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Since achieving independence, Azerbaijan has employed its Islamic identity in its foreign policy to develop an international Islamic agenda concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict. It has promoted the notion of Islamic solidarity and diversified its strategic interests in the conflict. The study aims to analyse Azerbaijan’s diplomatic strategies to garner comprehensive support from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, focusing on the 2020 war. The paper argues that Azerbaijan has developed Islamic diplomacy and instrumentalized religion as one of the components of its foreign policy against Armenia and the de facto Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. During the 2020 war, Azerbaijan applied the discourse of Islamic solidarity and the Azerbaijani narratives on the NK conflict that have been introduced in the OIC during the last three decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines neoclassical realism and Armenia’s international orientation as one of the directions in the transformation of the theory of international relations of small states. In this article, neoclassical realism is analyzed from the point of view of subjective aspects of policy formation and the influence of domestic political features of a small state on its foreign policy. Taking into account that neoclassical realism is a completely independent development of neorealism with a complementary elemental level of analysis of international politics. In terms of content, neoclassical realism of Armenia clarifies such concepts as resilience, national security, balance of power, balancing policy and others. The neoclassical model of Armenia’s foreign policy as a small state allows us to study the conditions under which great powers and small states deviate from the policy of balancing. From this point of view, the article proposes to analyze international politics through the prism of a global rollback to state-centric politics. The article takes into account that globalization presents new challenges for small countries such as Armenia, which risks being marginalized as a result of the restructuring of both global and regional economic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental security does not recognize political borders. Despite the will of the neighboring countries, common environmental threats exist and require careful assessment and joint efforts to reduce and eliminate them. During many natural and techno gene disasters, as well as pandemics and other trends, as indicated in the works of many international experts, countries face similar challenges. As can be noticed from recent developments, common environmental threats often compel us to deal even with parties involved in armed conflicts. The significance of discussing risks and ways of unofficially reducing them is emphasized, along with the need to invite impartial professionals in environmental security with a calm demeanor on both sides. It is also significant to count on issues of common interest in which technical cooperation is possible with the help of international structures and flexible approaches, as well as a technically well-structured agenda for the environment followed by monitoring political events to shape dialogue in a relevant and developmental context. In addition, financing cross-border cooperation needs external support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Armenia's official foreign policy of complementarism aims to sustain national security and development by balancing strategic and friendly relations with Russia, while also engaging in multilevel political, economic and cultural interactions with the EU and the USA. However, after the 2020 Karabakh War and amidst the increasing confrontation between the West and Russia, complementarism faced unprecedented challenges. To investigate whether Armenian elites still adhere to the line of complementarism and to determine whether they reflect or contradict public perceptions of foreign policy, we gathered novel sociological data on foreign policy preferences in Armenian society through a nationwide survey, outlining changes and continuities in their perceptions over the past ten years. Our study reveals that Armenian elites have started to modify complementarism as they began to doubt Russia's role in Armenian foreign policy, particularly in the context of the European neighbourhood. Armenian society's trust in Russia has consistently declined, despite Moscow still being ranked as the main strategic ally in public perceptions. The misbalancing of complementarism by Armenian elites not only challenges Russia's role in Armenian security and public opinion but also offers no viable alternative for the security of Armenia and the Armenian population in Karabakh. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A significant body of literature exists examining the coverage of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war by Western media. However, there is a lack of comparative studies analyzing the coverage of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war by both Eastern and Western media. We examined 245 news reports from two prominent Eastern channels (TRT World and Al-Jazeera) and two prominent Western channels (BBC World News and DW) through content and frequency analyses. This study aims to investigate the magnitude of Air Time dedicated to the second Karabakh war by both Eastern and Western media, examining the disparities between the two. Additionally, it seeks to analyze the lexicosemantic linguistic manipulation techniques employed and the use of euphemisms and dysphemisms during the coverage. Our research reveals a pronounced bias favoring Armenia in the coverage provided by both Western television channels. Conversely, among Eastern television stations, TRT World exhibited a distinct pro-Azerbaijani leaning, while Al-Jazeera maintained a relatively neutral standpoint. This clearly shows that media outlets and journalists are not free from bias. They predominantly mix their reporting with their ideological beliefs or faith, state interests, and their country’s foreign policy directions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]