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The photovoltaic (PV) industry experienced a drastic overcapacity, leading to heightened market competition in 2009. After the overcapacity, the EU and the USA initiated trade barriers targeting Chinese PV goods in 2011, stimulating China to seek alternative markets. In 2013, China announced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Although the BRI is a framework of international cooperation instead of a specific strategy that aims at PV industry, its role in helping Chinese PV firms deal with the trade sanction should be addressed. Based on the data from Chinese Custom Trade Statistics spanning 2009 to 2016, this paper precisely quantifies the extent of PV trade deflection from China to BRI markets that can be ascribed to the BRI effects. Employing spatial analysis, we manifest the trade deflection on maps. Moreover, we adopt the linear probability models and panel logit models to investigate the impact of BRI on China's PV export expansion. The results show that BRI markets provide a buffer area for Chinese PV enterprises to alleviate their loss caused by trade sanctions. The BRI facilitated 4751 million more PV products conveyed from China to BRI markets from 2013 to 2016, occupying about 33.25% of the total export from China to BRI markets. Chinese PV firms prefer to explore the BRI markets than the rest of the world. Compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), non-SOEs are more active in entering BRI countries. However, no significant difference had been detected in BRI effects on SOEs and non-SOEs. It was noted that a robust local industrial basement related to the PV industry can potentially ease firms' transition to BRI markets. Comparatively, firms situated in central China have benefited more from the BRI than their counterparts in the coastal and western regions. Furthermore, the BRI encourages Chinese PV enterprises to venture into countries with low economic complexity. This paper provides novel insights into BRI by validating BRI's effects on Chinese PV firms' export expansion. On the one hand, unlike previous BRI research that rarely considers the unstable external environment, we validate that the BRI can provide a spare market for China when it competes with developed countries. On the other hand, by investigating the roles of firms, regions and destinations, our results are enlightening for renewable energy industrial and trade policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potency of economic sanctions imposed on nations depends on demand and supply adjustment possibilities. Adverse GDP impacts will be maximal when import, export, production, distribution and finance are inflexible (universal non-substitution). This paper elaborates on these conditions and quantifies the maximum GDP loss that Western sanctions could have inflicted on Russia in 2022–2023. It reports the World Bank's predictions, contrasts them with the results and draws inferences about the efficiency of Russia's workably competitive markets. This paper shows that Russia's economic system exhibits moderate universal substitutability and is less vulnerable to punitive discipline than Western policymakers suppose. The likelihood that economic sanctions will compel the Kremlin to restore Ukraine's territorial integrity ceteris paribus is correspondingly low, even though war reduces Russia's quality of existence. Western economic sanctions serve narrow geostrategic ends that are reconcilable with Pareto-efficient free trade and globalization, if precision-targeted, but as the Russo-Ukrainian war intensifies, an expanded array of novel and dubiously legal sanctions is degrading free trade, and spurring de-globalization and anti-Western coalitions. If this armed combat is prolonged, the goals of free trade and globalization could be set back for decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic resilience, considered in this paper as the ability to withstand and recover from economic shocks and disruptions, has become a linchpin of ensuring national security and stability. As demonstrated by conflicts such as the one in Ukraine, where economic sanctions were deployed to diminish an adversary's capacity to sustain its war efforts, it has become evident that military power alone is insufficient in today's complex security landscape. A comprehensive approach to defence must incorporate economic considerations, as the economic well-being of a nation is intrinsically linked to its overall security. The main research objectives of this paper are to investigate the concept of economic resilience, from the perspective of the concept of comprehensive defence and the ways it is interconnected with other resilience domains, through the development of an economic resilience index outlining the relative economic resilience of the 29 European countries that are NATO members and to propose a methodology for identifying the main factors that influence the economic resilience from a comprehensive defence point of view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes several key questions that should be unavoidable in the research on history of economic sanctions. Four key questions are identified. The first one is what the aim of the sanctions is; what are they supposed to achieve? The second question relates to the mechanisms of sanctions. The third question is, are sanctions effective, i.e. do they produce economic impact and what is its magnitude? The fourth question is, are sanctions efficient, i.e. has the aim been achieved? All these questions are further developed into several more specific questions. Crucial methodological obstacles to answering all these questions are identified and guidelines for overcoming them are provided. The answers to the proposed key questions should be only the starting point in research on history of economic sanctions. Some preliminary answers to these questions were given for the case of February 2022 sanctions against Russia, imposed after it invaded Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Economic sanctions are defined as restrictions imposed by other countries against individuals, groups, or governments of other countries. These sanctions have a detrimental impact on the economies of countries and can also limit access to healthcare services for people as a secondary consequence. This study aims to systematically review the literature to examine the direct and indirect effects of economic sanctions on health through a narrative synthesis. Methods: This systematic literature review was limited to papers published between January 1990 and July 2023. Relevant documents published in English and Persian were searched for in databases including Cochrane Library, PubMed, Embase, Scopus, Web of Science, SID, Magiran, and Irandoc. The direct and indirect effects of sanctions on health were classified using two frameworks proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO): the Health System Building Blocks and "Social Determinants of Health". Results: Out of a total of 18,219 articles, 59 were selected based on inclusion criteria. The effects of sanctions were divided into direct and indirect groups. Direct effects encompassed seven main themes: access to essential medicine, medical products, vaccines and technologies; financing; health workforce; service delivery; research and health information systems; health outcomes; and financial risk protection. Indirect effects also were classified into six main themes: socioeconomic status; food and agricultural products; stress; early life conditions; high-risk behaviors and addiction; and transport. Most studies focused on the access to medicines, food, economic and social status. Conclusions: Economic sanctions have had profoundly negative impacts on all aspects of the healthcare system. The international community must address these effects on health and take necessary measures to prevent or mitigate them, particularly in ensuring the provision of basic and essential healthcare needs for individuals and communities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Russia's