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Monopole, das Theorem der komparativen Vorteile und Warenpreisabkommen: Eine allgemeine Gleichgewichtsanalyse. — Wenn in einem einfachen allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell einer geschlossenen Wirtschaft eine Industrie eine Monopolstellung besitzt, ist ihr Output suboptimal. In diesem Modell steht der Monopolist einer Marshallschen Nachfragekurve gegenuber, seine Durchschnittskosten steigen, und bei Einfuhrung des Au\enhandels verschiebt sich die inlAndische Nachfragekurve; es gibt FAlle, in denen das Theorem der komparativen Vorteile nicht zutrifft. Der Au\enhandel kann die Wohlfahrt des Landes, in dem der Monopolist produziert, reduzieren, wenn dadurch der Output des Monopolgutes verringert wird. Um ein Optimum zu erreichen, mu\te das Land einen Zoll einfuhren und den Monopolisten subventionieren, wobei die Hohe der Subvention bei einer unelastischen Nachfrage nicht konstant sein darf. Fur das andere Land erweisen sich ein Warenpreis-Stabilisierungsabkommen und die Einfuhrung eines Zolls als optimal.

There has been much controversy over corporate social behavior in recent years. At one extreme, Milton Friedman [1970] argues that profit-maximization is the only responsibility of business enterprise. Others, including Carl Kaysen [1957] and many business leaders [C.E.D., 1971] see enterprises as "soulful," and compliment them for mixing the profit objective with others which are responsive to social needs. To this point, there has been little analysis of how or why corpora? tions and their managers respond to social priorities. Worse, there has been no analysis of the impact of corporate social behavior on consumers. This paper is an effort to introduce economic theory to the issue. Firms operating in the perfectly competitive markets obviously have no alternative but to seek profit-maximization as their only goal; firms in less than perfectly competitive markets may have such alternatives be? cause of monopoly rents. Hence, attention focuses on firms in markets of the latter type and, more specifically, on firms where competitive pressures in both product and capital markets are weak enough to allow for managerial discretion. Because of its tractability for the purposes at hand, the managerial discretion model developed by Oliver William? son [1967, 1963] is used to compare regulated and unregulated enter? prises. There is an underlying philosophical problem. The analysis rests on the assumption that managers of both regulated and unregulated firms are utility-maximizers. Their satisfactions derive from several sources, including the approbation which comes from corporate social responsibil? ity, but they appear to be cast as essentially hedonistic and egoistic rather than as altruistic. While the separation of egoism and altruism may be important for divine judgment of managerial character, it is not im? portant here. The results of the analysis should stand whether the utility

This research was motivated by curiosity about how AfroAmericans view the recent detente in Sino-American relations. As it has been known, the People's Republic of China perceives Afro-Americans as being "subjected to the ruthless oppression and exploitation of the United States monopoly capitalist class for a long time" (Peking Review, 1971). The Chinese have long regarded the problems of Afro-Americans as their own problems and accordingly show their concern. In the eyes of the Chinese, the white-dominated government and "monopoly capitalist class" of the United States appears to be not only the enemy of the Chinese people but also the oppressor of the Afro-American minority. However, almost all of a sudden, a ping pong ball cracked open the barrier of hostility between China and the United State. Within this situational context, how do Afro-Americans look upon this relaxation of tension between these two countries?

This paper analyses the pricing policy of a major U.S. telephone company in 1967. A mathematical programming model was used to calculate the prices per telephone call on each of three representative routes in each of four periods of the day which would be implied by a variety of alternative maximands (consumers' plus producers' surplus, profit, sales units, sales revenue), under a variety of alternative profit constraints and assuming capacity to be either fixed (at 1967 levels) or variable. Cost and demand data were supplied by several telephone company officials, and supplemented by published material. Sensitivity analysis was carried out on the demand elasticities. A total of one hundred versions of the model are reported on. Our major conclusions include: (i) Maximising consumers' plus producers' surplus subject to a pair of minimum profit constraints provided a good approximation to 1967 policy. (ii) There is perfect discrimination between large and small users for interstate toll calls. (iii) The effect of the state regulatory commission was to keep down the price of intrastate toll calls at the expense of interstate toll calls. (iv) As alternatives to regulation, perfect competition, if attainable, would increase benefits by about $100 million whereas perfect monopoly would reduce them by $300 million per annum, within the area of the company's operations.

