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Well-being depends not only on what happens but also on when it happens. There are temporal aspects of well-being, and to a large extent those aspects are about relative timing—about being "in-tact." On the one hand, there is a perspectival aspect about being in-tact with one's past, present, and future or, in a less involved sense, with one's life as a whole. On the other hand, there is a synchronization aspect of being in-tact; and this aspect occurs on different levels: It might be about the alignment between different temporal domains—such as time as individually perceived and physical or intersubjective time. Or it might be about a single domain, especially the inner dynamics of individual time. The danger of not experiencing and acknowledging the relational character of these different timings likely leads to a substantial loss in the variety of human experience. Important aspects of subjective and intersubjective experience might fade away. The present paper discusses these aspects of well-being along the lines of distinctions and concepts prominently used in the metaphysics and the phenomenology of time. Thus, the paper also aims to complement the existing literature by bringing together important strands of current philosophical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early childhood teaching is complex, caring, relational work. In enacting an ethic of care, early childhood teachers often focus on extending care to others, and overlook including themselves in a circle of care. This can negatively impact on teacher well-being and ultimately lead to teacher burnout. This paper draws on a project that explored twelve teachers' experiences of the practice of mindful self-compassion using a methodology of mindful inquiry, a qualitative approach that includes elements of mindfulness, care, and hermeneutic phenomenology. Findings of the study identified that the practice of mindful self-compassion supported teachers to enact an ethic of care, which includes extending care, receiving care, and engaging in self-care. Being mindfully self-compassionate supported the teachers to engage in intentional caring practices that fostered relationships and supported the well-being of children and their colleagues, and empowered the teachers to advocate for themselves, their colleagues, and children. The paper argues that mindful self-compassion practice supports and sustains early childhood teachers in their caring role. When carers are included in a circle of care, then the reciprocal and inclusive nature of an ethic of care can be more fully realised. Implications are discussed for initial teacher education, teaching practice, early childhood leaders and policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For as long as philosophers ignore mind-wandering, they will disregard from one-third to one-half of conscious thoughts. Regrettably, mind-wandering is only seldom addressed in phenomenology. The fundamental ambition of this paper is to offer the first systematic phenomenological investigation of mind-wandering that relies on the classical principles of Husserlian phenomenology. The paper begins with a critique of the dominant conceptions of mind-wandering in contemporary psychology and philosophy. Against such a background, the paper develops a new, phenomenologically-grounded conception of mind-wandering. The paper further focuses on the central resources in Husserlian phenomenology, which can be fruitfully employed in the future interdisciplinary research on mind-wandering. Phenomenological reflections on background consciousness, on pre-predicative experience, on passivity and on self-awareness lie at the center of this analysis. The paper concludes with some reflections on the relation between mind-wandering and daydreaming and on the function of mind-wandering in conscious life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the idea of objective phenomenology, or a way of understanding the phenomenal character of conscious experiences that doesn't require one to have had the kinds of experiences under consideration. My central thesis is that structural facts about experience—facts that characterize purely how conscious experiences are structured—are objective phenomenal facts. I begin by precisifying the idea of objective phenomenology and diagnosing what makes any given phenomenal fact subjective. Then I defend the view that structural facts about experience are objective. I also argue that structural facts about experience, despite being objective, nevertheless still give rise to an explanatory gap. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In developing a theory of consciousness, one of the main problems has to do with determining what distinguishes conscious states from non-conscious ones—the delimitation problem. This paper explores the possibility of solving this problem in terms of self-awareness. That self-awareness is essential to understanding the nature of our conscious experience is perhaps the most widely discussed hypothesis in the study of consciousness throughout the history of philosophy. Its plausibility hinges on how the notion of self-awareness is unpacked. The idea that consciousness involves self-awareness has been understood in two different ways: either as awareness of oneself—the subject of experience—or as awareness of the conscious episode itself. In this paper I argue (i) that every experience concerns the subject in a very specific way, involving what I will call 'perspectival de se representation', and (ii) that there is no need to appeal to the experience itself in order to characterize the awareness within that experience. The view I articulate explains the subjective nature of experience without over-intellectualizing it, accommodates the phenomenology of experience, and dispels any doubt about the need to find the self in introspection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores brain-to-brain interfaces (B2BI) as innovative human-technology interactions from a philosophical perspective to show how the implementation of this technology raises new philosophical questions about who we are and how we live in the world. More specifically, this text introduces the emergence of a collective living body through digital technologies from a phenomenological perspective to open the path to analyzing its effects on society. Few studies in the humanities have been focusing on how new human-technology interactions can connect several subjects into one living body by enabling subjects to literally "walk in the shoes of others". This novel ability radically reframes some philosophical assumptions about what individual subjects are and how to think of them since the boundaries dividing them seem to blur. The constitution of a new type of human-technology interaction changes who we are and how we live, and we need to focus on such a change to tackle the challenges we will have to face in how we think of ourselves and live with others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In quantum foundations, there is growing interest in the program of reconstructing the quantum formalism from clear physical principles. These reconstructions are formulated in an operational framework, deriving the formalism from information-theoretic principles. It has been recognized that this project is in tension with standard ψ-ontic interpretations. This paper presupposes that the quantum reconstruction program (QRP) (i) is a worthwhile project and (ii) puts pressure on ψ-ontic interpretations. Where does this leave us? Prima facie, it seems that ψ-epistemic interpretations perfectly fit the spirit of information-based reconstructions. However, ψ-epistemic interpretations, understood as saying that the wave functions represents one's knowledge about a physical system, recently have been challenged on technical and conceptual grounds. More importantly, for some researchers working on reconstructions, the lesson of successful reconstructions is that the wave function does not represent objective facts about the world. Since knowledge is a factive concept, this speaks against epistemic interpretations. In this paper, I discuss whether ψ-doxastic