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1. Outline of the Project. This paper is intended to be a progress report on a project in philosophy of science. The immediate stimulus of this report is the eightieth birthday of E. A. Singer, Jr., who was the inspiration of the project, and, needless to say, though responsible for the whole is not responsible for the misconceptions in the specific parts.2 The project lies within the philosophy of science, in a tradition that is not empirical and not "metaphysical," yet is possibly more empirical than positivism and more metaphysical than phenomenology. The project can be characterized as follows: to study the procedures of science without assuming any hierarchy of the sciences. This means that no discipline is to be regarded as fundamental with respect to another. Or, in specific instances, there is nothing in the nature of one problem as such which requires that it be studied prior to certain other problems. In slightly more formal terms, the project consists of constructing a conceptual model of science in which "presupposes" is not asymmetrical in the methodological sense. In order to explain this notion we first say that one problem A, presupposes another B, if the final answering of B requires the final answering of A. Evidently this formulation itself demands more explanation, but for the present, the idea should be simple enough to grasp. A physicist may have to solve a differential equation before he can determine the answer to a problem of mechanics. If so, the problem of mechanics presupposes the problem of mathematics. Now I suppose that normally one would assume that if problem A presupposes problem B, then B does not presuppose A (i.e., that the relation of "'presupposes" is asymmetrical). The practical consequence of this assumption is that if one has shown that A presupposes B, one should tackle B first. In other words there is no onus to prove that B does not presuppose A. Thus, philosophers argue that pragmatics presupposes semantics; do they also prove that semantics does not presuppose pragmatics? Metaphysical problems presuppose an adequate language; do the problems of language presuppose metaphysics? The concepts of physics presuppose the concept of "observables"; does not the concept of "observables" presuppose the concepts of physics? The assumption that problems can be ranked by the relation of "presupposes" has very definite consequences for the design of research for it implies that certain areas cannot be investigated fruitfully until certain other areas have been studied. The project to which I refer is an attempt to conceptualize science in such a manner that "presupposes" is not asymmetrical, that is, problem A may pre

MUCH in sympathy with Mr. Rescher's criticism 1 of Mr. Storer's paper 2 I believe it is possible to go even further in favor of two-valued logic. In fact I want to offer for consideration a theory which, if true, not only will show why logic is two-valued, and probably forever will remain so, but also will put into proper perspective much discussion about this topic, including some of Storer's and Rescher's arguments. Rescher opens up his discussion by stating quite rightly that "the claim to primacy of two-valued logic is not based upon some purported inclusiveness as a formal system" (p. 55). Yet it seems to me that there is a sense in which every m-valued logic is subsumed under the two-valued logic. For apparently it must hold, for every m, that either it is true or false, but not both, that a certain statement within the many-valued logic is m. This purely theoretical contention is not wholly without bearings on the two following more practical questions of Rescher's, if English is two-valued, and if two truth-values are sufficient to describe reality. Although there is a certain agreement between the two authors with respect to Storer's thesis that "no English sentence is unequivocally true or false in every situation where it might, reasonably, be called forth from some English-speaking individual" (p. 77), Rescher still finds it difficult to apply this assertion to the sentence "Napoleon's birthday antedated his defeat at Waterloo." 3 The example, however, probably runs the risk of being considered analytic, and though, for reasons I will not elaborate, every analytic sentence seems to me definitely to be true or false, Storer's thesis still holds for empirical sentences; surprisingly it may seem, and I for one did not originally believe it, but have sought persistently for counterexamples without success. We must not refrain from accepting it, misled by the fact that some sentences are definitely true, or are definitely false, e.g., "Boston is north of New York," and "Napoleon lived in the twentieth century." The two towns might have been on exactly the same latitude, and the general might have died New Year's Eve 1899 at twelve P.M. sharp. Presumably these examples will not interfere too heavily with the practical usefulness of two-valued logic. But some others in a certain sense conspicuously do so, namely all terms traditionally classified as vague: bald, diligent, etc. Suppose we ask a man if he is always diligent with respect to his pro

T BHE DECLINE OF THE CARTESIAN WORLDVIEW in the early decades of the eighteenth century has been described from several vantage points.' As a metaphysical system it reflected the failure of the ontology of substance philosophy.2 The categories substance and modification were too limited in scope; the essences extension and thought so different in kind as to forbid causal interaction. As a methodological system it failed because certain knowledge of the temporal phenomenal world could not be deduced from its logical axioms.3 As a planetary explanation its vortical aethereal motions were shown by Newton to be inconsistent with Kepler's laws, while the gradual demise of these aethereal hypotheses has been recently documented by E. J. Aiton.4 My purpose in this paper is to indicate the inadequacies of the Cartesian worldview in handling problems in terrestrial mechanics. I shall show that although Cartesian presuppositions were used in mechanical problems, the mathematical results supported Leibnizian or Newtonian conclusions. Cartesianism was unable to maintain

i l ^ HARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, who contrib, iuted the term pragmatism to the language of philosophy, insisted always that the term was intended to designate a method. Pragmatism, he warned, is not a Weltanschauung, nor a doctrine of metaphysics, nor even an 'attempt to determine any truth of things." It is simply a method of ascertaining meanings, of making them clear, and of pointing a way for the successful determination of the truth of things. Peirce's practice consistently belied his preaching in this regard, for his exposition of the method involved a metaphysical system of considerable scope; and this, it seems to me, was unavoidable. Yet it was as a method that Peirce first presented his distinctive point of view, and it is primarily as a method that I wish to consider it here. Into metaphysics, or Weltanschauung, we shall surely be led; despite Peirce's pronouncement, I make no apology for that. Peirce presented his pragmatic method in two of his most famous papers, published in the Popular Science Monthly in 1877 and i878.1 His purpose was to tell what thinking is, in terms of what it aims to do, and to suggest the method most appropriate for the accomplishment of its aim. The name

Interpretation of theAgamemnonin general and of its first choral sequence in particular has tended to proceed on two assumptions: first, that Aeschylus could have given an answer (not necessarily a simple answer) to the question, ‘Was Agamemnon free to choose whether or not to sacrifice his daughter?’; and secondly, that he composed the play in such a way that if we try hard enough we can discover his answer. I submit in this paper an interpretation which replaces both these assumptions with an alternative trio of hypotheses for which, I think, a case can be made: first, that Aeschylus was well aware that in real life we cannot know the extent to which an agent was able to choose whether or not to commit a particular act; secondly, that inAg.104–257 he has portrayed realistically the manner in which people respond to the commission of an extraordinary and disagreeable act by a respected agent; and thirdly, that the aspect of Agamemnon's predicament which made the most powerful impression on Aeschylus and his audience is an aspect to which modern interpreters of the play have seldom alluded even by implication. I would not be so rash as to assert that Aeschylus never concerned himself with the question of responsibility, nor that his concepts of justice and retribution are of small interest, but I am not satisfied that ‘with all the powers of his mind’, as Professor Lesky puts it, ‘he wrestled with the problem arising from the conflict between human existence and divine rule’, nor do I take the view that a dramatist passionately involved in metaphysics and theology is a wiser and greater man than one who devotes the powers of his mind to concrete problems of poetic and theatrical technique. The scale of values adopted by interpreters of early Greek tragedy has certainly been affected, and has perhaps been somewhat distorted, by the dominant position of philosophy in European culture and education.

