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For Japan's former prime minister Abe Shinzō, security cooperation with Southeast Asia was central to preventing the South China Sea from turning into a "Lake Beijing" - completely under Chinese control. This paper explains why Abe's security engagement in the region focused mainly on providing Capacity Building Assistance (CBA) to Southeast Asian coast guards agencies to counter China's maritime assertiveness. Answers are provided by looking at not only international but also domestic factors. Based on key variables of post-Cold War Japan's foreign policy, namely the US-Japan alliance, the dominance of economic tools, and normative and institutional constraints on the use of force, the analysis concludes that CBA was an ideal response to the complex demands and restrictions of Japan's security policy. In particular, the economic benefits of providing CBA are an important finding of the analysis and one that has not yet received much scholarly focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social media communication makes visible the linkages between governments' actions to diplomatic events and domestic audiences' reactions. This study analyses tweets that discuss the recent diplomatic crisis between Japan and Korea. Through the detection of clusters of Twitter users and the content analysis of the tweets in the two countries, this study shows the public's interpretation of a crisis widely differs by their stances towards their country's government. The analysis finds that the clusters are aligned with their pro- and anti-stances towards the current government and that pro-government clusters tend to interpret the diplomatic crisis through a historical perspective, while anti-government clusters interpret it as a matter of present-day politics. Furthermore, we find strong negativity in the tweets discussing the opponent online groups, especially by the anti-government cluster against the pro-government online camp. These findings suggest that a diplomatic crisis may create or deepen domestic polarisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The late 19th century marked a significant period in Korea's history, when it established formal diplomatic relations with the outside world. Goryeo celadon began appearing in the context of diplomatic and other exchanges in the 19th century. These celadon pieces were exquisite and often of the highest quality. There are also cases of foreign diplomats collecting Goryeo celadon. British consul William Carles, French consul Victor Collin de Plancy, and American consul Horace Allen played prominent roles in collecting, selling, and donating Goryeo celadon. In the complex landscape of East Asian diplomacy, ceramics occasionally played a role in exchanges between China, Japan, and Southeast Asian regions. Overall, this phenomenon can be attributed to the changing economic and cultural value of Goryeo celadon, particularly during the late 19th century. However, the inclusion of Goryeo celadon in diplomatic contexts or as prominent diplomatic gifts was also closely related to the changing perception of Goryeo celadon within Korea, as it began to be viewed from a more externalized perspective. Moreover, as foreign interest in Korean (Joseon) culture expanded into a range of ethnographic studies, Goryeo celadon came to be recognized as an artistic product that demonstrated the cultural competence of the nation. Simultaneously, Goryeo celadon took on the role of a diplomatic medium, symbolically representing Korea's heritage on a national level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 2010s, Japan has said publicly that it will provide foreign assistance to protect its national interest. A systematic text analysis reveals, however, that Japan had announced this objective as far back as 1969. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the connection of aid to the national interest was indirect and long-term, with the belief that global stability would lead to prosperity. In the 2000s, the suspension of aid to China and the reconstruction of Iraq became major topics of discussion. In recent years, securing the national interest through aid has diverged from the mercantilist approach of the past, which revitalized the Japanese economy. The presence of China as a competitor for infrastructure aid in Asia is the primary reason Japan has emphasized the national interest in its aid policy. The data demonstrate that Japan's actual aid allocation behavior has been significantly influenced by its emphasis on the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Japan was among the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with Malaya (then Malaysia). On 9 September 1957, nine days after Malaya achieved independence, Japan opened its embassy in Kuala Lumpur. The introduction of the Look East Policy (LEP) in 1982 strengthened the existing Malaysia-Japan bilateral relations. The main objective of this study is to examine the nature of the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and Japan during the implementation of the Look East Policy (LEP) and to identify the mutual benefits obtained by both countries in the implementation of LEP 2.0. This study adopted a qualitative analysis method by conducting intensive interviews and focus group discussion involving 13 informants who were directly involved with the implementation of LEP. The study found that, among other things, while LEP made the good practice of the Japanese people as the main driving factor, it also included the Japanese work culture, discipline, ethics, integrity, accountability, management and strategic partners. Three decades after the implementation of LEP in Malaysia, LEP took up a notch with the introduction of the Second Wave of LEP in 2012. Otherwise known as LEP 2.0, it prioritised new areas in line with technological developments in the millennial era. In line with that, LEP 2.0 also focused on the context of mutual benefit (common interest) for both countries especially in Halal hub industry and tourism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]