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This paper studies the recycling and remanufacturing mode and sales channel issues in the closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, this study establishes an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and divides the recycling model into recycling by the manufacturer or recycling by the platform. Considering two common sales models in e-commerce platforms: the resale model and agency model, combined with the recycling model, four different research scenarios are formed. We use backward induction to solve the Stackelberg game problem and explore the remanufacturing and channel strategies of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform. The research results show that for the manufacturer, under the same recycling model, when consumers' preference for remanufactured products and the sensitivity of recycling volume to recycling prices are low, he will prefer the resale model. Under the same sales model, the manufacturer always prefers the recycling model in which he is responsible for recycling. However, the choice of platform is contrary to that of the manufacturer. In the resale model, both the manufacturer and the platform will choose to recycle by themselves, which cannot achieve a win-win situation. Under the agency model, when consumers' preference for remanufactured products is high and the sensitivity coefficient of recycling volume to recycling price is low, supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation, and the scope of the win-win situation decreases as the unit production cost of new products increases. In addition, rising consumer preference for remanufactured products will lead to lower consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the book "The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis in Law and Economics: Towards a Synthesis for the 21st Century" by Fabrizio Esposito, the author argues for replacing the classical total welfare approach with the consumer welfare hypothesis in Law and Economics. This proposal is likely to face opposition from different strands of legal scholarship. Esposito aligns with Calabresi's Law and Economics school of thought, which prioritizes consumer welfare over total welfare. The book explores the economic pedigree of consumer welfare and examines how EU legal structures, such as antitrust and consumer law, align with the goal of maximizing consumer welfare. The author suggests that efficiency and equity are not necessarily in conflict and that economic analysis can provide valuable insights into European antitrust and consumer laws. While the book may face criticism for oversimplification and potential tautology, it offers a third way between Posnerian Law and Economics and Law and Political Economy, making it a significant contribution to legal scholarship. [Extracted from the article]

When externalities are present, is the inclusion of the affected stakeholders in the firm's decision process a better solution than the shareholder governance? This paper argues that the internalization of the externality hinges on the available information and the market strategy used by the firm rather than its governance structure. In the absence of income effects (i.e., if preferences are quasi-linear), a market for "customer rights" reveals all the necessary information about the surplus of a homogeneous consumer population. In that case, a Coase-type equivalence obtains: whether the firm uses the information in the interest of its shareholders or all its stakeholders, the outcome in each case is an efficient allocation. With income effects, the market for customer rights may fail. Still, if appropriate information can be obtained, efficiency can be achieved under both governance structures (or neither). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]