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Jacobson radical of gamma rings is one of the most significant concept in the ring theory. In this paper we consider the Jacobson radical for gamma rings due to A.C. Paul and T.M. Abul Kalam Azad [5]. Some new characterizations are developed in this radical. The Jacobson Density Theorem and its converse Theorem are also proved here. GANIT J. Bangladesh Math. Soc. (ISSN 1606-3694) 29 (2009) 147-160 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3329/ganit.v29i0.8524

The reputation of Ḥanbalite thinkers among academicians is one of an aggressive opponent to other Islamic fields of thought. They refute the scholars of Muslim theology, philosophy and mysticism on the basis of pure Islamic faith, represented they believe by the pious ancestors (al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ). According to the Ḥanbalites, true Islamic belief can only be derived from the Qurʾan, the Sunnah of Prophet Muhammad and the first generation of companions. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 AH/1328 CE), the subject of this discussion belonged to the Ḥanbalite school of thought in Islam and was regarded as their most prominent representative. He has indeed come to be known as the father of the salafī 1 doctrine.Key words: Ḥanbalite, Ibn Taymiyya, Islamic philosophy, Qur’an, sunna, generation (ḥudūth), divine will and knowledge, kalam, God’s essence, reason, eternal creation, God’s attributes, genera and species, Ashʿarite and Muʿtazilite.

Last year Professor Sachau, of Berlin, pointed out to me among the MSS. in the British Museum an important work of Arabic philology. The work bears the title “ Critical Observations on the Mistakes of Philologers by Abu’l-Qāsim ‘Ali ibn Ḥamza al-Baṣri ” (cf. Rieu, Supplement to Catalogue of Arabic MSS., No. 841). The British Museum MS. is a modern copy of an ancient codex in the Khedivial Library in Cairo, and is on the whole legible and accurate, though at points it is not quite reliable. Another similar copy exists at Strassburg (cf. Nöldeke, Z.D.M.G., 1886), and the Library of Count Landberg contains a third. The work includes ‘observations’ on the following eight ancient philological works:—(1) The Nawādir of Abu Ziyād al-Kilābi al-’A‘rābi; (2) the Nawādir of Abu ‘Amr ash-Shaibāni ; (3) the Kitāb an-Nabāt of Aḥmad ibn Da’ūd ad-Dīnawari; (4) the Kāmil of al-Mubarrad; (5) the Faṣīḥ of Tha‘lab ; (6) the Gharīb al-Muṣannaf of Abu Obaid Qāsim ibn Sallām; (7) the Iṣlāḥ al-Manṭiq of Ibn as-Sikkīt; (8) the Makṣur wa’1-Mamdūd of Ibn Wallād. The ‘ observations,’ though sometimes pedantic, are usually valuable from a lexicographical point of view. Abu’l-Qāsim gives many corrections of the statements of the authors on whose books he comments, and supports his contentions by quotations from the poets, which are in many instances not to be found in the lexicons or in similar works.

IBN KHALDfUN opens his sketch of the "science of the Kalam" with a discussion of two topics, the unity of God and the power of God. His purpose is to show that the belief in the unity of God is not incompatible with the belief that attributes are real incorporeal beings, eternally subsisting in God, and that the belief in the power of God, that is, in predestination, is not incompatible with divine justice in its holding man responsible for his actions. These were two distinct problems in Muslim religious philosophy. He combines these two problems and tries to solve them by one common argument. The one common argument by which he tries to solve these two problems may be briefly stated. Throughout the history of philosophy, the unity and power of God were treated as corollaries deducible from the proofs of the existence of God. So Ibn Khalduin says to himself: Let us examine the proofs for the existence of God and see what kind of unity of God and what kind of power of God are established thereby, and then let us see whether that kind of unity is compatible with divine attributes and whether that kind of power is compatible with divine justice. Accordiingly, at the very beginning of his discussion of the Kalam, after stating that the "unity" of God is the core of the articles of faith and after declaring that he was going to prove the unity of God in a method and manner which is "most direct,"' he proceeds to prove not the unity of God but the existence of God. Let us study Ibn Khaldtin's proof of the existence of God. In Arabic philosophy, by the time of Ibn Khalduin (1332-1406), the proofs used for the existence of God were mainly of two types. Both of these types were of the cosmological kind. We may characterize them, with reference to their ultimate philosophical origin, as the Platonic type of argument and the Aristotelian type of argument. The Platonic type of argument starts with the assumption that the world came to be (-yvyvo,yevov) after it had not been,2 or as the Muslim theologians have come to express this view, the world was created (makhliiq). Then, adding the principle that everything created must have a creator, it directly infers that there must be a Creator. The Aristotelian type of argument starts with the assumption that the world is eternal. Then, by an empirical study of the world, it arrives at the conclusion, first, that every form of coming into being within the world is effected by a cause and, second, that since the world is eternal, the series of causes and effects would have to be infinite. Then, adding

ONE OF THE MOST distinctive concepts in Kalam philosophy is that of particularization (takhsis). In barest outline, it is the notion that when an object has a given characteristic but could conceivably have a different one, something must serve to particularize it, that is, to select the particular characteristic it does have from among all those that it might have.1 The concept can provide the nerve of a proof of the existence of God if it is shown, first, that the universe or its parts could conceivably have other characteristics, and, then, that only an agent with the attributes of a deity could select out the particular characteristics that the universe and its parts do have. In addition, the concept can provide the nerve of a proof of creation, should it be shown that whatever has a particular characteristic selected for itself cannot exist from all eternity and therefore must be generated. Both alShahrastani (d. 1153) and Averroes (d. 1198) name al-Juwayni as the originator of just such a combined proof of creation and the existence of God.2 In fact, as we shall see, Juwayni's innovation was very small, since all the elements of his proof were known before his time. After Juwayni, too, the proof underwent further development as two philosophers, al-Ghazali and Moses Maimonides, undertook successively more precise definitions of the legitimate application of the concept of particularization. Still, Juwayni does