim and Husserl made claims to the authority of scientific method. Both established rules and proceeded, or sought to proceed, systematically according to them. Interestingly, Husserl, who outlived Durkheim in creative terms, never paid any reference to Durkheim's work.

Presents a letter to the editor about the sociologist Emile Durkheim's position in the realm of morality and ethics.