This paper tries to give an answer to the question why the Neopositivist "Logic of Science" has not been able to cope with the peculiar interests and problems of the Iiumanities (i.e. Philologies, History and critical humanistic Social Science), to speak more precisely: why Neopositivists conceive of "understanding" only as an heuristic auxiliary function in the service of "covering law explanation" and thus cannot account of Hermeneutics, that is the methodology of interpreting the meaning of symbols (texts, works, actions, institutions etc.). The answer given starts from the thesis that Methodological Solipsism that is the assumption that, in principle, one person alone can practice science by objectifying the whole world without presupposing a complementary hermeneutic knowledge by communication with human Co-subjects belongs to the secret metaphysical presuppositions of Logical Positivism. As an alternative a transcendental foundation of Hermeneutics (and of Critique of Ideology) is proposed which presupposes the Apriori of Conmmunication.

The object of this paper is to comment on the close connection between the study of physics and the practice of medicine. The partnership is of respectable antiquity. Indeed, it could hardly be older, for it originated in the school of Aristotle. He regarded ⊘νσικη as the study of natural phenomena, organic and inorganic; so the same term came to be used for science and for the healing art-as well as for metaphysics, which was the subject next to physics in the curriculum of the Lyceum at Athens where the Peripatetic philosophers held their classes.

Some academic subject matters have a quaintly old-fashioned ring-‘moral sciences’ for example, or ‘natural philosophy’. ‘Practical theology’ has a similar odd sound today. To the theological outsider is must sound remarkably like a contradiction in terms, whilst to the professional theologian it may carry undertones of an unscholarly pragmatism or a tendency towards liberal theology. Yet perhaps the juxtaposition of these two terms is an important one. It may, by its oddity, encourage us to ask the question, ‘Is practical theology possible?’ This would be a question similar to the familiar one about the possibility of metaphysics. It is asking for a formal definition of the subject matter which will meet adequate criteria of meaning, consistency and relationship to other disciplines whose status is not in doubt. In this paper I shall attempt some answers to this question of possibility.

1. Introduction. Nowadays metaphysics is so far out of fashion, with scientists at any rate, that a few words of justification may be required for putting it in relation with science, as in this paper.Metaphysics is nothing occult, nor is it necessarily dogmatic or allied to theology. Strictly, it is a science itself, the science of being. But since a large section of being—even the whole of it, according to some metaphysics—consists of phenomena, and since the ostensible business of natural science is with phenomena, a distinction has to be made. The use of ‘metaphysics’ in this paper is restricted to the non-phenomenal mode of being. More explicitly, it is restricted to formal and general things, such as category, class, variable, relation, order. General words, which I take to be all the words except certain proper names, are, accordingly, metaphysical signs; and the metaphysical matrix is by no means limited to science but extends to all discourse in which there are general terms.

The thesis' which I wish to argue in this paper is that Aristotle introduces for the first time in the history of the Greek language the progressive sense for the present periphrasis in order to establish a new metaphysical theory, and furthermore, that this grammatical innovation was indeed necessary in order to express this theory in a plausible fashion as it applies to crucial examples. The theory is that what a thing is, or more accurately what a thing is in itself, is determined by members of all ten categories, but only in a primary way in relation to the category of substance (ouiaLa) and in secondary ways in relation to the other categories. In other words, in answer to the question "What is it (in itself)?", one may correctly say "a man" or "an animal" and thus say what it is (in itself) primarily, but in addition, one may say that it is white, three feet high, or walking, and thus say what it is (in itself) secondarily. (The crucial examples in question are those of the continuous action of an agent going on at the time of the assertion.) This equivocation of being-in-itself is virtually the same as the famous equivocation of being explained in Metaphysics Z 1. To establish this historical point about the Greek language and the philosophical interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics which parallels it, I shall focus my interpretation upon a difficult but crucial passage in Metaphysics A 7 1017 a 22-30, and especially 11. 27-30 where Aristotle asserts that "A man is walking" does not differ from "A man walks". However, before entering upon a discussion of Aristotle's text, it is necessary (1) to clarify the grammatical notion of a periphrasis and the logical notion of the progressive sense, (2) to establish the historical

In this paper I criticize Toulmin's concept of ‘Ideals of Natural Order’ and his account of the role these ‘Ideals’ play in scientific explanation as given in his book, Foresight and Understanding. I argue that Toulmin's account of ‘Ideals of Natural Order’ as those theories taken to be self evident by scientists at a given time introduces an undesirable subjectivism into his account of scientific explanation. I argue also that the history of science, especially the recent history of microphysics, does not support Toulmin's contentions about the supposed self-evidence of the basic explanatory theories in science.

IT is the purpose of this paper to consider the method put forward by Herbart as the instrument by which inference can be made from the cominon concepts of experience to such knowledge of Reality as shall render a ratiopal explanation of experience possible. It will be well to define at' the outset Herbart's relation to his great predecessor Kant, and his great contemporary Hegel. Herbart's philosophy is founded on Kant, as is Hegel's, though Herbart and Hegel are almost wholly opposed to one another. Hegel is the better known, for Herbart's attempt at continuation has been much ignored, and there is no English work on the subject; yet it is of interest as leading to a consistent pluralism. Herbart differs from Kant concerning the possibility of knowledge of ultimate Reality. Kant denies this possibility, whereas Herbart maintains that the nature of appearance is significant of the nature of Reality-" Wie viel Schein, so viel Hindeutung zur Sein". Kant, says Herbart, does not "I accept the decided challenge to undertake an investigation that would lead to the determination of what exists in Reality (Das Seiende) as it is of necessity determined, so that appearance should present itself as it is and not otherwise" (iii., ? 118, 344).1 -Nevertheless it is evident that " as the smoke points to the fire, so does appearance to Reality; it not merely points thereto, but requires us to set about looking where the fire burns " (iii., ? 118, 344). To understand this divergence, the point at issue between the two philosophers must be stated more clearly. Both start with experience, experience which is for them necessarily organised by certain common concepts, such as space, time

IN A recent article 1 Strawson attempts to mediate between a skeptical position with regard to the existence of mental states in others and a philosophical behaviorism which would identify such states with observable behavior. He does so by exhibiting what we may advisedly call a rule of use for the ascription of mental, personal, or "P predicates" whereby the latter "span" both selfand other-ascribing uses. In symbolic terms, if Px is the general form of the propositional function of a P-predicate, then both "I" and "He" are values of X.2 The reason we allegedly have such a rule is that we hold a concept of the person as an entity of a type to which P-predicates are significantly ascribable. This concept, moreover, may be established as "logically primary" and all others as secondary or derivative. Finally, the justification for any P-predicate ascription is grounded on the behavior associated with such entities. Behavior, Strawson asserts, is a "logically adequate criterion" of ascription. My paper will be divided into the following three sections which conform to the main points in Strawson's argument: (1) the formulation and substantiation of the P-predicate rule, (2) the logically primitive concept of the person on which that rule is allegedly based, and (3) the notion of behavior as a logically adequate criterion of ascription.

