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Gift-giving practices of the Japanese Americans in Honolulu have been analyzed within the framework of the reciprocity norm. This system of balanced reciprocity requires that specified amounts of money be given at important events in the life cycle. It is concluded that reciprocity serves important social functions by facilitating status placement, providing generational continuities, reducing conflict, and equalizing class differences.

Summary-The technique of behavioral contracting is used to strengthen the control of family and school over the behavior of delinquents. A behavioral contract is a means of scheduling the exchange of positive reinforcements among two or more persons. The use of these contracts is predicated upon four assumptions: (I) receipt of positive reinforcements in interpersonal exchanges is a privilege rather than a right; (2) effective interpersonal agreements are governed by the norm of reciprocity; (3) the value of an interpersonal exchange is a direct function of the range, rate and magnitude of the positive reinforcements mediated by that exchange; and (4) rules create freedom in interpersonal exchanges. The use of a behavioral contract with one delinquent girl is described and analyzed using Markovian methods. ANY INTERVENTION program intended for use with delinquents must first define a specific subpopulation as a target group. Delinquents may be subdivided according to whether their predominant offenses are or are not classifiable as adult crimes, whether they are initial or chronic offenders, and whether or not they reside in environments replete with constructive resources which can be mobilized to their advantage. For many delinquents [e.g., for 24 per cent of the adolescent male wards of one Michigan county juvenile court (Huetteman, Briggs, Tripodi, Stuart, Heck and McConnell, 1970)], violations of parental authority and other uniquely juvenile offenses (e.g., possession of alcoholic beverages and failure to attend school) constitute the only “crimes” ever recorded. Many engage in chronically dysfunctional interactions with their families and schools, both of which settings contain the rudiments of effective behavioral controls. A continuum of short- to intermediate-term dispositional goals is available for working with

Conflicting predictions were derived from social exchange theory about the role of social attraction and the reciprocity norm on mutual self-disclosure in dyadic relationships. Sixty-six female subjects were exposed to one of three levels of disclosure input: conventional-low disclosure, conventional-high disclosure, or devianthigh disclosure. In support of the reciprocity norm prediction, willingness to disclose personal information was a positive function of the amount of disclosure input from another person, regardless of the degree of liking for the initial discloser.

The problem raised in the present paper deals with the role of reciprocity in complex structures. By definition, a three-entity situation in which all six relations are negative is unbalanced, yet all the relations are re ciprocated. A similar three-entity structure in which these six relations are positive is balanced and completely reciprocated, as well. The question which is raised is whether reciprocity is an independent source of cognitive bias. From the results of DeSoto and Kuethe (1959) it would appear that with respect to the liking relationship reciprocity may indeed constitute a source of cognitive bias. Subjects in their experiment estimated the probability of reciprocation of the liking relation to be .74. In a further experiment by DeSoto (1960), Ss took longer to learn a hypothetical social structure characterized by absence of reciprocity than one in which all relations were reciprocated. It was not clear from the results of either experiment, however, if these learning effects were due to reciprocity alone or to balance, since the structures employed by these researchers differed from one another not only in terms of reciprocity but in terms of structural balance as well.

Organizational pressures are found to be highest in the development department of an industrial research organization, next highest in the applied department, and lowest in the basic research department. A test of the hypothesis that there is a positive and linear relationship between organizational pressures and role strains yielded the unexpected finding that there is more role strain in the applied department than in either basic research or development. To explain this finding, the norm of reciprocity is examined in relation to the functions of the three departments. The dysfunctions of the norm of reciprocity and the problem of role strain in research organizations imbedded in different institutional contexts are considered. Three role models, whose underlying norms bear a different relation to the norm of reciprocity, are analyzed: the employer-employee relationship, the professional-client, and the patron-artist.

Norms are only one of a variety of determinants of prosocial behavior. The distinction between knowing and personally accepting a norm is stressed. Two specific norms of prosocial behavior are discussed: the norm of reciprocity, and the norm of social responsibility. Reciprocity seems to guide both return of benefits and retaliation of harm. However, the intent attributed to another, the degree of his self sacrifice, and other conditions affect the degree of reciprocity. The evidence that a norm of responsibility guides helping behavior is less convincing. In emergencies (and probably other situations), not only normative (generalized) expectations, but also (specific) expectations communicated by other people who are present and rules applicable to the specific situation seem to greatly affect behavior. This may be due both to people's concern about others' reactions to them and to a social definition of reality.

