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Some commentators have recently argued that scientific psychology is overly reliant on artificial laboratory-based activities and that it undervalues field-based investigations. However, it remains unclear how a field-based programme of psychological research might be organized in a scalable way. We examine and compare two existing field-based approaches: Roger Barker's behaviour settings programme and Edwin Hutchins's distributed cognition programme. Both programmes prioritize observational work, and both reject the individual as the unit of analysis in favour of a community-scale unit. However, whereas the behaviour settings programme is concerned with structural properties of community life, distributed cognition is concerned more narrowly with the functional analysis of expert team performance. We discuss how these programmes can inform a future community-scale approach to studying psychology in the wild. We conclude that the two programmes are proof of concept of the possibility of a scientific psychology that rejects methodological individualism. This article is part of the theme issue 'People, places, things and communities: expanding behaviour settings theory in the twenty-first century'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the artisanal model of social norms and its ability to accommodate normative disagreement, contestation, and change. It addresses criticisms that the model is overly individualistic and idealized, arguing that it can account for the complexities of social norms and the role of individuals, communities, and institutions in shaping them. The author engages with comments from other scholars, highlighting points of agreement and disagreement. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of a nuanced understanding of the social world and its connection to our biological nature. [Extracted from the article]

The term 'counter-power' is widely used in political debates and social struggles. Scientifically, however, there is no clear distinction between powers and counter-powers. In the academic debate, largely based on methodological individualism, power is mostly conceived as an interpersonal relation, and counter-powers have no specific role, unless as opposing powers. In this paper, I develop an ontology of capitalist power, based on Marx's critique of capital, and I clarify the role of counter-powers in this ontology. With these lenses, I reconsider critically the debate on power in economics and I discuss the limits of the individualist approach, from neoclassical ultra-liberalism to radical political economics. Finally, I discuss the implications of my ontological enquiry into counter-powers as far as theoretical research and political struggle are concerned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Social Science Information is the property of Sage Publications, Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We offer three advances to the perceptual crossing simulation studies, which are aimed at challenging methodological individualism in the analysis of social cognition. First, we evolve and systematically test agents in rigorous conditions, identifying a set of 26 "robust circuits" with consistently high and generalizing performance. Next, we transform the sensor from discrete to continuous, facilitating a bifurcation analysis of the dynamics that shows that nonequilibrium dynamics are key to the mutual maintenance of interaction. Finally, we examine agents' performance with partners whose neural controllers are different from their own and with decoy objects of fixed frequency and amplitude. Nonclonal performance varies and is not predicted by genotypic distance. Frequency-amplitude values that fool the focal agent do not include the agent's own values. Altogether, our findings accentuate the importance of dynamical and nonclonal analyses for simulated sociality, emphasize the role of dialogue between artificial and human studies, and highlight the contributions of simulation studies to understanding social interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an increasingly polarised world, crisp labelling, dichotomisation, and the flourishing of nation- and ethnic-based prejudice hinders the finding and construction of spaces for transcending boundaries. By combining cosmopolitanism as forms of relating with networks as a social and cultural practice characteristic of our time, this special issue aims at discerning forms and situations which defy prior categorisation or bridge social boundaries. It brings together eight case studies that provide ethnographically grounded explorations of the articulation of cosmopolitan perspectives with networking practices. The articles cover a variety of ethnographic settings, Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Europe and Asia. Bringing 'cosmopolitanism' and 'network' together points to issues that are foundational to the discipline: from the definition of the 'Other' and the definition of the anthropological object of analysis, to the definition of the social in different social formations and actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti‐individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The practice of Corrective Feedback (CF), which is situated within a Second Language Acquisition (SLA) Paradigm, is currently positioned towards an accuracy-orientated delivery based on native speaker norms. This is despite the recognition in different areas of linguistic research that there is considerable variation in the way that English is spoken around the world. This paper argues that the epistemological assumptions and methodological approaches to investigate CF within an SLA paradigm have various underlying weaknesses that undermine research findings. These findings purport to provide support for an accuracy-orientated CF in the English classroom. However, it is suggested in this paper that a meaning-orientated CF would be more reflective and beneficial for students given the transformative changes that have occurred to English over the past 30 years. This perspective is discussed in relation to one teacher's approach to CF who participated in a larger project which examined CF conducted in a British-Sino University. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past twenty years, a persistent concern about the growing phenomenon of homegrown terrorism in the West has led researchers to study the radicalization process toward violent extremism. The potential link between ideology and behaviors is at the center of scientific debates. Some argue that adhesion to an ideology is not a necessary condition for political violence. According to this perspective, research should focus on the study of behaviors. Others argue that ideological aspects have an influence at every stage of engagement and that neglecting ideas would be a mistake in attempts at understanding radicalization. In this article, we contribute to that discussion by proposing a better way to understand the connection between ideology and behaviors. Using Raymond Boudon's general theory of rationality, we argue that engagement in violent extremism is a complex combination of actions, decisions, attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs the understanding of which requires the use of a comprehensive sociological approach. Thus, we defend a theoretical perspective based on methodological individualism and we develop a general typology for radicalization processes based on this perspective. We also point out how this perspective differs from conventional rational choice theory and other theoretical perspectives used in the field of radicalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a response and a reaction to the phenomenon of rural decline, the study of rural transformations has become an important research field in recent years, with special concern to the adaptation of agricultural systems, to the survival of rural communities and to the strategies of permanence in place at an individual farmer level. Based on a field research among farmers operating in the Gran Sasso and Laga Mountains National Park (a mountainous area in Central Italy that presents some rural decline related characteristics), this study is aimed at identifying the reasons behind permanence in place from the farmers' perspective. The farms' situation and the farmers' choice to keep staying in the remote areas of the Park are analyzed. The research has been carried out following a partially mixed methodology, which has combined quantitative and qualitative techniques, such as a secondary data analysis, a direct survey, territorial focus groups and face-to-face in-depth interviews. Based on the structural analysis of the rural decline within the area of the Park, the paper analyzes the processes of rural change associated with farmers' strategies to cope with the difficulties as well as the reasons behind their willingness to stay (permanence) according to an anti-reductionist view of individualism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a summary of the book "Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy" by Herzog. The book explores the challenges to democracy and proposes improvements to create an "epistemically well-functioning democracy." Herzog examines the social epistemological aspects of markets, courts, public schools, and other institutions and emphasizes the importance of managing knowledge in democracies. The book critiques the belief in free markets as efficient knowledge-producing mechanisms and challenges the idea of a "marketplace of ideas" where truth always prevails. It also discusses the role of expert communities and the need for a trust-based partnership between society and experts. The book concludes by highlighting the influence of institutions and social norms on democracy and proposes practical solutions to enhance democratic systems. [Extracted from the article]

Neoclassical economics has established itself as the discipline of rational choice. Consequently, under methodological individualism and in the context of consumption, an agent's choice is based on the ordering of preferences determined exogenously, disregarding any emotional, biological influences, or factors from socio-economic dynamics. Therefore, this paper aims to present an alternative framework for the decision-making of economic individuals at a theoretical and formal-mathematical level, grounded in the principles of evolutionary economics and complex adaptive systems. It is argued that the process of making choices in consumption is inherent to social dynamics. From an individual-holistic perspective, the mechanism motivating action can be characterized as an evolutionary algorithm that integrates biological, historical, cultural, social class, and market competition influences as endogenous elements in determining choice and consumption behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Politica y Sociedad is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

