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Over forty thousand people die in motor vehicle crashes in the United States each year, and over two million are injured. The careful deployment Of driving automation systems could prevent many of these deaths and injuries, but only if it is accompanied by effective regulation. Conventional vehicle safety standards are inadequate because they can only test how technology performs in a controlled environment. To assess the safety of a driving automation system, regulators must observe how it performs in a range of unpredictable, real world edge cases. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is trying to adapt by experimenting with a novel regulatory strategy. Instead of setting standards, the agency is using its statutory powers in unprecedented ways-ordering automation developers to report crashes daily and directing rapid recalls that require changes to defective software. NHTSA is betting that intense monitoring and the credible threat of recalls will push developers to prioritize safety. This Article argues that NHTSA's experimental strategy could be transformed into effective safety regulation. Regulators should (1) require that all new vehicles be equipped with telematics that can send safety data and receive software updates over the air: (2) mandate universal crash reporting; and (3) use recalls to force developers of driving automationsystems that create unreasonable risks to restrict where their systems can operate until they can develop safer code. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade-in program is a widely used way for recycling waste products. Similarly, a large number of automobile producers have launched trade-in-for new fuel cars or trade-in-for new energy vehicles to replacement consumers. We consider a two-period dynamic game problem and analyze the impact of the consumer anxiety behavior and the policy substitution effect on the customers' selection behavior, and the automobile producer's optimal pricing strategy. The results show that in the basic model, short-sighted customers' choices are diverse. In addition, both the consumer anxiety behavior and the policy substitution effect influence the producer's profit. In the extension models, it exists a threshold of the additional innovation level. When the additional innovation level is larger than the threshold value, automobile producers adopt the dynamic pricing strategy. Otherwise, they adopt the preannounce pricing strategy. Moreover, it exists a threshold of the additional innovation level. When it is larger than the threshold value, automobile producers adopt the single rollover strategy. Otherwise, they adopt the dual rollover strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]