F EW STEREOTYPES of Luso-Brazilian history have endured more tenaciously than the concept of the merchant as Jew, crypto-Jew, or foreigner. The association of the mercantile profession with New Christians has been particularly strong for the seventeenth century, with the terms burguesia and cristdos-novos often being used interchangeably in works about that period.' The political, social, and religious factors which contributed to the concentration of New Christians in commerce are familiar and need not be elaborated here. The converse theoretical explanation is that Portuguese gentiles (or Old Christians) abandoned the field to the interlopers because of their inability or unwillingness to compete with the New Christians' supposed racial aptitude for trade and their clannish favoritism in business practice. As commerce became ever more linked in the popular mind with the despised crypto-Jew, fear of guilt by association increased the aversion of Old Christians to the mercantile arts, ultimately leaving Portuguese trade in the hands of the New Christians. To contemporaries the problem appeared so compelling that in 1629 D. Felipe IV called a council of ecclesiastics and jurists to consider measures for dealing with the New Christians, whose monopoly of trade allegedly caused prices to soar "thus sucking all the money from the populace

In this paper an attempt has been made to analyze some of the major features of the interest‐rates in the Indian rural money market. Such a market is distinguished by its duality, with the unorganised sector largely dominating the supply of funds even today. Rural interest‐rates are largely explained by risk and uncertainty rather than by the monopoly power of the moneylenders, though monopoly profit may have existed in some cases. A theoretical model is then constructed and statistical tests show positive correlation between farmers’ income and repayments and negative correlation between the interest‐rate, on the one hand, and income, repayments and monetization on the other. Thus, a rise in farm incomes may reduce the risk premium and, therefore, rural interest‐rates. Further econometric study revealed that the bank rate is more likely to be the leader than the follower of the bazaar rate.

The optimal trade and licensing policies for a country which is the only owner of the technology to produce a good are developed in a general-equilibrium two-countries model. The analysis emphasizes the monopolistic position of the owner of the technology, and is essentially static in the sense that no process of generation of new technology is considered. The optimal behavior obtained turns out to entail (a) the full exploitation of any monopoly and/or monopsony power that the owner of the technology may possess with respect to the foreign market for his product and the foreign market for the factors which may be used in its production, and (b) full, competitive behavior with respect to the use of domestic resources and the sale of his product in the domestic market.

SUMMARY A tentative unified micro-macro model is developed to explain the persistent inflation-unemployment morass by replacing the competitive endogenous money wage theory with the exogenous facts of collective bargaining. Inferentially, a feasible Incomes Policy would alleviate inflation while reserving monetary and fiscal policy to sustain full employment. The aggregative Keynesian macromodel developed builds on Walrasian, Marshallian, and monopoly micro-foundations. Wage-share constancy, which also underlies Cobb-Douglas macromodels, provides a simplifying hypothesis with empirical underpinning for mark-up pricing. ‘Cost-push’ and ‘demand-pull’ as distinctive inflation forces appears generally spurious. Both forces have common roots in excessive money wage increases.

Historical and cross-cultural data call into question the concept of profession as formulated by British and American sociologists. A common underlying theme, however, is the monopolization of esoteric knowledge as a basis for professional authority. Because of the rapid proliferation of knowledge and technology, Daniel Bell has forecast a professionalized society, in which knowledge will be a source of power. This paper projects an alternative hypothesis based on several societal trends, using medicine as the prototypical profession and providing some cross-cultural evidence. These trends include an erosion of the knowledge monopoly as a result of rising levels of public schooling and sophistication and specific patient education, as well as computerization—which changes accessibility patterns—and new divisions of labor, which disseminate practice skills and information more widely. The consequences are decline of trust in professional decisions and diminution of professional power and authority...

In a paper recently published in this journal [ 31 we have shown that the export performance of firms’ is positively correlated with their size; large firms tend to export a higher proportion of their output than do small firms. The theoretical explanation of this empirical finding was based on both the theory of monopoly and the theory of the firm facing uncertain demand. We assumed that foreign demand is more elastic and more risky than local demand. Large firms will export a higher proportion of their output since (a) their size gives rise to ‘excess’ output which is sold in markets where the demand curves are both low and elastic, and (6) they are more willing (or able) to assume the higher risks involved in exporting. The latter hypothesis was based on the assumption that firms are risk averse, and that their utility function is characterized by decreasing absolute risk aversion. In this paper we construct a similar model in order to analyse the effect on exports of firms following from the estab!ishment of trade blocks. Again, we distinguish among industries, but the main explanatory variable is the size of the firm. We show that in general smaller firms will react more vigorously to the creation of trade blocks than will large firms, i.e., they will sell a higher proportion of their total output and total exports in the protected markets. Section II contains the model. In Section III some empirical evidence on the relation between size and export distribution between protected and nonprotected markets is presented. The definition of a protected market in the context of this paper is questioned in Section IV, where we discuss and demonstrate alternative definitions. The paper concludes with some remarks on policy implications following from the model and the empirical findings.

