Search

A few words may first be said of the fate of the established religions in China, when Mao Tse-tung in 1949 from T'ien An Men, Peking, declared the new regime, the People's Republic of China (PRC), which like other Communist regimes, looked upon religion as opium for the people. Karl Marx wrote: "The abolition of religion as illusionary happiness of the people is required for real happiness."' Very soon after the take over of power, Chow En-lai called representatives of various religions to Peking as Government guests to discuss the future of these religious organisations and assured them they could go ahead as usual, provided they co-operated with the government. Mao had stated before 1949 that everyone is free to believe or not to believe in religion, which statement was later on passed as Article 88 of the National Constitution. Moreover, Mao's attitude towards religion was declared in his article On New Democracy: "In the field of political action Communists may form an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal front with some idealists and even religious people, but we can never approve of their idealism or religious doctrine." Working under strict limitations the religious groups, at the outbreak of Cultural Revolution in 1966, had to stop all religious activities. Maoism has led to a new unity. Ceremonies include standing before a portrait of Mao each morning asking instruction for the day, reading portions of the works of Mao before meals with gratitude, also reporting from the work of the day at night. As prayer is at the core of all religions as well as meditation it would seem that this is practised in China today.

In this essay, José F. Ocampo of the Umversidad Nacional in Bogotá offers a historical and political framework for the articles which follow. Ocampo employs the theory of "new democracy" (sometimes referred to as Marxism-Leninism, or simply Maoism ) to analyze the current situation in Colombia. He presents the analysis of classes in Colombia; the strategy and tactics of the dominant classes; the spontaneous struggles of the oppressed classes; and the rise of a non-revisionist vanguard party of the proletariat.

How long should the period of New Democracy be? This was the first policy struggle between Mao [Tse-tung] and Liu [Shao-ch'i] after the Chinese Communists gained power.

Observations on Soviet Government. Over a year and a half has passed since soviet government was declared in Russia. That is not a long period of time in the history of a great revolutionary movement. Developments which loom large during these years and which impress even thoughtful men and women may prove to be of little consequence in the final determination of things, while the still small voices which are often unheard and usually unheeded by contemporaries swell into the chorus of decisive opinion which settles the course of affairs. It is a matter for trepidation, therefore, when one ventures to search mid the political and institutional debris for the foundation stones upon which a new democracy is to rest, or to attempt to appraise the undried, rough-hewn timbers hastily thrown into the erection of a temporary political superstructure. Only the hope that the tentative observations of one who was there may assist others to interpret this titanic movement justifies the present note.

Unquestionably, the present revolution is the first step and it will in the future develop into the second step, i.e., socialism. Only when she arrives at the period of socialism can China really be called happy. Yet the present is not the time to practice socialism. . . . The Chinese revolution can only be achieved in two steps: the first being that of new democracy; the second, that of socialism. Moreover, the period of the first step will be a considerably long one and can never be accomplished overnight.'

The social aspirations of the British public are just now finding expression in political agitation rather than in church activities. This article seeks to show what the church has contributed to the growth of liberal social ideals, and to point out further contributions which are being made by Christian idealism.

"On the relation between art and politics, I urge all comrades to read again 'On New Democracy.' (1) … We are more advanced today than during the period of 'On New Democracy.' We now have a new socialist culture. … The nature of our culture has been changing over this period of more than ten years, and this question has been cleared up. … 'Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art (2) set forth the orientation [fang-hsiang] of the workers, peasants, and soldiers, which belonged to the period of New Democracy. We are now in a socialist period. New Democracy belonged to the bourgeois democratic revolution, and at that time we did not yet oppose capitalism. At present, opposition to imperialism and feudalism are still important, but our main concern is opposition to capitalism. Socialism must oppose capitalism."