economy appears immune to any actions taken by countries supporting Ukraine in its struggle to preserve its sovereignty, the sanctions project directed against Russia continues to evolve. The sanctions policy pursued by the European Union, the United States, and their allies is isolating the Russian economy, gradually leading to its 'Sovietisation'. The primary purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the sanctions on the economic situation of the Russian Federation. The paper is based on available statistical information provided by the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and Russian news media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unilateral economic sanctions have become an essential tool in modern foreign policy playbooks. This development was massively emphasized following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and is particularly prominent in the United States' international strategy. U.S. sanctions hold a unique level of influence over international affairs due to the near-hegemonic reach of the American economy combined with the high functional capabilities of the country's relevant administrative bodies, chiefly the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). However, the sheer scope of the OFAC sanctions program--which in many areas tends to lack transparency--may give rise to human rights concerns, domestic legal inconsistencies, and direct policy blowback. This paper examines substantive and procedural safeguards in place against the imposition and maintenance of sanctions designations on both domestic and foreign entities. The paper specifically addresses the functional disparity between procedural avenues to recourse offered to sanctioned parties based on their status as U.S. persons or foreign parties. It seeks to define how domestic law, including the Fifth Amendment, offers judicially protected standards of procedure to sanctioned parties. Ultimately, the paper argues that the Constitution's due process requirements offer U.S. entities balanced procedural rights in consideration of national security interests inherent to OFAC's sanctions program. Additionally, it argues that courts are willing to consider, but have yet to functionally extend, similar procedural standards to foreign parties lacking Fifth Amendment protections as grounded in § 706(2) (D) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and relevant law regulating OFAC's administrative procedures for sanctions designation removal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The articles discusses the application of the concept of retorsion in relation to defensive measures against hostile cyber operations. Retorsion is a concept not regulated by international law, which gives the victim state a high degree of flexibility in its use. However, its limits are formed by the rules of international law (retorsion is an unfriendly act not prohibited by international law). The paper is divided into three main parts. The first part discusses the concept of retorsion in general terms and its relation to cyber operations, the second part defines the relationship between retorsion, countermeasures, plea of necessity and the right of self-defence, and the third part consists of in-depth analysis of states' practice. The analysis of states' practices includes both the actual measures that states have taken in response to cyber operations (e.g. expulsion of diplomats, economic sanctions, travel bans) and official statements on the issue that have been published, particularly in the period 2019–2022. Attention is also paid to the possibilities of using retorsion against cyber operations carried out by non-state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Review of International Affairs (04866096) is the property of Institute of International Politics & Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Extreme shocks, including climate change, economic sanctions, geopolitical conflicts, etc., are significant and complex issues currently confronting the global world. From the US–China perspective, this paper employs the DCC-DAGM model to investigate how diverse market risks asymmetrically affect return volatility, and extract correlations between stock indices and hedging assets. Then, diversified and hedging portfolios, constructed by optimal weight and hedge ratio, are investigated using multiple risk reduction measures. The empirical results highlight that, first, diverse risks exhibit an asymmetric effect on the return volatility in the long term, while in the short term, the US stock market is more sensitive to negative return shocks than the Chinese market. Second, risks impact correlations differently across time horizons and countries. Short-term correlations are stronger than long-term ones for the US market, with the Chinese stock market displaying more stable correlations. Third, the hedging strategy is more effective in reducing volatility and risk for US stocks, while the diversification strategy proves more effective for Chinese stocks. These findings have implications for market participants striving to make their portfolios robust during turbulent times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctions increase managers' motivations to manage profits and the accumulation of bad news due to their negative impact on corporate profitability and cash flow. According to Jin and Myers (2006), this issue increases companies' stock price crash risk. The higher probability of stock price crashes indicates a stock price overvaluation. As a result, the expected return on such shares will be low. The current paper used the softmax model to calculate the probability of stock price crashes and the expected return calculated by the Fama-French three-factor model. The sample used in this paper includes 80 import- and export-oriented exchange companies from 2008- 2021. The results of this paper indicate a positive and significant relationship between the sanctions variables and the probability of stock crashes. So, sanctions cause an increase in the accumulation of bad news and information asymmetry between managers and investors. The second part of the paper's results indicates a negative relationship between the probability of stock crashes and the expected return on the stocks in the Iranian capital market. Therefore, investors have relatively good analytical skills in the Iranian capital market due to its shallow depth and infrastructure problems. The results of this paper can be used in portfolio management to select stocks with a lower probability of crash and higher return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Materiales para la Historia del Deporte is the property of Polytechnic University of Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Japan and India are the two oldest and largest democracies in Asia. Since the inception of their diplomatic relations in 1952, the two countries have maintained a cordial relationship. They remain aloof during the Cold War period due to their ideological differences. After that, India following the economic liberalization followed by the "Look East" policy in the post-Cold War period had a positive impact on bilateral relations. This took a sudden gap due to India's second Pokhran nuclear test in 1998 followed by Japanese economic sanctions. However, the relations normalized soon when Mori visited India along with other South Asian nations in 2000. The bilateral relations further improved when the two countries signed the "strategic orientation of Japan-India global partnership" during Koizumi's visit in 2005. Since then, the two countries have been engaging in different aspects of strategic partnership, and a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific along with the "rule-based order" has always been their priority. Thus, different scholars and statesmen from both countries started the discussion on building a new architecture of 'rule-based order' in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, Japan and India have continuously engaged themselves in bilateral and multilateral