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An assessment is made of the impact of China's Cultural Revolution on her Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign relations, and foreign policy. In 1966-67, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs came under attack by Red Guard organizations determined to carry the Cultural Revolution into the foreign affairs system. Opposing the Mao inspired radicals, Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi sent work teams into ministry-related institutions to protect them from harassment. This adament resistance resulted in an investigation of Ch'en, a demand of public self-criticism, and the establishment of Red Guard liaison stations within the ministry to oversee its work. The Revolution's ebb and flow, however enabled Ch'en to maintain his position as minister and to mediate between conservative and rebel elements. Reaching peak power in August 1967, the radicals rapidly lost favor, probably due to their disregard of authority and the fact that Mao's purpose--to hold the Foreign Minister's influence in check--had been achieved. Thus Ch'en emerged the victor, but at the price of weakened authority, prestige, and health. Although Peking's foreign relations have undoubtedly been undermined, the conflict does not seem to have concerned substantive issues and China's foreign policy has returned to a diplomacy of relative moderation.

A survey of U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia over the next decade. The region is one of great instability and heterogeneity, and all Southeast Asia nations are in political and social transition. The expression of nationalism in neutral, leftist, or rightist directions, depends more on practical considerations than on doctrinal loyalties. The U.S. cannot expect to more than marginally influence these nations' political development. To adapt to these realities, and to enhance our flexibility in responding to changing conditions, the U.S. should adopt a posture toward Southeast Asia that upholds existing commitments but avoids further direct involvement. In the case of Taiwan, for example, we should slowly move toward a variant of the 'two Chinas' solution. American withdrawal from Vietnam should be accompanied by assurances of continuing interest in the region and commitment to existing obligations. Widespread accommodation to communism by Southeast Asian nations is unlikely., See also Rept. no. RM-5160-PR dated Feb 1967, AD653943.

This study focuses on VC regular-force battalions 261, 263, and 514. It suggests that the fragmented structure and compartmentalization characteristic of such units, together with a pervasive control and surveillance system, may have been the main supports of cohesion in the ranks despite highly adverse developments which, under a different military system, might have prompted widespread demoralization., Supersedes Rept. no. RM-5353-ISA/ARPA, AD384546.

The document draws attention to a number of anomalies and uncertainties in American military operations and ideas connected with the war in Vietnam.

Unlike previous Memorandums on the Viet Cong cadres, this study focuses on the nature of the cadre system and the ways in which it operated in main and local force units of III and IV Corps through 1966 to ensure maximum performance of high- and low-ranking military leaders. Based primarily on 63 interviews conducted by the RAND field team in South Vietnam, and augmented by captured documents and other interrogation reports, the study seeks to shed light on some of the reasons why many cadres were effective servants of the system despite the Front's failure to fulfill its ambition of national 'liberation' and despite an intensification of the war., Supersedes Rept. no. RM-5414-ISA/ARPA, AD388241

The author gives a fully documented, detailed account of the Conference.

The author discusses the concern about how an American withdrawal from Vietnam may relate to the rest of Southeast Asia and to American interests in the region. He holds that neither wholly pessimistic apocalyptic nor optimistic forecasts appear warranted, whether the United States should withdraw under very favorable circumstances in South Vietnam or in rapid, scheduled withdrawal. (Author)

Foreign policy consists not only of the principles and practices governing one nation's relations with others; it is in certain respects a reflection of the way a leadership guides, motivates, and controls its own society. To the extent that this is so, much might be gained from an integrated analysis of internal and external policy systems. Ideally, such an analysis should embrace detailed study of the national and international policies of individual countries at specific times (e.g., in periods of stress and relaxation); the ideological framework in which a leadership operates; and the psychological and historical roots of a nation from which its 'national purpose' might derive. (Author), Prepared for a Seminar on 'China after Mao and Chiang', sponsored by the Council of Religion and International Affairs, held in Santa Barbara, Calif., 7-11 Mar 68.

The presumed aim of the social scientist for balanced, objective reporting has thus far been frustrated when Taiwan has been the subject of attention. Well-merited criticism of the Republic of China (referred to in this article also as Nationalist China and, simply, China) has usually overlooked, or failed to take into account, substantial progress made on the island in all sectors during recent years. While the present paper relates only the principal political, international, social, and economic developments in the ROC during 1965 and 1966, and is therefore by no means an attempt at a comprehensive study of Taiwan under Nationalist rule, its goal is to survey the advances there no less than the areas of standstill and retreat.

The pattern of conservatism and liberalization that has characterized Taiwan since 1960 continued in 1966. In domestic politics and foreign relations, Chiang Kai-shek kept the nation locked in its course of retaining absolute Kuomintang control, preparing for an imminent return to the mainland, and acquiring support for the ROC as the true China. This political rigidity was in contrast to a number of ambitious economic and social undertakings that pointed up a firm commitment within the leadership to Taiwan's development into a modern, progressive state. (Author)

By purging Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), in December 1965, the Maoists were able to eliminate a politician whose opposition to Mao was suggested by his persistent, public dissent on basic strategic and domestic politics. The report presents an explanation of Lo's purge by linking the documents of the Vietnam debate and the revelations of internal politics during the Cultural Revolution. Implications for present and future Chinese policymaking are discussed. (Author)