The philosophy of quantum mechanics has often been conceived by physicists as a collection of dogmas concerning what can be measured, observed and known. To this branch of dialectics the present paper does not attempt to contribute, chiefly because it is written from the conviction that no part of science, nor any philosophy, can safely predict what may be feasible or knowable. Rather, this brief essay endeavors to expose the epistemology of quantum physics in a way which allows it to be recognized as an extension of the ordinary processes of cognition, as the continuation of a line which starts in sensory perception, leads straight through the methods of classical physics into quantum mechanics and shows no signs of terminating even there. Since the literature abounds with descriptions of the facts explained by the quantum theory, and since we make no pretense of adding to its mathematical formalism, we shall here be concerned neither with factual details nor with mathematical analysis. In true scientific spirit we should say that "we take them for granted." But we refuse to do so. There are problems in this field which are of a purely philosophic character and which will ultimately be solved by philosophers if they are solved at all. Therefore we take down the usual deterrent poster which says, "Danger, High Potential", omit the mathematics, and invite the philosopher to participate in a venture which is as challenging as it is important. 1. Methodology of Physics: Sense Data. The physicist who conceives his task to be the description of a given world, wholly external to himself and preformed as real, enjoys enviable practical advantages over his more skeptical brethren. His belief has fashioned for him a streamlined vehicle for his ride through nature, a vehicle which carries him to his goals with utmost dispatch and insures his researches to be efficient. But he has sold his philosophic soul. For his belief commits him to an unfortunate dualism, to the acknowledgment of an essential difference between his world and his knowledge of that world; and if he ever attempted to bridge the two he would need the strangest theories of metaphysics. This has always been true. But during the present century a new occasion for a critical examination of realism has arisen. Physics itself has renounced the thesis that we are mere spectators of the given. Reminders to this effect come from the theory of relativity with its denial of absolute space, from the newer forms of electrodynamics with their unhesitating acceptance of advanced potentials. In its most impressive form, however, do we read this memento in the quantum theory and its uncertainty principle, which makes reality depend on human observation. But the fact remains that realism, or more particularly the view which makes the scientist a spectator of the given is palpably correct in an important practical and obvious sense. Hence philosophy, no matter how refined, can never wholly disavow it. The view must in fact present itself as a first approximation 287

Guidance and counseling have drawn heavily from psychological theories; however, psychological bases alone can not adequately explain the guidance point of view. There is a need for some philosophic bases of guidance. The present paper attempts to review guidance principles and appraisal techniques from a philosophical angle. Metaphysics of guidance reviews the nature of the individual. Epistemology of guidance classifies various appraisal techniques based on the pattern of nyāaya, one of the systems of Indian philosophy.

W T THEN we consider it as a whole, Descartes's system appears to us as a type of metaphysics concerned with the problems of a complete and fundamental knowledge through which man is to attain the wisest and most creative life. Descartes's aim was the establishment of a universal science from which all the other sciences and truths were to be drawn. No one has ever endeavored more earnestly than did Descartes to discover through thought the truths of philosophy or wisdom. He looked upon philosophy as a tree, the roots of which were metaphysics, the trunk physics, and the branches all the other sciences (in turn reducible to the three principal branches of medicine, mechanics, and ethics).2 Except for their first principles, however, none of these sciences were conceived by Descartes, as they had been by ancient thinkers, as so many constant and immutable truths-but rather, in contrast, as means for progress, useful to man "for his conduct in life as well as for the preservation of his health and the invention of all the arts."3 Being first of all a physicist and a metaphysician, Descartes did not seek to propose social reforms, just as he did not try to impose on other people the philosophic method in which he thoroughly believed.4 He did, however, have the opportunity to observe a variety of social phenomena; hence there appear in his works, cautiously expressed, a good many moral and sociological statements which allow us to deduce up to a certain point the manner in which he regarded society. For "no one more than Descartes has been mastered by the necessity of abstraction; yet no one has ever possessed more abundantly a sense for the real."s It is the intention of this paper, accordingly, to indicate Descartes's conception of society, his view of the relation between society and the

n this paper, I want to examine two claims found in Aristotle's Metaphysics: (A) the claim that notions like being and unity do not constitute genera and (B) the claim that such notions are not univocally predicable of all things. I want, in particular, to consider the view (expressed by Porphyry, William of Ockham, and J. L. Ackrill) that (A) entails (B). I shall argue that the alleged entailment cannot hold since while (A) is true, (B) is false.

James argued that time is a sensation, and the main point of this paper is to deny that claim. The concept of the specious present is explained, indicating how it clarifies the concept of “the present moment.” But neither it nor an argument used by Mach and James show time to be a sensation. The analysis presented here requires distinguishing concepts of sensation from concepts of temporal relations. James' view is really a theory that time-as-duration is sensed. But this assumes that the description of time as sensed is also a description of time as an objective property of independent events. This is nowhere established, and making it plausible is a recurrent problem for philosophies like neutral monism and radical empiricism.

IN The Explanation of Behavior, Charles Taylor asks whether "the concepts we use in our everyday account [of human behavior] can be applied without change of meaning to beings whose behavior could be explained by nonteleological laws" (p. 40).1 Taylor's answer is no. He concludes that if there were an adequate non-teleological theory of human behavior, then this would show that such concepts as 'action,' 'intention,' and 'desire,' in their present meanings, do not apply to human beings (pp. 40, 49). The discovery of a general non-teleological theory of human behavior would show, according to Taylor, that human behavior is not action. I shall try to show that Taylor's arguments for this contention are unsound, and in doing this I shall argue that there are certain conditions under which a non-teleological theory of human behavior would be compatible with our ordinary teleological explanations of human behavior as action. Taylor provides a subtle and elaborate analysis of action which I will not attempt to set out here. The crucial part of the analysis for the purposes of this paper is the claim that it is a necessary condition for some behavior's being an action that some intention or purpose of the agent have a role in bringing about the behavior (p. 33). "Thus the laws by which we explain action must be such that the antecedent is the condition of the agent having a certain intention or purpose . . ." (p. 36). Such laws Taylor calls "laws governing action." An example of such a "law" is 'He strikes whoever contradicts him.' In this example, Taylor says, if certain intentions and purposes of the agent are changed as a result of his changing his policy or becoming more tolerant the sort of event described as the antecedent in this "law" would not result in the behavior described as the consequent (p. 35). Since laws governing action are laws which state conditions for inten

