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This article responds to a conference call for papers that makes universalist assumptions about clause structures, assuming all languages in the world basically follow the same organizing principles in terms of clause structure, argument structure, and alignment. The article presents data from Tagalog to show how different a language can be from the assumed universal organizing principles to make the point that by imposing an Indo-European framework on non-Indo-European languages, we are overlooking the true diversity of language forms found in the world's languages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the absolutive case in Modern Mandarin Chinese sentences with reversible argument structures. In these sentences, the two arguments adjacent to the verb can be interchangeable in syntactic position. Although previous research has provided partial descriptions and analyses of this grammatical phenomenon, there is still no comprehensive and systematic exploration of these reversible sentences. Employing a reductionist methodology, the study meticulously examines the interaction modes between the verb and its arguments in eight types of reversible sentence structures involving the addition or omission of argument roles. This analysis reveals a distinct pattern that highlights the centrality of an 'absolute argument' within these sentences. Building on these observations, the paper articulates the fundamental structural patterns of reversible sentences and concludes a unified explanatory framework. This research enriches our understanding of Mandarin Chinese syntax and offers valuable perspectives on the linguistic dynamics underlying reversible sentence construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In political discourse, it is common to claim that non-majoritarian institutions are legitimate because they are technical and value-free. Even though most analysts disagree, many arguments for non-majoritarian legitimacy rest on claims that work best if institutions are, in fact, value-free. This paper develops a novel standard for non-majoritarian legitimacy. It builds on the rich debate over the value-free ideal in philosophy of science, which has not, so far, been applied systematically to political theory literature on non-majoritarian institutions. This paper suggests that the argument from inductive risk, a strong argument against the value-free ideal, (1) shows why a naive claim to value freedom is a poor general foundation for non-majoritarian legitimacy; (2) provides a device to assess the degree of democratic value inputs required for an institution to be legitimate; which (3) shows the conditions under which a claim to technical legitimacy might still be normatively acceptable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Relying on the notion of "overlapping perspectives," this paper argues that entity realism and perspectivism are complementary. According to entity realism, it is justified to maintain a positive attitude toward the existence of unobservable entities with which multiple experimental interactions are possible. Perspectivism also explains that our beliefs about these entities are bounded by historically contingent theoretical and instrumental perspectives. The argument of the paper is developed through a discussion of Ronald Giere's versions of realism: entity realism, constructive realism, and perspectival realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine Socrates' argument that presupposes an audience familiar with Forms and explains why the sight-lovers are not philosophers. It is divided into three parts: the first part (476a1–6) shows why each Form is one in number; the second part (476a6–9) distinguishes Forms from their sensible appearances; and the third part (476a10–d6) draws an analogy between philosophers – people being awake and sight-lovers – people being asleep. Remarkably, the argument works only for opposites, which are mistakenly identified by the sight-lovers with sensible things. Also in this paper I suggest an alternative interpretation of the so-called 'Two Worlds Theory' which is based on the distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise in some sense. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Impurism says that practical factors encroach on knowledge. An important version of impurism is called 'Threshold-Impurism,' which says that practical factors encroach on the threshold that rational credence must pass in order for one to have knowledge. A prominent kind of argument for Threshold-Impurism is the so-called 'principle-based argument,' which relies on a principle of fallibilism and a knowledge-action principle. This paper offers a new challenge against Threshold-Impurism. I attempt to show that the two principles Threshold-Impurists are committed to—KJ and Fallibilism—are jointly in tension with a widely-held principle of credence that's called 'Truth-Directedness,' in the sense that the former two principles cannot both apply to those who know the third. This tension constitutes a serious challenge to Threshold-Impurists, because it leaves them two options, both of which are undesirable: denying Truth-Directedness, or accepting Truth-Directedness and accepting that whether KJ and Fallibilism apply to a person depends on whether she knows Truth-Directedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Tropelías: Revista de Teoría de la Literatura y Literatura Comparada is the property of Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The present paper investigates reflexives in Najdi Arabic (NA). We start by examining how the