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In an era of accelerating biomedical innovations, partial ectogenesis looms as a double-edged sword for female bodily autonomy and reproductive rights. Rather than simplifying or 'solving' abortion access and the ethical issues inherent to that right, this technology wields the alarming potential to curtail women's right to safe and legal abortions. This article investigates the potential of partial ectogenesis as a 'solution' to the abortion debate, focusing on two significant hypotheses. Foremost, the paper scrutinizes the dilemma of ectogenesis abortion; specifically, instances where a woman intending to terminate her pregnancy is obliged to undergo foetal transfer surgery. This scrutiny engages with Räsänen's concept of the right to the death of a foetus, yet ultimately concludes that this supposed right is unconvincing. Despite there being no such right, this paper argues that the prospect of partial ectogenesis is incapable of resolving the core issues of the abortion debate, not least because of the inherent conflict between a woman's right to her own body and the proposed technology or rather, compulsion of such surgeries. Instead, this article posits that a more significant ethical and logical concern lies in misconceptions surrounding the term 'foetus' and how such misconceptions impact considerations of autonomy. Thereafter, this paper examines the potential for partial ectogenesis to alter the legal viability threshold set by the Abortion Act 1967-in particular, this paper explores the impact a shift in the viability threshold would have on female bodily autonomy. In the aim of resolving these concerns, this article concludes by advocating for the decriminalisation of abortion to safeguard female bodily autonomy against constraints on abortion access were the viability threshold legally revised. By addressing these crucial topics, this article aims to provide a nuanced analysis of the dialogue surrounding reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, and the complex interplay between emerging biotechnologies, medical ethics and legislative frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a pregnancy ends in England and Wales, statutory time away from paid employment is limited to circumstances where there is a live birth or stillbirth. Forms of leave, such as Maternity Leave or Paternity Leave, depend on parental status derived from the civil registration of a new person or a post‐viability stillbirth. Other early pregnancy endings, such as miscarriage or abortion, do not provide specific time off work after pregnancy. This paper uses the concept of reproductive governance to analyze current and shifting biopolitical truth discourses, strategies of intervention, and modes of subjectification around post‐pregnancy leaves. It shows how different inclusions and exclusions are generated by the classificatory boundaries which act as political technologies in this field. Contributing to an area that is under‐researched in the literature, we provide a review of post‐pregnancy statutory employment leave entitlements in this context. We then consider proposals for change presented in the United Kingdom political system in relation to more inclusive leave benefits offered by some employers and different pregnancy ending leaves offered in other jurisdictions. We argue that current arrangements and proposals do not adequately reflect the complexity and diversity of pregnancy endings. We conclude with a call to policymakers in all contexts to carefully assess the consequences of new ideas around leaves for pregnancy endings and to formulate inclusive and fair proposals for change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]