Lately, an increased interest in formal devices has led to an attempt on the part of some mathematicians to do without those aspects of mathematics which require intuition. One consequence of this movement has been a new conception of pure mathematics as a science of axiomatic systems. According to this conception, there is no reality beyond an axiomatic system which the statements of mathematics are about; the fact that a statement is a theorem in the system is all that is of interest. This is a sort of nominalist position,2 since the contrary position seems to be committed to a belief in the existence of a domain of mathematical entities, which are just as suspect as the universals commonly discussed in metaphysical treatises. More often it is called formalism. I shall attempt to show, however, that one does not have to maintain a realist position in order to hold that there is a notion of mathematical validity independent of axiomatic systems. A mathematical theory can be given in the form of a conceptual scheme, which is a sort of intuitive model. The entities of a conceptual scheme, one might say, have ontological status only in the mind. But I feel that to say only this tends to be confusing,3 and therefore I will attempt an alternative formulation. In this paper, I shall discuss the relative merits of axiomatic systems and conceptual schemes as foundations for mathematics. I shall present some of the arguments in favor of axiomatic systems, but finally I shall attempt to demonstrate that mathematics requires conceptual schemes. Only by appealing to a conceptual scheme, I shall argue, can we have some idea that a mathematical theory is consistent, since axiomatic systems provide us with no legitimate basis for such judgments.4

I shall be concerned in this paper with the consideration of panpsychism and of materialism in new forms as alternatives. Extended reference will be made to C. S. Peirce's view of perception as realistic in intention and yet not quite clear as to its mechanism and how it attains objective import. I shall say little about Whitehead as a representative of panpsychism as I have just finished a detailed criticism of his epistemological framework. I shall, however, make comments on William James's radical empiricism as tied in with his view of perception as direct and immediate—roughly speaking, the alternative to Locke's representation of “unperceived things”—and bring in my own theory of sensations as guiding perceiving. Russell's neutral monism, connected historically with James's radical empiricism, will be touched on here in connection with his rejection of materialism. Phenomenalism and materialism exclude each other. Materialism, as an ontology, requires a realistic epistemology. I shall also make some comments on Dewey's biological experientialism. One can often best explain a perspective by means of contrasts.

The pre-designationist, anti-inductivist and operationalist tenor of Neyman-Pearson theory give that theory an obvious affinity to several currently influential philosophies of science, most particularly, the Popperian. In fact, one might fairly regard Neyman-Pearson theory as the statistical embodiment of Popperian methodology. The difficulties raised in this paper have, then, wider purport, and should serve as something of a touchstone for those who would construct a theory of evidence adequate to statistics without recourse to the notion of inductive probability.

THE views expressed in this paper are not original. The work of Wittgenstein inspired it. The arguments which it contains are for the most part such as have been used by writers in Erkenntnis, notably by Moritz Schlick in his Positivismus und Realismus and Rudolf Carnap in his Uberwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache. But some may find my presentation of them 'the clearer. And I hope to convince others by whom the work of Wittgenstein and the Viennese school has so far been ignored or misunderstood.

Whenever critics have noted an influence of the Platonic dialogues upon Byron, they have assumed that it is practically limited to the passing echo of Shelley's and Wordsworth's Platonism in the third canto of Childe Harold. In this paper I hope to show that, on the contrary, Byron had independent convictions about the Platonic-Socratic philosophy, which underlay most of his mature writing and which were inconsistent with his reflection of Shelley's metaphysics in Childe Harold.

M Y PURPOSE in this paper is, first, to make the beginnings of a case for the inclusion in the tradition of Western political philosophy of the French Nobel Laureate Albert Camus. It is, second, to explore and to evaluate those aspects of Camus's thought which seem to me relevant to the continuing problems of political philosophy. The moment that one raises the name of a man known primarily as a novelist and playwright in the context of political philosophy he gives a kind of prima facie validity to a pair of charges frequently invoked against political philosophy in the twentieth century. Partly because these charges seem to me to be in an important sense superficial, and partly because an examination of them will help to delineate the framework of the analysis that I shall attempt to present, we shall do well to pause for a moment to look into them. The first of these allegations is that contemporary students of political philosophy spend their time discovering or "rediscovering some deservedly obscure text"; ' and the second, the oft-repeated claim that political philosophy is dead.2 These charges are, of course, closely related: One looks, it is suggested, under every rock for a snippet of yet-unanalyzed political philosophy, or what, by some stretch of the imagination, can be classed as political philosophy, because political philosophy as a "going concern" no longer exists. To put it more pointedly, is not a discussion of Camus, a man whom very few would think of as a political philosopher and who certainly did not so present himself, a rather pathetic grasping at straws by someone who will not admit defeat even though it stares him in the face? It is superfluous, I suppose, to answer that I do not think so. The claim that political philosophy is dead is in many ways a superficial one because it hinges upon a particular, and, I would argue, an excessively narrow conception of what political philosophy is. If one insists that political philosophy must consist of a set of political prescriptions which are rooted in and inferred from an elaborate and general philosophical apparatus of a metaphysical and/or ontological sort, then, of course, contemporary political philosophy which is not for the most part a resuscitation of the classics is hard to find. In short, if Plato and Hegel are the paradigms, then political philosophy (since 1900 or so) is dead. A man must on this analysis be a philosopher first (in the sense of logical priority) in order to be a political philosopher at all. This definition is, however, an anachronous one; it demands of the political thinker a style of argument which is no longer intellectually available. I would argue instead for what might be called a functional definition of political philosophy. Political philosophy is always a set of recommendations about how men should engage in politics.3 Men have always and will always have questions concerning the proper way to organize politically and the criteria of proper decision in a political context. Whoever undertakes to answer such questions by a careful and yet general analysis of their meaning and the consequences of deciding them one way or another is a political philosopher. The political philosopher is very often less an observer of the political process than

IT IS a commonplace that the twentieth-century venue of the perennial "pseudomachy of science and religion" is psychology. Can what is known as "religious experience" be approved or not as objectively valid? "No," says the one school, headed by Professor Leuba, "modern psychology makes acceptance impossible." "Your conclusions are wrong," replies Professor Otto, "because all your arguments are irrelevant. We are here in a sphere where psychology can have literally nothing to say." Must these doctrines fight to the death, or is there a mediating view that will be more than a dishonest compromise? It is the thesis of the present paper that there is truth in both views. If we are to be honest with science, we must accept the results of Professor Leuba's criticism of religious experience, which assigns all the elements which his analysis has found in it to the domain of secular psychology. But if we are to deal with the full facts of religious experience, we shall have to admit that it includes an element that Professor Leuba's analysis has not allowed for-Professor Otto's sense of the "numinous." As Professor Leuba's analysis does not distinguish this,' his criticism does not directly touch it; and it will be maintained that, in the present state of metaphysics, no psychological criticism can touch it. I shall further suggest that this concept of the numinous will provide the norm for a scientific separation (in thought) of the specifically religious from the secular elements in "religious" experience, and hence for a settling of derivative problems like the validity of "grand mysticism," the relation of grand mysticism to mild, the relation of "conversion" to reli

FgANZ BREWrANO wrote, in a well-known passage, that intentionality is peculiar to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon, he said, shows anything like it; hence intentionality affords us a criterion of the mental or psychical? Let us refer to this view as "Brentano's thesis." Among the phenomena which he would have called "intentional" is the interpretation of signs. One may ask, is it possible to provide an adequate theory of signs which will show Brentano's thesis to be mistaken? In the present paper I shall make certain general points which, I believe, must be considered in any attempt to answer this question, I shall first attempt to state Brentano's thesis somewhat more exactly; then I shall turn to the analysis of the concept sign.