dialogue such as G4, Shangri-La Dialogue and Quad. Thus, this paper will try to see how far the two countries can persuade the international community to push the concept of "rule-based order" in the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the role of BIAs in the promotion of trade across the Cold War divide during the 1950s, when the creation of a new political and economic ensemble in Western Europe intertwined with the re-elaboration of imperialist entanglements and the emergence of Socialist economies. The focus on everyday business practice allows us to identify the nature and the purpose of these BIAs, revealing a great variety of logics, but a unifying interest: creating a new role for their national economies in China's nascent economic progress. In the absence of full diplomatic relations, these organisations were identified in many cases as main reference points by the Chinese authorities and were, thus, in a privileged position to change the image of West European countries from colonisers into viable partners at a time when the PRC was shaping a new national narrative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic sanctions are more popular than ever. But do they affect agricultural trade? Combining two new datasets and capitalizing on the latest developments in the empirical structural gravity literature, we investigate the effects of sanctions on international trade of agricultural products. We find that trade sanctions impede agricultural trade, whereas other sanctions do not show any significant impact. Complete trade sanctions have led to about a 67% decrease in the agricultural trade between the sanctioned and sanctioning countries, or a corresponding tariff equivalent of 25%, and we also obtain significant estimates for partial sanctions. At the industry level, we find substantial heterogeneity depending on the sanctioning and sanctioned countries, the type of sanctions used, and the direction of trade flows. The 2014 sanctions on Russia substantially decreased Russia's agricultural trade, mainly due to reduced trade with the EU but also due to reduced trade with other countries. Although no definitive evidence exists that sanctions alter the actions of governments of receiving countries, this paper provides broad evidence that sanctions hamper agrifood trade and hurt producers, consumers, and real output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, research on trade rebalancing in agri-food supply chains has gained prominence due to trade sanctions, supply chain disruptions, and vulnerabilities exposed by pandemics and conflicts. This study focuses on the recalibration of agri-food trade dynamics, using the 2014 Russian import ban as a case study. The ban significantly altered the structure of agri-food export destinations for affected countries, particularly those sharing a border with Russia (e.g., Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). Employing a cross-section regression model and structural break tests, we assess the trade rebalancing process. Our findings reveal short-term trade rebalancing effects, primarily observed in product groups not traditionally considered main trade specializations. There is evidence that significant part of the lost trade was redirected to EU28 or EAEU countries and end up in the common trade areas of these countries. Furthermore, we argue that the Russian import ban initiated a long-term structural shift in export patterns for non-traditionally traded banned products, while rebalancing for traditionally traded products was significantly quicker. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Success of economic sanctions hinges on their impact on sanctioned countries' trade. This, in turn, depends on the sanctioned country's opportunity to divert trade to a third party (a country not involved in sanctions). History is witness to third parties facilitating trade diversion, thus busting sanction. Nonetheless, literature does not present conclusive evidence on trade diversion or on motivation for busting sanctions. Therefore, in this paper, we address the following: What bearing do sanctions have on bilateral trade flows and trade diversion? Is diversion dependent on the political and trade alliance third-party shares with the sanctioned and/or the sanctioning countries? We estimate a structural gravity model for globally representative country-dyads, during 1990–2019, using inter-alia the Global Sanctions Database. We find that sanctions depress bilateral trade between sanctioned and sanctioning nations and cause trade diversion via third party. The existence of trade alliance between third party and country involved in sanction has an additional impact on trade diversion. Furthermore, a political alliance between third party and sanctioned country heightens trade between them. However, political alliance between third party and sanctioning country does not explain trade between them. Our findings offer insights into India's trade relations with Russia, since 2022, when Russia was subject to US-led sanctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The negative effect of oil shocks on the economy is one of the main problems faced by oil-exporting countries. These countries have many energy resources, but they have to sell their raw materials and may eventually fall victim to the Dutch disease due to the lack of development. In addition to suffering from Dutch disease, Iran is under international sanctions for more than 40 years. The sanctions against Iran date back to 1979 and include a combination of many different types of sanctions. In 2006, the United Nations Security Council imposed various arms and technology trade sanctions on Iran in response to the threatening trends in the development of Iran's nuclear capabilities. The US expanded its sectoral sanctions against Iran in 2007-2008. In 2012, Obama’s Administration deepened these sanctions by imposing severe financial sanctions on Iran, effectively cutting Iranian banks off from the global financial system. This, in turn, halted the country's oil exports and deprived the economy of significant revenues. These sanctions were further expanded in scope in 2013. In 2018, Trump’s administration unilaterally put Iran's economy under “aximum pressure” by re-imposing US sanctions after a brief period of multilateral sanctions relief related to the implementation of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Establishing and operating national development funds is a mechanism to reduce the negative impact of oil revenue volatility on the domestic economy. In addition to contributing to economic stabilization and intergenerational savings as well as protecting the domestic economy from the possible negative effects of natural resource revenues, these funds seek to invest financial resources and achieve higher returns (Sayadi, 2013). Additionally, they allow for the smoothing of government spending and investment, as surplus resources are accumulated in the funds in response to positive events and injected into the economy in response to adverse events (Bastani et al., 2016). At the beginning of the establishment of the National Development Fund in Iran, it was decided that, after deducting 14.5 percent of the oil company’s share and 3.5 percent of the oil-rich regions’ share, 20 percent of the foreign exchange earnings from oil and gas exports would be deposited in the fund’s account. This amount would be increased every year. However, due to the sharp decline in the oil revenues in 2014 and the needs of the government, this trend was not continued (Norouzi et al., 2019). In this context, this paper begins by reviewing the role of economic sanctions as a random shock to the Iranian economy, emphasizing the role of the National Development Fund and the stochastic-dynamic general equilibrium model. Next, Bayesian methods are used to examine their impact with the data from 2012 and 2018, when sanctions against Iran were at their most severe. In a developing country like Iran, which faces economic sanctions and Dutch disease simultaneously, the importance of this