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Objective: This study aims to model the relationship between parent-child interaction and perceived social support with moral behavior, mediated by cultural intelligence, in adolescent female students in Tehran. Methods and Materials: The research method is descriptive and correlational. The statistical population of this study includes all female high school students aged 12 to 16, with a total number of students in the academic year 2022-2023. Four hundred students were selected as the sample using cluster sampling. Data were collected using the Moral Behavior Questionnaire by Sabat and colleagues, the Perceived Social Support Questionnaire by Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, and Farley (1988), and the Cultural Intelligence Questionnaire by Ang and Earley (2004). Data analysis was performed using SPSS.22 and Smart PLS software, employing descriptive and inferential statistics such as mean, standard deviation, Pearson correlation coefficient, multiple regression, and structural equation modeling. Findings: The research results showed that the model explaining the parent-child interaction, perceived social support, and moral behavior with the mediation of cultural intelligence has a good fit. The results indicated that parent-child interaction has a direct effect on moral behavior (P<0.01). It was also found that perceived social support has a direct effect on moral behavior (P<0.01). Conclusion: The results confirmed that parent-child interaction does not affect moral behavior through the mediating role of cultural intelligence. Finally, other findings showed that perceived social support indirectly affects moral behavior through the mediating role of cultural intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the game-theoretical literature on forming international environmental agreements (IEAs) countries use to be self-interested materialists and stable coalitions are small. This paper analyzes IEA games with identical countries that exhibit Kantian moral behavior. Kantians are concerned with doing the right thing which means that they take those actions and only those actions that they advocate all others take as well. Countries may behave morally with respect to both emissions (reduction) and membership in an IEA. If countries are emissions Kantians or membership Kantians the equilibrium of the IEA games is socially optimal. To model more realistic Kantian behavior, we define an emissions [membership] moralist as a country whose welfare is a weighted average of the welfare of an emissions [membership] Kantian and a materialist. The game with emissions moralists produces stable coalitions not larger than those in the standard game with materialists. The game with membership moralists yields stable coalitions that are increasing in the membership morality. The aggregate emissions decline if the degree of morality of either type of moralists increases. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium of an IEA game with moderate moralists with respect to both emissions and membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]