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This paper aims to evaluate Marx's conception of alienated labour from the point of view of Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of practice. I will argue that Marx's conception of alienation in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (and elsewhere) is too abstract, and therefore needs to be revised to reflect the reality of the 21st century. It presupposes that, in capitalism, all salaried and waged labour is alienated (a claim recently reiterated by Amy Wendling in her otherwise outstanding Karl Marx on Technology and Alienation). Clearly, this is not the case. The key characteristics of alienation as spelled out by Marx may not be present in a great variety of contemporary jobs dominated by services, especially if they are (or can be seen as) MacIntyrean practices (for example, practicing medicine in a public hospital or working as an engineer in a private company). Drawing on some of the most notable literature on the forms of alienation and reification, I will aim to theorise the conception of meaningful non-alienated labour. Given that practices, as meaningful non-alienated activities, are small islands of human excellence and resistance against the economic pressures of institutional profit maximisation and the self-valorisation of capital, I will conclude the paper by considering the political importance of this conception of labour for anti-capitalist struggles in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bo Burnham's Inside, promoted as a musical comedy special by its platform Netflix, released in June 2021 to almost unquestioning praise, and has now won 3 Emmys. The work is an evocative retrospective of Burnham's fictionalized experience during the Covid-19 quarantine. Written, performed, filmed, and edited by Burnham himself, the piece reflects his career as a musical comedy performance artist, and also provides an intimate look into his struggles with mental health, internet culture, and artistic ego. Of particular appeal in this piece is the complex pairing of comedy with pathos. Its songs have become ironic backgrounds to TikTok videos and popular sea shanty renditions. Critics remark: 'What he's describing is the near-universal feeling of despair in 2020. And that feels good' (Herman 2021); 'A tricky work that for all its boundary-crossing remains in the end a comedy in the spirit of neurotic, self-loathing stand-up' (Zinoman 2021); 'A claustrophobic masterclass in comedy and introspection, Inside is a beautifully bleak, hilariously hopeful special' (Rotten Tomatoes). It is this complexity which I seek to investigate. I assert that Bo Burnham's Inside achieves its poignancy not through its comedic stylings, but through its implementation of a traditional Aristotelian tragic structure. This paper will discuss the ways in which Burnham follows the tragic structure and the monomyth while engaging with, and subverting, benign violation theory to provide a postmodern catharsis in its audience that feels like comedy, but ultimately provides a shared expression of, and outlet for, the audience's grief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many, striving to attain first place in an athletic competition is explicable. Less explicable is striving to attain first place in a virtue (aretē) competition. Yet this latter dynamic appears in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. There is 4.3's magnanimity, the crown of the virtues, which seemingly manifests itself in outdoing one's peers in virtue. Such one-upmanship also seems operant with 9.8's praiseworthy self-lover, who seeks to get as much of the fine (to kalon) as possible for herself. Contrary to many interpreters, this paper argues that praiseworthy self-love and magnanimity involve one-upmanship. The relevant exemplars are not simply striving to be the best that they can be in respect to virtue (in virtuous activity), but to be better than others. The paper argues that Aristotle's axiology, which sets activity (energeia) above state (hexis) and potentiality (dunamis), engenders one-upmanship. For only the level of activity substantially differentiates individuals, settling for inferiority is obviously objectionable, and equal achievement for Aristotle is not static but involves matching and surpassing the achievements of others. The paper concludes that modern discomfort with these dynamics is due to an axiology Nietzsche attributes to Christianity, one that bases human value fundamentally on non-differentiating potentiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle grants perceptible qualities the power to generate sense perception in animals. But it is unclear whether, for him, these qualities can produce any effect other than perception. In this paper, I address this issue through a novel approach. To show that they can produce non-perceptual effects, I explore contexts in his extant works where qualities appear to do causal work in nature without leading to perception in animals. This inquiry aims to demonstrate that Aristotle’s realism about qualities survives a potential threat posed by views that dispute the qualities’ causal efficacy outside perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between character education and citizenship education have existed for a long time. Some argue that character education is harmful to citizenship education; others claim that they are mutually beneficial and that we can and need to organise them synergistically. In this paper, I argue, through an exploration of civic virtue and ethical virtue in Aristotle’s theory, that citizenship education and character education are compatible and mutually supportive within Aristotelian educational frameworks, and that both are beneficial for students’ moral development and overall flourishing. First, the debate between character education and citizenship education is explored. This is followed by identifying the roles of citizenship education and character education in Aristotelian theory. Next, I examine more specifically the role of ethical virtue and civic virtue in Aristotle’s original works, and I argue that they are compatible (and sometimes overlap) to form an ideal educational outcome. In conclusion, synthesising citizenship education and character education based on Aristotle’s theory can effectively guide students toward flourishing lives, both as individuals and members of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes inspiration from Books III and IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, which discuss the ways in which the student of virtue can go wrong with respect to different vices. It uses this discussion to draw some conclusions about Aristotelian habituation. I will argue that habituation is an appropriate learning strategy for many kinds of students of virtue, not just children; that habituation is multi-faceted and involves habits of emotions, habits of reason and habits of action; and that habituation is messy because it reflects a messy subject matter. I will conclude with some thoughts on how educators can best respond to this messiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For almost 80 years, post-war Japanese moral education has adopted a dual-process structure, which states morality is taught through two processes: one through all aspects of school education and the other through a special moral education class. The necessity and effectiveness of this structure were theorised by Eijiro Inatomi. However, it has been almost neglected that his theory is largely based on Aristotle’s theory of virtue. This paper examines Inatomi’s Aristotle-inspired theory and its significance. After reviewing the social and historical background of his theory, I argue that Inatomi successfully adopted Aristotle’s theory of virtue in three respects: human definition, intellectual virtue, and ethical virtue. Finally, I suggest that post-war Japanese moral education can be understood as a nationwide social implementation experiment on the efficacy of Aristotelian virtue ethics and that Inatomi’s notion of cosmos can serve as a conceptual device to enhance the social feasibility of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A renewed interest in reading the Hebrew Bible as a work of philosophy has reasserted the value of pursuing comparative studies of Greek and Hebrew literature within their common intellectual environment in the Eastern Mediterranean. This study will contribute to a retrieval of Hebraic philosophy in its ancient context through a comparison of Aristotelian practical wisdom and perception as seen in Nicomachean Ethics with commensurate conceptions of wisdom and perception in Deuteronomy. This comparison will advance an appreciation of Deuteronomy as a work of philosophy in its own right, which is distinct yet comparable to Nicomachean Ethics in educating what Martha Nussbaum calls a "society of perceivers" who are skilled at making wise and discerning decisions to attain the Deuteronomic vision of the good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]