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The COVID-19 pandemic has been a major public governance issue in the United States since 2020. Public officials at all levels of government have provided important policies to control the spread of the pandemic and reduce its impact to society. This paper examines public value and ethical challenges that are related to the government's pandemic responses. The paper first provides a review of value and ethical studies in public administration and public health crisis. It then examines value concerns and ethical challenges in COVID management and policy cases and the influence of political polarization to the value challenges. The paper concludes with discussions about the pandemic's comprehensive challenges to the traditional professional management and suggestions of public value studies and trainings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Times of national and international crisis are often unifying events which lower levels of division within the public and between political elites. Yet, COVID-19 pandemic responses in the United States have been viewed as markedly polarized. Using a comprehensive dataset of over four million social media posts sent by local, state, and federal level political officials between January 2020 and September 2022, this paper explores the extent to which the COVID-19 pandemic was a rhetorically unifying or divisive event, and whether rhetorical responses differed across levels of government. The results show that federal level officials were less likely to message about COVID-19 and were more likely to do so in a polarizing fashion compared to state and local officials. Temporally, in the early stages of the pandemic there was indeed a collective rhetorical de-polarization across all levels of government. However, as the pandemic progressed, COVID-related messaging became more polarizing, especially among Republicans. Evidence also emerges of dynamic responsiveness from elected officials, with relativeness attentiveness to COVID increasing and polarizing rhetoric decreasing during time periods when local case counts were relatively high. These findings suggest that rhetorical unity is still possible, even in times of high political polarization, but that this unity is also short-lived and tempered by political and electoral considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some studies show that people with friends of different races also have lower levels of implicit racial bias. Yet, other studies do not replicate this finding. The omission of political parties from this research may explain its contradictory results, given the central role that race has played in the polarization of US society. Recent scholarship shows that political partisanship influences whether intergroup friendships improve explicit (i.e. conscious) attitudes. However, no studies have asked if friendships with African Americans have differing effects on white Democrats' and Republicans' anti-Black implicit bias. This paper examines this question by analyzing Race IAT and survey responses from 1,868 white Americans. Results reveal that white Democrats and Republicans maintain friendships with African Americans at similar rates. Yet, having Black friends only predicts weaker anti-Black implicit bias among white Democrats. This finding suggests that partisan differences in interracial friendship dynamics may shape implicit racial attitudes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although political parties are not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, the two-party electoral system is wellestablished in American elections and gerrymandering naturally occurs to benefit the party that controls both a state's legislative chambers and the governor's office. Tracing the evolution of partisan gerrymandering and examining the gerrymandering practices, this research finds that redistricting manipulation enabled by two-party electoral system, is a tale as old as time and it has continued for over two hundred years, rising or falling depending on the intensity of partisan politics. In 21st century, political polarization and gerrymandering have been feeding off each other. When the redistricting process is manipulated by entrenched partisan gerrymanders, it has become counterproductive to fair representation, competitive election, and translating public will into policies. As long as the foxes are allowed to guard the hen houses, partisan politicians will continue to abuse "one person, one vote" principle and pick voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Research indicates that affective polarization pervades contemporary democracies worldwide. Although some studies identify party leaders as polarizing agents, affective polarization has been predominantly conceptualized as a product of in-/out-party feelings. This study compares levels of party affective polarization (PAP) and leader affective polarization (LAP) cross-nationally, using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Applying like–dislike scales and an identical index to both concepts, we reveal that while the two strongly correlate, LAP is systematically lower than PAP. The United States emerges as an exceptional case, being the only country where LAP significantly exceeds PAP. Drawing on regime input/output and institutions as theoretical building blocks, we explore cross-national variations and show that the relative strength of LAP vis-à-vis PAP is increased by presidential regime type, poor government performance, and low party system fragmentation. The findings of this study contribute to the thriving research on affective polarization and personalization of politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beliefs and attitudes form the core of public opinion about climate change. Network analysis can reveal the structural configuration of these beliefs and attitudes. In this research, we utilize a belief system framework to identify key psychological elements, track change in the density of these belief systems over time and across political groups, and analyze the structural heterogeneity of belief systems within and between political groups in the United States. Drawing on fifteen waves of nationally representative survey data from 2010 to 2021 (N = 16,742), our findings indicate that worry about climate change is the most central psychological element. Interestingly, we find that among politically unaffiliated individuals, the connections between psychological elements have strengthened over time, implying an increase in the consistency of belief systems within this group. Despite the political polarization in beliefs about climate change between Republicans and Democrats, our findings reveal that the ways these two groups organize and structure climate change beliefs systems are not markedly different compared to those of other groups. These findings provide theoretical and practical insights for climate change experts and communicators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Affective polarization, or relative dislike of opposing partisans, is associated with several negative outcomes for democracy. However, a number of studies argue that affective polarization has one positive democratic consequence: it spurs political participation. However, political participation, especially voting, is habitual, and the factors that spur people to start participating are not the same as those that sustain participation once it is initiated. Existing work does not address this distinction. Leveraging large-scale survey data linked to validated measures of turnout as well as panel data, this paper shows that affective polarization mainly serves to sustain existing habits of turnout. In contrast, there is little evidence that affective polarization motivates people who did not previously participate to begin doing so. These results indicate that instead of improving democratic outcomes, affective polarization exacerbates existing inequities in political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealth inequality has been sharply rising in the United States and across many other high-income countries. Due to a lack of data, we know little about how this trend has unfolded across locations within countries. Examining the subnational geography of wealth is crucial because, from one generation to the next, it shapes the distribution of opportunity, disadvantage, and power across individuals and communities. By employing machine-learning-based imputation to link national historical surveys conducted by the U.S. Federal Reserve to population survey microdata, the data presented in this article addresses this gap. The Geographic Wealth Inequality Database ("GEOWEALTH-US") provides the first estimates of the level and distribution of wealth at various geographical scales within the United States from 1960 to 2020. The GEOWEALTH-US database enables new lines of investigation into the contribution of spatial wealth disparities to major societal challenges including wealth concentration, income inequality, social mobility, housing unaffordability, and political polarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]