At the beginning of the twentieth century, there was a widespread effort to reassess Victorian values so that they might be retained, but in a more viable form. The new democracy was the catalyst in this introspective process which affected political thought most of all. Before the Great War the anomalous behavior of the new citizen, in the streets and at the polls, compelled thoughtful attention to political problems in England. In reaction to the unreasonable and unpredictable behavior of the new democracy, a new democratic liberalism and a new elitism came into being. New liberalism, in trying to qualify rationalist assumptions and transform the negative program of nineteenth-century liberalism, largely succeeded. New elitism, like old elitism, in concluding that the great majority were fit only to be governed, largely failed. But the elitist critique of mass urban democracy was as compelling to many people as the new liberal's defense. While liberalism has received critical comment, discussions of elitism have been limited to Fabian methodology or subordinated to analyses of Utopian programs. Yet the most formidable elitist argument came from the infant science of social psychology, developed concurrently by William McDougall, a physiologist, and Wilfred Trotter, a surgeon and neurologist. In prewar Britain, social psychology was the basis for a political critique of democracy presented as a scientific analysis of behavior.This paper deals with the validity of social psychology as a reading of history which concluded in political elitism. The accuracy and significance of the social psychologists' explanation of behavior are assessed solely in terms of its political implications as a plea for government by an Elect of social scientists, a plea hidden within a purportedly scientific account of social evolution.

Our task is the achievement of a truly social democracy. Religion is a creative energy. In its great creative periods the Christian religion has been fruitful for democracy. Out of its spiritual values democracy has grown. The task of religious education is to make Christianity fully conscious of its democratic function. The masses of men must be made intelligent, socialized Christians. Premillenarianism is powerful: theological and social standpattism prevail in the churches-both hindrances to any Christian leadership in democracy. The most consciously social movements today are indifferent to Christianity. Religious education may meet the need. It is necessary, however, as preliminary steps, (1) to train the whole church to appreciate the new ideals of religious education and to co-operate in the task; (2) to interpret the Bible as a source of modern religion; (3) to integrate religious education with the whole community life and the church's world-wide task. Christianity, with its universal ethics and ...

In a recent interview with Edgar Snow, Mao Tse-tung asserted that he did not remember having written “Dialectical Materialism,” and that if he had written it, he surely would have remembered it. There is both internal and external evidence to support Mao's assertion. If the article was published under his name without his approval, then those who undertook this venture may have had the support of Soviet authorities, perhaps even of Stalin himself. There is also the possibility that it was forged and published by intriguers within the CCP who disapproved of the united front policies which Mao had just elaborated in his “New Democracy.” By first weakening his position with a damning forgery, they might then have hoped to overthrow him with Moscow's tacit approval. The Russian returned student leaders, Wang Ming and Po Ku, might well have devised such a plot.

scholar, the economist Varga, has preferred to characterize the regime of the satellites as "the New Democracy."3 The most usual denomination of this regime, as adopted in the Soviet press, is, however, the "People's Democracies" (Narodnye Demokratii). Thus, the satellites represent a transitional form and are supposed to move from the "bourgeois democracy" toward the "highest" or "perfect" type of democracy of the Soviet pattern.4 Having absorbed the basic principles of people's democracy, they are on the way to complete identification with the Soviet standard. There are some differences between the constitutions of particular satellites.

IN a country justly called backward in industry, the People's Government of China today places extraordinary stress on policy to guide the modern industrial worker. Essentially this policy of the Chinese Communists is a modification of Soviet Union methods made to fit the structure of Mao Tsetung's New Democracy. Purporting to be a stage precedent to the attainment of full socialism in China, the New Democracy permits the coexistence of state and private enterprise. Thus, unlike the Russian labor program for an economy of full state ownership, Chinese policy must be designed for workers under both public and private managements. However, the Chinese industrial dichotomy affects certain details of labor policy only, and does not result in two sets of principles radically dissimilar in intent. As the policy is verbalized, at least, the workers of private industry are to enjoy roughly the same privileges as those accorded labor in state industry in such matters as organizing, collective bargaining, wages, and the settlement of disputes. The major difference is one of attitude on the part of Communist leaders pledged to the doctrine of class struggle. Although it is admitted that personnel problems may arise from "bureaucratic tendencies" or other deviations, the basic interests of labor and management in state enterprises are said to be alike. On the other hand, the government must paternalistically "protect" the workers of private industry from designing capitalists. THE WORKERS' STATUS

