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Strategic cooperation has garnered significant attention in business. In this study, we explored the operating mechanisms of supply chains utilizing three Stackelberg models, in the following ascending order of cooperation level: price only, marketing cost sharing, and cross-shareholding. Further, we investigated the impact of cooperation on prices, marketing efforts, and profits, and analyzed the strategic cooperation preferences of different supply chain members. The results show that the influence of the level of cooperation on the wholesale and selling price is nonlinear. Interestingly, increased levels of cooperation do not always result in better outcomes. The marketing cost-sharing strategy aggravates the marketing burden on retailers. In contrast, the cross-shareholding strategy not only increases the total marketing effort level, but also efficiently reduces the burden of marketing on retailers. Moreover, all cooperation strategies solely benefit manufacturers rather than retailers, and not all of them improve the supply chain's performance. Finally, the cross-shareholding cooperation strategy only maximizes the consumer surplus and social welfare under certain conditions. Overall, our study describes the operational mechanisms of diverse cooperative strategies and provides managerial guidance for those seeking to enhance marketing efforts and economic and social performance using a cooperation strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the recycling and remanufacturing mode and sales channel issues in the closed-loop supply chain. Specifically, this study establishes an e-commerce closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an e-commerce platform, and divides the recycling model into recycling by the manufacturer or recycling by the platform. Considering two common sales models in e-commerce platforms: the resale model and agency model, combined with the recycling model, four different research scenarios are formed. We use backward induction to solve the Stackelberg game problem and explore the remanufacturing and channel strategies of the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform. The research results show that for the manufacturer, under the same recycling model, when consumers' preference for remanufactured products and the sensitivity of recycling volume to recycling prices are low, he will prefer the resale model. Under the same sales model, the manufacturer always prefers the recycling model in which he is responsible for recycling. However, the choice of platform is contrary to that of the manufacturer. In the resale model, both the manufacturer and the platform will choose to recycle by themselves, which cannot achieve a win-win situation. Under the agency model, when consumers' preference for remanufactured products is high and the sensitivity coefficient of recycling volume to recycling price is low, supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation, and the scope of the win-win situation decreases as the unit production cost of new products increases. In addition, rising consumer preference for remanufactured products will lead to lower consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compare social welfare, consumer surplus and profits in two different institutional settings in which an item whose quantity is fixed and controlled (vehicle registration permit) is allocated to the buyers of a complementary good (car). In the first setting, which resembles the way in which vehicle registration permits are allocated in Singapore, the central planner runs a uniform price auction for permits in which the consumers who bid the highest receive the permits and pay the highest losing bid. Then each winning consumer purchases a car from a seller. In the alternative setting, the central planner first allocates the permits to sellers and then sellers offer to consumers bundles, each consisting of a car and a permit. For two different models of product differentiation, we find that social welfare is greater when permits are auctioned to consumers, but consumers and sellers generally prefer the alternative setting. • We study a model inspired by allocation of vehicle registration permits in Singapore. • We consider two institutional settings for permits allocation. • In one setting, first the government auctions permits and winning bidders buy cars. • In the other, government allocates permits to sellers, who offer bundles car&permit. • We compare these settings in terms of social welfare, consumer surplus, seller profit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On February 24, 2022, Russian Federation troops invaded Ukraine. Ukraine was previously at war with Russia in 2014, and in April 2015, the government abruptly raised the natural gas tariffs to residential customers. It also scaled up its energy assistance program, the HUS. We examine the welfare effects of the HUS. Using Ukraine's Household Budget Survey, we find that after the tariff hike, the average household that did not receive the HUS spends 11% of its income on electricity, gas, and fuels, meeting the definition of "fuel poor." The average share among households that do receive the subsidy is 6-8%. The HUS cuts the rate of fuel poverty in half and brings considerable consumer surplus gains (6% of income), at a price tag of 1-2.5% of GDP. Meaningful savings would be achieved with only a moderate loss of consumer surplus if the HUS was cut in half. Social tariffs or replacing the HUS with a one-time energy efficiency subsidy would be sustainable and entail modest or no welfare losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the book "The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis in Law and Economics: Towards a Synthesis for the 21st Century" by Fabrizio Esposito, the author argues for replacing the classical total welfare approach with the consumer welfare hypothesis in Law and Economics. This proposal is likely to face opposition from different strands of legal scholarship. Esposito aligns with Calabresi's Law and Economics school of thought, which prioritizes consumer welfare over total welfare. The book explores the economic pedigree of consumer welfare and examines how EU legal structures, such as antitrust and consumer law, align with the goal of maximizing consumer welfare. The author suggests that efficiency and equity are not necessarily in conflict and that economic analysis can provide valuable insights into European antitrust and consumer laws. While the book may face criticism for oversimplification and potential tautology, it offers a third way between Posnerian Law and Economics and Law and Political Economy, making it a significant contribution to legal scholarship. [Extracted from the article]

This paper analyzes strategic environmental policy when polluting firms engage in overlapping ownership arrangements (OOAs) under differentiated duopoly with quantity competition. Specifically, we focus on two pollution control instruments: emission taxes and standards. The key findings are as follows: (i) Compared to the case without ownership, the optimal environmental tax rate and absolute standard are higher (lower) when the polluting firms' products are complements (substitutes). (ii) Both the tax and standard policies are equally efficient in their effects on the firms' output and abatement decisions, consumer surplus, environmental quality, and social welfare, regardless of whether the differentiated products are complements or substitutes. (iii) If the government sets equity share and emission tax (or standard) simultaneously to maximize social welfare, the optimal equity share may exceed 50% for OOA firms producing two complements and is inversely related to the degree of product complementarity. Our results have welfare implications for the choice of environmental regulation between taxes and standards, when equity share is exogenous, or when the government determines an optimal mix of equity share and emission tax (or standard). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indication-specific value-based pricing (ISVBP) is a mechanism that allows the prices of multi-indication drugs to vary across indications by aligning the drug prices with value. However, the overall impact of ISVBP on patients across indications is uncertain. This study examines the theoretical welfare effects of ISVBP for multi-indication drugs and compares consumer surplus under ISVBP and single pricing, the latter of which is based on the weighted average value. We considered a healthcare system with government-negotiated drug prices based on the value of drugs. We assumed a drug with 2 indications and 1 relevant comparator for each indication. The value of the drug was uniformly distributed among the patients of each indication in the base case. We also considered alternative scenarios with exponentially and Pareto distributed drug values. Numerical simulations were conducted to explore potential settings where ISVBP was welfare-improving for patients compared with single pricing. The theoretical analysis showed that the consumer surplus change was strictly non-positive from single pricing to ISVBP. Therefore, it was not welfare-improving for patients in the settings of interest. Numerical simulations confirmed this result across various scenarios of value distributions. This study provides insights into the patient welfare implications of ISVBP for multi-indication drugs. We did not identify conditions under which ISVBP can enhance overall patient well-being, suggesting that it should be implemented cautiously. Future research should examine dynamic welfare implications related to innovation incentives because they may significantly affect population health in the future. • Indication-specific value-based pricing (ISVBP) varies drug prices across users. • The patient welfare implications of ISVBP are not well documented by far. • Our theoretical results suggest that ISVBP is not necessarily patient welfare improving, and ISVBP should be carefully evaluated and implemented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We discuss horizontal mergers in a homogeneous good industry where firms compete à la Bertrand with increasing marginal production costs. We show that profitable mergers can occur even for lower post-merger prices with respect to the pre-merger scenario, thus implying an increase in consumer surplus. The driving force of the result is the ability of the merged entity cutting production costs by sharing the output among its plants. This output rationalization effect can compensate for the revenue loss due to the merged entity producing less than the cumulated pre-merger production of the merging parties. • Mergers can be profitable for lower post-merger prices compared to the pre-merger case. • They can increase consumer surplus without creating any merger-induced synergy. • They can be profitable and welfare enhancing in a coalition proof market structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As high-cost medicines put increasing pressure on public health care budgets, the need to identify 'fair' prices for medicines has never been greater. This paper proposes a framework, built upon fundamental economic principles, that allows for the consideration of 'fair' prices for medicines. The framework incorporates key considerations from conventional supply-side and