issue is enormous. Methodology: A new Keynesian stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model for the oil-exporting open economy is the subject of this section. The model includes households, labor market, firms, government, oil, national development fund, and foreign trade. The model parameters were estimated using the Bayesian method. The Central Bank of Iran (CB) and the Statistical Center of Iran (SCI) were the primary data sources for our quantitative analysis of the period of 2004-2020. The analysis focused on time series of available macroeconomic variables such as GDP, migration, exports, imports, and exchange rates. Seasonally adjusted quarterly data were also used from 2004Q1 to 2020Q4. They included de-trended data (Hodric-Perscott filter) on GDP, capital stock, government consumption, and private consumption. Findings and Discussion: Based on the variance decomposition results, among different shocks of sanctions, the share of the shocks caused by sanctions is different. The non-oil export sanctions have had the greatest impact on real wages, inflation, employment, exchange rate, and total production. After that, the embargo on the import of intermediate goods and capital is in the next rank of influence on these variables. Also, the assets of the National Development Fund have been more affected by non-oil exports and imports. This proves that the resources returned to the fund by the private sector and governments have changed and actually decreased, which is due to the increase in sanctions. On the other hand, a large part of the oil revenues have not been deposited in the fund. Furthermore, the IRF data indicate that the oil export sanction has reduced the reserves of the National Development Fund as well as the Fund's facilities to the private sector. This has occurred by reducing its exports. There will be an increase in the government consumption expenditure when these sanctions are in place, indicating that a larger share of oil revenues is being spent on government consumption rather than on contributions to the Fund. Indeed, the falling oil revenues reduce the National Development Fund, resulting in fewer facilities granted by the Fund to the private sector (Sayadi & Bahrami, 2014). As a consequence, private-sector investment has declined. Despite the existence of the National Development Fund, after ten periods of fluctuation, it has returned to equilibrium. Conclusions and policy implications: Economic sanctions have worsened the economic conditions of Iran and ultimately caused the reduction and reversal of the role of the National Development Fund in the country. In general, the imposition of economic sanctions on both export and import areas will worsen the situation of Iran's economy. On the one hand, the decrease in oil revenues has caused an increase in the government's consumption expenditures and budget deficit. It causes an increase in the fund. On the other hand, the imposition of this embargo on the oil sector by reducing the income of the fund has caused a decrease in the payment of facilities to the private sector; therefore, the investment of the private sector has decreased, and the amount of production has been affected too. The imposition of sanctions on nonoil exports and imports has caused an increase in the debts of the private sector to the fund due to the effect of reduced production. In order to manage the crises caused by sanctions in the short term, the governments have no choice but to withdraw from the development fund, so the majority of the fund's resources are allocated to expenses and the budget deficit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Russia attacked Ukraine, national states as well as multinational bodies such as the European Union imposed economic sanctions against Russia. Companies in sanctioning countries were expected to terminate their business with companies in the sanctioned country. However, the threat of bankruptcy made some companies chose deviance to circumvent and evasion sanctions. The case study in this paper describes an insurance firm’s attempt to terminate an insurance arrangement to avoid allegations of money laundering. The ownership of a seafood company in Norway had been transferred from Russians to a Norwegian. However, it seemed that the Russians were still the real owners since the Norwegian had paid nothing for the ownership. This paper presents the civil trial in the case and discusses convenience propositions for the Norwegian based on convenience theory in the dimensions of motive, opportunity, and willingness for deviance.

States have long used economic sanctions in response to violations of international law as a strategy to restore order. Increasingly, firms also reject doing business with violators. In response to the war in Ukraine, hundreds of multinational corporations voluntarily withdrew from Russia, even when policymakers were still debating the extent of sanctions. How did firm managers evaluate whether to withdraw from the Russian market? Using a survey experiment with Japanese firm managers conducted three months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, we explore how peer effects--information on what other firms are doing in response to the crisis--influence support for withdrawal of business activity with Russia. Our findings show that information about withdrawal by other firms from a diverse set of countries promotes peer conformity that increases support. In contrast, information about ongoing business with Russia by Chinese firms fosters competition that reduces support. Market exposure moderates these reactions, although the concern about peer behavior does not appear to be driven by a reputation mechanism. Our research provides insight into how business actors perceive the strategic interplay of peer influence and market dynamics in the context of geopolitical conflicts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this research, the system dynamics method has been used to simulate the causal loop model of the goals of the West from the nuclear dispute with Iran. First, we deal with the crises in which the Western world, the US at its head (especially the US), is involved. In the following, the status of sanctions policy and economic sanctions are discussed as the pressure lever in contrast to political issues and international conflicts. Given the existence of the Iran-West nuclear dispute, and the US at its head (mainly the US), the effects of the sanctions are expressed below and the relationship between the goals of the West and the nuclear dispute with Iran is shown by developing a comprehensive model. In the model, the goals of the West from the nuclear dispute with Iran, including the transition of the West from fossil fuels to new energy, the US trade deficit by raising the price of oil, the systemic leap of the West, the survival of the military industry of the West, and the project of the passageway of Western civilization using causal loops are modeled. The developed models provide a comprehensive and systematic perspective for policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the topical issues of doctrine and international judicial practice regarding the determination of the State's responsibility for international wrongful acts, in particular, those related to the activities of foreign non-State armed groups. The authors analyse the international legal framework of State responsibility for international wrongful acts, as well as individual criminal liability of individuals. The paper substantiates a set of economic and legal instruments for the implementation of international responsibility (reparations, satisfaction, restitution, economic sanctions) as a mechanism for ensuring compliance with international law by States. The study identifies the legal positions of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the European Court of Human Rights and other international judicial institutions on the application of the concepts of "effective control" and "overall control" in judicial practice, as well as problematic issues of law enforcement.

