Search

Promoting the ESG concept is of great significance for the realization of the 'Carbon Peaking and Carbon Neutrality' Goals and ESG has gradually become a comprehensive system for evaluating sustainable development. Based on the 2015 ESG ratings of SynTao Green Finance as a quasi-natural experiment and based on the panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2020, this study deeply explores the impact of ESG ratings on the continuous innovation ability of enterprises by constructing a multi-temporal double-difference model and a triple-difference model. The results show that ESG ratings can significantly enhance firms' continuous innovation ability, a conclusion supported by a series of robustness tests. The positive impact of ESG ratings is more prominent for firms with low market attention, state-owned enterprises, and firms with high digital transformation. The impact mechanism suggests that ESG ratings advance firms' ability to continuously innovate by increasing employment, improving employee income, and enhancing firm value. It is further found that ESG ratings are more effective in enhancing the continuous innovation ability of heavy polluters and capital – and technology-intensive firms than other firms. The findings of the study help to promote the sustainable development of enterprises and realize the synergy between ESG construction and high-quality development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To respond to the goal of "carbon peaking and carbon neutrality," reducing carbon emissions in the construction industry is urgent and necessary. A sound profit allocation based on carbon emission reduction is essential to promote low-carbon initiatives implementation by construction supply chain enterprises. In this paper, considering the potential impact of an effective emission reduction scheme (ETS), the Stackelberg game models are established to explore the carbon emission reduction decisions and profit allocation mechanism under decentralized, collaborative and centralized decision-making scenarios between developers and contractors. By conducting a comparative analysis, we obtained insights into the level of enterprises' carbon emission reduction effort, the profit allocation proportion and the impact of ETS. The main findings can be summarized as follows. (1) The proportion of carbon emission reduction profit allocation in the collaborative scenario is higher than that in the decentralized one. (2) For contractors, carbon emission reduction efforts are the highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the collaborative one. For developers, the carbon emission reduction effort is highest in the centralized scenario, but is followed by the decentralized one. When the carbon emission reduction effectiveness of the contractor is greater than a certain level (about 0.52), the carbon emission reduction volume in the collaborative scenario is larger than that in the decentralized scenario. (3) Total profits are most sensitive to carbon trading prices in the centralized scenario, followed by the collaborative scenario. This research provides valuable reference for the government and construction enterprises to promote carbon emission reduction initiatives and low-carbon development in the construction sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Natural gas hydrate (NGH) is a significant alternative energy resource in achieving carbon neutrality. The developmental trend and competitive landscape of NGH exploitation and production are crucial for policymakers in government, managers of enterprises, and researchers. This study introduces a novel framework for conducting an in-depth analysis of NGH, integrating patentometrics, technology evolution, and correlation relationships to monitor developmental trends and competitive landscape through patent analysis. The results indicate that China, the USA, and Japan have distinct technology advantages. Current technological developments in the NGH field focus primarily on extraction technologies, equipment, and processing systems. The co-opetition analysis among countries reveals that the most extensive international cooperation network is primarily in Europe and the USA, with national partnerships in Asia concentrated in China and Japan. Institutional cooperation remains limited, primarily within universities in China, while both the USA and Japan foster collaboration between enterprises. The competitive landscapes of key NGH-related technologies among countries and institutions are also examined. This study contributes not only to monitoring the developmental trend and competitive landscape in NGH but also to providing policy recommendations for government and enterprises regarding strategic management and collaborative innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green innovation is not only a significant source of sustainable enterprise development, but it is also critical to China's aim of carbon peak and carbon neutrality. Under the current context of informatization and resource-based development, whether the public resource trading center, as a highly standardized and unified public resource trading platform, can assist firms in improving their green innovation level merits further investigation. The policy of public resource trading centers is used as a quasi-natural experiment in this article, and empirical research is conducted using data from China's A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2021. The study found that the establishment of public resource trading centers can considerably enhance enterprise green innovation, and this conclusion holds up after a series of robustness tests. It is worth noting that green invention patents typically have a stronger promotion effect than green utility model patents. Meanwhile, the establishment of public resource trading centers has a stronger influence on green innovation incentives for state-owned enterprises, small and mediumsized enterprises, and enterprises in high-polluting industries, according to the heterogeneity study. Furthermore, the establishment of public resource trading centers promotes green enterprise innovation through improving normalization and standardization of public resource trading and strengthening the responsibility of regional