demand-side approaches for specifying a cost-effectiveness 'threshold', including the health opportunity cost borne by other patients (k ) and society's willingness to pay for marginal improvements in population health (v ). The costs incurred by manufacturers in developing and supplying new medicines are also considered, as are the incentives for manufacturers to strategically price up to any common price per unit of benefit (cost-effectiveness 'threshold') specified by the payer. The framework finds that, at any 'fair' price, a medicine's dynamically calculated incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) lies below k . When pricing medicines collectively, the framework finds that a common price below k is required to maximize population health (consumer surplus) or to maximize total welfare (consumer and producer surplus). This framework has important policy implications for payers who wish to improve population health outcomes from constrained health care budgets. In particular, existing approaches to 'value-based pricing' should be reconsidered to ensure that patients receive a 'fair' share of the resulting economic surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When externalities are present, is the inclusion of the affected stakeholders in the firm's decision process a better solution than the shareholder governance? This paper argues that the internalization of the externality hinges on the available information and the market strategy used by the firm rather than its governance structure. In the absence of income effects (i.e., if preferences are quasi-linear), a market for "customer rights" reveals all the necessary information about the surplus of a homogeneous consumer population. In that case, a Coase-type equivalence obtains: whether the firm uses the information in the interest of its shareholders or all its stakeholders, the outcome in each case is an efficient allocation. With income effects, the market for customer rights may fail. Still, if appropriate information can be obtained, efficiency can be achieved under both governance structures (or neither). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior to designing detailed subsidy contract terms for public–private partnerships (PPPs), local governments often face the challenge of selecting the basic modes of a subsidy (in this case, passenger demand subsidy or vehicle-kilometer subsidy). However, most studies do not discuss the reasons for choosing a particular mode or its applicability. This paper addresses this gap by constructing Stackelberg game models to analyze the characteristics of two subsidy modes: vehicle-kilometer subsidy and passenger demand subsidy. Four situations derived from these two subsidy modes are then modeled and analyzed, exploring the relationships among parameters and clarifying the strategies of local governments. Additionally, a comparison is made between the two subsidy modes to demonstrate the optimal utilization of subsidies. Based on this analysis, an efficiency-oriented subsidy framework is proposed to overcome the shortcomings of existing subsidies and provide new insights into subsidy design for PPPs. The results indicate that the vehicle-kilometer subsidy loses its incentive or regulatory effects on the private sector when the vehicle-kilometer is predetermined. Furthermore, the subsidy mode, the local government's goals, and financial stress will influence key parameters (price and vehicle-kilometer); further, the preference of both parties for subsidy modes is closely related to price. The proposed efficiency-oriented subsidy framework offers significant advantages in reducing prices, increasing consumer surplus and efficiency, conserving social resources, and strengthening cost control. This paper contributes to the literature by emphasizing the importance of selecting appropriate subsidy modes, exploring the differences between two common modes, and further providing a novel and effective subsidy mode. Further, this paper can also guide mutual parties to optimize their strategies and enhance the overall efficiency and performance in PPP urban rail transit projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid adoption of on-demand mobility services has brought a challenge in accessing their equity impacts at a regional scale due to the absence of consistent trip data and efficient transportation models. This study shows the potential of integrating synthetic population data and a choice-based optimization model to support large-scale mobility service region design with equity concerns. We propose a decision support tool that specifies budget-constrained optimal service regions for new mobility services under one of several objectives such as minimizing consumer surplus insufficiency. We test using New York State synthetic data and illustrate its application by considering new ride-hailing and microtransit services. The "cost of equity" is measured: under budget level II, each vehicle requires a subsidy of $71.39/day to minimize disparity and $29.86/day to minimize insufficiency. Our findings contribute to the literature by quantifying trade-offs among different services, objectives, and budget levels, thereby supporting funding and resource allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The U.S. CCA aims to tackle significant sources of GHG in global supply chains. • Implementing the CCA can reduce carbon emissions in the U.S. and the global market. • An all-win situation exists depending on the market size structures under the CCA. • The long-term CCA implementation affects the optimal decisions and carbon emissions. The US Clean Competition Act (CCA) aims to tackle significant sources