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to demonstrate, by means of elementary logical principles, that there is no such thing as a valid "deductive probability" argument. The view that there is was probably originated by Jacques Bernoulli, and was developed by numerous adherents of the classical theory of probability. More recently, it has received the powerful and influential support of C. S. Peirce (A Theory of Probable Inference), W. S. Jevons (Principles of Science), and, among contemporaries, D. C. Williams (The Ground of Induction), C. J. Ducasse (Some Observations concerning the Nature of Probability), C. I. Lewis (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, and Professor Chisholm and Empiricism), R. M. Chisholma (The Problem of Empiricism), and others too numerous to mention, who accept though they do not specifically advocate the theory of "deductive probability arguments."

R EADERS have always found it easier to agree that Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy is a good book than to agree on precisely what makes it so good or what message it is, in its laborious and complicated manner, delivering. As they stress now this aspect and now that of its fathomless richness, they seem at times hardly to be talking about the same work. For example, we are told that Burton is utterly credulous: 'For the nature of evidence (as it is called by the modems) he cares nothing. Everything is admissible that has been written in a book.'l And yet, 'in Burton the English Renaissance grows... skeptical.'2 The book is 'a medical treatise... orderly in arrangement.'3 Yet it is a 'trackless jungle.' It is a 'formidable statement of... skepticism.'4 On the contrary, 'no greater adept of Platonism' than Burton 'ever lived';5 or rather, 'Burton was, first of all, a neo-Platonist.'6 But then, 'he is no metaphysician. He has evidently read metaphysical works by Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus. . .. But abstruse speculation has small appeal to his practical mind.'7 The Anatomy is 'serious in purpose, and weighty beyond belief in authorities.'8 Nevertheless, 'we read Burton for fun.'9 Many, or most of these statements can doubtless be accommodated in a synthesis; but their diversity suggests an unusually ambiguous book. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the Anatomy's ambiguity in a particular instance: its relation to the work of the celebrated sixteenthcentury logician Peter Ramus. I hope to show that Burton innocently used the tools of Ramism for utterly different ends from those for which they had been forged.

This morning I wish to give you a short review of the work of the biological section of the International Society for Signifies. The pur pose of this section consists in submitting the concepts of biology to a significal and logical analysis. Whereas experimental biology aims at an elimination of emotional elements, emotional and volitional elements are often abundantly represented in speculative, vitalistic biology. To come to an exact definition of technical terms in biology, it is necessary to start from the basic language, that is the language of every-day life. The purpose of the biological section consists also in submitting terms of the speculative biology such as causality, teleology, finality, totality, wholeness, to a critical analysis. For the time being, the section has limited itself to an investigation of the concepts of taxonomy, coenology and animal-psychology. At the moment my pur pose consists in giving you a brief review of the results achieved in the field of taxonomy. Lectures were given, papers were read by Prof. Raven about zoology, by Dr de Froe about anthropology and by my self on the field of taxonomy of plants, the formulations of which were discussed in our circle.

This paper tries to show that although Carnap's distinction between internal and external questions in terms of a linguistic framework is philosophically important, and that although metaphysical questions are, as Carnap claims, external questions, Carnap's conclusion that all meaningful metaphysical questions are practical questions about language is not justified. This is done in three steps. First, it is argued that it is plausible to suppose that there is for languages a kind of external question other than the one kind Carnap specifies, because “language games” are like the game of chess in important ways and there seems to be such a kind of question for chess. Second, it is shown that at least some metaphysical questions can quite reasonably be interpreted as being of this kind. Third, reasons are given for rejecting Carnap's grounds for claiming that there is only one kind of external question.

BUDDHISM as a religion is divided into Hinayana Buddhism, the Buddhism of the narrow path, and Mahayana Buddhism, the Buddhism of the wide path. Hinayana has remained close to the teachings of the Sakyamuni Buddha, and has devoted itself largely to the salvation of the individual and the avoidance of metaphysics. The cloistered monk or arhat is the ideal Hinayanist. Mahayana looks for universal salvation, and has not taken seriously the advice to avoid metaphysics. It is a layman's religion filled with warmth and originality by minds unfettered by scholastic devotion to a body of sacred writings. The Bodhisattva, a being that has qualified itself as a Buddha but has postponed its full nirvana in order to help others save themselves, is the ideal Mahayanist. Neither Hinayana nor Mahayana follows the original doctrine of Gautama. Chatterjee and Datta looking at Hinayana and Mahayana from the detached point of view of Vedantic absolutism write, "The first without the second would remain sublime but relatively useless; the second without the first would cease to be."' I doubt that any Hinayanist or Mahayanist would agree! Mahayana Buddhism can be divided philosophically by the two methods which the Buddhists have used to grasp ultimate reality: Reason and Experience. "Experience" here denotes sensations that are immediate and non-sharable. Both reason (nydya-meaning "rule" or "principle") and direct experience (dhydna-from the root dhi meaning "to perceive") were in the legacy of the Buddha. These two ways may be described as knowing by the use of rules and knowing by pure sensation. The Buddhists separate sensation and awareness. Pure sensation is a subjective state without the judgment that an object is being sensed. Pure sensation grasps the ultimately real, a real which is unutterable and uncognizable by discursive thought. As Stcherbatksy says, "The Buddhist maintains that by pure sensation 'we really perceive the blue, but we do not know that it is blue' (nilan vijanati, na tu "nilam iti" vijanati). As soon as we tell that it is blue, we have already compared it with the non-blue, and this the senses alone cannot achieve. A consistent sensationalism must be speechless."2 In the Vajrasamadhi Sutra these two ways are described as "Entrance by Reason" and "Entrance by Conduct." Takakusu calls them "Negative Rationalism" and "Introspective Intuition." In this paper we shall examine the Yogacara and the Madhyamika schools in Nyaya Buddhism and the Zen school in Dhyana Buddhism. Asvaghosa (first century A.D.) and Nagarjuna (second century A.D.), the outstanding contributors to Yogacara and Madhyamika respectively, are commonly regarded as the founders of the Mahayana. Their schools are the two great speculative systems of Indian Buddhism. Zen is China's contribution to Buddhism.