DEMSETZ, in a recent issue of this Journal,' has presented an explanation of profitability and concentration which is based on the notion of competitive superiority. He argues that efficiency is associated with concentration. That is, rates of return earned by the large firms in an industry will be greater than those earned by smaller firms, not because of collusion or abuse of monopoly power by the larger firms, but because of their greater efficiency. He suggests, on the basis of his investigations, that a government following a deconcentration or anti-merger public policy may produce more inefficiency than was present in the situation which it aimed to eliminate. Such a view has important implications both for those concerned with analyzing structure, conduct and performance in Australian industries, and those involved in the implementation of antitrust action in Australia. Australian industries are noted for their comparatively high levels of concentration.2 Several reasons are put forward to explain this, including the relatively small size of the markets which they serve, the need for firms to achieve economies of scale, the wide-scale presence of overseas-owned firms and the almost total absence of any effective government antitrust policy and enforcement until the last few years. The advent to power in December 1972 of Australia's first Labor Government since the 1940's, has resulted in a series of proposals designed to discourage certain types of industry behaviour. Recently passed legislation bans per se many undesirable restrictive practices such as horizontal price agreements, market sharing and exclusive dealing. In addition, companies are prohibited from engaging in acts of merger or monopolization (this term being very broadly defined, leaving the

often suggested that governments, by virtue of their being democratic, can be treated as if they were perfectly competitive suppliers of public output. By contrast, there are other strands of thought suggesting that governments are captured by and operated for the benefit of self-interested bureaucrats, and are more appropriately viewed as monopolistic suppliers of public output, or at least as potential monopolists.' This paper examines these alternative perspectives on government, using as a vehicle an examination of the budgetary consequences of certain types of changes in the organization of government in metropolitan areas. There are two primary structural features of the organization of government in metropolitan areas. One is the fragmentation of governments, and the other is the overlapping of governments. The fragmentation of governments refers to the provision of the same service or services by a multitude of governments. Fragmentation means that such services as police, fire, and recreation will normally be provided by a large number of mutually exclusive municipal corporations. Similarly, educational services will normally be provided by a large number of school districts.2 Governmental fragmentation would seem to be substantial. For instance, over one-half of the metropolitan areas with population exceeding 250,000 according to the 1967 Census of Governments contained more than 100 units of government. The overlapping of governments refers to the independent supply of separate components of public output by different units of government. Hence

Historians of the early phases of British conquest in India have until recent years given comparatively little attention to the economic elements in British expansion. Historians of the late nineteenth or early twentieth century generally portrayed conquest as a largely defensive reaction to French rivalry or to the instability created by the collapse of the Mughal empire. The commercial functions of the East India Company were largely ignored; if they were mentioned at all it was only to point out that the Directors of the Company believed that costly wars and conquests were incompatible with successful trade and therefore took a jaundiced view of the supposed ambitions of Warren Hastings and Wellesley. Wellesley. In 1948, however, in his John Company at Work, Professor Holden Furber both revealed a much more complex pattern of British economic interests in India, including an extremely vigorous private sector operating in the interstices of the Company's monopoly, and suggested a number of links between ‘economic contact between India and the west’ and the rise of British ‘imperialism’. More recently, historians have begun to examine such links in detail in studies of specific parts of India. The extent to which the British had entrenched themselves in the economic life of Bengal long before Plassey, was noted by Dr Bhattacharya in his The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, a book which prompts questions about the extent to which Siraj-ud-daula or Mir Kasim were victims of British economic success.

The textbook theory of tariffs, and their converse, the movement to freer trade, has more elements than we need for the nineteenth century, but also lacks some. In the usual comparative statics, a tariff may be said to have ten effects: on price, trade, production (the protective effect), consumption, revenue, terms of trade, internal income distribution, monopoly, employment and the balance of payments.