environmental supervision and management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transportation industry is an essential source of urban carbon emissions, among which urban taxis account for a massive proportion of carbon emissions in urban transportation due to their long driving distance. Hence, the carbon emission reduction of taxis is highly significant. The study proposes the carbon emission reduction path of taxis for the whole life cycle by introducing the carbon trading mechanism (CTM) and the double-credit policy (DCP). Then, taking Beijing as an example, a system dynamics model is constructed to predict the development trend of taxis and the carbon emission reduction situation in the future. The results show that carbon trading for taxi operation enterprises can accelerate the electrification process of taxis and make the number of fuel taxis in Beijing fall to zero three years ahead of schedule. Based on the implementation of DCP by automobile production enterprises, CTM for energy supply enterprises and taxi operation enterprises has the best carbon emission reduction effect. Compared with the baseline scenario without carbon reduction measures, the Beijing taxi sector under this scenario can reduce emissions by a cumulative total of 6.026 million tons from 2010 to 2030. The research results of this study can provide a basis for decision-making for the government and related enterprises in the development of urban taxis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the context of carbon peak and carbon neutrality, new energy vehicle (NEV) is considered as ultimate objective in development of automotive industry. To facilitate sustainable growth of automotive market and ensure a smooth transition for fuel vehicle (FV) enterprises, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model based on tripartite Hoteling model, which involving NEV enterprises, FV enterprises and governments. The herd effect and time-delay effect are considered to improve the tripartite evolutionary game. Results indicate that: (1) Fund feedback to NEV enterprises will counterintuitively decrease probability of active assistance from NEV enterprises. (2) Governments' willingness for strict involvement positively correlates with supervision costs but negatively correlates with additional benefits. (3) Time delay in funds leads to weak effect of high default penalties in promoting active assistance of NEV enterprises in early stage, but opposite situation appears in later stage. (4) Higher NEV production proportion counterintuitively stimulates FV enterprises to give up transition. (5) High rewards drive diffusion of herd effect, further increasing competition among vehicle enterprises leading to FV enterprises giving up transition. (6) Herd effect and time-delay effect increase dependence of FV enterprises on funds results in higher sensitivity of credit trading price compared to credit ratio requirement. [Display omitted] • Consider transition of FV enterprises to a tripartite evolutionary game model. • A tripartite evolutionary game model is integrated with tripartite Hoteling model. • Consider adaptive punishments for FV enterprises during the transition process. • Check impacts of two players on strategy choice of a third player at the same time. • Consider the herd effect and time-delay effect to improve the evolutionary game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At present, China and some other countries and regions are adopting both electricity and carbon trading markets to optimize the resource allocation of the power industry. The aim of this research is to explain the production behaviors of fossil fuel power enterprises in these complex dual market conditions and then evaluate the market effects. On the basis of the real market rules of China and the production characteristics of these enterprises, we describe the production decision process of enterprises with different market positions (leader, follower, and taker), obtain their optimal yield, and then offer market equilibrium results (total electricity supply, clearing price, total CO 2 emissions, and carbon intensity level). Besides, we evaluate the impacts of government interventions (market condition changes) on regional market equilibrium situations by numerical simulation. Our results indicate that the direction (positive or negative) of the above impacts is determined by the level of the allocation coefficients of the carbon emission quota, and the degree of these impacts is determined by the level of fine for unit excess carbon emissions. Moreover, our research also proves that enterprise collusion behaviors aggravate market failure but lower the carbon intensity level. • Fossil fuel power enterprises in China are facing complex dual market conditions. • We describe the production decision process of enterprises with different market positions. • We offer the equilibrium results of electricity and carbon trading markets. • We evaluate the impacts of government interventions and enterprise collusion behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional manufacturing industry is in the early stages of transition to low-carbon innovative production, and is in urgent need of a low-carbon innovation system to achieve the goal of carbon neutrality. In order to realize the effective supervision of enterprise carbon emissions, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the corporate, government and public from the perspective of dynamic subsidies and taxes. The main results are as follows. First, the increase in government subsidies to a certain extent will help encourage companies to choose low-carbon innovative production strategies, but more subsidies are not always better. Excessive subsidies will increase the cost of government regulation and reduce the probability of government regulation. Second, the tripartite evolutionary game system does not converge under the static subsidies and taxes mechanism. But the system could quickly converges to the stable condition under dynamic subsidies and taxes. The stable point is the situation of corporate low-carbon innovation, government regulation, and public supervision. Third, the public intervention and supervision can effectively prevent the phenomenon of government misconduct