IN AN article entitled "Mr. Pap on Meaning Rules," 1 Mr. Grover Maxwell contends that the necessary character of analytic truths can be accounted for solely on the basis of linguistic rules or stipulations. The purpose of the present paper is to discuss this contention. I wish to avoid, as far as possible, consideration of "Platonism" (I agree, of course, with Maxwell that meanings or universals should not be thought of as shadowy particulars), and of the necessity of intuition in the determination of necessary truth. I should suppose, however, that some appeal to intuition is necessary in determining the truth-value of any statement, if direct understanding of the meaning of sentences is counted as a kind of intuition; after all, a statement cannot specify its own meaning. It should be remarked, moreover, that intuition is a notion relating not to the truth of statements, but at best to the recognition of such truth. Thus, even if 33

In a pair of very important papers, namely “Space, Time and Individuals” (STI) in the Journal of Philosophy for October 1955 and “The Indestructibility and Immutability of Substances” (IIS) in Philosophical Studies for April 1956, Professor N. L. Wilson began something which badly needed beginning, namely the construction of a logically rigorous “substance-language” in which we talk about enduring and changing individuals as we do in common speech, as opposed to the “space-time” language favoured by very many mathematical logicians, perhaps most notably by Quine. This enterprise of Wilson's is one with which I could hardly sympathize more heartily than I do; and one wishes for this logically rigorous “substance-language” not only when one is reading Quine but also when one is reading many other people. How fantastic it is, for instance, that Kotarbinski1 should call his metaphysics “Reism” when the very last kind of entity it has room for is things—instead of them it just has the world-lines or life-histories of things; “fourdimensional worms”, as Wilson says. Wilson, moreover, has at least one point of superiority to another rebel against space-time talk, P. F. Strawson; namely he (Wilson) does seriously attempt to meet formalism with formalism—to show that logical rigour is not a monopoly of the other side. At another point, however, Strawson seems to me to see further than Wilson; he (Strawson) is aware that substance-talk cannot be carried on without tenses, whereas Wilson tries (vainly, as I hope to show) to do without them. Wilson, in short, has indeed brought us out of Egypt; but as yet has us still wandering about the Sinai Peninsula; the Promised Land is a little further on than he has taken us.

Many theories of social change associate the rise of religious movements with underlying social imbalance and strain. What is important in such assumptions is the existence of a large number of aggrieved whose wants are not being adequately met within the framework of the society.1 In postwar Japan, reflecting extensive cultural conflicts and political changes, many new religions developed. Some survived, but many failed. Among the former, the two most successful are the Rissh6 K5seikai and the Saka Gakkai, which share the same Nichiren philosophy but have developed two different versions of Buddhistic teachings. In this paper, we shall compare and contrast them, with emphasis upon their respective organizational features including such areas as dogma, methods of recruitment, leadership and authority relationships. Further, we shall comment on their respective political activities to illustrate their different patterns of influencing social groups and society as a whole. The Rissh6 K6seikai was founded in 1938 by the present President Nikky6 Niwano and his lifelong co-worker, the late Mrs. My6k6 Naganuma. Its current membership is about 600,000 households, with heaviest concentration on the Kanto Plain (Tokyo and six surrounding prefectures). The S6ka Gakkai which also began in the prewar period, was founded by Tsunesabur6 Makigushi, author of the Theory of Value on which the metaphysical foundation of the S6ka Gakkai has been based. While their prewar activities were virtually nil, the two religions flourished rapidly after the war. The Rissh6 K6seikai enjoyed a sharp increase in membership around 1950 and reached a peak around 1955-58. Although lagging behind by a few years, around 1955 the S6ka Gakkai commenced to make determined, forceful moves for conversions and developed an open confrontation with other new religions, particularly the RisshU K6seikai. It made its initial breakthrough around 1958-1960. Today, the S6ka Gakkai claims its membership is roughly ten times that of the Rissh6 K6seikai.

As was pointed out early in the preceding paper,' only the third section of the Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals, entitled by Kant " Transition from the metaphysic of morals to the critique of pure practical reason ", contains doctrines which can be said to be specifically critical in character. The doctrines in question concern the fixing of a limit to the competence of any system of practical philosophy; Kant puts forward the idea that since we can demonstrate that freedom is incomprehensible, we cannot explain its existence, but must be content with showing that no proof of its impossibility is itself possible. In all this Kant is dealing with a province which he was the first to conquer. But in the first two sections of the work, the " Transition from common to philosophical rational knowledge of ethics " and the " Transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysic of morals ", which are of a purely analytical nature, he is standing upon the same ground as his predecessors in moral philosophy. It is true, of course, that he turns this ground over and ploughs it up. Thus the peculiar object of the Grundlegung is the discovery and determination of the supreme principle of morality, and the formula offered of it in the first two sections is a new formula, originated by Kant himself. But it should be noticed that Kant only claims the merit of having " formulated " what we must do if we are to fulfil our obligations; he never suggests that he is introducing a new principle of all morality, for that would be equivalent, as he says, to " discovering morality for the first time ". What he believes that he is the first to do is to give a precise determination to a principle which the " most enlightened moralists " of the past have long attempted to determine. It is in accordance with this that, for example

The monumental works of Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat have set a firm pattern of interpretation which many follow in their approach to the Philosophy of Leibniz. In the Preface to the second edition of The Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell reaffirms his contention that “Leibniz’s philosophy was almost entirely derived from his logic”. He welcomes the support provided in Couturat’s La Logique de Leibniz. Russell remarks “No candid reader—can doubt that Leibniz’s metaphysic was derived by him from the subject-predicate logic. This appears, for example, from the paper ‘Primae Veritates’ where all the main doctrines of the Monadology are deduced, with terse logical rigor from the premises; ‘Always therefore the predicate or consequent adheres in the subject or antecedent, and in this fact consists the nature of truth in general—But this is true in every affirmative truth, universal or singular, necessary or contingent’.” Referring further to Couturat, he points out that in his book the “Principle of Sufficient Reason” and “The Identity of Indiscernibles” are “expressly deduced—from the analytic character of all true propositions”. In short, Russell is contending that in formulating his metaphysics Leibniz (i) used the rigorous methods of deductive logic and (2) employed “models” drawn from logic to construct his “picture of reality”, i.e. his metaphysics.