Out of the evils of ancient ethnic nationalism has grown a new consciousness. Out of the consciousness of kind born of blood bonds between races has come a consciousness of kind based upon well-defined community of interests. The new democracy is taking root in the foundation of modern society and is abandoning the myth of race superiority which has for so many centuries been the touchstone of race antagonism, class privilege, and economic exploitation. Out of old hates and jealousies and self-seeking trading in the destinies of peoples, so common under the influences of imperialistic ambition, comes a new watchword, a new slogan-Democracy. Misconstrued, misunderstood, and even misguided democracy is challenging not only our sincerity, our intelligence, our aspirations, our ideals, but its own very existence. In the Near East, democracy may merely be turning the odds in favor of a new class and laying foundations for a new struggle. In America, the most stable of the democracies of the world, we may so eagerly and so rapidly integrate our national life as to render democracy a lifeless, stagnant, cumbersome machine whose existence breeds its own destruction. The Americanization movement which has sprung into being, not from any desire to develop democracy at home, but rather as an effort for national integration that would strengthen our hands in our effort to safeguard democracy abroad is pregnant with dangers that threaten the very ideals upon which the United States built its foundation; while at the same time it opens up new vistas for the contemplation of an internationalism that would guarantee the peace of the world through the creation of a dynamic and social rather than political or racial nationalism at home.

Middle-level education and citizen's education [see glossary] in the Border Region has in the past suffered from serious problems of dogmatism and old-fashioned orthodoxy, thus departing from and even opposing the needs of the Border Region and of the Border Region peoples. The senior cadre meeting of the year before last and the third meeting of the Government Committee in the spring of last year pointed out a clear and correct policy: for the purposes of the War of Resistance Against Japan and of service to the Border Region peoples, the education of cadres comes first, citizen's education second. That is, we must change those aspects of education that are not relevant to carrying on the War of Resistance and not relevant to the Border Region and its people, thus making education fully compatible with revolutionary San-min chu-i [Three People's Principles] (which is to say, the New Democracy) and with the spirit of the Ten Great Policies,* and suitable to the present needs for construction in the Border...

The basic policy of Communist China in regard to ? private business is succinctly stated in Article Ten of its newly adopted Constitution: "The policy of the state towards capitalist industry and commerce is to use, restrict, and transform them." The full significance of this triple policy was not appreciated in the early days of the Communist regime, partly because the Com? munists were then placing more emphasis on the "use" of private capital and adopted certain temporary meas? ures to allay the fears of private capitalists. As the new state became more sure of its position and power, the "restrictive" and "transformative" aspects of the triple policy became more prominent until it was clear that the final objective of the new state was the liquidation of all private capitalism and the realization of com? plete socialism in the national economy. Writing on the "New Democracy" in 1940, Mao Tsetung said that the economy of the New Democracy must be socialistic in nature but it would still provide a place for private capitalism. Later, in his treatise On Coalition Government, he amplified his view as follows: "Some people suspect that the Chinese Communists are opposed to the development of individuality, to the development of private capitalism, and to the protection of private property. This is wrong. Imperialistic and feudal oppression has cruelly fettered the . . . development of private capitalism. The task of our New Democratic system is to remove these fetters to permit the free development . . . of private capitalist economy. . . .