and enterprises over-emission production. And the influence of public reward and punishment is more effective for the government than for enterprises. • A tripartite evolutionary game of low-carbon innovation system among enterprises, government and the public. • Dynamic subsidy and tax mechanisms drive the model to converge to the ideal state. • Increased government subsidies will promote low-carbon innovation, but it isn't the more the better. • The same degree of public supervision is more effective for governments than for enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the target of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, high-energy consuming enterprises face enormous pressure to reduce carbon emissions. In order to quickly obtain low-carbon resources, low-carbon mergers and acquisitions (LMA) have emerged. This study attempts to test the impact of LMA on energy efficiency (ENE) in listed high energy-consuming companies based on SYS-GMM and fixed effects models. Results are as follows: (1) Compared to firms without LMA, firms with LMA increase ENE by 1.7 %. (2) Cash-paid LMA, horizontal LMA, and local LMA are more likely to promote ENE. (3) LMA promotes ENE by increasing environmental responsibility, low-carbon technology innovation, environmental investment. However, LMA may inhibit ENE by increasing manager confidence, management costs, and performance pressure. (4) The higher the government regulation and media supervision, the higher the promoting effect of LMA on ENE. (5) In the firm heterogeneity, LMA has more promoting effect on ENE in state-owned enterprises and eastern enterprises. This study is beneficial for providing references for high energy-consuming companies to promote LMA. [Display omitted] • Features of low-carbon mergers and acquisitions (LMA) are analyzed. • LMA can promote energy efficiency (ENE). • Impact paths of LMA on ENE include responsibility, ability and hindrance effects. • LMA inhibits ENE by increasing manager confidence, costs and performance pressures. • Government regulation and media supervision can moderate the effect of LMA on ENE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The high carbon emissions of public buildings owned by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) pose challenges to achieving carbon peaking and neutrality goals. Hence, the active participation of SOEs in green renovation is crucial. The literature mainly focuses on private enterprises and considers stakeholders' benefits from the perspective of economic incentives while neglecting SOEs, which are heterogeneous from private enterprises. To fill this gap in the literature, we propose a synergy mechanism underlying how the parent company and the operations and construction subsidiaries of a typical SOE cooperate and compete with each other to promote the completion of green renovation projects. We use an evolutionary game model to describe the synergy mechanism by analyzing political, economic, and reputational factors. We make the following conclusions: (1) Under the conditions of asymmetric game power, three equilibrium stable strategies are identified. The behavior of the parent company, which is notably influenced by political factors, is critical for the success of green renovation. (2) Political penalties are the fundamental factor breaking the dilemma of low implementation efficiency in green renovation. This event occurs when political penalties for non-incentive management exceeds the cost of incentive management. (3) Each factor exerts varying impacts on the synergy mechanism, with the impact of political, economic, and reputational factors decreasing sequentially. The government can rely on environmental benefit preference and reputational incentives to drive SOEs to actively participate in green renovation. The parent companies of SOEs can enhance political promotion penalties, increase political preference, and reduce decision-making error costs in green renovation to ensure smooth implementation. • Public buildings have considerable potential for carbon emission reduction. • Political factors are key to drive SOEs to participate in green renovation. • In some cases, economic incentives are ineffective compared to political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon trading market is a central policy tool for promoting cleaner enterprises' energy consumption and investment behaviors. It is crucial for enterprises to establish a green and low-carbon development model by clarifying carbon trading impact mechanism on enterprise behaviors and the interactive relationship between entities in the carbon market. China's contract-based carbon market is still in the development stage, the impact of the mainstream allowance mechanism and government regulation on enterprises' energy behaviors has yet to be determined. In view of this, this paper describes mathematical mechanisms of the influence of carbon prices and carbon quotas on enterprises' energy consumption and investment, and the evolutionary game model of government-enterprise behaviors is constructed, the evolution process and appropriate strategies of enterprises' energy behaviors in the development of the carbon market are discussed. This paper uses real data of China carbon market to simulate the model, it is found that strategies such as relaxation of carbon quotas and carbon subsidies dynamization are needed during the initial development of the market. In the mature stage of the carbon market, strategies are needed to increase the proportion of government carbon revenue and reduce its regulatory cost. The higher the initial willingness of government-enterprise, the better the effect of strategies and the constraints of public willingness. The model and results have theoretical implications for enterprises' energy transformation and government regulation, and provide a reference for the development of China's carbon market. • Constructed benefit-cost analytical framework for enterprises' energy behaviors. • Described mechanisms of carbon trading affecting enterprises' energy behaviors. • Constructed government-enterprise behaviors model by the evolutionary game theory. • Found new conclusions of enterprises' energy behaviors under the carbon market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]