Professor Schubert Ogden's The Reality of God (New York: Harper & Row, 1966) consists of eight essays. The longest, which also gives the book its title, is based upon the author's 1965 Merrick Lectures at Ohio Wesleyan University. Two others, "What Sense Does It Make To Say 'God Acts in History'?" and "Theology and Objectivity," first appeared in this Journal in January, I963, and July, I965, respectively. '" The Temporality of God " was originally published in the Festschrift for Bultmann's eightieth birthday. "What Does It Mean To Affirm, 'Jesus Christ Is Lord'?" is reprinted from Encounter, where it had a slightly different title; and "Myth and Truth" comes from a special supplement to the McCormick Review. The remaining two papers, presumably published for the first time in the present volume, are on "The Strange Witness of Unbelief" and "The Promise of Faith." In his Preface, Ogden declares that "the usual ways of approaching the problem of God today make an adequate solution of it impossible," and urges that "this is doubly tragic because the resources of our situation, largely neglected though they are, offer a perhaps unparallelled opportunity for adequately solving it" (p. ix). The nub of this problem lies in two questions: "(I) as to the bases in our common human experience for talking about the reality of God at all; and (2) as to the conceptuality or system of fundamental concepts in which that reality is most adequately conceived and understood" (p. x). The essence of Ogden's answer to the first question is that the one indispensable "'proof of God's existence"' is that "we are selves at all only because of our existential faith in him and that, in consequence, such faith must also be affirmed self-consciously if the reflective inventory of our beliefs is to be both complete and consistent" (p. 43). The "resources of our situation" which "offer a perhaps unparallelled opportunity" foradequately answering the second question are those provided by A. N. Whitehead and C. Hartshorne. These two have at last created "a neoclassical alternative to the metaphysics and philosophical theology of our classical tradition. ... The ancient problems of philosophy have received a new, thoroughly modern treatment, which in its scope and depth easily rivals the so-called philosophia perennis." It is through "the conceptuality provided by this new philosophy" that Ogden would have us "conceive the reality of God" (p. 56; here and

This paper is a record of experiences in a simple general practice among rural Africans (mainly Zulus) in South Africa where medical communication was in the African language of disease. To achieve meaningful and effective understanding it became necessary to investigate and explore certain relevant communication patterns used by patients. This dialogue about disease, illness or sickness, revealed an interpretive point of view from which a theory underlying the practice of a system of traditional medicine was structured. The problems of communication between traditional and modern medicine essentially concerns the very divergence of subjective truths accepted by African believers and regarded by them as objective truths. Thus the truths of faith and the truths of science resemble one another in social consequences, though they differ in the methods of demonstration, proof or verification. It must be admitted, however, that every proposition, scientific or unscientific, which is a relevant explanation, for an observable fact like sickness, has some evidence in its favour—namely the fact to which it is relevant. These propositions of traditional medicine can and must be criticised by scientific medicine not by apodistic argumentation, but by its involvement in the practical solution of problems of health and disease. Internal criticism of African medicine is weak or lacking; and the more the group or society is isolated by lack of effective communications in space and time, lack of health manpower and material resources, the more the group or society is isolated and insulated, the more such beliefs become canonized as truth. Understanding of these beliefs must begin with a systematic and true account in subjective terms of what some Africans do, think, entertain and fear in problematic situations sickness, disease and dis-ease; and this can only be achieved by a systematic study of various traditional medical systems.

THE British Museum Additional Manuscripts 32531-32537 are described by Augustus Hughes-Hughes as " Essays, memoranda and criticisms relating to music by, and mostly in the hand of, Roger North [1653-1734], sixth son of Dudley, fourth Lord North ". The reason why these papers have not been published in full is, perhaps, because they contain more than one re-working of the same draft material. As yet the collection has yielded two short volumes, the ' Memoires of Musick ', reprinted by Rimbault in I846, and 'The Musicall Grammarian', edited by Hilda Andrews in I925. These published portions of North's memoranda have achieved a certain eminence among works of their kind. Considered in isolation, however, they give a somewhat misleading impression of his interest in music. The Memoires are avowedly " historico-criticall Collections ". But to class North along with Pepys, Aubrey and Anthony Wood as just another purveyor of small-talk about music is to misunderstand his significance. It will be noticed from the tables of contents in Hughes-Hughes's Catalogue that these writings of North are not confined to the discussion of practical music and music-makers, as the published extracts would seem to suggest. The first item listed, for instance, is a set of" Notes upon an essay of Musick printed in I677, by way of comment and amendment "-the essay referred to being the ' Philosophical Essay of Musick ' by North's brother Francis. (This work deals largely with the relationship between music and number, and is not concerned with aesthetic considerations.) Likewise, the fourth volume of the Additional Manuscripts is a Theory of Sounds, and is devoted to the discussion of vibrations, sound propagation, intervals, the properties of air, discords, scales and so on. Most of these memoranda are mere notes; but their existence indicates the original bent of North's mind, which was towards natural philosophy rather than to aesthetics alone. In his Autobiography (Volume III of the ' Lives of the Norths ') Roger North describes how, as a student at Cambridge, he was impressed by the writings of Descartes, whose influence was strong enough to make him forsake Magirus and Senectutus. " I had books of ethics and metaphysics also to peruse," he says, " but my delight was in philosophy and mathematics." As one consequence 236

espanolLa intencion teorica que pretende este estudio es la de exponer la idea del eterno retorno sobre el terreno filosofico del lenguaje. Se puede captar en la reflexion de Nietzsche, mas alla del analisis psicologico, un estatus linguistico-gramatical de la venganza. La omnipresencia de este instinto es tan radical que se entrelaza con la omnipresencia de la metafisica del lenguaje. La venganza empuja a la busqueda del culpable, del autor, de la causa, del sujeto, Empuja a la venganza en busqueda de culpables, del autor, el caso de la materia, entrelazandose con el gesto de fundacion metafisica en general. La liberacion de la venganza, que promete Zaratustra con el eterno retorno, puede ser interpretada como un intento paradojico de redencion de la ultima «sombra de Dios», de la fe en la gramatica. EnglishThe purpose of this paper is to present the Nietzschean concepts of revenge and eternal return on philosophical grounds of language. One can grasp in the reflection of Nietzsche, beyond psychological analysis, a linguistic-grammatical meaning of “revenge”. The pervasiveness of this instinct is so radical that it is intertwined with the pervasiveness of the metaphysics of language. The revenge drives in search of the culprit, of the author, of the cause, of the subject, and it is linked with the founding gesture of metaphysics in general. But this vengeful research of an author is rooted first and foremost in grammatical functions, in the predicative structure of the speech, which declines each event according to agent and activities. The deliverance from revenge, that Zarathustra promises with the eternal return, can be interpreted as a paradoxical attempt to get free from the last shadow of God, the faith in grammar.

particularly about structures, are worthy of serious consideration. The first section of the present paper contains some general remarks about structures and reduction. The second section contains a synopsis of Polanyi's irreducibility arguments, as well as an evaluation of these arguments in the light of the general remarks of section one. I will try to show exactly what Polanyi's arguments accomplish, as well as show that

r3H -E proposal for an ethical science which Nicolai Hartmann submits . in his Ethics is based upon a penetrating and persuasive analysis of moral experience. This analysis is closely associated with Hartmann's doctrine of values as self-existent "essences," a doctrine which for various reasons is not acceptable to some of those who are most in debt to Hartmann for his insight into the character of value judgments. The evidence and arguments embodied in this paper are intended to show that Hartmann's analysis of ethical experience may reasonably be interpreted in a way which deprives the doctrine of essences of its plausibility as a ground for ethical theory. On the basis of this interpretation it will also be suggested that the problem which was to be solved by the doctrine of essences-namely, the question of the "objectivity" of ethical values -may be the product of a misunderstanding of what is required for sound moral judgments.

