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Since 2010, with Viktor Orbán's return to power, Hungary has progressively turned into an antidemocratic regime through a well-thought process of state and democracy capture. This slide has come along with chimeric narratives about national identity. Consecutive narratives about the nation and the country's sense of belonging have given the impression that Hungary is moving on the map, as the Orbán regime has been locating itself more and more explicitly against the West. During the migration crisis, 'Central Europe' was at the centre of Orbán's cultural map, as he extrapolated his ideology to the East-Central European macro-region, hoping to turn it into a region against the European establishment. Budapest's tactical moves in the Western Balkans have gained importance as Orbán is increasingly isolated in the EU community. On the global scale, the regime has mixed trade and diplomacy with tying political alliances in Central Asia and beyond. These narratives do not result in a system. However, there is a common denominator in Orbán's consecutive discourses on Hungary's geopolitical place and role: anti-Western and anti-EU convictions flow through the opportunistic contradictions of national propaganda. In a contradictory way, only an EU member state could proceed to state and democracy capture and become famous for it, giving the impression that the small, peripherical Eastern European state is more important than it is. It is an EU member that has fallen into Russia's arms to propagate pro-Kremlin narratives in and outside the EU. In this paper, I will examine the geopolitical narratives used by the Orbán regime and show how Budapest's very sense of scale has got lost in the process. Indeed, it is Hungary's precarious location on the map that the regime seems to have forgotten about and has reached this point at the time of renewed Russian aggression in Hungary's direct neighbourhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central European countries with a historically dominant Roman Catholic heritage belong to a particular cluster in respect to the governance of religion. This paper focuses on Hungary and Slovakia and addresses the effect of religious nationalism on the regimes of governance of religion in the two countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a brief period of neutral stance towards religion, which was characterized by liberal values. With the introduction of the bilateral Concordat agreements with the Holy See, both countries started to treat traditional Christian Churches preferentially. By the 2010s legislation in both countries created restrictive entry barriers for "new" religions. This created two or multi-tiered systems for "old" and "new" religions, in which the former enjoyed closer relationship with the state. As a result, the separation of church and state has become blurred. Preferentially treated churches reappeared in the public space as providers of certain educational and social services. Preferentially treated churches and the state developed asymmetrically interdependent relationships, the state having the upper hand. Meanwhile, increasingly populist and nationalist parties instrumentalized religion by involving Christianity in their nationalistic political discourse. This helped create a normative space, in which the state is able to give further preferential treatment to certain religious groups over others. The emphasis on Christian national identity underpinned these governments' narratives that conflates migration with security and Islam, which pushed those religious groups on the margins, which do not fit in the religious nationalist narrative of the increasingly right- and populism-leaning governing elite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]