Abstract Background Economic sanctions are defined as restrictions imposed by other countries against individuals, groups, or governments of other countries. These sanctions have a detrimental impact on the economies of countries and can also limit access to healthcare services for people as a secondary consequence. This study aims to systematically review the literature to examine the direct and indirect effects of economic sanctions on health through a narrative synthesis. Methods This systematic literature review was limited to papers published between January 1990 and July 2023. Relevant documents published in English and Persian were searched for in databases including Cochrane Library, PubMed, Embase, Scopus, Web of Science, SID, Magiran, and Irandoc. The direct and indirect effects of sanctions on health were classified using two frameworks proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO): the Health System Building Blocks and “Social Determinants of Health”. Results Out of a total of 18,219 articles, 59 were selected based on inclusion criteria. The effects of sanctions were divided into direct and indirect groups. Direct effects encompassed seven main themes: access to essential medicine, medical products, vaccines and technologies; financing; health workforce; service delivery; research and health information systems; health outcomes; and financial risk protection. Indirect effects also were classified into six main themes: socioeconomic status; food and agricultural products; stress; early life conditions; high-risk behaviors and addiction; and transport. Most studies focused on the access to medicines, food, economic and social status. Conclusions Economic sanctions have had profoundly negative impacts on all aspects of the healthcare system. The international community must address these effects on health and take necessary measures to prevent or mitigate them, particularly in ensuring the provision of basic and essential healthcare needs for individuals and communities.

Industrial investment in Iran, especially in the wake of sanctions’ intensification in the 2010s, decreased significantly. The government implemented fiscal policy which has been associated with uncertainty. In this paper, using a dynamic panel model and generalized method of moments, we examined the effect of fiscal policy uncertainty on investment in 24 industrial groups in Iran over the period 2002-2020. The results indicated that the growth of fiscal level shock,resulted in a low but positive effect on investment directly. However,the coefficient of cross effect between the growth of fiscal level shock and the fiscal policy uncertainty undermined the positive effect on industrial investment. The government has had two effects on industrial investment indirectly through the demand side shock. By creating demand, it has had a positive effect on industrial investment with the cross effect between the growth of the fiscal level shock and industrial sales. However, on the other hand, the growth of the fiscal level shock has been associated with the creation and growth of fiscal policy uncertainty, so that the cross effect between the growth of fiscal policy uncertainty and the growth of industrial sales on industrial investment shows a high negative coefficient. The results of these two effects suggest that due to high uncertainty,the indirect government effect on investment in 24 industrial groups is negative, which happens through the demand-side shock. Moreover, the growth of fiscal policy uncertainty, sanctions, and interest rates, respectively, have had the most adverse effect on investment in 24 industrial groups in Iran.