encoding of reflexivity in NA can be attained lexically, morphologically, and syntactically. We also investigate the argument structure of reflexive constructions in NA in accordance with Reinhart and Siloni’s (2005) bundling approach. Finally, possessive reflexives and their cross-linguistic distribution with definiteness marking are examined, providing empirical coverage to this area in NA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper investigates participial root configurations, i.e. participial clauses that are grammatically independent of a host clause. Unlike previous work, which has focussed on either directive or (non-directive) performative uses of so-called past participles (i.e. participles that have passive and/or perfect(ive) interpretations), the present paper establishes a typology of 'root participles' in Germanic and contrasts the properties of four main types: (1) directive (RPdir), (2) expressive (RPexp), (3) commissive (RPcom), (4) representative root participles (RPrep). The main claim with respect to the properties of these distinct types is that they differ in terms of whether they include a verbal or an adjectival (passive) participle. In fact, arguments based on argument structure, orientation, aspect, and adverbial modification are presented to substantiate the claim that types (1) and (2) are formed with verbal and types (3) and (4) with adjectival participles. Additionally, the distinct types will be shown to differ in their status of either being non-sentential (i.e. structurally different from potential clausal counterparts) or merely elliptical (just phonologically reduced): types (1) and (3) can be shown to be non-sentential and hence receive a dedicated syntactic analysis, where special attention is paid to the contribution of the (imperative vs. declarative) left periphery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the oscillation of solutions to a class of first-order differential equations with variable coefficients and a general delay argument. New oscillation criteria are established, which improve and extend many known results reported in the literature. A couple of illustrative examples are given to show the efficiency of the newly obtained results. In particular, it is shown that our criteria partially fulfill a remaining gap in a recent sharp result by Pituk et al. [31]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In terminally ill individuals who would otherwise end their own lives, active voluntary euthanasia (AVE) can be seen as life-extending rather than life-shortening. Accordingly, AVE supports key pro-euthanasia arguments (appeals to autonomy and beneficence) and meets certain sanctity of life objections. This paper examines the extent to which a terminally ill individual's wish to donate organs after death contributes to those life-extension arguments. It finds that, in a terminally ill individual who wishes to avoid experiencing life he considers to be not worth living, and who also wishes to donate organs after death, AVE maximizes the likelihood that such donations will occur. The paper finds that the wish to donate organs strengthens the appeals to autonomy and beneficence, and fortifies the meeting of certain sanctity of life objections, achieved by life-extension arguments, and also generates appeals to justice that form novel life-extension arguments in favour of AVE in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates and refines the proportionalist solution to the causal exclusion problem developed by Menzies and List. First and foremost, it explores the implications of their inter-level compatibility result. It is highlighted that in theory the inter-level causal compatibility of realizer and realized properties allows for scenarios where the higher-level property is multiply realized. By developing concrete illustrations, the paper proves this to be an empirically plausible option. Further non-trivial implications of the framework are unpacked to show that the sensitivity of causal relations to background conditions is as important in deciding on the existence and the direction of exclusion as sensitivity to the realization of the cause. This insight also opens the way to further refinements: a richer reconceptualization of upwards exclusion and a plausible answer to a critic of the Menzies and List project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss with some contemporary Thomists the possibility of re-actualizing Thomas's fifth way to God in the science–theology dialogue. We start with a reference to Spinoza's critique of teleology in light of some recent Spinoza studies, and after summarizing several Thomistic defenses of Aquinas's teleological argument, we interpret that critique as targeting the fifth way as well. We then focus on Darwin's impact on biological design arguments. We argue that his naturalistic explanation of biological teleology also affects the fifth way. The distinction between internal-Aristotelian and external-Platonic conceptions of teleology does not seem to be able to protect the teleological argument from a Darwinian critique. We conclude by stressing the importance and fruitfulness of Thomas's thought for contemporary interdisciplinary dialogue, provided that Darwin's impact on the biological version of the fifth way is taken into due account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper navigates artificial intelligence's recent advancements and increasing media attention. A notable focus is placed on Eliezer Yudkowsky, a leading figure within the domain of artificial intelligence alignment, who aims to bridge the understanding gap between public perceptions