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Informal learning spaces present ripe opportunities to supplement formal learning experiences. In this paper, we offer a new approach to creating enriching learning activities for public spaces that reflects evidence‐based practices rooted in developmental psychology and uses community‐centring practices from participatory research approaches. We first argue that extant theory and research supports the use of guided play pedagogy to foster learning. Second, we argue that effective translation of research to practice should incorporate community voices at every stage of the design, implementation and evaluation process. We describe a new initiative called Playful Learning Landscapes that reflects tenets of core developmental theory including constructivism and social learning theories as well as guided play pedagogy. Playful Learning Landscapes also extends the scope and scale of these evidence‐backed theories by collaborating with communities to design activities for local community spaces. Taken together, we offer a way of upholding core developmental theory with equitable, culturally inclusive research and intervention practices. Transforming community spaces into hubs for children's learning promises wide‐reaching implications for equitable access, school readiness and early childhood education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to give an account of what it is to internalize a rule. I claim that internalization is the process of redistributing the burden of instruction from the teacher to the student. The process is complete when instruction is no longer needed, and the rule has reshaped perceptual classification of the circumstances in which it applies. Teaching a rule is the initiation of this process. We internalize rules by simulating instruction coming from someone else. Running these simulations enables us to toggle between the perspective of the instructor and our own perspective. By doing this we coordinate our perspectives with that of the teacher. The account given here provides a deeper explanation of why internalizing a rule involves the dispositions and reactive attitudes proponents of Rule Consequentialism often say it does, why moral reflection is variably demanding, how intergenerational moral progress is made possible by our cognitive architectures, and why the adoption of a rule should be understood in terms of teaching that rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While much criticism has surrounded the seemingly incoherent law governing decision‐making for adolescents, relatively little work has sought to address the question of whether and when adolescents will be acting autonomously in decisions to refuse treatment, particularly in cases where their choices are motivated by religious beliefs inculcated from a young age. This is important, not just because it goes to the heart of when an adolescent ought to be able to exercise a right to self‐determination, but also because an analysis of the case law indicates that judges are taking account of concerns about the authenticity of the values or beliefs which motivate a given decision when deciding cases. This paper will examine how different accounts of autonomy and authentic choice map onto the psychological development of adolescents, and thus the extent to which adolescent's decisions to refuse treatment on religious grounds can be regarded as truly authentic. It will conclude by considering how such cases ought to be approached by the courts, suggesting a modified Mental Capacity Act 2005 test for assessing adolescent capacity, and offering an empirically‐grounded justification for overriding the choices of even capacitous adolescents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the first two decades of the 20th century unfolded, clinical psychologists, who had until then been mainly associated with intelligence testing, attempted to implement a specific psychological method—Carl Gustav Jung's (1875–1961) word‐association "test"—in individual personality assessments. As one of the early clinical psychologists who attempted to use the method, Carl Ransom Rogers (1902–1987) is conspicuously absent from the historiography of clinical psychological testing. In fact, historians have recently suggested that we are lacking narratives about Rogers' early ideas and techniques in the context of both the development of clinical psychology and the emergence of psychological testing as clinicians' foremost scholarly activity. In light of the above, this paper pursues two main goals. First, it attempts to reconstruct Rogers' first original research project on emotional adjustment testing in young children in the broader context of the development of word‐association tests as carried out by Jung and Whately Smith (1892–1947). Second, it aims to reconstruct Rogers' earliest theoretical ideas as well as his epistemological assumptions regarding test objectivity, validity and reliability. By drawing on unpublished documents and heretofore overlooked primary sources I show that although Rogers initially drew from Jung and Smith's complex and refined tradition, he ultimately rejected it as well as the tests themselves. At first drawn to Smith's quantitative, empiricist and experimental philosophy of psychology, Rogers was deterred when the data gathered through his own research in 1927 suggested that word association tests had no real, effective clinical value when used in children. By showcasing the complex process of test construction and validation undertaken by 1920s clinical psychologists, Rogers' case illustrates the research practices, the methodological problems and the epistemological dilemmas faced by most if not all of his contemporaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Developmental science benefits from a rich tradition of conceptual frameworks, such as Relational Developmental Systems metatheory, that seek to understand the individual ⇔ context relations that promote thriving across the lifespan. However, there are substantive methodological challenges associated with capturing individual‐level and contextual variables, let alone the dynamics between them. These challenges have encouraged the perpetuation of simple models that focus on either individuals or their contexts alone, or as parallel processes with little attention to the dynamics of the relations. In this paper, we engage in cross‐disciplinary dialogue between developmental and personality science (adding to recent work being done by those in personality development) and highlight the benefits that developmental science can reap by adopting several recent advancements in dynamic personality theory and the methods used to test them. In addition, we discuss what personality science might gain from applying a developmental lens to their research questions. Such integration may also help personality scientists better understand how developmental theory can complement their methods for understanding the development of individual differences over time. Ultimately, the two fields can use their similar missions of understanding the development of individual differences in order to support one another in pursuing good science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current paper presents an overview of the workflow of the Working Memory, Cognition and Development (WomCogDev) lab at the University of Geneva, Switzerland, as an example of how Open Science principles can be applied in a developmental psychology lab. We describe the importance and challenges of applying Open Science practices in developmental research and detail each step of our workflow from research design to dissemination. We provide examples and give emphasis to steps that typically receive little attention but that may hold promise for application in other labs (namely, project design, data collection and data analysis). Finally, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of our workflow and summarize the main takeaways for other labs. By 'opening up' our lab's workflow, we want to encourage other labs to incorporate the aspects that they like into their own workflows and to share their own processes for the continued benefit of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]