of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) in global supply chains. Under the CCA, the foreign supplier (outside the U.S.) exports carbon-intensive materials (e.g., aluminum) to the home manufacturer (within the U.S.) whose production is imposed an environmental charge on the basis of the level that exceeds the U.S. carbon intensity standard. Given this policy, this study examines the operations in global supply chains where the foreign supplier decides to distribute the same or differentiated materials to the home and foreign manufacturers with the CCA. Differentiated materials can refer to resource shuffling, that is, the foreign supplier exports low-carbon materials to the home market and sends higher-carbon ones to his own country's market. Our results show that the size difference between the two markets is critical in foreign suppliers' decisions. Specifically, resource shuffling is preferable for the foreign supplier when the foreign market size is sufficiently small or large, and vice versa. Implementing the CCA can reduce carbon emissions in the U.S. and the global market. It can also achieve an all-win outcome for all supply chain members, consumers, and the environment (i.e. , higher profit and consumer surplus, and lower carbon emissions) under resource shuffling when the foreign and home markets follow specific market size structures. Moreover, our study sheds light on the managerial insights into the impacts of the CCA on global supply chains. Specifically, as the implementation time of the CCA continues, in the long run, resource shuffling is more likely to be efficient in carbon emission reduction in the U.S. but less likely to be efficient in carbon emission reduction in the global market. Thus, policymakers should evaluate the efficiency of implementing the CCA yearly and consider adjusting the policy if the efficiency is not satisfied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A more comprehensive understanding of how recreational values and forest visitation rates vary across different activities enables forest managers to tailor conservation and management strategies to align with preferences among visitors, ensuring more effective allocation of budgetary resources. However, current research often focuses on only a few recreational activities, resulting in limited insights for forest managers. This study aims to expand the nature-based activities considered so that management can better serve the broader public. We conduct a travel cost analysis using a large survey-based dataset to estimate the value of nature-based recreation in national forests in the Sierra Nevada region and assess how these values differ across main activities. We categorize recreational activities into five broad groups (Passive, Active , Camping , Winter , and Other) to offer a comprehensive view of recreational preferences. A truncated negative binomial regression accounting for endogenous stratification is used to analyze the relationship between the number of trips to the forests, travel cost, activity categories, and socio-demographic variables. Our results suggest a mean consumer surplus (CS) of $65 per visit per person to national forests in the Sierra Nevada. Aggregated over annual per person visits, the total CS is approximately $313.3 million per year. Our findings reveal variations in CS across activity groups, with winter activities (e.g., skiing, snowboarding) and active activities (e.g., hiking, fishing) attracting the highest number of visits, and the highest total CS. Our results provide valuable insights for national forest managers, facilitating the strategic allocation of limited resources to recreational activities that maximize societal welfare. • Estimate CS of nature-based recreation in national forests in the Sierra Region. • Analyze variations in consumer surplus across recreational activity groups. • Winter and active activities provide the highest consumer surplus. • Our findings guide forest managers in aligning strategies with visitor preferences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although some prior studies have examined the optimal trade-in providers in supply chains, the impacts of alternative online selling models like reselling and agency selling that are widely adopted in the e-commerce environment are under-explored. Traditionally, both the manufacturer and retailer have incentives to offer trade-in programs to consumers in a supply chain. However, this is no longer true when an agency selling model is implemented. In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium "trade-in provider" under the two selling models respectively in a stylized e-commerce single-manufacturer single-e-tailer supply chain. Our findings show that different selling models do have distinct influences on the two firms' preferences of who should provide the trade-in program. Particularly, under the reselling model, there is always a conflict between the two firms regarding who should provide trade-ins, which is consistent with the findings in related literature; however, under the agency selling model, there are some win-win cases under which the two firms possess consistent preferences on the trade-in format. Furthermore, the "boxed pigs game" equilibrium may appear under agency selling, where either of the two firms has to provide the trade-in program, although this is not their most preferred trade-in format. The robustness of our main results has been well verified by extending our study to consider (i) the case where the e-tailer can be delegated to implement trade-ins, (ii) the case where the e-tailer is the first-mover in determining whether to provide trade-ins, and (iii) the reselling and agency selling models co-exist. • We