and rationalist viewpoints on artificial intelligence technology. This focus analyzes his predicted course of action for artificial intelligence outlined within his unpublished paper AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities. This is achieved by attempting to understand the concept of intelligence itself and identifying a reasonable working definition of that concept. The concept of intelligence is then applied to contemporary artificial intelligence capabilities and developments to understand its applicability to the technologies. This paper finds contemporary artificial intelligence systems are, to some extent, intelligent. However, it argues that both weak and strong artificial intelligence systems, devoid of human-defined goals, would not inherently pose existential threats to humanity, challenging the notions of artificial intelligence alignment, bringing into question the validity of Nick Bostrom's Orthogonality Thesis. Furthermore, the possibility of artificial life created through the method of assembling various modules each emulating a separate mind function is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent paper, Justin D'Ambrosio (2020) has offered an empirical argument in support of a negative solution to the puzzle of Macbeth's dagger—namely, the question of whether, in the famous scene from Shakespeare's play, Macbeth sees a dagger in front of him. D'Ambrosio's strategy consists in showing that "seeing" is not an existence-neutral verb; that is, that the way it is used in ordinary language is not neutral with respect to whether its complement exists. In this paper, we offer an empirical argument in favor of an existence-neutral reading of "seeing". In particular, we argue that existence-neutral readings are readily available to language users. We thus call into question D'Ambrosio's argument for the claim that Macbeth does not see a dagger. According to our positive solution, Macbeth sees a dagger, even though there is not a dagger in front of him. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reconsiders Ezekiel's alleged anti-imperial attitude toward the Babylonian empire. It nuances the alleged attitude with Frantz Fanon's theory of colonized subjects' desire to be like their colonizer. Looking at Ezekiel's privileged social location, I argue that the book exhibits a desire to be like the Babylonian empire. Ezekiel intertwines Babylonian's "anti-Egyptian" propaganda with Yahweh's interest in maintaining loyalty toward the empire. To support this argument, the paper first surveys the Babylonian and Egyptian conflict over the Levant. It then reconsiders the situation of Ezekiel and his community in exile. Further, it discusses Fanon's theory of colonized subjects' desires and how Ezekiel operates within it. It concludes by looking at what Ezekiel might gain through this maneuver. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sober and Huemer have independently argued that simplicity has no place in evaluating philosophical views. In particular, they have argued that the best rationales for scientists to appeal to simplicity in judging between rival theories fail to carry over to philosophers judging between rival philosophical accounts. This paper disagrees with Sober and Huemer. It argues that two rationales for scientific appeals to simplicity equally well underwrite appeals to simplicity when philosophers evaluate rival rational reconstructions of some social normative practice. These two rationales are shown to apply to two philosophical appeals to simplicity: in Quine's argument against analyticity and in an argument against pluralism in accounts of scientific explanation. Some factors are identified that influence how much weight simplicity should carry in these and other philosophical cases. Simplicity's legitimate role in evaluating rival rational reconstructions suggests that simplicity will also turn out to be justly relevant to ontological investigations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Where sporting games may be said to epitomize our species' unique agential capacity for playful movement, sports played in nature differ from their equivalent played indoors in that they envelop the human agent within the living physical environment from which our agency originates. In this paper, we draw attention to how sporting sites differ according to origin by pursuing a biosemiotic line of reasoning. Here, the story of a meaningful human life begins with the eukaryotic cell, even though the human subject itself arises much later. As such, the story of nature in relation to our agency, here, in sports, changes too. We present key concepts from biosemiotics, including its continuum life-as-semiotic-agency view, Umwelt, metasemiosis, and semiotic scaffolding to advance our argument that naturogenic sporting sites provide continuity to the macro processes that have generated our semiotic ability to play. Meanwhile, secluded anthropogenic environments constitute yet another discontinuity for the modern sportsperson where the moving body steps into an anthroposemiotic loop and its restricted signscapes from centralized agency. We conclude on the primacy of naturogenic sporting sites as they preserve the quality and complexity of animal ludens' constitutive relations and therefrom semiotic freedom, on which current and future gameplaying depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the question of whether nature sports are to be counted among the (traditional) sports and Kevin Krein's recent argument, based on sporting excellence, as to why they should. Krein argues that sports as such are ultimately about sporting