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In this work, the bank credit enriches renewable energy investment channels, and the optimal equilibrium solutions under no cap-and-trade mechanism (NM), the grandfathering mechanism (GM), and the benchmarking mechanism (BM) are derived and compared. The main results are as follows: First, from the perspective of environmental performance, both GM and BM are more conducive to promoting the electricity generator's renewable energy investment than NM, in which the BM perform far better than the GM. Second, from the perspective of economic performance, BM and NM may be the unique equilibrium mechanisms, depending on the unit and total carbon quotas. Third, to tradeoff the environment and economic performance, BM is the optimal mechanism in the long term to obtain a win-win-win outcome for the renewable energy investment, the electricity generator and retailer, and consumer surplus. Although GM always hurts the electricity retailer and consumer surplus under any situation, the electricity generator may be beneficial, and the total carbon emission is also the least. Therefore, some mechanisms, like profit distribution, can lead GM to become the optimal mechanism. Finally, raising bank credit rates is neither conducive to renewable energy investment and economic performance nor to carbon emission reduction.

This article examines two commonly used financial strategies of an electricity enterprise (EP): the carbon quota sale financing strategy (Strategy S), and the carbon quota pledge financing strategy (Strategy P), while considering a capital constraint. The findings show that Strategy S yields higher renewable energy investment and demand, as well as lower total carbon emissions, compared to Strategy P when the total carbon quota exceeds a certain threshold or when the EP does not have the financial constraint under either strategy. Conversely, when the EP faces the financial constraint under both strategies, the opposite holds true. The study also reveals that an increase in the renewable energy preference degree does not always lead to beneficial outcomes in terms of renewable energy investments and carbon reductions when the EP faces the financial constraint. Under this condition, electricity prices, demands, and total carbon emissions increase, while renewable energy investments remain unaffected by changes in the renewable energy preference degree. In addition, for a lower renewable energy preference degree, combining Strategy S (or Strategy P) with a higher (or lower) total carbon quota leads to lower electricity price and greater renewable energy investment. However, for a higher renewable energy preference degree, neither strategy results in lower electricity price nor larger renewable energy investment simultaneously. Moreover, whether the EP is constrained by financing or not, an increase in the cost coefficient of renewable energy investment adversely affects renewable energy investments, demands, total carbon emissions, and the EP's profits. However, when the EP faces the financing constraint, the initial carbon trading price proves beneficial in increasing both the renewable energy investments and demands, as well as reducing total carbon emissions.