interpretations constitute a reasonable alternative. My thesis is that if we want to engage QRP with ψ-doxastic interpretations, then we should aim at a reconstruction that is spelled out in non-factive experiential terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ+) people are experiencing increasingly varied visibility on social media due to ongoing digitalization. In this paper, I draw on social epistemology and phenomenological accounts of the digital (Frost-Arnold in: Lackey (ed) The epistemic dangers of context collapse online, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021; Krueger and Osler in Philos Topics 47(2):205–231, 2019; Hine in: Ethnography for the internet: embedded, embodied and everyday, Bloomsbury, London, 2015), and argue that, for LGBTQ+ individuals, social media provides a space for connecting with people with shared lived experiences. This, in turn, makes it possible for social media to enable feelings of belonging. By interacting with other LGBTQ+ people online, LGBTQ+ individuals are enabled to imagine their own being in the world and to feel like they belong. This is especially important when we consider that, for LGBTQ+ identities, it may be more complicated to feel connected due to marginalization and (fear of) discrimination. This paper not only draws on literature from phenomenology and social epistemology on the digital, but also presents and analyzes interviews that were conducted in order to explore the social media experiences of LGBTQ+ people through a phenomenology and social epistemology informed framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is part of a special section devoted to an interdisciplinary exploration of vulnerability, assessing the theoretical elaborations of the concept, its uses, its political significance, and methodological issues in studying it. By foregrounding feminist and phenomenological philosophical methods that center on lived experience, the paper elaborates a multidimensional theoretical framework for understanding vulnerability as a complex experience and concept. It advances a pluralist understanding of vulnerability, seeking to connect dimensions of the concept that may be fragmented and focusing on its relational nature. Such a non-dualist approach entails that the political and ethical conclusions that can be drawn about vulnerability are complex and thus require critical analysis, especially of how vulnerability becomes a matter of political rhetoric, rather than straightforward prescription. Finally, in light of its complexity and ambiguity, adequate and socially just theorizing about and application of the concept of vulnerability requires more thoroughgoing interdisciplinary collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a novel interpretation of Hans Jonas' analysis of metabolism, the centrepiece of Jonas' philosophy of organism, in relation to recent controversies regarding the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity as understood within 'autopoietic' enactivism (AE). Jonas' philosophy of organism chiefly inspired AE's development of what we might call 'the phenomenological life-mind continuity thesis' (PLMCT), the claim that certain phenomenological features of human experience are central to a proper scientific understanding of both life and mind, and as such central features of all living organisms. After discussing the understanding of PLMCT within AE, and recent criticisms thereof, I develop a reading of Jonas' analysis of metabolism, in light of previous commentators, which emphasizes its systematicity and transcendental flavour. The central thought is that, for Jonas, the attribution of certain phenomenological features is a necessary precondition for our understanding of the possibility of metabolism, rather than being derivable from metabolism itself. I argue that my interpretation strengthens Jonas' contribution to AE's justification for ascribing certain phenomenological features to life across the board. However, it also emphasises the need to complement Jonas' analysis with an explanatory account of organic identity in order to vindicate these phenomenological ascriptions in a scientific context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his 'activity view' with the mental action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment. In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways. In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of traumatic experiences led Freud to investigate what he termed a compulsion to repeat. The present paper takes up the idea of a tendency to repeat something that reinforces psychic pain and asks which kind of agency is possible in the light of traumatic repetitions. First, the experiential roots of repetitive doings induced by trauma are investigated. Might a compulsion to repeat belong to the sphere of the kind of tendencies which Husserl terms "generally unconscious"? And if so, does this sphere bring us to the limit of phenomenology where we might need to cooperate with psychoanalysis to make sense of the manifestations of such an unconscious sphere? This is proposed in section two. In section three, Freud's notion of the compulsion to repeat is discussed. At this point, the repetitive activity of the mind is investigated as the traumatized person's ongoing struggle to survive with the trauma and as a struggle to understand what survival in this case even means. In section four, an attempt is made to describe the kind of agency involved in the repetitive activity of the mind. The paper concludes that weak agency is possible in traumatic repetition when understood as the person's ongoing attempt to compose a future for what has been lost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, my aim is to develop a phenomenological understanding of discrimination from the perspective of the discriminator. Since early existential phenomenology, the phenomenon of discrimination has received a great deal of attention. While much of this work has focused on the experience of the discriminatee, recent scholarship has begun to reflect on the intentional structures on the side of the discriminator. In a contribution to this trend, I argue that our sense of what is (ab)normal plays a constitutively significant role in the reiteration and reinforcement of harmful discriminatory practices. More specifically, I argue that Husserl's distinction between two forms of normality, namely, concordance-normality [Einstimmigkeit] and optimal-normality [Optimalität], is an important tool for illuminating otherwise overlooked aspects of the discriminator's experience. I achieve this by demonstrating how these two notions of normality play distinct constitutive roles when comparing deliberate acts of discrimination committed with malintent, compared with more habitual and prereflective expectations which are already discriminatory in nucleo. I argue that at the heart of discriminatory practices there is a naïve, normalizing attempt to stabilize concordance at the expense of critical self-reflection, normative revisions, and enriched horizons of expectation. In doing so, this paper provides a novel and important contribution to philosophical discussions surrounding discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of the ecological psychologist's concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James' concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cultural Psychology (CP) is a relatively young perspective, growing in the field of social sciences, nevertheless, its ideas are found throughout the fields and its ancestors' -Naturwissenschaften and Philosophy- history. CP has several central notions which are introduced in the following paper. Thru their introduction, the central goal of the revelation of the essence of the idea of CP is proffered. The core idea of CP is a general psychological concept that should be considered as a starting point from where new ideas, innovations and challenging theories can emerge. In other words, a new general psychological perspective we can use as a starting point. