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With the emergence of critical heritage studies, scholars show that 'bottom up' initiatives that blur the boundaries between private, civil, and state have arisen not as a modernising vision to legitimise national authority but as 'rooted in identification with local community', linking past and future. In China, such studies demonstrate the emergence of a different kind of museology – with 'private' heritage initiatives on behalf of individuals and groups – tolerated by the state authorities through investments that link heritage tourism to development. However, when a maritime vision of national history is at stake, the central state would co-opt 'private' heritage initiatives to subsume them under the wider, sanitised narrative of Chinese maritime civilisation that requires a different relation to the past and its extraction from the localities that do not inscribe their heritage into these universalised visions. Zooming in on three museums in Hainan related to the South China Sea (SCS), I reveal the contradictory claims made by different actors regarding the use, representation and ownership claims of historical seafaring in terms of cultural heritage. Therefore, I argue that heritagisation of seafaring in the SCS represent proprietary and thus territorial claims for China's rhetoric of maritime ecological civilisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The South China Sea (SCS) conflict has become a critical factor for regional peace and development with growing geopolitical competition between China and the USA. To face the rising threat of China, the study argues that the balance of power theory is relevant to explain why Vietnam attempts to strengthen strategic alliances with the USA, Russia, EU, and India to balance against the rising threat of China in SCS. However, this theory is not able to explain why Vietnam has a bandwagoning policy toward China at the same time. To fill the gap of the previous studies, this study endeavors to put forward the point that as geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers, the United States and China, intensifies, Vietnam is put in a predicament of balancing the economic and the political choices against the choices of taking a neutral stand against the assertiveness of China in the SCS. Further, the alternative traditional balance options with ASEAN, and Russia are not sufficiently effective for Vietnam to balance against China since the position of both ASEAN and Russia is much weaker than China. This study also suggests that the support of the USA, EU, and its alliance for Vietnam's position creates unbearable costs for China's aggressive behaviors in SCS. By using the mathematical and logical framework, the study suggests that Vietnam tends to adopt a mixed strategy (balancing, bandwagoning, neutrality) in dealing with China's threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Basement buried hill reservoirs represent significant emerging prospects among the newly discovered growth poles in the deepwater areas of the northern South China Sea. Addressing the unclear key factors contributing to their formation, this study dissects successful global exploration cases of basement buried hill reservoirs and analyzes the common characteristics of basement reservoir accumulation under different basin types, structural backgrounds, basement lithologies, and oil and gas geological conditions. A three-element coupling relationship, termed "sourcereservoir- cap", is proposed as the dominant mechanism controlling basement buried hill reservoir formation. The genesis of these reservoirs requires adequate oil and gas supply, appropriately sized accumulation bodies, and effective sealing layers. The optimal configuration of the "source-reservoir-cap" relationship directly influences the efficient charging and preservation of oil and gas within basement buried hill reservoirs. Four configurations are identified, including circumstances such as the source-underlying low-positioned basement buried hill with a "sourcereservoir cover docking migration type", the source-border middle-positioned basement buried hill with a "source-reservoir lateral window docking migration type", and the source-outside high-positioned basement buried hill with both "source-reservoir short-distance transport and migration type" and "source-reservoir long-distance transport and migration type". The first to three models present favorable accumulation conditions. Based on the "source-reservoir-cap" three-element coupled model, this study identifies the Yunkai basement buried hill in the Pearl River Mouth Basin, the central depression in the Qiongdongnan Basin, and the northern and southern basement buried hills belts as crucial exploration targets in the deepwater areas of the northern South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carbon dioxide capture, utilization and storage technology is considered to be one of the most effective strategies to mitigate CO2 emissions. In this process, CO2 that is injected into seabed sediments under specific temperature and pressure conditions is sealed in the form of CO2 hydrate, known for its high gas storage density and exceptional security features. This method has significant advantages compared with onshore geological storage schemes. Thus far, however, there has been no industrial demonstration of CO2 hydrate storage, and the CO2 hydrate storage potential in the South China Sea remains underexplored without targeted evaluations. In this study, the phase equilibrium mechanism is combined with the volumetric method to describe and evaluate the CO2 hydrate storage distribution range, effective thickness, and potential volume available for CO2 hydrate storage. Based on the latest exploration and development data from the Qiongdongnan Basin, along with geological structure data, multibeam bathymetry, local high-resolution three-dimension multichannel seismic reflection data, logging data, and submarine heat flow data, the distribution of the CO2 hydrate storage stability zone is determined. The results show that the effective thickness and regional scope of CO2 hydrate storage in the concerned area can be determined by virtue of the local water depths and the submarine temperature and pressure of 18 virtual wells. The minimum water depth in the Qiongdongnan Basin that satisfies the temperature and pressure conditions needed for CO2 sediment storage is established as 415 m. The theoretical geological storage capacity of CO2 hydrate in the Qiongdongnan Basin is determined as 5.75x1011 to 8.73x1011 t, where the value range of E is between 0.56 and 0.85. These findings offer a solid foundation for China to create, advance and execute a viable strategy for CO2 hydrate storage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deepening multipolar competition has imposed constraints on European Union foreign and security policy (EUFSP). In the South China Sea (SCS), the European Union (EU) faces a complex foreign policy terrain for three reasons. First, the EU's geographic distance from – and relatively limited capabilities in – the region may lend itself to a de minimis mitigating strategy, especially when considered against the backdrop of the broader imperative to mitigate the impact of multipolar competition on its foreign policy more generally. Second, multipolarity can be compatible with the preservation of a rules-based international order (RBIO) if the latter term is interpreted less stringently. And third, rather than being a factor purely to mitigate, multipolar competition in the wider Indo-Pacific theatre offers the EU certain opportunities – albeit not without risks – to strengthen the character of its foreign and security policy by actively participating in a competitive dynamic. Together, these facts should encourage us to rethink whether 'mitigation' always captures the entire essence of the EU's response to multipolar competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]