The patent monopoly is abused when the economic and social objectives of the patent system are jeopardized by the behaviour of the patentee. The monopoly could be abused by: Insufficient disclosure of the invention; lack of use or inadequate use of the patented invention; and abusive practices in licensing agreements. The paper considers the legal remedies towards controlling abuses with especial emphasis on the compulsory licensing system. It shows that the compulsory licensing remedy has proved to be unsatisfactory and that a thorough re-examination of the subject, at the national and international levels, is called for, bearing in mind the needs of developing countries.

Notions of economies of scale have always played a unique role in public policy formation, although most often implicity rather than explicitly. It is the cornerstone of the theory of natural monopoly and provides the primary justification for direct government regulation of telecommunications common carriers. The relations between the technical economic concept of economies of scale and current public policy issues in telecommunications are examined. The relationship between economies of scale and the traditional approach to regulation as a basis for understanding current policy conflicts between federal and state regulators is discussed. The theoretical economic concept of economies of scale, in contrast to concepts of short-run capacity utilization, economies of specialization, and economies of technological change is developed. The importance of time, uncertainty, and market characteristics in the measurement of scale effects is emphasized. Finally, the implications of economies of scale for current public policy issues in telecommunications such as the role of competition, cream skimming, and discriminatory rate reductions in response to competition are addressed.

An M/M/1 service station (computer center) consists of M separate queues. The ith (i = 1, 2, …, M) queue has priority over the jth iff i < j. Upon arrival, a customer receives all the information regarding the state of the system and accordingly makes an irrevocable decision as to which queue to join, or rather to balk (leave) and go to a competitor. The higher the priority of the queue, the higher the toll fee to join it but the shorter the time spent in the system. This paper considers nonmonopoly and monopoly cases, and optimal priority-purchasing or balking rules for the newly arrived customer, as well as optimal pricing policies for the service station for both preemptive-resume and non-preemptive-priority disciplines.

Apparently minority recruitment programs aren't working when it comes to electrical and electronics engineering. Based on the excellent response (about 40 000 U.S. member respondents, or a 40-percent response) resulting from the 1975 IEEE U.S. Membership Survey, less than 4 percent of the Institute's U.S. membership would appear to be non-Caucasian and only 0.5 percent would appear to be female ? this at a time when the Society of Women Engineers claims that 2 percent of all engineers are women.

Few would deny that the U.S. economy is today dominated by huge corporations. Much recent writing has proposed that these corporations form a stable and monopolistic (or oligopolistic) “core” around which a more competitive “peripheral” sector exists. Firms in the core are said to be “eternal,” while firms in the periphery demonstrate the mortality and high turnover expected in competitive industries. In another context, Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy emphasized the permanence of big corporations when they noted: The real capitalist today is not the individual businessman but the corporation. …The giant corporation of today is an engine for maximizing profits and accumulating capital to at least as great an extent as the individual enterprise of an earlier period. But it is not merely an enlarged and institutionalized version of the personal capitalist. There are major differences between these types of business enterprise, and at least two of them are of key importance to a general theory of monopoly capitalism: the corporation has a longer time horizon than the individual capitalist, and it is a more rational calculator.

Kalecki scored a breakthrough by introducing the ‘degree of monopoly’ into his macrodynamic model. He offered a theory of distribution that was independent of the neo-classical tradition. He introduced a promising alternative theory of distribution, even if it lacked a comprehensively formulated theory of market behaviour and was in some respects deficient in dealing with the question of investment decisions. To build a realistic theory of distribution, Kalecki offered an explanation of how prices in fact are formed by mark-ups on prime costs. This use of mark-ups to cover overheads is very important. Though it entails monopoly power it is not synonymous with it.

This paper investigates, through simulation models, the factors that affect organizational slack in a monopoly company under varying conditions of budget information, managerial behavior, and economic growth. The impact of organizational slack on corporate economic variables was identified in the models. The analysis of individual factors and the interactions among factors was based on the output of the factorial design. The implications of the findings for decision-making are discussed.

The first section of the paper is a review of current and planned data communications services. This covers the current state of the art in these services, identifies the need for change and surveys what plans have been made for new services. It looks at what forms of data communications have been established in various countries including the U.K., Germany, U.S.A. and Australia. The second part of the paper poses some key questions. These are broadly similar to those involved in planning other major new investments in utilities or public transportation involving a high degree of technical innovation. They cover the problems of designing a new technology, the pricing of data communications utilities, how to evaluate new services and what the role of the monopoly supplier should be. The paper does not set out to answer these questions but to expose them as areas where controversy is centred, and new research work required.