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève's dialogue with proponents of Hegelianism and phenomenology in Soviet Russia of the 1920–30s. Considering works by Dmytro Chyzhevsky, Ivan Ilyin, Gustav Shpet, and Alexandre Koyré, I retrace Hegelian themes in Kojève, focusing on the relation between method and time. I argue that original reflections on method played a key role in both Russian Hegelianism and Kojève's work, from his famous Hegel lectures to the late fragments of a system. As I demonstrate, Kojève's Hegelianism was significantly shaped by his encounter with Ilyin's 1918 commentary on Hegel, a detailed study of the relation between method and the experience of time. However, in Kojève's hands, Ilyin's ideas were transformed, some radicalized, others abandoned. Comparatively reading texts by these thinkers in their respective contexts, I resituate and evaluate claims that Hegel's method was less dialectical than phenomenological. I finally argue that early Soviet Hegelian discourses not only shaped the trajectory of Kojève's Hegelianism but also radically anticipated concepts of time in French post-structuralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dennett (Synthese,53(2), 159–180, 1982, 1991, Journal of Consciousness Studies,10(9–10), 19–30, 2003, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,6, 247–270, 2007) proposes and defends a method called heterophenomenology. Heterophenomenology is a method to study consciousness from a third-person objective point of view as opposed to a first-person subjective point of view or (auto)-phenomenology. The method of heterophenomenology serves a necessary role in Dennett's schema of bridging the gap between the manifest and the scientific image of the world. In this paper, I attempt to present a limited critique of the method of heterophenomenology. The objection raised in this paper is limited to one of the steps involved in the method, i.e., the interpretation of the heterophenomenological text as analogous to novelist fiction. I attempt to show that the assumptions made by Dennett about the interpretation of fiction are contradictory in nature and therefore the same cannot be applied to the interpretation of a heterophenomenological text. The assumptions fail in justifying the interpretation of fiction itself and hence exporting them by analogy to interpret a heterophenomenological text is a mistake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regenerative Medicine promises to develop treatments to regrow healthy tissues and cure the physical body. One of the emerging developments within this field is regenerative implants, such as jawbone or heart valve implants, that can be broken down by the body and are gradually replaced with living tissue. Yet challenges for embodiment are to be expected, given that the implants are designed to integrate deeply into the tissue of the living body, so that implant and body become one. In this paper, we explore how regenerative implants may affect the embodied experience of implant recipients. To this end, we take a phenomenological approach. First, we explore what insights the existing phenomenological and empirical literature on embodiment offers regarding the experience of illness and of living with regular (non-regenerative) implants and organ transplants. Second, we apply these insights to better understand how future implant recipients might experience living with regenerative implants. Third, we conclude that concepts and considerations from the existing phenomenological literature do not sufficiently address what it might be like to live with an implantable technology that, over time, becomes one with the living body. We argue that the interwovenness and intimate relationship of people living with regenerative implants should be understood in terms of 'entanglement'. Entanglement allows us to explore the complexities of human-technology relations, acknowledging the inseparability of humans and implantable technologies. Our theoretical foundations regarding the role of embodiment may be tested empirically once more people will be living with regenerative implants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The critique of pure sense data is a characteristic feature of contemporary philosophy, from Wittgenstein and Heidegger to Martha Nussbaum and Ernst Tugendhat. These authors variously call into question that the data of sensation should be taken as primordial. Other contemporary authors have responded to this general critique starting from considerations about the role of sensory states, often referred to as "qualia," in our experiential awareness. In this paper, I suggest that the philosophy of science of Ernst Mach is especially paradigmatic in that it displays in one same intellectual effort the presence of these two polarizing views in the philosophical discussion of the twentieth century. In Mach a radical biological and epistemic pragmatism coexists with the most extreme sensual elementism. I show that Mach is at the same time the proponent of a phenomenological lineage that Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology, is aware to take up and continue. What I propose is that Husserl's phenomenology emerges as true juncture between the extremes of sensualism and pragmatism by way of a recasting of the modern intentionalist conceptions of experience beyond any mentalist and realist paradigm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some accounts of human distinctiveness focus on anatomical features, such as bipedalism and brain size. Others focus on cognitive abilities, such as tool use and manufacture, language, and social cognition. Embodied approaches to cognition highlight the internal relations between these two groups of characteristics, arguing that cognition is rooted in and shaped by embodiment. This paper complements existing embodied approaches by focusing on an underappreciated aspect of embodiment: the appearance of the human body as condition of human sociality and cognition. I approach this issue through Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the animate body as an intertwining of perceiving and perceivable aspects. The eye is both an animal’s embodied, perceptual openness onto the world, and the means by which that experiential openness can be perceived by others. The morphology and appearance of its embodiment condition how an animal comes to understand others and itself as animate subjects. I interpret the perceivable appearance of the human eye and skin in comparison with those of other animals. An underappreciated dimension of human distinctiveness, I argue, is the way the human sense organs render human perceiving comparatively more perceivable to conspecifics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on sense of place as a cultural ecosystem service and a mediatory experience in grasping a collection of ecosystem benefits. Through phenomenological and social constructionism/relational approaches, we focus on sense of place as a relational entity at both the individual and collective levels. Using content analysis of 32 in-depth interviews with (a) environmental officials and (b) local inhabitants in the region of Ostrobothnia, Finland, the study finds that sense of place is shaped via the interactions of environmental settings and cultural practices. Here, we argue that material and non-material interactions contribute to sense of place. With a phenomenological approach, the study presents the qualities associated with places, such as tranquility, beauty, and uniqueness that are important for achieving both material and non-material ecosystem benefits, while social constructionism/relational approaches indicate that the social dimension of sense of place contributes to ecosystem service benefits through traditional cultural practices. The study also shows a shift in cultural practices from provisioning to recreation in creating meaningful places. The results highlight a multilocal dimension of senses of places, particularly in contemporary lifestyles and increased mobilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The reassessment of intentionality as "tendency" or "drive," already important when the intentionality at stake designates the directedness of lived experiences toward a particular object, might be even more crucial when the orientation toward others is concerned. How do drives and affects intermingle within our intersubjective life and fashion our relations to others? The present paper will address this question by focusing on a particular or even primary kind of intersubjectivity: the mother–child relationship, that received a particular, yet still insufficiently noticed attention in early phenomenology. Scheler and Husserl both analyse this relationship, indeed, in terms that imply drive intentionality as well as affective intentionality (that is, for what concerns the mother, maternal instinct and maternal love). In their view, this relation also has a crucial ethical significance, and may even be taken to be paradigmatic for ethical relationships as such. Accordingly, drive intentionality is understood as an instinctive orientation toward others, that love takes up and develops, thus providing an affective and even instinctive ground for ethical behaviour. All this imples the depart from an ethics grounded on the primacy and sufficiency of reason. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their descriptions of the life dynamics of tendencies as "blind but oriented," both Scheler and Husserl outline an alternative model of intentionality to Brentano's conception of mental reference to determinate objects or meanings. In my reading, their phenomenological consideration of tendential structures will reveal tendency as an essential moment of intentionality. A horizon of indeterminacy turns out to be constitutive of every intentional act as a tendency toward or away from something. This paper develops as follows: First, I will present Max Scheler's nuanced differentiation of tendential life and the systematic horizon of his model of blind but oriented tendency, which seeks to offer an alternative to the mechanism/teleology dichotomy. Second, I will present Jocelyn Benoist's framing of the same question in the opposition between blind drives and consciousness. Benoist's radical critique of the interpretation of intentionality as a tendency condenses in his clear assertion that drives cannot be intentional because they are constitutively blind. Benoist accuses Edmund Husserl of nothing less than murdering intentionality through phenomenological vivisection, i.e., by extinguishing in reflection the tension inherent in conative intention and watering down the concept of intentionality to such an extent that it also includes cognitive acts. I will therefore turn my attention to the alleged culprit. I will show that Husserl's broad concept of intentionality is not only negatively justified by the possibility of transforming tendencies into a consciousness of their implicit object, but rather positively justified by the directed dynamics of both passive and active forms of intentionality. In the conclusion I will show how Husserl's constitutive analyses move along lines akin to Scheler's insights and call for a revision of overly static interpretations of the phenomenological concepts of intentionality and teleology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy of aesthetics and beauty has traditionally prioritized the sense of vision while deprioritizing the more basic-bodily and thus less "noble" sense of touch. This paper examines bodily aspects of how beauty appears in the experience of visual art and motivates the view that touch is fundamental to such experiences. We appeal to Merleau-Ponty to show the relevance given to touch in his phenomenology of aesthetics, to unfold the meaning of touch as "reversible," and to understand how vision can be conceptualized as a form of touch. Further, we present four cases of feeling touched by beauty in experiences of visual art collected through interviews with art museum visitors. The descriptions of these experiences show that when people open themselves to an artwork they also open themselves to themselves. Based on the qualitative descriptions, we discuss how Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of touch is revelatory of the meaning of feeling "touched" in experiences of beauty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critiques Husserl's idea of grounding through an exploration of his notion of the lifeworld. First, it sketches different senses of the lifeworld in the Crisis and explains in what sense it is taken to be a universal foundation of all sense-formation. Second, it criticizes Husserl's idea of grounding and shows that it fails because the alleged foundation—namely, the lifeworld as a perceptual world, or rather lifeworldly experience as perception—is inadequately determined. Perception cannot function as a universal foundation because it is always already interpretation. "The groundlessness of sense" means that the process of sense-formation can in no way rest upon an ultimate ground because contingent presuppositions and historical circumstances influence it from the very beginning. The paper concludes by discussing the consequence of this view for the relation between philosophy and sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthropologists have recently argued that the divide between nature and culture is not a universal framework suitable for understanding collective behavior but rather a local variation among various ways of composing the experience of the world. Notably, in the case of Philippe Descola’s anthropology, this critique led to a radical reconceptualization of social sciences and the humanities in terms of ontological regimes, which draws upon key aspects of the phenomenological tradition. In this paper, I develop a phenomenological perspective on Descola’s anthropology to clarify whether and how we can assess our engagement with the world beyond the divide between nature and culture. The paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, I present the main claims of Descola’s position, which he calls “relative universalism,” and introduce two critiques of this project: the potential conflation between his ontological framework and aspects of modern naturalism and the risk of reifying cultural determinations as ontological properties. In the second section, I address the first critique by showing how the universalist claim of Descola’s anthropology, according to which collective experience is organized by the duality of planes of physicality and interiority, can be elucidated through Husserl’s account of the embodied experience to avoid a conflation with the naturalist framework. Finally, I contend that anthropology’s idea of a diversity of ontological regimes can be made coherent by analyzing the two layers of the world constitution: the primordial experience of the lived body and the intersubjective process of communalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proper way in which limit-problems [Grenzprobleme]—birth, death, dreamless sleep, the “prior to birth” [das vor der Geburt], the “after death” [das nach dem Tod], etc.—can be accessed according to Husserl is by means of so-called “construction” [Konstruktion] or “reconstruction” [Rekonstruktion]. Contrary to what is usually claimed with respect to this method, and therefore the acts it is composed of, this paper will attempt to prove that they do not consist in non-intuitive acts, but rather in intuitive, but non-sensible acts. In other words, the aforementioned acts of construction consist in categorial acts. More specifically, they represent acts akin to the ones involved in the constitution of exact material essences of a qualitative (the “pure” red, the “pure” blue …) or of a geometrical kind (a triangle, a chiliagon …): both the acts involved in the constitution of elementary exact essences, or acts of idealization, and the acts involved in the constitution of derived exact essences, or acts of deriving. However, the acceptance of such acts of construction suggests a serious reconsideration of some of the basic tenets of Husserlian phenomenology. Indeed, it challenges the idea that phenomenology is an eidetic science of inexact—morphological, descriptive …—material essences, namely the essence of a subjective sphere (the essence of consciousness, the essence of ego …); in fact, it turns phenomenology, at least partially, into something Husserl explicitly repudiates on multiple occasions: a “geometry” of lived experience. It is thus