study the optimal trade-in program provider in a supply chain with different selling models. • There is always a conflict between the two firms regarding who should provide trade-ins under the reselling model. • There are some win-win cases in which the manufacturer and the e-tailer have the same preference under the agency selling model. • Implementing the trade-in program can increase consumer surplus and social welfare but may hurt the environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies a manufacturer's selling channel structure choice in a supply chain wherein the firms may concern about consumer surplus. In addition, the retailer can make the demand-enhancement investment, the effect of which may spill over to the manufacturer, subsequently altering the manufacturer's selling channel structure choice among the reselling channel (mode R), the direct-selling channel (mode M), and the dual channels (mode D). Several intriguing results are obtained. First, when the manufacturer concerns about consumer surplus, the manufacturer prefers mode R if both the retailer's investment cost and the manufacturer's concern for consumer surplus are either high or low, while choosing mode M if the investment cost is high and the concern for consumer surplus is relatively low. Conversely, the manufacturer may not choose mode M when the retailer concerns about consumer surplus. Besides, whether the manufacturer or the retailer concerns about consumer surplus, only mode R may arise as the jointly preferred channel choice for the firms. Second, mode R is more profitable for the supply chain when the manufacturer's (retailer's) concern for consumer surplus is sufficiently high, because the sales competition is weaker and the retailer's investment incentive is stronger in mode R. Third, mode M cannot be optimal for consumer surplus and social welfare due to the absence of the retailer's demand-enhancement investment. Finally, the manufacturer's (retailer's) increasing concern for consumer surplus does not necessarily improve consumer surplus and social welfare because of the effect of investment cost on the manufacturer's equilibrium channel structure strategy. • Manufacturer channel choice with dual-purpose firms and demand investment is studied. • Mode R may arise as the equilibrium for dual-purpose firms under certain conditions. • The manufacturer may abandon mode M when the retailer cares about consumer surplus. • The manufacturer's dual-purpose concern does not always favor consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low-carbon certification provides third-party credibility in firms' green claims, thus representing a potential way to differentiate their products and gain access to the green market segment. To analyze the impact of the type of information provided by low-carbon certification, we develop a multi-stage sequential game model and analyze the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concerning environmental quality investment and price competition within a duopolistic market structure. By comparing pass-fail certification with precision certification, we find significant differences in certification standards depending on whether the third-party certifier is environmental NGOs, industries, or governments. In most cases, pass-fail certification leads to greater social benefits, but when the environmental coefficient is low and the variable cost of improving green technologies is high, precision certification leads to higher social welfare than pass-fail certification. The comparison of industry profits, consumer surplus, and environmental benefits between the two types of certification mainly relies on marginal costs and environmental coefficients. This study offers valuable insights for firms to choose the most suitable certification method and assists third-party certifiers in selecting the optimal certification standards to achieve their objectives. • Develop multi-stage sequential game model to examine the impact of information types provided by low-carbon certification. • Uncover why more information is not better in low carbon certification from an economic perspective. • In most cases, pass-fail certification leads to greater social benefits. • Obtain the optimal certification strategy from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Discusses the platform's pricing strategy and mode selection by the Hotelling model. • Considering the factors such as network effect and levels of user involvement. • Multi-homing on agents could make RSP subsidize agents, and AP charges higher fees. • RSP with access to aggregation harms its service providers in specific conditions. • Multi-homing on agents benefits RSP and social welfare with RSP accessing specific conditions. As the platform of Ride-Sharing Platforms (RSPs), the Aggregation Platform (AP) integrates resources from RSPs which provide an on-demand car-sharing service by matching suitable passengers and drivers. From the view of the platform, consumer surpluses and social welfare, this paper discusses the platform's pricing strategy and mode selection (single-homing or multi-homing on agents) by the Hotelling model considering network effect and levels of user involvement. Research findings include whether RSP accesses the aggregation, the single-homing or multi-homing on the agents does not affect the agent fees both platforms charged. The multi-homing on agents makes the platform accessible to agents if the RSPs are not integrated into the aggregation platform. The multi-homing on agents makes the RSP subsidize agents, and AP charges higher fees to agents when RSP accesses the aggregation. Furthermore, under single-homing or multi-homing on the agents, the