Sanctions have become an established feature of the economic landscape in Russia and Iran and may lead to economic insecurity and distrust of political bodies among citizens. However, few studies have investigated the way individuals adapt to these sanctions and whether their coping strategies are linked to their trust in institutions. To address this gap, we conducted a comparative study between Russians and Iranians, examining their economic coping strategies (ECS), including traditional ways of storing value, modern investments, cost-cutting measures, extra work, and resorting to social and material resources in response to sanctions and their relationship with institutional trust. Utilizing a cross-sectional research design, we administered surveys and obtained sample sizes of 364 and 311 in Russia and Iran, respectively. Our findings revealed that Russians exhibit higher institutional trust and lower levels of employing ECS compared to Iranians. Furthermore, we observed that lower institutional trust is associated with a greater overall use of ECS among Russians but not Iranians. When analyzing each coping strategy individually, we found that Russians with lower institutional trust tend to rely more on extra work, cost-cutting measures, and social and material resources, while in Iran, we observed this relationship for cost-cutting measures and modern investments. We concluded that in Russia, the financial insecurity induced by sanctions may have impacted institutional trust of those low-income individuals that were pressed to use certain strategies, while in Iran, the link between cutting expenses, modern investments, and institutional trust may be better explained by reduced life satisfaction and cultural factors. Given the role of institutional trust in well-being, it is crucial to protect at-risk segments of society from the adverse effects of financial challenges on their institutional trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes the factors influencing public support for economic sanctions in the Bucharest Nine (B9) states in the context of the war in Ukraine (2022) and the measures taken by the European Union (EU) against Russia. Operating data from the Flash Eurobarometer 506 (2022) survey, this work assesses the influence of public awareness, trust in the sender alliance, emotional resonance, solidarity with the aggressed state, and targeted sanctions on public opinion across these nine EU member states. Multiple regression analyses demonstrate that a multifaceted approach, incorporating various dimensions, yields a more comprehensive understanding of public support for economic sanctions. The findings of this study emphasize that the most significant factors driving public support include sanctions imposed on Russian oligarchs, closer military cooperation within the EU, and military equipment provided to Ukraine. It can be concluded that the findings of this study reveal that the citizens of B9 countries have a pragmatic rather than an emotional approach when referring to both the conflict in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia. Plain Language Summary: This study analysed the factors influencing public support for economic sanctions in the Bucharest Nine (B9) countries in the context of the war in Ukraine and the measures taken by the European Union (EU) against Russia. It tested five hypotheses related to public awareness, trust in the issuing state, emotional resonance, solidarity with the aggressed state, and preference for targeted sanctions. Linear regression models were applied to analyse the data and concluded that all five tested hypotheses were validated. The study's results highlight the significance of factors such as public awareness, trust in the issuing state, emotional resonance, solidarity with the aggressed state, and preference for targeted sanctions in shaping public support for economic sanctions. Implications of this study include providing cherished evidence to policymakers, international relations and foreign policy practitioners. Understanding the factors that determine public support for sanctions can help develop and implement effective communication and action strategies. It can be concluded that the findings of this study reveal that the citizens of B9 countries have a pragmatic rather than an emotional approach when referring to both the conflict in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions against Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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De-dollarization is a "significant reduction in the use of dollars in world trade and financial transactions, [as well as] decreasing national, institutional and corporate demand" for United States dollars. (Goldman Sachs 2023; Li Yuefen 2024) De-dollarization has been a persistent theme since the collapse of the Bretton Woods Gold System in 1971 and the rising US national debt. (Cohen 2015) Efforts to minimise reliance upon the US dollar, such as the 1976 introduction of the IMF Special Drawing Right and the 2002 introduction of the Euro, failed to displace dollar dominance. (Eichengreen 2011) The Euro is a currency without a Nation State and the IMF SDR is not a currency used to invoice and settle international trade and financial transactions. However, the decision of the United States to "weaponize" the use of the dollar and to impose restrictions on global payment systems have impelled countries to construct an alternative to the dollar system.1(Sen 2019) This article first examines the adverse effects of using the US dollar as a global reserve currency. Second, the article examines the application of economic sanctions, specifically against the Russian Federation, to illustrate the probable development of an alternative reserve and invoice currency to co-exist with the dollar. Third, the article posits the conditions necessary to establish a viable alternative to the dollar and then examines efforts to promote alternatives to global payment systems such as SWIFT, and to build a new reserve currency.2 The article concludes: [1] the imposition of economic sanctions compels target countries to create alternative financial systems and settle international trade in national currencies; [2] establishing a new reserve currency out of whole cloth is a formidable task and lacks a recent historical counterpart, [3] the renminbi is the likely currency to rival, not displace, the US dollar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States often use market access as a bargaining chip in international politics. A state that requires simultaneous compliance in multiple issue areas before granting market access maximizes incentives to comply but also makes them brittle – any targeted states that cannot comply in one issue area have no incentive to comply in any. More generally, programs of economic coercion can achieve at most two of the following three objectives: 1) secure a broad coalition of domestic political support, 2) the association of meaningful trade value with each policy issue, and 3) assurance that enforcing one political issue will not reduce the target's incentives to comply with conditionality on others. Characteristics of the program's domestic constituency, of the issues themselves, and of the international economy are key determinants of how the state prioritizes the three objectives. The trilemma explains the number and types of issues that can be linked to economic value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Iran's economy is founded on three main sectors: cooperative, private, and governmental. Various key documents outline objectives for each sector, highlighting certain industries with unique advantages and capacities. These industries not only have strong interconnections with other sectors but also drive demand and contribute to economic growth. This study aims to analyze and present various potential futures for Iran's economy, adopting a holistic and comprehensive perspective. It explores the key factors shaping the economy, including constructive economic drivers, significant uncertainties, and potential future scenarios, considering various influential dimensions. The research employs a qualitative scenario-based approach, structured in eight stages. Data is gathered through interviews, expert panels, and the Delphi survey method, with analysis supported by Mac and Scenario software and a wizard tool. The study identifies primary economic drivers for Iran, including economic growth, oil dependency, the impact of economic sanctions, fundamental challenges, and the level of economic openness. While other factors like high unemployment, a small capital market, rent-seeking, weak infrastructure, and corruption significantly influence the economic landscape, they are not classified as primary drivers in this study. However, these elements will be considered in developing future economic scenarios. Also, in order to prioritize solutions to deal with economic threats, it should be said that using short-term methods in the programs and executive plans of the country's institutions will be the first step to deal with threats. At the same time, planning and using solutions of higher levels, respectively, can move the country step by step in terms of structure and institutions in the direction of resilience, invulnerability and regeneration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research background: Cross-national sanctions are external factors with high uncertainty. The current situation of green innovation is not optimistic and the future of the uncertain development is worth exploring. Purpose of the article: This study intends