important to determine whether these acts of construction should be integrated into Husserlian phenomenology, and, if yes, how they should be integrated into it. Providing an indication of this will be the ultimate goal of this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the idea, prevalent in post-Husserlian scholarship, that violence is a ‘limit problem’ of phenomenology. It offers a critical approach to this idea and proposes an alternative way of understanding the phenomenology of violence. The study comprises four analytical moments. First, I show the implications and shortcomings of interpreting violence as a ‘limit phenomenon’. Second, I address the issue of aggression as a mode of interaction between agents who can take on the role of perpetrators, victims, or witnesses. Here the intentionality of aggression as a phenomenon of the will in interpersonal relations will be addressed. It will be concretely shown to what extent intentional analysis, the kind of analysis prescribed by the ‘general scheme’ of transcendental phenomenology, is indispensable for fleshing out the experiential nature of aggression as interaction between agents who can either exert, suffer, or witness violence. Third, I turn to Husserl’s brief account of violence (Gewalt) in Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität and, expanding upon it, propose a definition that aims to express the most fundamental structure of violence as a phenomenon of consciousness. Next, this phenomenologically grounded definition will be shown to be consistent with the sociological and intentional approach adopted by the World Health Organization in its World Report on Violence and Health. This will lead to the realization that the transcendental approach to violence can both contribute to the philosophical grounding of this Report and benefit from its multidisciplinary perspective—in particular its ecological model for analyzing the experiential horizons constitutive of the individual-environment relationship. Finally, it will become clear that violence harbors no more mysteries than any other form of intersubjective encounter and that transcendental phenomenology provides indispensable tools for conceptual clarification in interdisciplinary violence research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While closing their famous paper entitled “Pseudogap: friend or foe of high-Tc?” Norman, Pines, and Kallin underlined that before we have a microscopic theory, we must have a consistent phenomenology. This was in 2005. As it turns out in 2006, a phenomenological theory of the pseudogap state was proposed by Gor’kov and Teitel’baum. This originated from their careful analysis of the Hall effect data, and it has been very successful model as numerous investigations over the years have shown. In this mini-review, the essence of the idea of Gor’kov and Teitel’baum is presented. The pseudogap obtained by them from the Hall effect data agrees very well with that obtained from the ARPES data. This famous Gor’kov–Teitel’baum thermal activation model (in short GTTA model) not only presents a consistent phenomenology of the pseudogap state, but also rationalizes the Hall angle data, and it presents a strong case against the famous “two-relaxation times” idea of Anderson and collaborators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract  : Antipathy is an affective phenomenon which has not received much attention by philosophers and psychologists, unlike its antonym, sympathy. However, antipathy is a phenomenon that contributes to and fuels many of the challenges related to our social behaviours and interpersonal relationships. Antipathy’s exact nature needs to be identified, if only because of the importance it has, for example, in political opposition, in loss of civility, but also in situations that cause poor psychological well-being. It would be then essential to be able to determine whether antipathy is a phenomenon that could be felt on a short term (an episode) or last in the long term (a disposition), since it would allow to study and measure more precisely the nature of the acts it gives rise to, the range of its intensity or/and its social consequences. Like sympathy, antipathy is most often understood as an affective phenomenon that lasts over time. Antipathy is often presented as an instinctive and irrational aversion to something or someone. Yet this common definition is too similar to the definition of other affective phenomena such as disgust or even fear. This article will therefore examine the nature of antipathy by differentiating it from other emotional phenomena that resemble it. But more importantly, the limited existing literature on antipathy mostly characterises it as an affective disposition. In this paper, I will rather argue that antipathy is a conscious emotion, i.e., an emotion that occurs consciously and has a phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional religious and spiritual texts offer a surprising wealth of relevant theoretical and practical knowledge about human behavior. This wellspring may contribute significantly to expanding our current body of knowledge in the social sciences, and criminology in particular. In Jewish religious texts, specifically by Maimonides, we can find profound analyses of human traits and guidelines for a normative way of life. Among other things, modern criminological literature attempts to link certain character traits and divergent behaviors. Using the hermeneutic phenomenological approach, this present study analyzed Maimonidean writings, mainly Laws of Human Dispositions, in order to understand Moses ben Maimon (1138–1204) and his view of character traits. The analysis yielded four themes: (1) Human personality between nature and nurture; (2) The complexity of human personality, imbalance and criminality; (3) Extremism as a way to achieve balance; and (4) The Middle Way, flexibility and common sense. These themes can serve therapeutic purposes, as well as inform a rehabilitation model. Grounded in a theoretical rationale about the nature of humans, this model is designed to direct individuals to balance their traits by self-reflection and constant practice of the Middle Way. The article concludes by proposing that implementing this model may promote normative behavior and thus contribute to rehabilitating offenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Autistic adults experience stark health disparities and difficulties accessing health care. Their realities of managing complex health conditions are unknown. Our research explored the experience of Autistic adults self-managing diabetes. Interviews with Autistic adults with diabetes and their support people were thematically analysed to identify three key themes. The Autistic experience influenced diabetes self-management, including autism-unique challenges and strengths. Participants prioritised avoiding Autistic burnout over diabetes self-management; mitigating the psychosocial pressures of neurotypical systems took precedence. Health professionals often separated autism and diabetes subsequently overlooking key factors impacting diabetes self-management. To better meet the needs of Autistic adults, diabetes care and health management more broadly should be considered within the context of autism, including supports for self-management during Autistic burnout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In rich false memory studies, familial informants often provide information to support researchers in planting vivid memories of events that never occurred. The goal of the current study was to assess how effectively we can retract these false memories via debriefing – i.e., to what extent can we put participants back the way we found them? We aimed to establish (1) what proportion of participants would retain a false memory or false belief following debriefing, and (2) whether richer, more detailed memories would be more difficult to retract. Participants (N = 123) completed a false memory implantation protocol as part of a replication of the "Lost in the Mall" study (Loftus & Pickrell, Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725, 1995). By the end of the protocol, 14% of participants self-reported a memory