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This study investigates the association between variable rate premiums (VRPs) charged by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and defined benefit pension funding in the United States. The PBGC requires VRPs from firms that fail to adequately fund their pension plans. Because millions rely on pension income, it is important to understand how government incentives impact pension funding decisions. In the aggregate, VRPs are positively associated with increases in pension funding. However, these premiums are not associated with excess pension contributions (EPCs) for financially distressed firms. These results suggest that financially distressed US firms engage in risk shifting. The lack of association persists even for financially distressed firms with tax benefits associated with pension funding. Finally, the association between VRPs and EPCs holds only for firms with combined lower borrowing costs and higher premiums. This finding suggests that higher premiums are not an effective incentive when firms also face higher borrowing costs and that lower premiums are not an effective incentive for EPCs, regardless of a firm's borrowing cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The incentives of fund managers and their superior capabilities in order to invest and manage them are two explanations for the risk changes of joint venture funds in different market conditions. To this end, in this research, through the analysis of 21 mutual funds in stock for the period of 79 months from August 2011 to March 2018, using the least squares method, we examine the incentives for risk managers of mutual funds in the stock and its effect on return on investment. The results of the research show that in the bull markets, there is a motivation to compensate for losses, as managers of these funds increase the level of risk in the future, Causing increase the returns of the funds Future period. Against the managers of winning funds, using the exhibit superior investment ability, reduce the risk of fund and increase the returns of the Future period.According to the results, In bearish markets, managers will reduce their future returns by increasing the risk of the fund, which reflects the organizational weakness or weakness of the managers' skills in investing. In contrast managers who reduce the risk level of the fund seek to increase the return on the fund's future period, which is motivated by the managers' career concerns.

Using the China's stock open-end mutual fund data from 2005 to 2020, this paper finds that bank-affiliated funds outperform unaffiliated funds with similar risk shifting levels. We find that risk shifting of bank-affiliated fund managers is more sensitive to previous performance ranking. Coherently, we collect compensation policy data from 62 fund companies, it is shown that the risk shifting behavior is preliminarily related to the motivational compensation policies. Furthermore, our findings also suggest that skilled bank-affiliated managers are prone to aggrandize the portfolio risk shifting levels to pursue future prominent performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Basel III features requirements on bank capital and liquidity along with disclosure requirements. I study these prudential tools by developing a general equilibrium model with bank runs in a global game framework, where leverage, liquidity, interest rates, and the probability of a banking crisis are all determined endogenously. With timely disclosure about bank assets, the unregulated economy has efficient liquidity but excessive leverage due to a pecuniary externality, warranting a leverage restriction. Delayed disclosure gives rise to bank risk shifting, making leverage even more excessive and liquidity insufficient, which warrants joint requirements on leverage and liquidity. Empirical predictions and policy implications are derived and discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]