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Ritual protocols aimed at rainmaking have been a recurrent sociocultural phenomenon across societies and throughout history. Given the fact that such protocols were likely entirely ineffective, why did they repeatedly emerge and persist, sometimes over millennia, even in populations with writing and recordkeeping? To address this puzzle, many scholars have argued that these protocols were not instrumental at all and that their practitioners were not really endeavoring to employ them to bring about rain. Here, taking advantage of the wealth of historical records available in China, we argue to the contrary: that rainmaking is best viewed as an instrumental, means-end activity and that people have always placed strong emphasis on the outcomes of such activities. To account for the persistence of rainmaking, we then present a set of cultural evolutionary explanations rooted in human psychology that can explain why people's adaptive learning processes did not result in the elimination of ineffective rainmaking methods. We suggest that a commitment to a supernatural worldview provides theoretical support for the plausibility of various rainmaking methods and that people often overestimate the efficacy of rainmaking technologies because of statistical artifacts (some methods appear effective simply by chance) and underreporting of disconfirmatory evidence (failures of rainmaking not reported or transmitted). The inclination to "do something" when a drought hits versus "do nothing" likely also plays a role and persists in the world today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When a good idea is discovered, who gets credit for it? This is an important question in science, the arts, law, and everyday life. We suggest that people have intuitions about credit ownership that depend on three factors: (i) whether the idea suggests the discoverer is competent; (ii) whether the discovery elicits gratitude toward the discoverer; (iii) who the first individual to come up with the idea is. We test these intuitions in three vignette experiments with UK participants, in the context of priority disputes in science. In Experiment 1, participants find a discoverer less competent and award less credit to them for a scientific idea if they perceive that the discoverer could have plagiarized another discoverer, but attributions of credit are also shown to differ from attributions of competence. In Experiment 2, participants are more grateful toward, and award more credit to a discoverer who makes their discovery public. In Experiment 3, participants are more biased toward the first discoverer in terms of credit attribution than in terms of competence attribution or feelings of gratitude. In conclusion, we suggest that intuitions of credit ownership help explain the popularity and endurance of the priority rule in science, by which all the credit of a discovery is supposed to go to the first discoverer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]