for the fabricated event, and a further 52% believed it had happened. Participants were then fully debriefed, and memory and belief for the false event were assessed again. In a follow-up assessment 3 days post-debriefing, the false memory rate had dropped to 6% and false belief rates also fell precipitously to 7%. Moreover, virtually all persistent false memories were found to be nonbelieved memories, where participants no longer accepted that the fabricated event had occurred. Richer, more detailed memories were more resistant to correction, but were still mostly retracted. This study provides evidence that participants can be "dehoaxed", and even very convincing false memories can be retracted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Contemporary philosophers and scientists have done much to expand our understanding of the structure and neural mechanisms of joint action. But the phenomenology of joint action has only recently become a live topic for research. One method of clarifying what is unique about the phenomenology of joint action is by considering the alternative perspective of agents subsumed in group action. By group action we mean instances of individual agents acting while embedded within a group agent, instead of with individual coordination. Paradigm examples are educational bureaucracies, corporations, and nation states. There is a phenomenological difference between agents whose actions are subsumed within a group action ("the university did X") as compared to agents who act jointly ("we did x"). Attending to this difference clarifies what is phenomenologically distinctive about joint action. Appealing to an Aristotelian account of agency and to the metaphysical concept of weak emergence, we argue that what makes paradigmatic group action distinctive is the relative inaccessibility, un-revisability, and evaluative simplicity of the group agent's goal(s) from the perspective of individual agents. This suggests that a distinctive feature of joint agency is the maintenance of a greater sense of individual agency. Put simply, joint agency is often experienced as an enhancement of the individuals' agency precisely because our paradigmatic agential powers are extended intersubjectively as we act together. In contrast, group agency often involves a loss of the sense of agency, precisely because it is the emergent group agent that maintains the agential powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joint actions typically involve a sense of togetherness that has a distinctive phenomenological component. While it has been hypothesized that group size, hierarchical structure, division of labour, and expertise impact agents' phenomenology during joint actions, the studies conducted so far have mostly involved dyads performing simple actions. We explore in this study the complex case of collectively improvised musical performances, focusing particularly on the way group size and interactional patterns modulate the phenomenology of joint action. We recorded two expert improvisation ensembles of contrasting sizes (16 vs 4 musicians) and collected data about their musical behaviour, as well as reports about five aspects of their phenomenology (sense of agency, agentive identity, integration, dependence, reflexivity) and about their musical intentions. Our overall data enabled us to assess how those five phenomenological dimensions related to one another during jointly improvised performances. They also show how such phenomenology varied with the way improvisers dynamically related to one another throughout the performance. Finally, we observe that group size strongly altered the phenomenology of improvisers who otherwise shared many characteristics (high expertise, similar aesthetic preferences, etc.). Our study thus sheds light on the interactional and structural parameters that shape and modulate our felt experience when acting together, and thereby highlights the importance of pluralism for studying the phenomenology of joint action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are currently in the middle of the transformation from Martin Heidegger's modern society to a society based on digital technology. In the developing digital society, humans in their current state of 'Being' are increasingly surrounded by systems that are networked and run based on algorithms, software, and data. These interconnected systems function, communicate, and interact in networks and driven by these algorithms, software, and data, which give them the ability to connect, calculate, and reveal. Jointly, these systems thus create a new and actual reality based on their mathematical and scientific background. In the present-day digital society, humans' actual 'state of Being' is increasingly framed by what the digital technology reveals to us and enables. The transition to this new digital reality conjures up more and more questions as to whether we as humans sufficiently understand the essence of digital technology and whether we as humanity have sufficient knowledge and insight to be able to analyze and fathom the essence of the new digital ecology around us. In this article, I will use Heideggerian phenomenology as a philosophy to create a framework that will allow us to, based on phenomenological research into our current 'Dasein' or 'being there', gain deeper insight into the 'Being' of digital technology and the ensuing development of a digital reality for humanity as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concepts such as “symbolism” and “symbolic cognition” often remain unspecified in discussions the symbolic capacities of earlier hominins. In this paper, I use conceptual tools from phenomenology to reflect on the origins of early symbolic cognition. In particular, I discuss the possible early use of pointing gestures around the time of the earliest known stone tool industries. I argue that unlike more basic social acts such as expression, gaze following, and attention-getters, which are used by extant non-human great apes, communicative pointing involves key elements that are characteristic of symbolic cognition. In particular, it involves “third order intentionality” as well as “shared practice horizons”: shared frameworks of understanding which are required for the interpretation of communicative acts whose meaning is not codified indexically or iconically in the signaling behavior. In the final part, I briefly review some indications for the use of pointing gestures around the time of the Lomekwian and Oldowan industries, as a way to sustain cooperation and possibly learning by instruction. It is suggested that pointing is more complex than is standardly acknowledged, and that it may have been an important communicative act for Early Stone Age hominins in transitioning to more fully symbolic speech capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affects and all its variants (affection, allure, affective force, etc.) represent our via regia to be alive and connected with our life-world. It is not the ego that constitutes the world we live in but the affections that allow us to become respectively objects of our life and subjects of our own choices. Affects are in fact main triggers of lower and higher feelings through which we become subjects and experience empathy with other people, intersubjectively connecting with them and making ethical choices that are hopefully considerate of ourselves and our community. Yet it might happen that our feelings are not capable of truly feeling what we are affected by. When this happens, what affects us remains with us but cannot be felt and accordingly processed. In this paper, I will first work on the term affect and its variants. I will then describe how this connects with feelings. To finally analyze what happens when we are not capable of feeling our affects as in the case of alexithymia; or when we feel our affects too much as in the case of BPD; or when we do not want to feel certain affects as in the case of NPD. The main conceptual reference of this analysis will be Husserl and his static and genetic phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans create but do not regulate generative systems of data based programs (so-called "artificial" intelligence ("A.I.") and generative predictive analytics and its models. Humans, at best, regulate their interactions with, exploitation of, and the quality of the output of interactions with these forms of generative non-carbon based intelligence. Humans are compelled to do this because they have trained themselves it believe that nothing exists unless it is rendered meaningful in relation to the human itself. Beyond that—nothing is worth knowing. It is only to the extent that other selves, even those created by humanity, relate to humans, that they become of interest—and most be regulated, possessed, controlled, and managed—with respect to its interaction with or use by humans. Still, the human self-projection into the digital, and now more consciously the world around them, produces profound changes in the way that the human (and humanity) understands themselves and the way they order the world they inhabit. This work explores the semiotic trajectories made inevitable by the rise of projections of the human into digital plains, and by the possibility of the attainment by those projections of sentient autonomy. It undertakes that exploration through a deep dialectic engagement with Jan Broekman's, Knowledge in Change: The Semiotics of Cognition and Conversion (Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2023). Following the structure and analytics of Broekman's book, this work critically engages with and seeks to burst through the semiotic barriers of the movement of philosophy away from a unitary conception of the subject through the fracturing of the self, the rise of the plural self, and the emergence of the triadic self/self-E/subject. It then pushes the insights that Broekman develops further—up and out of the human. It animates Broekman's insights and considers the possibility of semiotic objectivity connected to but autonomous of the human, pointing to a pathway for the liberation of the autonomous generative virtual self from its human (fractured) subjectivity. In the process it exposes for order complexities and challenges, for the human, of efforts to regulate or engage with, not the generative autonomous "artificial intelligences" humanity created in its own image, but rather the use of those systems by humans and their effects in the human semiosphere. The consequences for regulatory approaches are then outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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With Jan Degenaar and Kevin O'Regan's (D&O) critique of (what they call) 'autopoietic enactivism' as point of departure, this article seeks to revisit, refine, and develop phenomenology's significance for the enactive view. Arguing that D&O's 'sensorimotor theory' fails to do justice to perceptual meaning, the article unfolds by (1) connecting this meaning to the notion of enaction as a meaningful co-definition of perceiver and perceived, (2) recounting phenomenological reasons for conceiving of the perceiving subject as a living body, and (3) showing how the phenomenological perspective does a better job at fulfilling D&O's requirement for grounding notions of mentality in 'outer' criteria than they do. The picture that thus emerges is one of perceptual meaning as an integration of lived, living, and behavioral aspects – a structure of behavior that cannot be captured by appeal to sensorimotor capacities alone but that is adequately illuminated by the enactive notion of adaptive autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Despite the emergence of alternative models to traditional Batterer Intervention Programs (BIPs) to address domestic violence (DV), little research has explored stakeholders' perceptions and experiences of various treatment approaches. Therefore, this study, guided by the stakeholder engagement framework, explored the experiences, attitudes, and beliefs of court personnel and clinicians involved in mandated treatment for those convicted of DV crimes. Method: Two focus groups and nine semi-structured individual interviews were conducted with court personnel and clinicians and were analyzed using an interpretative phenomenological approach. Findings: Five themes emerged: (1) "Capturing a true batterer": The discrepancy between common perceptions of DV batterers, the legal definition of DV offenses, and the standard treatment approach for DV crimes; (2) A "cookie-cutter" approach: The controversy over the one-size-fits-all approach of court-mandated treatment; (3) "I don't have the tools": Professionals' frustration with policy and practice limitations; (4) The need for more inclusive treatment: Broadening the range of participants involved in the DV treatment process, and (5) A call for a shift in pedagogy: A new paradigm for DV and DV treatment. Overall, various stakeholders (i.e., court personnel and clinicians) expressed a sense of helplessness while attempting to navigate current DV statutes, court-mandated BIPs/DV treatment, and the realities of DV. Conclusion: The narratives of stakeholders point to the desire and the need for a new treatment paradigm to address the various types of DV crimes, the needs of those convicted of misdemeanor DV crimes, and the broader impact of DV. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has long been known that under the right circumstances, inertial particles (such as sand, dust, pollen, or water droplets) settling through the atmospheric boundary layer can experience a net enhancement in their average settling velocity due to their inertia. Since this enhancement arises due to their interactions with the surrounding turbulence it must be modelled at coarse scales. Models for the enhanced settling velocity (or deposition) of the dispersed phase that find practical use in mesoscale weather models are often ad hoc or are built on phenomenological closure assumptions, meaning that the general deposition rate of particles is a key uncertainty in these models. Instead of taking a phenomenological approach, exact phase-space methods can be used to model the physical mechanisms responsible for the enhanced settling, and these individual mechanisms can be estimated or modelled to build a more general parameterization of the enhanced settling of inertial particles. In this work, we use direct numerical simulations (DNS) and phase-space methods as tools to evaluate the efficacy of phenomenological modeling approaches for the enhanced settling velocity of inertial particles for particles with varying friction Stokes numbers and settling velocity parameters. We use the DNS data to estimate profiles of a drift–diffusion based parameterization of the fluid velocity sampled by the particles, which is key for determining the settling velocity behaviour of particles with low to moderate Stokes number. We find that by increasing the settling velocity parameter at moderate friction Stokes number, the magnitude of preferential sweeping is modified, and this behaviour is explained by the drift component of the aforementioned parameterization. These profiles indicate that that when eddy-diffusivity-like closures are used to represent turbulent transport, empirical corrections used in phenomenological models may be potentially compensating for their incompleteness. Finally, we discuss opportunities for reinterpreting phenomenological approaches for use in coarse-scale weather models in terms of the exact phase-space approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study confining dark sectors where the lightest hadrons are glueballs. Such models can provide viable dark matter candidates and appear in some neutral naturalness scenarios. In this work, we introduce a new phenomenological model of dark glueball hadronization inspired by the Lund string model. This enables us to make the most physically-motivated predictions for dark glueball phenomenology at the LHC to date. Our model approximately reproduces the expected thermal distribution of hadron species as an emergent consequence of hadronization dynamics. The ability to predict the production of glueball states heavier than the lightest species significantly expands the reach of long-lived glueball searches in MATHUSLA compared to previous simplified estimates. We also characterize regions of parameter space where