excellence and because both so-called traditional sports and nature sports fulfil that criterion, nature sports belong in the sport domain. Here, I show that Krein's argument rests on an equivocation between two concepts of sporting excellence. Sporting excellence in traditional sports is connected to sporting success. Here agon (contest or competition) dictates or frames areté (striving for excellence). This is not the case for sporting excellence in nature sports, as these are not competitions. We are dealing with two different concepts of sporting excellence and Krein's argument, based on sporting excellence, must be rejected. It gives no basis for including nature sports in the sport domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the major divides in contemporary philosophy of consciousness is on whether phenomenal consciousness requires some form of self-consciousness. The disagreement revolves around the following principle (or something in the vicinity): IA: For any subject S and phenomenally conscious mental state C of S, C is phenomenally conscious only if S is aware of C. We may call the relevant awareness of one's own mental states "inner awareness" and the principle "Inner Awareness Principle" (IA). In a paper recently published in this Journal, Stoljar (2021) puts forward a massive theoretical criticism of IA. He addresses many extant arguments for IA, and argues, for each of them, that it is unpersuasive. In this paper, I focus on what strike me as the two most compelling arguments in Stoljar's list: the argument from memory and the argument from attention. I argue that Stoljar's objections to them can be rebutted; accordingly, those arguments promise to constitute the steadiest theoretical ground for IA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I offer reasons to conclude that either belief impermissivism or credal impermissivism is false. That is to say, I argue against the conjunction of belief impermissivism and credal impermissivism. I defend this conclusion in three ways. First, I show what I take to be an implausible consequence of holding that for any rational credence in p, there is only one correlating rational belief-attitude toward p, given a body of evidence. Second, I provide thought experiments designed to support the intuition that there are at least a few credences in some cases for which more than one belief-attitude is rationally permissible. Third, I provide one possible theoretical grounding for my position by appeal to Jamesian values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Guaranteed lower Dirichlet eigenvalue bounds (GLB) can be computed for the m-th Laplace operator with a recently introduced extra-stabilized nonconforming Crouzeix–Raviart ( m = 1 ) or Morley ( m = 2 ) finite element eigensolver. Striking numerical evidence for the superiority of a new adaptive eigensolver motivates the convergence analysis in this paper with a proof of optimal convergence rates of the GLB towards a simple eigenvalue. The proof is based on (a generalization of) known abstract arguments entitled as the axioms of adaptivity. Beyond the known a priori convergence rates, a medius analysis is enfolded in this paper for the proof of best-approximation results. This and subordinated L 2 error estimates for locally refined triangulations appear of independent interest. The analysis of optimal convergence rates of an adaptive mesh-refining algorithm is performed in 3D and highlights a new version of discrete reliability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Wittgenstein Studien. Neue Folge is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The aim of this paper is to explore the forms of official and unofficial negotiation, using the rescue of the Staré Hrady castle, renovated between 1949 and 1993, as a case in point. The paper first outlines the earlier history and current situation of this monument, then the cultural and legal context, the actors and, lastly, the history of the rescue itself. It then proceeds to examine the final phase of the rescue to provide an illustrative example of a castle renovation project that was financially and ideologically supported by the regime and where the rescue went hand in hand with its cultural use, which served as an argument for the renovation in the first place. The paper discusses the forms of communication formally required for the official negotiation related to this project, as well as the informal level of the negotiation, which existed outside the written sources. It concludes that both of these negotiation levels were equally important for the preservation of the Staré Hrady castle: they were used as dictated by the situation and ultimately aimed at achieving the same goal: to preserve a cultural monument whose restoration had been considered impossible and pointless a little more than two decades earlier. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The project Untangling the cordel (2020-2024) aims at studying and promoting a collection of 19th-century Spanish chapbooks via a digital library (DL). This resource is composed of digital scholarly editions of chapbooks and of a catalogue of woodcuts, which decorate the first page of almost all the documents. In this paper, after presenting the project's editorial workflow, we focus our attention of the way we design the interface of this DL to represent the different facets of chapbooks (document, text and illustrations). For that, we have chosen to follow a method, proposed by Andrews and van Zundert in 2018, that consider an interface as an argument editors made about their data and their digital editions. Through this case study, we demonstrate the feasibility of this approach, where each component of an interface contributes to the scientific discourse a project made about its goals and its perception of digital editing. We also stress the impact of this method on user experience and on a project itself, as another way to see data and their modelling. This paper describes how the Untangling the cordel project created the interface for its digital library, using a method that considers an interface as an argument that editors make about their project and their data [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary Motivated by existing works on the ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ state‐feedback controller for nonlinear systems, in which the ℒ∞$$ {\mathcal{L}}_{\infty } $$ norm of the output for the worst disturbance with a unit magnitude is required to be bounded by 1, this paper considers an extension of those works to an output‐feedback form. More precisely, the existence of an ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller for nonlinear systems is characterized by developing output regulation map and output controlled invariance domain, which are extended versions of the conventional regulation map and controlled invariance domain in the previous works. We first lead to a sufficient condition for the existence of an ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller by ensuring the lower‐semicontinuity of the corresponding output regulation map. It is also shown in this paper that there exists an ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller only if there exists an output controlled invariance domain. Based on these conditions, we further introduce algorithmic guidelines for verifying the existence of ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller. Finally, a numerical example is provided to verify the validity of the overall arguments developed in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erode Venkatappa Ramaswami Naicker, known as ‘Periyar’ to his followers, is seen as both a ‘Non-Brahmin’ leader and as the father of Dravidianism, an identity politics that sought to secure the interests of the Dravidian people, variously imagined but most commonly associated with Tamil-speakers. This paper traces the ways in which the precolonial and colonial sense of being Tamil enabled Periyar’s Dravidianism, which was not a racial or ethnolinguistic chauvinism but a conditional particularism, instrumentalising an identity in order to secure a rationalist and egalitarian future by reconnecting with an idealised Tamil past. This paper also builds on M.S.S. Pandian's interpretation of the ‘transitivity’ of Periyar's various mobilisational categories to argue that Periyar's Dravidian becomes an identity constructed by history, but also a transitive universality that can evoke an indefinite number of categories of the oppressed. In making this argument it engages with certain conclusions about Periyar offered by Karthick Ram Manoharan, an active and insightful scholar of Periyar’s thought. More broadly, by taking Periyarism seriously, I explore some limitations in some theoretical approaches to identity by demonstrating how collective identity and universality are not necessarily opposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I.J. Good's "On the Principle of Total Evidence" (1967) looms large in decision theory and Bayesian epistemology. Good proves that in Savage 's (1954) decision theory, a coherent agent always prefers to collect, rather than ignore, free evidence. It is now well known that Good's result was prefigured in an unpublished note by Frank Ramsey (Skyrms 2006). The present paper highlights another early forerunner to Good's argument, appearing in Janina Hosiasson's "Why do We Prefer Probabilities Relative to Many Data?" (1931), that has been neglected in the literature. Section 1 reviews Good's argument and the problem it was meant to resolve; call this the value of evidence problem. Section 2 offers a brief history of the value of evidence problem and provides biographical background to contextualize Hosiasson's contribution. Section 3 explicates the central argument of Hosiasson's paper and considers its relationship to Good's (1967). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Andi (Nakh-Daghestanian; Russia) displays a typologically remarkable phenomenon: adverbs of numerous morphological and functional types inflect for agreement with a clause-level controller. To the extent that adverb agreement has been observed elsewhere, it is commonly taken to signal that the items involved are semantically oriented towards the participants they agree with, aligning the phenomenon with secondary predication. This paper demonstrates that Andi works differently: the widespread clausal agreement seen on Andi adverbs is insensitive to participant orientation. While agreement exponence on adverbs is morphologically complex, a simple structural principle (modelled here in Minimalist terms) ensures that clause-level agreement is always with the absolutive-case argument. The Andi facts thus provide evidence for a typological distinction between those languages where clausal agreement on adverbs can serve a semantic function and those where it cannot. A potential challenge is posed by the exceptional “biabsolutive” construction, where both subject and object appear in absolutive case and either may control adverb agreement, suggesting a role for some additional non-structural factor. However, on independent grounds this paper identifies the two arguments as belonging to distinct structural layers; this apparent flexibility in controller