Once upon a time there was a fine new country. It occupied a small part of a beautiful continent which offered a vast opportunity for expansion and limitless wealth of resources. The birth of the new country was difficult, as most births are. In tearing away from the mother country the little nation fought hard and considered its mother its most hated enemy. Many good people were killed on each side of the struggle. The men and women who sacrificed wealth and life in the battle felt that they were establishing a new democracy based on the premise that all men are created equal. In spite of this and the bitterness of the struggle, the small country accepted many aspects of its inheritance with little question. Ideals, customs, and institutions were retained with very slight adaptation to the new demands. Among the institutions were the schools. Perhaps because the fledgling country was insecure in so many ways it seemed that the mother country knew the best way to educate the young. In any case, the emulation of the schools was almost complete and, rather than build a new system on new ideals of democracy, the citizens established and supported schools for the sons of the rich which were copies in both method and content of those in the old country. After almost two centuries, the once-new country was to look on these schools as its very best. They were still not to be for the common man but for the elite-if there can be an elite in a democracy. So there came about the strange situation in which the citizens of a country who had endured a war started schools like those of the enemy. Can it be they envied the enemy and wanted to bring up children like him? Time passed and the small country grew and grew, filling its wealthy continent until it became a respected nation of the world. Its people had energy and courage, characteristics which were essential in developing their strength and in meeting the many hurdles of a new

This chapter focuses on the new democracy of China. For many years, communists have struggled for a cultural revolution as well as for a political and economic revolution, and the aim is to build a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation. That new society and new state will have not only a new politics and a new economy but a new culture. Any given culture is a reflection of the politics and economics of a given society, and the former in turn has a tremendous influence and effect upon the latter. In the course of its history, the Chinese revolution must go through two stages, first, the democratic revolution, and second, the socialist revolution, and by their very nature they are two different revolutionary processes. Here democracy does not belong to the old category — it is not the old democracy, but belongs to the new category — it is new democracy. It can thus be affirmed that China's new politics are the politics of new democracy, China's new economy is the economy of new democracy, and that China's new culture is the culture of new democracy.

Publisher Summary This chapter presents a study of society, schools, and progress. It reviews the characteristics of the Chinese society and its recent developments under the following by highlighting its massive land and a massive people, a long history and a rich culture, the opium war, the new culture movement or the Chinese renaissance, the two world wars, coalition government and the new democracy, the three red flags, and anti-revisionism. The chapter provides an overview of the school system in China. In a static social order, the school is usually the main educational institution and can be studied apart from other institutions. But in a society in revolution, the school is not the main educational institution and cannot be studied independently. The Chinese People's Government is still the strongest and best organized that China has seen for many centuries. The present hierarchy may change but it will be a Communist hierarchy and no other. It would be the abdication of the hierarchy and not of the party.

This chapter focuses on the publication of The Chinese Worker . Led by its own political party, the Communist Party of China, the Chinese working class has waged heroic struggles for the past 20 years, and become the most politically awakened section of the people and the leader of the Chinese revolution. Rallying the peasantry, and all revolutionary people against imperialism, and feudalism, it has fought to establish a new democratic China, and to drive out Japanese imperialism, and its contribution has been outstanding. The Chinese revolution has not yet triumphed and great efforts are still needed to unite the working class itself, and to unite the peasantry, and the other sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and the entire revolutionary people. This is a tremendous political and organizational task. The responsibility for its accomplishment rests on the Communist Party of China, on the progressive workers, and on the entire working class. The immediate task of the Chinese working class, therefore, is to strengthen unity in its own ranks and unite the people, to oppose imperialism and feudalism, and to struggle for a new China, a China of new democracy. The Chinese Worker is being published with just this task in view.

N examining recent developments within the Chinese People's ReI public, the Western observer is tempted to compare the domestic policies of the new regime with the programs and institutions characteristic of various stages in Soviet Russian history. Generally such a comparison is likely to reveal more differences than similarities, but there are certain features of the present Chinese Communist program that bear rather striking resemblance to the New Economic Policy (NEP) which Lenin inaugurated in Russia in i92i. Like the NEP, current Chinese Communist policy calls for important concessions to the peasantry and for moderation in other spheres of political and economic activity. And, like Lenin in I92I, the Chinese Communist leaders of today are using certain capitalist incentives and institutions in order to move toward the eventual destruction of all capitalist incentives and institutions. There are, of course, a number of equally striking differences which come immediately to mind: the environment of the NEP was Russian, while that of Mao Tse-tung's New Democracy is Chinese; the Bolsheviks of 1921 were charting a totally new course, while Chinese Communist leaders today can benefit from the early mistakes of their Russian allies and from the long history of Red Chinese regional governments; the world context of i95i is far different from that of i92i, and so on. But, despite these differences, there seem to be similarities enough to warrant further analysis. Throughout the period of War Communism (I9I8-2I) the Russian Bolsheviks, while prosecuting the Civil War and resisting Allied invasions, sought to socialize their entire economy as a stage in the transformation of Russia into a truly Communist state. In this direction, industrial production became a state monopoly; government agencies requisitioned peasant grain; and attempts were made to abolish the money economy.'