At one time education was considered an extravagant and wasteful process which was useful and necessary only for the ruling minority. Historically one finds a close relationship between school and leisure, between school and the ruling authority and between school and monopoly. This attitude has gradually changed and education is now looked upon as a productive process, an investment and utilization of human capital. Education has become, therefore, one of the rights of all citizens, an integral part of economic development, of political and social progress, each of which makes use of the other for the realization of its objectives. The relationship between education and development is controversial. Comprehensive education accelerates national development plans which, in turn, raise the standard of education. Adversely, iUkeracy and absence of awareness create backwardness and hinder the execution of comprehensive development plans. Denison 1 refers to phenomena of economic development and technological progress that have taken place in the United States, U.S.S.R. and Japan, to the enormous progress of education in these countries, and he concludes that more than three-fifths of the actual income is due to the effect of rising educational standards on increasing the capacity of production, and that 23 per cent of the average of the annual growth in the United States arises from the continuous increase of the educational level of manpower. The planning committee in the Soviet Union has stated that the

Both the Averch-Johnson (A-J) model and the Chamberlin model fail to consider the value of excess capacity to consumers. Service industries, whether they are regulated or not, will usually have excess capacity in the Chamberlinian sense because this capacity conserves time for consumers. This paper examines a model of the taxi industry where allowance is made for capacity to affect the value or quality of the service through its effect on waiting time. The central issue is to determine equilibrium output, capacity, and the utilization of capacity when the market is organized as a franchised monopoly, through a medallion system, and when there is free entry, and to exhibit the relationship among these variables and prices, cost of capacity and output, and policies of the regulator. It is found that many of the characteristics of taxi markets that would appear to confirm the monopolistic-competition thesis arise because of the nature of regulation of these markets.

Recent studies by the historians of pre-colonial Africa have tended to assume that external trade has always led to the formation or enlargement of states, and was crucial for the continued existence of these states. An example where an uncritical application of the above ‘trade-stimulus hypothesis’ has led to some distortion of reality has been in the study of the Rozvi empire in Southern Rhodesia in the eighteenth century. Previous students of the Rozvi empire have claimed that the latter was such a loosely connected tribal confederacy that its internal power bases—given as military and religious—were politically so slender that on their own they could not have sustained whatever power the Rozvi ruler wielded. Instead, it is said that the main source of the power exercised by the Rozvi Mambo came mainly from the latter's ability to redistribute the profits of external trade, especially that of the gold trade of which he is said to have had a strictly enforced monopoly.

Two areas of governmental activity have been woefully neglected in the traditional analysis of political phenomena. These areas are the general use of coercion or sanctions in domestic affairs, and the collection of taxes by governments. These topics, nevertheless, are clearly of importance in understanding political processes. Indeed, political analysts are fond of employing Weber's definition of the state: that institution which has a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion in a given geographical area. General acceptance of this definition clearly makes the lack of analytic work on the domestic use of coercion a major shortcoming of modern political analysis. Similarly, taxation, as experienced by the "common man" is a permanent part of political life ("nothing is certain except death and taxes"). Yet little attention has been paid to the mechanics of taxation relationships.1 In this essay we will analyze tax relationships as a set of situations in which coercion, or threats, are used to extract resources from one or more parties. This perspective leads us to examine taxation as a special interaction involving governmental use of coercion and the use of positive inducements in extracting taxes. We assume that the positively valued programs are supplied collectively.

Salary discrimination was found to bezero in a transferable monopoly — baseball. Nonwhites and white players received equal pay for equal work. Barriers to entry were foundnot to exist against nonwhites after taking into account that barriers to entryhad existed against nonwhites and had created a long-run equilibrium differential.

This paper considers the prospects for the development of a Marxian interpretation of deviance and control. The weaknesses of conventional perspectives are identified and an approach is suggested which applies the insights of Marxian theory to an investigation of deviance production in modern society. This process is explored with special attention to the capitalist mode of production, the system of class control in capitalist societies, the genesis and maintenance of “problem populations,” the channeling of these populations into deviant statuses, and the distinctive character of deviant groups. The emergence of monopoly and state capitalism is examined in an attempt to understand the dynamics of structural change, deviance production and social control. The overproduction of deviance in advanced capitalist societies and attempts at the “solution” of this problem are also discussed.