RESEARCH OBJECTIVE: The article discusses the concept of zoon politikon in order to provide arguments justifying the attractiveness of Aristotle's practical philosophy. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND METHODS: There are three quasidefinitions of man in Aristotle's works, each of which emphasises a different aspect of humanity. According to the philosopher, we are speaking animals, political animals (zoa politika) and the only animals endowed with reason. I argue that it is the condition of zoon politikon that comes to the fore as the most human of human properties. The article uses a historical-philosophical method supported by textual analysis. THE PROCESS OF ARGUMENTATION: In the first part of the text, Aristotle's term zoon politikon is analysed as a concept intended to show the superiority of humanity over animality. In the second part, it is presented as a limitation that distinguishes humans from gods. By analysing how these two perspectives overlap, it is then possible to discuss some political consequences of the tension between them. RESEARCH RESULTS: The analysis leads to the conclusion that, according to Aristotle, a good human is not someone who "exercises rationality to a high degree" (Hurka, 1993, p. 3), but above all someone who is political to a high degree. It also suggests that Aristotle's concept can be used to distinguish between two kinds of politics, which should not be reduced to each other: "artificial" politics (which can be equated with power), and natural human politics (which is based on free individual action in the area of praxis). CONCLUSIONS, INNOVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The notion of zoon politikon reflects the relational character of the individual human self, and thus offers a perspective that allows both methodological and political individualism to be challenged. It can also be (and is; see: Arendt, 1958; Crick, 1962) a source of inspiration for those scholars, who argue that politics cannot be reduced to power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While prior research has examined the connection between civic engagement and collectivist views, the present study considers to what extent years of education have been associated with more collectivistic views. This study analyzed data from the 2021 United States General Social Survey. Results suggested that more years of education was associated with believing that the government should do more for Black people and that the government should do move overall (in a scaled average of individualism/collectivism). Specific demographic factors were associated with more collectivist or individualistic views. Implications for program and policy development within higher education are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that a certain kind of naturalist approach to social ontology is likely to be both philosophically fruitful and relevant to empirical social science. The kind of naturalism I employ might be called contextualism, which emphasizes the constant presence of assumed background knowledge, is suspicious of general inference rules and all or nothing claims about the ontology of the social sciences, and argues that Quine’s quantificational criterion for ontological commitment has to be supplemented with local interpretations and arguments about what specific social science research is committed to. I look at three case studies employing this perspective, one on agent based models and individualism, a second on the reality of social class, and a third on the reality of race. In all three cases work is first needed to clarifying what empirical social science is claiming, what ontology or ontologies it seems to presuppose, and then description of the kinds of evidence that supports its commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social movements possess transformative and progressive power. In this paper, I argue that how this is so, or even if this is so, depends on one's explanatory framework. I consider three such explanatory frameworks for social movements: methodological individualism, collectivism, and complexity theory. In evaluating the various appeals and weaknesses of these frameworks, I show that complexity theory is uniquely poised to capture the complex and dynamic reality of the social world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Spiritual Turn: The Religion of the Heart and the Making of the Romantic Liberal Modernity" by Galen Watts explores the decline of traditional religion in Western countries and the emergence of a new form of religious expression called the "religion of the heart." Watts argues that this new form of spirituality helps individuals find meaning outside of religious institutions. However, the book's arguments are criticized for not engaging with relevant theories and empirical findings on secularization. The author also questions the definition of "religion" and whether the "religion of the heart" can truly foster social cohesion. [Extracted from the article]

In the present paper, I attempt to provide a reconstructed Marxian response to the question of whether the social (and behavioral) sciences constitute a philosophical threat to the autonomy of ethics. I suggest that shedding light on some aspects of the Marxian work (especially the Theses on Feuerbach), from the standpoint of the debate on naturalism in contemporary analytic philosophy, can offer valuable philosophical insights against the framework of scientific naturalism. This framework is responsible for presenting the social sciences as a philosophical threat to the autonomy of ethics. I argue that Marx detects and rejects three fundamental presuppositions of scientific naturalism: empiricism, ‘God’s point of view,’ and methodological individualism. I conclude that the Marxian view is a liberal naturalist perspective which allows both the scientific comprehension of the social world and the autonomy of ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]