to investigate how cross-national sanctions affect green innovations by examining data from 130 countries from 1990 to 2020. We use six different forms of sanctions (including those from the U.S., EU, UN, as well as unilateral, plurilateral, and economic sanctions) as the primary explanatory variables, with environmental management innovations serving as a proxy for green innovations. Methods: Difference-in-Difference (DID) technique; Logit model. Findings & value added: The number of environmental management inventions produced by a nation's inventors is negatively affected by plurilateral and economic sanctions, as well as by the US and the EU sanctions, while other types of sanctions have weaker effects. In terms of sub-indicators, plurilateral and the US sanctions have a serious negative impact on air pollution control and water pollution control inventions, while plurilateral, The EU and economic sanctions have a negative impact on waste management innovations. However, unilateral and the UN sanctions have no apparent effect on any type of environmental technology. Further logit model tests show that the US and economic sanctions lead to a decrease in green innovations. Moreover, the difference between Asian and African countries is that the negative effects of plurilateral, the U.S., the EU, and economic sanctions are more obvious in African countries, while cross-national sanctions have no significant impact on Asian countries. The results of our study should help countries under sanctions to respond more effectively to environmental progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is dedicated to exploring the peculiarities of the legal aspects of decentralized autonomous organizations, specifying their characteristics, and legal status and formulating proposals for improving legislation in this regard (particularly in combating criminal activities and reducing instances of circumventing economic sanctions imposed by Ukraine, countries of the European Union, the United States, and others against entities of the russian federation through the use of decentralized autonomous organizations). The legal status of decentralized autonomous organizations has been examined, their characteristics have been specified, and legislative improvements in this direction have been proposed to combat criminal activity and prevention of economic sanctions evasion. It is noted that a decentralized autonomous organization cannot be registered as a legal entity in Ukraine due to its "virtual" nature and the problems arising from provisions of national legislation. However, it can be qualified as a business entity acting as a virtual assets service provider. Proposed amendments to legislation regarding the registration of decentralized autonomous organizations as service providers and the imposition of sanctions on them have been suggested. Based on the obtained results, further research directions in this area have been specified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The improvement of employment and economic growth is an important economic goal of any country but its achievement is a big challenge without considering the effects of economic sanctions on Iran's economy. Therefore, the present research estimated the direct effect of economic sanctions on employment and economic growth of Iran from 1984 to 2020 using the Markov switching method. The appropriate index was first calculated for sanctions, using the factor analysis method during the target period. After finding the quantitative values of sanctions in different periods, the employment and economic growth models were defined using the Markov switching method. In this regard, employment and economic growth could be divided into two regimes, including Regime (1) with low mean and high standard deviation and regime (2) with high mean and low standard deviation. The results of estimating Markov switching models indicated that sanctions had negative effects on employment but they had no significant effect on economic growth. The results also indicated stable employment in the low regime and economic growth in the high regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Iran, barley is considered the second-largest cultivated crop. However, more than 40% of Iran's requirements are imported from the international market. Due to the importance of barley in providing livestock feed and food security, its price variation is a critical issue for Iranian governments. Therefore, in this study, the influence of different determinants of domestic barley price, such as international price, real effective exchange rate variation, price volatility of barley, Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, and the existence of economic sanctions, has been investigated by applying the Markov-Switching model. The main results indicated that in both states, the real effective exchange rate was the primary determinant of the domestic price. Moreover, the impact of international price in first state is much more powerful than the second state. Also, the results revealed that the persistence of US economic sanctions amplified barley prices in both regimes. According to these findings, the government should eliminate interventions in the barley market by utilizing the preferential exchange rate for importing barley. Moreover, pursuing a political agenda to create a stable political condition and lift economic sanctions should be considered the priority for the government to mitigate the barley price upsurge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the influence of a country's financial access and stability and the adoption of retail central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) across 71 countries. Using an ordinal logit model, we examine how individual financial access, the ownership of credit cards, financing accessibility by firms, offshore loans, financial sanctions, and the ownership structure of financial institutions influence the probability of CBDC adoption in nations. These findings reveal that nations facing financial sanctions and those with substantial offshore bank loans are more inclined to adopt CBDCs. Furthermore, a significant relationship is observed in countries where many people have restricted financial access, indicating heightened interest in CBDC adoption. Interestingly, no statistically significant relationship was found between the adoption of CBDCs and the percentage of foreign-owned banks in each country. The results show that countries with low financial stability and financial access adopt CBDCs faster. This study expands our knowledge of how a nation's financial situation influences its adoption of CBDCs. The results provide important and relevant insights into the current discussion of the direction of global finance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study is aimed at considering topical international legal problems related to notarial proceedings on the territory of Russia and foreign countries, including within the framework of the EAEU. This article deals with some modern actual international legal problems of notarial proceedings in private international law.Aim . Find ways to solve certain topical problems of notarial proceedings in private international law, in particular, the use of electronic documents issued outside the territory of the Russian Federation and the performance of notarial acts in connection with the introduction of economic measures in the context of sanctions against the Russian Federation.Tasks. Outline the essence and depth of certain topical problems of modern notarial proceedings in private international law, in particular, the use of electronic documents issued outside the territory of the Russian Federation and the performance of notarial acts in connection with the introduction of economic measures in the context of sanctions against the Russian Federation; formulate conclusions and suggestions on the specified research topic.Methods. The methodological basis of this study was the method of analysis and synthesis, the analytical method, the comparative legal method, the system-structural method, and some others.Results . During the study, the authors concluded that notary activity with a foreign element is a complex and responsible process that requires not only a high level of professionalism and competence from a notary public, but also the ability to work with clients from different countries, as well as with other specialists, in order to ensure the correct and accurate execution of documents. It is important to understand that each case can be unique, and a notary must be prepared to adapt to different situations and provide effective problem solving for his clients. However, a properly organized and professionally executed notarial activity with a foreign element can be an important step towards a successful international transaction or legal procedure.Conclusions . If we turn to modern problems of notarial proceedings in private international law, we can conclude that notarial proceedings in the Russian Federation were significantly affected by the global pandemic and the imposed sanctions conditions, which made it difficult or impossible to provide paper documents necessary for notarial acts. We believe that the transition to electronic document management will have a positive impact on international cooperation and will facilitate the performance of notarial acts. As a solution to the problem, we proposed the conclusion of an international treaty regulating electronic document management, in which it would be possible to establish the possibility of accepting international electronic documents.

