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Carbon trading market is a central policy tool for promoting cleaner enterprises' energy consumption and investment behaviors. It is crucial for enterprises to establish a green and low-carbon development model by clarifying carbon trading impact mechanism on enterprise behaviors and the interactive relationship between entities in the carbon market. China's contract-based carbon market is still in the development stage, the impact of the mainstream allowance mechanism and government regulation on enterprises' energy behaviors has yet to be determined. In view of this, this paper describes mathematical mechanisms of the influence of carbon prices and carbon quotas on enterprises' energy consumption and investment, and the evolutionary game model of government-enterprise behaviors is constructed, the evolution process and appropriate strategies of enterprises' energy behaviors in the development of the carbon market are discussed. This paper uses real data of China carbon market to simulate the model, it is found that strategies such as relaxation of carbon quotas and carbon subsidies dynamization are needed during the initial development of the market. In the mature stage of the carbon market, strategies are needed to increase the proportion of government carbon revenue and reduce its regulatory cost. The higher the initial willingness of government-enterprise, the better the effect of strategies and the constraints of public willingness. The model and results have theoretical implications for enterprises' energy transformation and government regulation, and provide a reference for the development of China's carbon market. • Constructed benefit-cost analytical framework for enterprises' energy behaviors. • Described mechanisms of carbon trading affecting enterprises' energy behaviors. • Constructed government-enterprise behaviors model by the evolutionary game theory. • Found new conclusions of enterprises' energy behaviors under the carbon market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous studies have discussed the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in recent years. However, the effectiveness and trade-offs of diverse countermeasures still need to be investigated, particularly under the long-term goal of low-carbon transition, which is crucial for understanding the potential impacts of the future public health emergency (PHE) related economic crisis. Given that China still faces big pressures from the potential PHE and carbon neutrality, this paper assesses the effectiveness of policy instruments in restoring the economy and advancing green development after the PHE using the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium framework. Our findings reveal that the PHE imposes more constraints on the economy because of the decrease in productivity on the supply side and in consumption on the demand side. Compared to the other counterparts, the mixed stimulus can overcome the adverse impacts of the PHE while contributing to carbon reduction. Furthermore, all types of low-carbon policies investigated in this study can contribute to carbon reduction at the expense of economic growth. Meanwhile, the carbon tax realizes the target of reducing emissions with the smallest negative impact on economic growth. Thus, we suggest adopting the carbon tax policy as the most effective low-carbon measure to address uncertainties associated with the PHE. • This study explores pathways for advancing economic recovery and green development after the public health emergency. • We develop a scenario-based dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. • We characterize public health emergency shocks from a supply and demand perspective. • The model introduces different carbon abatement mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Promoting the trading of blue carbon generated by marine ranching (MR) is essential for China to achieve its carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals. As blue carbon trading develops, it remains uncertain whether it can promote the transformation of marine ranching firm (MRF) from traditional fishery aquaculture-type MR (FAMR) to more eco-friendly conservation-type MR (CMR). This paper constructs a game model involving MRF and the government to explore the impact of blue carbon trading on the transformation of MRF' production modes by considering carbon asset renting, carbon cap-and-trade, government subsidies, and green investment, which is of great significance in managing coastal marine and aquatic organisms, as well as promoting sustainable development of the marine economy. Research shows that the price and demand of FAMR products are solely influenced by carbon cap-and-trade. The introduction of carbon rents will increase the incentive for MRF to choose CMR, and this incentive is further enhanced when government subsidies are provided. Concurrently, green investment and MRF's profit have an inverted-U relationship. Both government subsidies and blue carbon trading will increase blue carbon. Although this policy will also increase MRF's carbon emissions, the carbon surplus generated by MRF will be higher than without subsidies. • A game model considering MRF, and government was developed. • Carbon asset renting can lead MRF to choose greener CMR production mode. • MRF is more willing to provide green investments when subsidy is offered. • MRF's green investment volume has an inverted-U relationship with profits. • Government subsidies and blue carbon trading can increase carbon surpluses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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