The writer believes that much that has been written about reciprocity ignores some of the problems inherent in its use. These problems include knowing when reciprocity is expected, how power is balanced in the buyer/seller relationship, reconciling reciprocity with profit centers, administrative costs, possible increased buying costs, and organizational difficulties.

Seventy-two males and 72 females played a prisoner’s dilemma game, modified to include occasional promises to the S stating that he would be given extra points if he cooperated on the next trial. The probability and magnitude of promised reward and the overall cooperativeness of the promisor were manipulated. Females cooperated more and evaluated the promisor more favorably than did males. It was concluded that the norm of reciprocity overrode the effects of the manipulations on compliance for the reason that the promisor was unconditionally accommodative on the promise trials. An indirect relationship between ratings of the promisor’s potency and his rewardingness was obtained.

Forty fifth- and sixth-grade children of entrepreneurial and bureaucratic parents were faced with a simulated peer who intermittently sent threats to them during the course of a reiterated prisoner’s dilemma. One-half of each group of children was assigned to high, and one-half to low-threat credibility conditions. Irrespective of parental occupation, children responded to the cost-gain features of the situation. Entrepreneurial children cooperated more frequently than did bureaucratic children. The latter result was interpreted as indicating that entrepreneurial children are more responsive to a positive norm of reciprocity.

The manner in which the concept of reciprocity is implicated in functional theory is explored, enabling a reanalysis of the concepts of "survival" and "exploitation." The need to distinguish between the concepts of complementarity and reciprocity is stressed. Distinctions are also drawn between (1) reciprocity as a pattern of mutually contingent exchange of gratifications, (2) the existential or folk belief in reciprocity, and (3) the generalized moral norm of reciprocity. Reciprocity as a moral norm is analyzed; it is hypothesized that it is one of the universal "principal components" of moral codes. As Westermarck states, "To requite a benefit, or to be grateful to him who bestows it, is probably everywhere, at least under certain circumstances, regarded as a duty. This is a subject which in the present connection calls for special consideration." Ways in which the norm of reciprocity is implicated in the maintenance of stable social systems are examined.

Individuals receiving "dropped" wallets (86 males and 2 females) at selected locations in Seattle were unobtrusively observed and sex of retriever, an age estimate, dress type, and location of drop were recorded. The return of an intact wallet ($1.25 in cash and contents such as pictures) was used as a measure of altruism. The wallets were dropped in the entrance to an "adult" bookstore (specializing in erotica) and in the entrance to a regular paperback bookstore, both locations in the downtown area. An identification card coded for location of drop with an address and telephone number was included so that wallets could be returned to the supposed owners. The extant research on altruism has thus far turned up few powerful personality influences (3). In this study, dress type (suit, casual, or work clothes) was used as a rough estimate of socioeconomic status and was significantly (X% 8.7, df = 2, p < .02) related to altruism. Of those in the "suic/sportcoat" category, i.e., wearing tie and coat, 65% returned intact wallets, 54% of those in the "casual" category, i.e., slacks and sports shirt, did so, whereas only 20% of those in the "work clothes" category, i.e., khakies, jeans or uniform, did so. This difference could not be accounted for by differential composition of patrons at the two stores nor by the ages of those returning the wallets. One might predict this finding on the basis of need for money, but it is also consistent with Berkowitz' ( 1, 2 ) formulation concerning altruism in the various social classes, namely, that lower-class individuals are more influenced by the norm of reciprocity and segments of the middle-class more by the norm of social responsibility. Although the cause of such a difference cannot be attributed to this source for certain, data are consistent with the earlier findings. In addition, significantly more (X' = 5.5, df = 1, p < .02) patrons of the paperback store returned intact wallets (75% ) than did patrons of the erotic bookstore (44% ) . This finding may be due to a generalized factor of moral behavior since rhere were no differences in dress between the stores or to some unobserved variables. Of those exiting the paperback store 86% returned the wallets, while 67% of those entering did so. Of persons exiting the pornographic bookstore, 50% returned the wallets compared to 38% of those entering, a nonsignificant difference. These data do indicate that exposure to erotic stimuli did not lead to an increase in the antisocial behavior of stealing.