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This paper examines the stagnation of Brazilian exports of products other than coffee during the postwar period. Export stagnation led to a pattern of autarkic development. The combination of growing domestic demand and income-inelastic supply of imports put pressure on the real exchange rate. As the external value of the cruzeiro depreciated more rapidly than the internal inflation, relative prices moved to favor domestic producers for many new products, leading to the establishment of many new industries producing only for the internal market, and very rapid growth based on import substitution. This process was self-sustaining, as import substitution coupled with export stagnation in one period lowered the equilibrium exchange rate for imports, and stimulated further import substitution in the next. Because of the increasing inelasticity of domestic production with respect to downward movements of the exchange rate, however, import substitution became a progressively more expensive way both of saving foreign exchange and of generating growth.

Nurkse's classical analysis of nineteenth-century trade and development dealt largely with the temperate-zone countries. Why the tropical countries remained "outsiders" to this process is not clearly understood. In an effort to substitute historical analysis for the a priori explanations which have been popular in this area, the present paper presents data and analysis on international trade and its effects on income growth, structural change, and income distribution in Brazil during the period 1822-1913. Apart from its historical and analytical interest, this material may also be useful for checking the historical relevance of the stylized facts which underly deductive models of trade and development. Perceptions concerning nineteenth-century tropical trade and its effects on development have provided an implicit background to economic models of trade and development as well as to policy making in the current less-developed countries. What actually happened in tropical trade and development during the nineteenth century, however, is not at all clear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes some aspects of the industrialization policies followed by the Brazilian government in the post-World War II period. This article concentrates on the effects upon the structure of the economy, the rate of growth, and the performance of the principal new industries. Brazil's industrialization should be viewed against a background of declining earnings of its traditional exports, which consist principally of coffee, cocoa, sugar, and cotton. From the long-term trends in world trade, it would seem that these commodities are not among those which have a bright future. Further evidence of the dim outlook for the exports of primary producing countries and their continued reliance on specialization in those goods has recently been shown by the United Nations World Economic Survey, 1962. Although Brazil came out of the second World War with substantial amounts of foreign exchange reserves, these vanished within one year in an import spurt, a large proportion of which consisted of consumer goods.

The article presents information on a survey of management problems among groups of businessmen from Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil and Michigan. The author presents a comparison of the problems perceived by the two sets of managers and offers solutions to each set based on cultural aspects particular to each group. A discussion is presented about the differences in the business climate and situations that exist between Brazil and Michigan. An overview of cultural differences affecting international business is presented.

This article is limited to the study of the structure of trade conducted between a semi-industrialized country and a group of countries possessing an advanced industrial base. To analyze the commodity composition of trade between a semi-industrialized country, like Brazil, that has a relatively small and unsophisticated manufacturing sector and the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America, the neo-factor proportions theory is evoked. The factor proportions account views trade patterns as the outcome of the interaction between the production characteristics of commodities and the countries' relative availability of these factors.

The war brought many problems to Brazil. It brought also a great deal of industrial progress as traditional sources of supply were eliminated and as incomes and effective demand rose. Postwar adjustments are called for and are proving difficult to make. The cost of living is too high and the monetary unit is overvalued. Price control measures have been at best only partially effective. The year 1947 brought at least a beginning of necessary readjustments. The trend in the cost of living is tapering off and some prices have softened. Nevertheless, there would appear to be no immediate prospect of a sharp deflation or break in industrial activity, in spite of some troubles in the textile industry. Real trouble will not come until or unless the staple exports--coffee and cotton--begin to suffer. After some uncertainty in this area, the international markets for these items appear to be quite firm. The welfare of the nation is irrevocably bound up with continued high incomes in the rest of the world, particularly the United States, which is now both the largest seller to and buyer from Brazil. The Brazilian balance of payments is all-important, the export surplus performing the role customarily reserved to investment in more advanced countries. Fiscal policy is inextricably tied to this factor, even the volume of money in circulation being generally a function of it. The Brazilian's international interest, therefore, is in expanding trade at high incomes; with a continuance of such a situation, exchange stability (following the initial adjustment) will follow as a matter of course. Without it, exchange stability will be almost impossible to retain. In a very real sense, the Brazilian has a personal interest in the adoption of wise and sound economic policies in Washington and London. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]