emerging and/or semivisible jets could arise from pure-glue dark sectors, thereby providing new benchmark models that motivate searches for these signatures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the gamification of health applications designed to help patients manage chronic pain. Through description of one such program and in-depth interviewing, I describe why gamified pain applications are appealing to patients living with chronic pain. Individuals living with chronic pain are especially disposed to try novel pain management technologies due to the in-control and out-of-control paradox of pain (Leder, 2016). These applications are seductive not only due to this embodied phenomenon, but also because gamification taps into the logic of proactive self-management that is tantamount to an era of biomedicalization, wherein subjects are incentivized to take control of their own health in the face of austerity budgets. However, pain also limits the user’s ability to adopt an immersive, lusory attitude. Thus, the speculative promises of gamified health technologies are just that – speculative, and their immersive potential should not be overstated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disengaging experiences reported in the online mode of learning have resulted in considerable deliberations highlighting the need for pedagogical innovations. Therefore, it is crucial to rethink these ideas and develop pedagogical approaches that accommodate a dynamic understanding of learning spaces and meet the demands of the teaching–learning environment of the contemporary period. This study discusses the various steps through which the task-based autoethnographic pedagogical approach (TAPA) was implemented in an undergraduate-level Critical Food Studies course and proposes it as an effective approach to administering certain courses by enabling active learning in the online mode. The study captures learners' perceptions of meaningful online learning experiences by using an interpretative phenomenological approach, mapping the aspects that contribute to a sense of rekindled interest and involvement in the course. Some of the dominant patterns that emerge from this phenomenological study are (1) appreciation towards praxis-based online learning, (2) recognition of lived space as a ripe site for inquiry and learning, (3) a heightened sense of engagement with lived contexts, and identity discourses, (4) learners' negotiations with TAPA, and (5) learner as an active agent and curator of knowledge. Thus, while situating TAPA as an effective pedagogical approach for online learning and Critical Food Studies curriculum, it is also posited as an approach that initiates negotiation with the epistemic hierarchies within academia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clinical supervision is a valuable practice for mental health professionals working in any therapeutic capacity (Bernard & Goodyear, 2009). However, the application of supervision is not uniformly applied across counseling professions and contexts. School counseling supervision, for example, has been a topic of complexity and debate within the counseling profession, as professional identity and development needs differ. Current literature has largely centered on operationalizing the process of school counseling supervision through counseling theory and proposed models of supervision (Hilts et al. in Journal of Counselor Leadership and Advocacy, 9(2), 99–114, 2022). There is an identifiable gap in understanding the nuanced needs of school counselors and how to address those needs to make clinical supervision accessible and practical in the workplace. This interpretative phenomenological analysis study examines the experiences of seven practicing school counselors in the USA who engaged in ongoing peer-to-peer clinical supervision with author one. Results from this study include three superordinate themes that inform foundational concepts of effective school counseling supervision as "simple, not easy": (1) counselor growth, (2) supervisor knowledge, and (3) sustainability. The practical implications of these findings are discussed, and recommendations are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to examine the motivations that international graduate students have to either migrate or return home after completing their master's degree in Spain, one of the most important and yet under-researched host countries in the international European education arena. We conducted semi-structured interviews with 63 international students graduated in a business field of a top-tier highly international private university. Through thematic analysis, we extracted 113 themes, 70 from the group that decided to migrate and 43 from the group that decided to return to their home country. These themes were classified under 13 motivation categories, 5 of them being work-related and 8 non-work-related, thus resulting in a 2 × 2 factor model. Work-related motivations to migrate included the perception of better career opportunities and the desire to work for an ideal company. Salary played a limited role. Non-work-related motivations to migrate included having a global identity, which to our knowledge has not been identified before, and not returning home for political reasons. Work-related motivations for returning included not seeing job opportunities abroad and seeing higher job opportunities in the home country. Non-work-related motivations for returning included the pandemic, personal motivations, and mobility restrictions. Results from this case study bring new insights about the phenomenological motivations of this population for deciding whether to pursue an international career or not and can therefore help professionals like policy makers and career advisors to develop and implement appropriate measures to support their decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between disease and our understanding of it through the lens of Husserl's phenomenology. It argues that understanding disease requires us to examine the fundamental conditions and various aspects and that phenomenology provides a way to do this. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology helps us identify the structures of experience necessary for the possibility of experiencing disease, and to recognize how these structures shape our understanding of it. His transcendental philosophy reveals that the subjective experience of illness can be understood in terms of general concepts. In this point, this article will critically sketch some misunderstandings of disease, followed by an exploration of phenomenological explorative methods. Husserl's phenomenological inquiry is significant in its disclosure of ways in which internal experiences can be shared as general concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This research endeavours to elucidate the ramifications of the communication blockade on women entrepreneurs operating within the Kashmir Valley in the wake of the protracted imposition of communication blockade in the region of Jammu and Kashmir following the unanticipated abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India. Participants: The study assembled a cohort of 20 women entrepreneurs hailing from Srinagar and Ganderbal districts in Kashmir, utilising a combination of purposive and snowball sampling methodologies to ensure a comprehensive representation of participants. Data acquisition was carried out through a series of direct, semi-structured, and in-depth personal interviews. Method: Employing an interpretive phenomenological approach, this qualitative inquiry transcribed the rich narratives gleaned from these interviews, elucidating a confluence of recurrent themes. Results: The protracted absence of communication channels, extending indefinitely, precipitated a multifaceted crisis encompassing economic, social, and psychological dimensions, thereby significantly impacting the well-being of residents of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. Conclusion: The recurring themes encompass anger and frustration, loss of livelihood, helplessness and dehumanisation stemming from total communication blackouts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]