West Europeans, Japanese and Americans are accustomed to thinking of their own market-based economic systems as more flexible, hence more rational, than the rigid central planning systems employed in most Communist countries. It is startling, however, to compare the energy policies of the two different groups of countries. Dr Wright contends that Communist planners are, by and large, pursuing a course of cautious, deliberate, rational energy decisions based (both domestically and internationally) on relative cost and price. In contrast, capitalist governments have shown us a pattern of draconian measures involving quantitative restrictions, suspension of the market mechanism, government manipulation of prices, encouragement and protection of monopoly — and even, during the energy panic of 1973–1974, the attempted central planning of crude oil and refined products. In spite of official claims to the countrary, the results in the capitalist countries have been anything but rational.

panel on "Current Problems in International Finance/' meeting at the present time, has a virtually unlimited smorgasbord from which to fill its plates and food in ample quantity for everyone to fill a second or third plate if he or she so desires. One might well discuss, as a business economist, the possibility of bank failures and financial and monetary collapse that might be triggered by the opportunities offered to would-be-clever operators by the present unparalleled opportunities for speculation on interest rates and forward exchange rates. As a political economist, one might discuss the problem of Arab oil money, and particularly the power politics of arrangements for soft lending from more to less fortunate oil importing countries, as these involve the power positions of the United States, the European Economic Community, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and the Arab countries themselves. As an international institutionalist, one might discuss the market arrangements and guarantees necessary to lure the Arabs into the civilized world of high international finance and investment, as well as the characteristics of an international monetary system that might be shock-proof against further exercises in the organization of cartels to exploit collective monopoly power in key raw materials. As an international monetary theorist, pure and perhaps also naive, one might consider what changes need to be made in the theory of floating exchange rates now that, for the

DECENTRALIZATION is rapidly replacing God, Country and Motherhood in popular favor. From the revolutionary left: "The sweeping concentration of power and control in the nationwide political and military Establishment necessitates the shift to decentralized forms of organization.... Monopoly capitalism has given a new concrete sense to the 'revolution from below.'"1 To the utopian left: "The core radical ideals and values of community, equality, and humaneness ... can most nearly be realized through decentralization."2 To the reformist left: "Decentralization will not 'solve' the problems of the poor, but it is a useful beginning."3 To the reformist right: "The foundation of endeavor must be good human relationships, not impersonal control from aloft and afar. Power should be more decentralized."4 To the status quo right: "A person can be expected to act responsibly only if he has responsibility. This is human nature. . . . Let us locate responsibility in more places. And let us

(1975). The Monopoly in Rhenish Stoneware Imports in Late Elizabethan England. Post-Medieval Archaeology: Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 219-224.

In recent years historians and sociologists alike have given increasing attention to the relationship between education and social structure in France. Louis Althusser has argued that the French educational system was designed to preserve elites. Michel Crozier concluded that the system prevented a too rapid mobility that would upset thestatus-quoand that ‘graduates [ofgrandes é'coles] have ade factomonopoly on the top brackets of the Civil Service, the universities, and medicine, and decisive advantages in entering most professions and many industrial organizations’.

The author argues that the so-called oil crisis may open out a new perspective on development aid to the Third World if the oil-producing countries, instead of allowing the giant Western banks and corporations to make a grab for their petro dollars (as the Western nations had so far made a grab for incredibly cheap oil energy), decide to pool the surplus oil revenues for self-help among the Third World countries. He suggests the setting up of an interregional Third World Bank, which, unlike the existing World Bank group (typecast as the instrument of the rich market economies), would be the instrument of the developing countries, thus breaking the monopoly of the West in international financing.

Numerous studies have attempted to place monetary values on recreation resources using consumers' surplus or monopoly revenue techniques. Previous studies have treated travel and on-site costs as t...

During the 1964 Hearings on Physician-Ownership held by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly witnesses charged that certain medical doctors were establishing firms that purchased prepared drugs in bulk, packaged them, and then marketed the drugs in smaller quantities under brand names. Physicians with interests in drug repackagers would write prescriptions specifying brands marketed by their firms, and antisubstitution laws would prevent the pharmacist from using other brands. Critics of the practice argue that physicians purchase drug repackagers and tie drugs to extend their monopoly power into the ethical drugs market with the resulting foreclosure of independent firms. This paper argues that physicians purchase drug interests not to create a new monopoly, but rather to extract more monopoly profits from their original markets. But evidence exists that in doing so physician-owners impose a welfare loss on their patients. The paper concludes with an analysis of efforts made thus far to end the practice and suggests that amendment of state antisubstitution laws would make it more difficult for physician-repackager owners to tie drugs.