choice merely reflects the ability of certain adverbs to modify either layer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a comparative efficiency analysis of hashing algorithms from a perspective of their use in systems based on the zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-SNARK). Hash functions sha256, sha3, poseidon, mimc, and blake2, most commonly used in modern distributed ledgers, are considered. For parameter measurement experiments, an infrastructure using the ZoKrates toolbox is developed. Based on experimental data, the limits of practical applicability of the algorithms to the problem of proving knowledge of a hash preimage with zk-SNARK circuits in distributed ledgers are determined, and related efficiency problems are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes a case for treating the boundary between what counts as practical reasoning and what does not as essentially indeterminate. The idea that there is an “essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process” was put forward by Bernard Williams in his well‐known discussion of statements about an agent's reasons for action. But in contrast to the more familiar argument of that paper, the idea has received almost no attention. To understand and defend the idea, I first offer a somewhat novel reconstruction of the more familiar argument against making statements about a person's reasons intended on an “external” interpretation. On my reading, the argument shows how making such statements runs afoul of ideals of honesty in our interpersonal dealings. I then argue for countenancing an essential indeterminacy in what counts as practical reasoning, in a manner that involves a re‐application of these same ideals of honesty, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. One advantage of understanding the entire discussion of reasons statements and reasoning along these lines is that it highlights the deeply anti‐rationalistic flavor of Williams' own interest in these topics. Unsurprisingly, Williams' treatment displays a deep affinity with the anti‐rationalistic ethics advanced by Hume. It also turns out to be at cross purposes with the far more rationalistic ethical vision that animates more recent attempts to advance a “Humean Theory of Reasons,” which is sometimes mistakenly seen as following in Williams' and Hume's footsteps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tackles the issue of whether syntactic head movement exists in Japanese. Sato & Hayashi (2018) and Sato & Maeda (2021) propose that Verb‐Echo Answers (VEAs), an instance of fragment answers, in Japanese are derived via the so‐called Verb‐stranding TP‐Ellipsis (VTPE; i.e., TP‐ellipsis accompanied by verb‐raising to C), thereby claiming that head movement exists in Japanese as a syntactic operation. In response, this paper argues that pro and Argument Ellipsis (AE) in Japanese sufficiently account for the key observations presented in their works. Specifically, a careful examination of the discourse in each question‐answer pair reveals that the seemingly problematic scope patterns in VEAs do not call for the VTPE analysis. We also show that the unacceptability of voice mismatches in VEAs can be explained by a discourse‐based analysis within the Question Under Discussion framework. Further, we provide an extensive discussion on the alleged evidence against the pro/AE analysis concerning adjunct‐inclusive readings. We show that negative scope reversal effects, which Sato & Maeda (2021) argue occur in VTPE, do not occur between adjuncts and negation in the novel data. Given this, we discuss possible ways to account for the availability of adjunct‐inclusive readings in VEAs with no recourse to VTPE, and suggest avenues for future research. The proposed analyses of VEAs shed new light on intriguing aspects of ellipsis phenomena, which involve complex interactions between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of tyche (τύχη), a Greek term that can be alternatively translated as luck, fortune, or fate. The paper disentangles various threads of argument in the primary sources to argue for a realist understanding of what we moderns call "luck." In short, it contends that Aristotle's account of these issues is mostly correct and merits close attention when canvassing recent philosophical debates about luckology. Aristotle argues that science pertains to the general rule; it is not about the particular. Particular events have contingent content that exceeds the scope of science. Even if we could predict all future events with ultimate accuracy, we would still be left wondering why good or bad things happen to specific people. Although luck is not a scientific category, it has an existential reality that leaves momentous events open to metaphysical and even religious interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses lines of argument drawn from Amartya Sen's Idea of Justice to support the notion that NGO efforts, far from being oppressive, are helpful and progressive. It cites the work of Lairap‐Fonderson and Chen, and alludes to specific projects. Contrast is made with Rawls, and the paper suggests that more formal theories of justice may not enable us to grapple with our intuitive sense that justice for the poverty stricken involves, at a minimum, both financial progress and forward movement with respect to internal growth. Examples of work done by NGOs in Bangladesh and other places help us to realize that women in these areas often have their own sense of what a more just situation would require—and NGOs and others can work from these conceptions as a point of departure. Part of the conclusion here