Terrorist designation has increasingly become an important counterterrorism tool used by intergovernmental organizations and state governments. This article examines the determinants of terrorist listing and argues that terrorist listing is driven by security as well as political concerns. While countries tend to designate groups that pose a greater security threat, terrorist listing can also be influenced by interstate relationships including alliance ties and state rivalry. We test these arguments using a dataset on 35 countries that currently maintain their own lists of designated terrorist organizations. Our findings show that governments are more likely to list groups that have a record of attacking their domestic interests. Domestic groups are more likely to be designated than foreign groups. Moreover, countries are more likely to designate groups that are designated by their allies, even when these groups do not pose a direct threat. Our study contributes to the literature on terrorism and more broadly international security by systematically examining the determinants of terrorist designation and explaining the heterogeneity of terrorist lists across countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Liquidity is considered one of the important assets of economic units and enterprises, which plays a significant role in financial decisions. Organizations usually face imbalances in assets and liabilities that must be balanced. If an organization is not successful in balancing such a gap, there will be a liquidity risk and several adverse consequences such as the risk of inability to pay debts, the risk of reputation and credit, etc. will occur. Liquidity management includes preventing the inability to pay debts (bankruptcy), reducing the period of accounts receivable, increasing the amount of collections, and such cases. Investors, lenders and managers pay special attention to the financial statements of companies so that they can evaluate liquidity risk by using liquidity ratios, which is liquidity management. On the other hand, working capital management is a liquidity management tool and one of the strategies for achieving desirable liquidity for companies, so that desirable liquidity for companies is maintained to the extent that they are not exposed to surplus or shortage of liquidity. In addition, economic sanctions increase inflation and disrupt money transfers and liquidity management. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of economic sanctions on liquidity management (based on operating capital factor), in listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. Method: To test the research hypotheses, the financial information of the 126 companies (1260 years-companies) accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange was used between 2011 and 2020, given the tightening of sanctions in 2011. The necessary data were extracted by referring to the financial statements and accompanying explanatory notes in the companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange, available in the Codal, the website of the Tehran Stock Exchange Organization, and Rahvard Novin software. The final analysis of the collected data was done using Eviews and Stata econometric software. After measuring the variables of the research, multivariate linear regression analysis was used to test the research hypothesis. Results: The experience of recent years shows that Iran has always struggled with the issue of economic sanctions. In terms of time, sanctions on Iran after the Islamic Revolution can be divided as follows: the initial period of the Islamic Revolution and hostage-taking (1979-1981); the period of Iraq's imposed war against Iran (1981-1988); Reconstruction period (1989-1992); Clinton era, bilateral restraint (1993-2001); After September 11, 2001 and after the resolutions of the Security Council. In the period from 2011 to 2014, the international sanctions against Iran caused a decrease of more than 17% in the real GDP of the country. In the period between 2012 and 2015, the most severe banking sanctions, including those of the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union, were imposed on Iranian banks and their SWIFT system was shut down. For this reason, studies investigating Iran's sanctions usually choose this period as the period of economic sanctions; Because it was unique in terms of intensity and depth and significantly overshadowed the economic and business indicators of the companies. The severity of the effects and consequences of the recent sanctions make it relevant to examine its impact on variables such as the company's liquidity. The results of the statistical tests indicate that economic sanctions have a negative impact on the liquidity management of the company by imposing restrictions on the purchase, sale, GDP, technology and contraction of economic activities (inactivity in the economy). In an alternative practice, the research model was also fitted with clustered standard error (cluster panel). The results of the model estimation with the panel cluster method (sensitivity test) support the main results of the research and state that sanctions have a negative effect on the company's liquidity management. Conclusion: Economic sanctions cause disruption in growth, financial flexibility, efficiency of economic activities, employment, profitability and consequently liquidity management by creating an unhealthy environment in the business environment and restrictions on doing business. Hence, companies perform worse in times of economic sanctions. Based on the results of the research and considering the negative effect of economic sanctions on liquidity management in companies, it is suggested that the statesmen and other authorities of the country pay more attention to the general policies of the economy in order to strengthen the economy of Iran. Regarding the impact of sanctions on liquidity management, there are two solutions to deal with it: a) Coordination of political and economic officials in the path of not sanctioning the country, which is of course bound to preserve the values of the society. b) The existence of alternative markets with which it is possible to exchange in the conditions of sanctions and the strengthening of any type of regional union and alternative market. The limitation of the current research is that the variable that is considered to measure sanctions is a virtual variable that depends on time and is defined in a period of time, and in this period, it cannot be confidently claimed that it is the only event that affects the macro economy of Iran. is sanctioned; Rather, other events, such as the deterioration of the balance sheets of banks and energy price reforms (implemented in 2010), etc., which have occurred in this period of time, can also affect the generalization of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]