RSP with access to the aggregation will permanently harm its service providers but benefit AP and social welfare in specific conditions. Additionally, the multi-homing on agents will harm the aggregation platform service providers but benefit RSP and social welfare in specific conditions when the RSP accesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Outdoor recreation is important for improving quality of life, well-being, and local economies, but quantifying its value without direct monetary transactions can be challenging. This study explores combining non-market valuation techniques with emerging big data sources to estimate the value of recreation for the York River and surrounding parks in Virginia. By applying the travel cost method to anonymous human mobility data, we gain deeper insights into the significance of recreational experiences for visitors and the local economy. Results of a zero-inflated Negative Binomial model show a mean consumer surplus value of $26.91 per trip, totaling $15.5 million across nearly 600,000 trips observed in 2022. Further, weekends, holidays, and the summer and fall months are found to be peak visitation times, whereas those with young children and who are Hispanic or over 64 years old are less likely to visit. These findings shed light on various factors influencing visitation patterns and recreation values, including temporal effects and socio-demographics, revealing disparities that warrant targeted efforts for inclusivity and accessibility. Policymakers can use these insights to make informed and sustainable choices in outdoor recreation management, fostering the preservation of natural resources for the benefit of both visitors and the environment. • Human mobility data applied to travel cost model to estimate recreation values. • Weekends, holidays, and the summer and fall months are peak visitation times. • Lower visitation from those over 64 years, Hispanic, or with young children. • Total recreation value of $15.5 million across trips observed in 2022. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Users' energy use behavior has great impact on the economic and efficient operation of integrated energy systems (IES). This paper proposes energy usage strategies based on integrated demand response (IDR) by developing a Stackelberg game based simulation model, in which the user-side flexible resources (FRs) and comfort cost are considered. In the paper, a framework of community integrated energy system (CIES) and an IDR model considering the consumer psychology were established first, in which the community users were viewed as a user aggregator (UA). A Stackelberg game simulation model was then developed for studying the energy interactions between community integrated energy service provider (CIESP) as the leader and UA as the follower based on the proposed IDR model. The benefit gain and energy use behavior of the UA were analyzed, by using the model developed, in six scenarios. The study found the strategy developed with the consideration of FRs and consumer psychology could make the UA's cost of purchasing energy reduced by 17.14 %. Meanwhile, the consumer surplus could increase by 11.58 %. The results also showed that by introducing user-side gas boilers and distributed energy storage more benefit gain for users and improved load regulation capabilities for CIES could be achieved. • A Stackelberg game based simulation model is developed for a CIES. • An IDR model considering the consumer psychology is established. • The optimal energy use strategy is obtained considering the user-side flexible resources and comfort cost. • This strategy can reduce the cost of energy use and increase the consumer surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Build an analytical model for standardized/collaborative service price and quality decisions. • Examine the impact of the fraction of consumer surplus and effort-exertion performance. • Identify the preferred pricing scheme and service type for informal caregiver and HHCSP. • Discuss coordination mechanisms and provide guideline for the participants and government. Home health care service platforms (HHCSPs) serve older consumers by gathering informal caregivers who offer standardized care services and/or collaborative care services. These platforms aim to maximize both profit and consumer surplus by motivating participants to make proper price and quality decisions. Service prices can be determined by an HHCSP or an informal caregiver, leading to four scenarios: standardized service pricing by platform (PLS scenario), standardized service pricing by informal caregiver (ICS scenario), collaborative service pricing by platform (PLC scenario), and collaborative service pricing by informal caregiver (ICC scenario). We develop an analytical model to examine the service price and quality decisions based on these four scenarios. We find that the preferred scenarios of the HHCSP and the informal caregiver are those in which they can take the power of pricing. In most cases, the preferred scenario of the informal caregiver (HHCSP) will more likely evolve from the I C C PLC scenario to the I C S PLS scenario as the informal caregiver becomes more efficient. The HHCSP focusing on consumer surplus may not help generate many more economic benefits. Social welfare can be maximized under the ICS , PLS and PLC scenarios, while it is always lowest under the ICC scenario. In addition, we propose two contracts to increase collaboration between platforms and informal caregivers. The findings are robust in two extensions where both categories of service coexist and where the service rate affects the market demand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]