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This article examines the growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine and their impact on regional and global geopolitical dynamics, focusing on the importance of military organizational management in this complex situation. The confrontation between the two countries, fuelled by Moscow's geopolitical aspirations to consolidate its control over Ukraine, has escalated into a military conflict with far-reaching repercussions. Ukraine's rapprochement with the European Union and NATO has exacerbated tensions, generating indirect arms deliveries and threatening regional stability. In this context, military organisational management becomes crucial to manage and mitigate the escalation of the conflict. The capacity for strategic planning and coordination of military actions is essential to maintain stability and prevent wider conflict. Also, the ability to manage human and material resources effectively and strategically can influence the outcome and duration of conflict. In addition, it is important to stress that tensions between Russia and Ukraine not only have bilateral consequences, but also affect relations between Russia and NATO. Military management must therefore be adaptable and address the complex and interlinked challenges of this rapidly changing geopolitical context. The paper further argues that an appropriate approach to military organisational management can be essential for managing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as for maintaining regional and global stability in the face of the complex challenges of current geopolitical tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the growing tensions between Russia and Ukraine and their impact on regional and global geopolitical dynamics, focusing on the importance of military organizational management in this complex situation. The confrontation between the two countries, fuelled by Moscow's geopolitical aspirations to consolidate its control over Ukraine, has escalated into a military conflict with far-reaching repercussions. Ukraine's rapprochement with the European Union and NATO has exacerbated tensions, generating indirect arms deliveries and threatening regional stability. In this context, military organisational management becomes crucial to manage and mitigate the escalation of the conflict. The capacity for strategic planning and coordination of military actions is essential to maintain stability and prevent wider conflict. Also, the ability to manage human and material resources effectively and strategically can influence the outcome and duration of conflict. In addition, it is important to stress that tensions between Russia and Ukraine not only have bilateral consequences, but also affect relations between Russia and NATO. Military management must therefore be adaptable and address the complex and interlinked challenges of this rapidly changing geopolitical context. The paper further argues that an appropriate approach to military organisational management can be essential for managing the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as for maintaining regional and global stability in the face of the complex challenges of current geopolitical tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our research documents the experiences of business crisis management in wartime Ukraine. The goal of the paper is to contribute to our understanding of business crisis management in a conflict zone in wartime conditions, a significantly underresearched area. Based on interviews with the owners and managers of 20 Ukrainian companies spanning sectors and geography of the country, the paper provides insights into the various elements that characterize and distinguish war as a crisis type, including having an unknown end point, and, furthermore, what we can learn from how Ukrainian managers have approached this crisis. Among the key findings are how war situations appear to be "cosmology episodes" for which it is not possible to adequately prepare and for which the end point is unknown, both of which call for emergent, adaptive crisis management capabilities and leadership skills characterized by improvisation and other forms of resilience. Notwithstanding this, company wartime crisis management experiences have stimulated intention to more structured anticipatory and preparedness practices, as well as narratives of future renewal in communications with staff and stakeholders, which serve both as a guidepost and coping mechanism during the current crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Conventional wisdom tells us that mediation without ripeness is a fool's errand (Zartman and Touval, 1985). What, then, is Türkiye's motivation for mediating the war in Ukraine in lieu of ripeness – and what can its behavior as a mediator tell us about that motivation? In pursuit of this question, this paper inductively analyzes Turkish mediation in the Ukraine war to unpack the relationship between a contextual (ripeness) and actor-level (motivation) variable. Of particular interest is the decision-making and behavior of third parties (like Türkiye in Ukraine) who elect to mediate highly complex conflicts in which ripeness is indiscernible. The purpose of this research is not to propose or test a causal relationship between obscured ripeness and mediation, but rather to examine mediation behavior in situations where ripeness is obscured. Design/methodology/approach: The impact of weaponized information on ripeness and third-party mediation is evaluated through an original, systematic and inductive case study analysis of Turkish mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war. As an intense theater of operations for information warfare for well over a decade, the war in Ukraine serves as an especially apt choice for an analysis of "obscured ripeness." Likewise, Türkiye's anomalous position as the only substantive source of mediation in the conflict lends significance to an empirical examination of its motivation and behavior as a mediator. Findings: This research reveals that the pervasive use of weaponized information in the Russia–Ukraine war has distorted and disordered the information environment, thereby obscuring the ability of third parties to determine if the conflict is or could be ripe for mediation. However, the condition of obscured ripeness that prevails in the conflict has not proven a deterrent for mediation by Türkiye, which, as the only mediator in the conflict, has used a transactional approach to mediation motivated by self-regarding interests and animated by a manipulative mediation strategy. In sum, this inductive analysis of Turkish mediation in Ukraine reveals that the use of weaponized information in a conflict indirectly selects on transactional mediation (and mediators). The significance of this finding is magnified by the widespread use of weaponized information in contemporary conflicts as well as the declining frequency of third-party mediation. Originality/value: There have been few, if any, systematic assessments in Turkish mediation of the Russia–Ukraine war, and none specifically concerned with the effects of weaponized information. Additionally, the paper proposes a typology of mediator motivation that is used to structure that assessment, while also introducing a new concept ("obscured ripeness") and linking that concept both to the existing literature on ripeness and to the use of weaponized information in contemporary armed conflicts. As such, this manuscript represents an important contribution both to the empirical and theoretical landscape with respect to the study of mediation and international conflict management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that the international institutions in which negotiations have often taken place have been challenged by increased conflict among member states in the early 21st century. Multilateral international institutions function best when common interests are viewed as paramount by the state parties, because they allow the state parties to negotiate structures and processes that serve their shared interests and values. The paper analyzes the difficulties in managing international conflicts in the UN, osce, nato, and EU since 2000 due in part to the inability to achieve consensus within fractured and stalemated institutions. These problems have increasingly limited the role of these institutions in managing some of the most dangerous global conflicts, including on arms control and disarmament and managing the Russian war in Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]