AIODERN CHIVALRY, the first distinctively American novel, was written in instalments in 1792-18151 by Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Princeton graduate and frontier lawyer.2 In addition to providing extensive commentary on the political differences of the Jeffersonians and Hamiltonians, the novel attempted to establish an apolitical value system for the new democracy which was based on philosophical reflection rather than existing social precedence. Brackenridge's concern with independent thinking in Modern Chivalry foreshadows the themes of artistic isolation, subjectivity, and alienation which preoccupy many nineteenthand twentieth-century American novelists. Brackenridge is the first American novelist to focus on the theme of the alienated artist in a democracy. The problem of artistic selfdefinition in a society which denies the value of art can be better understood in the context of the efforts of Captain Farrago, the protagonist of Modern Chivalry, to survive the levelling influence of the mob and to counteract the confused values of the new democracy. Farrago, unable to accept the emphasis on profit and the materialistic definition of success in post-Revolutionary America, becomes a pioneer on the psychological frontier, and he is the first fictional protagonist in a long list of solitary figures who appear in later novels.

XI TE cannot separate ourselves from the realities we see before us." VI VSo says Mao Tse-tung in his New Democracy, the work which is now described by Chinese Communist spokesmen as "a new contribution to the treasury of Marxist-Leninist thought". The advice is certainly sound. The realities will in the end determine events, and the task of statesmanship is to distinguish these realities from the wishful thinking and cherished fallacies of interested groups. There are in the present relationship between China and the Western powers three great realities which both sides must recognise. The first, that the Chinese Revolution, for good or ill, has come to stay, and that the government of Peking is the regime with which the rest of the world will have to deal in the foreseeable future. The second, that the alliance between China and Russia gives to both sides satisfactions and securities which neither can afford to dispense with, and that therefore Western policy cannot at present hope to detach China from the Soviet orbit. The third, that the Western powers are determined to contain Communism in Asia, and thus to obstruct the expansion of Chinese influence in the countries which were formerly part of the Chinese Empire. It will be objected, from one side or the other, that these propositions are not in fact realities at all but preconceived views. The Right will claim that the Chinese Revolution is a product of Russian intrigue, unsupported by the Chinese people, and that the Nationalist Party in Formosa, or some unpredictable uprising of the people, may yet unseat the regime of Mao Tse-tung. The Left will still believe that the Chinese Communists can be wooed away from Russia by friendly gestures, by recognition, admission to the United Nations, and offers of economic assistance. The Chinese Communists themselves will still count on the weakness and divisions of the West in Asia to give them all they seek in the southeast of that continent. The argument that the Communist regime in China has not fulfilled all of its promises, that the peasants are disappointed, the merchants dissatisfied, the intellectuals frustrated and the regime increasingly based on terror, may be founded on some realities; it is very un

According to most commentators, the government formed in Bonn after the Bundestag election of September 28, 1969, reflected a "change of power" (Machtwechsel) in West Germany. This is an important assertion, especially if one remembers that a shift of power among competing political parties has traditionally been considered the basic criterion of stability in a democracy, particularly in a new democracy such as the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed, critical observers of the German governmental system had emphasized time and again that until 1969 the Federal Republic had never undergone such a test.1 If one interprets the election results and formation of the new government as a change of power, one can chalk up a great plus for German democracy after the minuses represented in the rise of the NPD and the formation of the Grand Coalition of 1966. Such an interpretation overlooks three important points, how