is that Sen's concept of the just is a step in the right direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we study essential hereditary undecidability. Theories with this property are a convenient tool to prove undecidability of other theories. The paper develops the basic facts concerning essentially hereditary undecidability and provides salient examples, like a construction of essentially hereditarily undecidable theories due to Hanf and an example of a rather natural essentially hereditarily undecidable theory strictly below R. We discuss the (non-)interaction of essential hereditary undecidability with recursive boolean isomorphism. We develop a reduction relation essential tolerance, or, in the converse direction, lax interpretability that interacts in a good way with essential hereditary undecidability. We introduce the class of Σ 1 0 -friendly theories and show that Σ 1 0 -friendliness is sufficient but not necessary for essential hereditary undecidability. Finally, we adapt an argument due to Pakhomov, Murwanashyaka and Visser to show that there is no interpretability minimal essentially hereditarily undecidable theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Let { X n } n ∈ Z be a stationary process with values in a finite set. In this paper, we present a moving average version of the Shannon–McMillan–Breiman theorem; this generalize the corresponding classical results. A sandwich argument reduced the proof to direct applications of the moving strong law of large numbers. The result generalizes the work by Algoet et. al., while relying on a similar sandwich method. It is worth noting that, in some kind of significance, the indices a n and ϕ (n) are symmetrical, i.e., for any integer n, if the growth rate of (a n) n ∈ Z is slow enough, all conclusions in this article still hold true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigate whether Mandarin short passives contain an implicit external argument (EA; such as an agent or experiencer). Syntactic tests yield inconclusive results in Mandarin. We employ intervention effects as a diagnostic tool and demonstrate that, unlike English, Mandarin short passives do not syntactically project an implicit EA. Our findings are based on spontaneous language data from the CHILDES corpora, encompassing 1182 children aged 2–6 years, and experimental data from 78 Mandarin-speaking children aged 3–6 years. This cross-linguistic structural difference explains the earlier acquisition of short passives in Mandarin compared to English and also raises a learnability question, which we briefly address: how do children know to project an implicit EA or not in their language? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bertrand Russell abandoned the notion of acquaintance in July 1918. What changes does this force in his account of the mind? This paper focuses on one puzzle of interpretation about this. In 1913, Russell offered an account of 'egocentric particulars', his term for indexicals and demonstratives. He argued that the fundamental objection to neutral monism was that it could not provide an adequate theory of these terms. In 1918, Russell now embraces a form of neutral monism, but he does not return to the problem of indexicals until 1940 in his William James lectures. Is the account given in 1940 significantly different from the one given in 1913? What was the argument against neutral monism in 1913? Does Russell offer a new solution in 1940 or reject his earlier view as mistaken? The answers offered here are used to draw more general morals about the current debate concerning relational theories of sense perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uncovers how metaphor forces argument overtness – across languages and parts of speech. It addresses the relationship between semantically unsaturated terms, functors, and the argument terms that complete them. When the component terms' default senses clash semantically, a metaphor arises. In such cases, the argument must be overt, in contrast to literal uses. It is possible to say Everyone was waiting at the hotel. Finally, Kim arrived. By contrast, people do not use arrived metaphorically without a goal argument: Everything had been pointing to that conclusion all along. *Finally, Kim arrived. What they say is Finally, Kim arrived at it. We illustrate the phenomenon with powerful and diverse evidence: three corpus studies (Indo-Aryan languages, British English, Vera'a) and a sentence-completion experiment with around 250 native speakers of English. Both the corpus studies and the experiment show no or almost no exceptions to metaphor-driven argument overtness. The strength of the effect contrasts with a complete lack of speaker awareness. We propose that metaphor-driven argument overtness – as well as the lack of speaker consciousness – is a universal phenomenon that can be accounted for in terms of human language processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S doubts that a source O is reliable and believes that information i is delivered by O, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of i. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Responses to skeptical arguments need to be serious: they need to explain not only why some premise of the argument is false, but also why the premise is plausible, despite being false. Moorean responses to skeptical arguments are inadequate because they are not serious: they do not explain the plausibility of false skeptical premises (Sects. 