In a series of articles1 Paul K. Feyerabend has attacked what he calls the standard view of observation sentences, the view that they, together with their descriptive constituents, are invariant in meaning from theory to theory. He also claims that this goes hand in hand with (or perhaps is equivalent to) the view that the ontology of the observational domain is fixed independently of scientific theories. This attack is thus of interest to those2 who, like myself, hold to a principle of acquaintance that serves both as a tool of ontological analysis and as a central constituent of an empiricist epistemology. In this paper I wish to examine both Feyerabend's attack and his own position from the point of view of a proponent of such a principle of acquaintance. Feyerabend's strategy in this series of articles appears to be the follow ing. He specifies criteria for being an observation sentence which are neu tral to the issues of meaning and reference. He then points out that there are sentences which qualify as observation sentences on these criteria but which cannot be understood by one who does not know a particular theory. He infers from this that such observation sentences gain meaning from the theories in whose context they are made. He then attempts to attack the fundamental presuppositions of the standard view which would seek to qualify other sentences that meet his criteria as being epistemolog ically more basic than those which are theory-laden. This is intended to show by elimination that all observation sentences are dependent for their meaning on the theories in whose context they are made. Feyerabend's attack upon the standard view turns upon the following thesis

THE mystic is important but baffling among the phenomena of religion. On the one hand he claims to have direct experience of God (or of some transcendental being), but on the other he says that this experience cannot be described. At the same time he apparently tries to describe it in terms of paradoxes and contradictions. Robert Hoffman, in "Logic, Meaning, and Mystical Intuition," I has interestingly applied one of the arguments central to contemporary analytic philosophy, Wittgenstein's "private language" argument, to these statements of the mystic. While agreeing that the argument is relevant here and that it leads to a definite conclusion about the mystic's claims, I disagree with the conclusion Hoffman draws. In this paper, therefore, I shall summarize the argument, point out what actually does follow from it, and show why I believe Hoffman to be wrong. Finally I shall have some general comments on mysticism. Briefly, the argument offered is this: The mystic claims to have direct experience of X (God, Self, Godhead, Brahman, etc.). A claim, though, must be made linguistically, and so anyone making a claim must speak a language and thus follow linguistic rules. But one can't be said to be following a rule unless there is some criterion for being correct or making a mistake. This criterion cannot be subjective, because "justification consists in appealing to something independent."2 But the mystic characterizes his experience of X as unique and absolutely incomparable. One conclusion which I believe can correctly be drawn here is this: the mystic, in so characterizing his experience, rules out the possibility of an (independent) criterion for the phrase 'direct experience of X.' It follows that this expression has no regular, meaningful use, and a fortiori cannot be used in claiming direct experience of God. Whether Hoffman would agree that this conclusion is correct or not, it is not the one he arrives at. But before discussing the above conclusion, I want to comment on the last part of Hoffman's contentions and give my reasons for thinking them wrong. Hoffman agrees that mystical experience is indescribable, but instead of drawing a conclusion about the phrase 'direct experience of X,' as I have above, he argues that 'X' has no correct or incorrect use: "Since the mystic . . .claims that his experience of X is unique, i.e. absolutely incomparable, he is unable to explicate it for us. But if this is so, how can he or anyone at all formulate a criterion for the correct use of terms he employs to 'describe'

The writings of Teilhard de Chardin' can be read in a variety of ways: as evolutionary science, as poetry and mysticism, as natural theology, and as Christian theology. There is, however, one aspect of his thought to which little attention has been given, namely, his undeveloped process metaphysics, which, I have suggested, plays a crucial role in his synthesis of scientific and religious ideas.2 In this paper I will explore some of Teilhard's metaphysical categories which reflect both evolutionary and biblical assumptions. Successive sections will be devoted to: (I) reality as temporal process, (2) the "within," (3) freedom and determinism, (4) continuing creation, (5) God and time, (6) the problem of evil, and (7) the future of the world. Teilhard's thought can be illuminated by comparing it with that of Alfred North Whitehead, the most systematic exponent of a philosophy of process. The striking similiarities may help to show the character of Teilhard's ideas. The significant differences may make more evident the points at which his contribution is distinctive, or in some cases may suggest ambiguities or limitations in his approach. I will not deal directly with his Christology, which is a major point of divergence from Whitehead; but by showing the influence of Teilhard's temporalistic metaphysics on his interpretation of a number of biblical themes, I hope

W hile historians of philosophy, ancient and modern, have generallY and rightly considered the main interest of Democritus to lie in his metaphysics and epistemology, the bulk of the fragments of his writings deal not with these but with ethical topics. It is, therefore, of obvious interest to enquire what connexion, if any, may be discerned between the ethical writings and the main body of the atomistic system. Further, this enquiry, as undertaken by modern critics, has produced considerable divergence in its results. Thus on the one hand Dyroff 1 was unable to see any connexion at all, while Bailey2 is content with the conclusion that the ethical doctrine, whicl was in itself in no sense a coherent system, had only a loose connexion with the main atomistic theory. In contrast, Natorp3 held that the ethical theory is closely integrated with the cosmological, a view which has been developed with impressive erudition by Vlastos.4 In this paper I attempt to show that while there certainly exists a close connexion between the two main strands in Democritus' philosophy, the exact nature of that connexion has not been adequately outlined by either Natorp or Vlastos. To be more precise, their mistake seems to me to lie in looking for the connexion in some description of the ultimate end of human action as conceived by Democritus, rather than in the relation of his accounts of moral and of theoretical knowledge.

Professor MacKinnon, in an essay on Philosophy and Christology, remarks that Christology confronts theology with difficult but 'inescapable problems' because logically 'it is unique; and yet it overlaps here, there and every where'.' The complexity of the task, however, does not excuse the theologian from the need to determine the logical nature of the concept of 'incarnation' if he wishes to use it in his work-and, as I hope to show, any theology which attempts to describe the actual nature of God probably cannot avoid using this concept in some form or other. Only by appreciating the logic of this concept can the theologian be confident that he understands its proper content and implications and that he offers appropriate justification for his claims about it. In this paper I want to suggest one possible way of viewing the logic of incarnational talk in theology which is based upon the attempt to treat such talk in terms of the notion of 'revelati6n'. I will do this through a consideration of five questions: I. What is the purpose of talk about incarnation? 2. What is the logical character of propositions revealed in incarnational claims? 3. Is the traditional Christian concept of the incarnation in Jesus possibly tenable ? 4. How can claims about incarnational revelations be verified? 5. Is historical factuality a necessary condition of claims about an in carnational revelation of God? I will be approaching these questions from the point of view of process philosophy. By this I mean the philosophy which has been developed on the basis of A. N. Whitehead's later thought, a philosophy which sees reality as essentially dynamic, as a rich complex of societal inter-actions in which whatever is actual is in process. Since God is held to be no exception to ultimate metaphysical principles,2 it follows that in at least some respects his reality must be describable in terms of temporal events, processes and interactions. In particular, God is conceived as what makes possible the continuing actuality of all other entities and is related to them as a patient