2–3). Skeptical arguments presuppose the truth of the following two claims: the requirements for epistemic justification are internalist, and these internalist requirements are never satisfied (with respect to our beliefs about the external world). In this paper, I provide a serious response to the skeptic on behalf of the internalist: I explain why the claim that internalist requirements are never satisfied is plausible but false. First, I argue that the claim is plausible, but only insofar as one lacks an account of how perceptual experiences make it rational to hold beliefs about the external world (and the skeptic does lack such an account) (Sect. 4). Second, I provide such an account of experiential rationality, and I argue that in light of this account John McDowell can be understood as persuasively arguing that the claim that internalist requirements are never satisfied is false (Sects. 5–6). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1984, Bressoud and Subbarao obtained an interesting weighted partition identity for a generalized divisor function, by means of combinatorial arguments. Recently, the last three named authors found an analytic proof of the aforementioned identity of Bressoud and Subbarao starting from a q-series identity of Ramanujan. In the present paper, we revisit the combinatorial arguments of Bressoud and Subbarao, and derive a more general weighted partition identity. Furthermore, with the help of a fractional differential operator, we establish a few more Bressoud–Subbarao type weighted partition identities beginning from an identity of Andrews, Garvan and Liang. We also found a one-variable generalization of an identity of Uchimura related to Bell polynomials. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognized that Emil Kraepelin explicitly advocated for eugenic ideas in his academic works. Given the renewed interest in related concepts such as self-domestication and neo-Lamarckism in different contexts, this article revisits his eugenic arguments by scrutinizing a section of his seminal work, the 8th edition of his textbook published in 1909. Our analysis reveals that Kraepelin's arguments consisted of multiple theories and ideas prevalent at the time (i.e. self-domestication hypothesis, neo-Lamarckism, degeneration theory, social Darwinism, racism and ethnic nationalism), each of which presented individual fundamental claims. Nevertheless, Kraepelin amalgamated them into one combined narrative, which crystallized into an anti-humanistic psychiatry in the next generation. This paper cautions that a similar 'packaging of ideas' might be emerging now. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This essay offers an interpretation of Plato's Phaedo, which proceeds in two parts: (1) methodological interpretation of myth and (2) application of the method to the analysis of the soul. The paper claims that the myths in this dialogue are not limited to the explicitly mythical sections but that the entirety of the Phaedo—including the arguments that it presents—is saturated with myth. Through this interpretive lens, the soul, as it appears in the Phaedo, ceases to be characterized as a mere thing and gains an ontological dimension. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a critique of the current version of Derk Pereboom's "disappearing agent argument" against event-causal libertarianism. Special attention is paid to a notion that does a lot of work in his argument—that of settling which decision occurs (of the various decisions it is open to the agent to make at the time). It is argued that Pereboom's disappearing agent argument fails to show that event-causal libertarians lack the resources to accommodate agents' having freedom-level control over what they decide. The connection between the disappearing agent argument and the problem of present luck is explored, as is the connection between settling which decision one makes and luck. Pereboom's disappearing agent argument also is distinguished from another argument with the same name that targets intentional action itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine Takada Shinji's (1893–1975) view of the 'Mandate of Heaven (天命 tenmei)'. Takada understood the 'Imperial Way (皇道 kōdō)' as one of two axes, the 'Mandate of Heaven' and the 'Rectification of Names (正名 seimei)', together they made possible a theoretical systematization of the 'Imperial Way' discourse as well as its concrete political embodiment. It is undeniable that the ideas of the 'Imperial Way' received heavy criticism after WWII. Because it was used as a problematic ideology in Imperial Japan. Nonetheless, it is necessary to grasp its original meaning as understood by its theoretical founder and innovators. This paper thus turns to examine Takada's unique understanding of the 'Mandate of Heaven' from the belief that such an examination should precede before starting a more systematic and comprehensive discussion of the 'Imperial Way' discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the basis arguments of so-called legal logic and their relation to logic in its standard meaning. There is no doubt that legal arguments belong to logic in the wide sense (sensu largo), but their reduction to schemes of formal logic (logica sensu stricto) is a controversial issue. It can be demonstrated that only some legal arguments fall under explicit rules of formal logic, that is, having a deductive character. Most such reasoning is fallible, and its correctness depends on appealing to extra-logical principles taken from legal norms. For instance, if we say, "If it is permitted more, then it is permitted less" (argumentum a maiori ad minus), we assume that the concepts expressed by the words "more" and "less" are already defined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]