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With the outstanding growth of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, security and power efficiency of integrated circuits can no longer be overlooked. Current approved standards for cryptographic algorithms are not suitable for constrained environments. In this context, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) started a lightweight cryptography (LWC) competition to develop new algorithm standards that can be fit into small devices. In 2023, NIST has decided to standardize the Ascon family for LWC. This algorithm has been designed to be more resilient to side-channel and fault-based analysis. Nonetheless, hardware implementations of Ascon have been broken by multiple statistical fault analysis and power analysis. These attacks have underlined the necessity to develop adapted countermeasures to side-channel and perturbation-based attacks. However, existing countermeasures are power and area consuming. In this article, we propose a new countermeasure for the Ascon cipher that does not significantly increase the area and power consumption. Our architecture relies on the nonvolatile feature of the Magnetic Tunnel Junction (MTJ) that is the single element of the emerging Magnetic Random Access Memories (MRAM). The proposed circuit removes the bias exploited by statistical attacks. In addition, we have duplicated and complemented the permutation of Ascon to enhance the power analysis robustness of the circuit. Besides the security aspect, our circuit can save current manipulated data, ensuring energy saving from 11% to 32.5% in case of power failure. The area overhead, compared to an unprotected circuit, is × 2.43 . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(1), 229-245 | European Forum Insight of 02 July 2024 | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. - II. EU approach to International Investment Law. - ii.1. EU competence over Foreign Direct Investment. - ii.2. Integration of sustainable development into investment agreements. - III. EU-Angola SIFA. - iii.1. History of the agreement. - iii.2. Substantive provisions of the EU-Angola SIFA. - IV. Is the EU-Angola SIFA a step forward towards the promotion of sustainable investments? - iv.1. Differences with other IIAs. - iv.2. An effective way to implement SGDs? - V. Conclusion. | (Abstract) In 2019 the EU Commission launched the ambitious so-called European Green Deal, a set of proposals aimed to revise and update EU legislation and to put in place new initiatives with the goal to ensure that EU policies are in line with climate and SDGs goals. To reach the targets set out by the EU institutions, a crucial role is attributed to private investments, which can mobilize the necessary capital to make feasible the green transition. In this regard, trade agreements are an important driver for sustainable growth both in the EU and in partner countries insofar as they promote private investments in strategic sectors while at the same time they contribute to sustainable development. While the EU Commission has already started to insert trade and sustainable development (TSD) chapters in its trade agreements, another possible path has been identified in the conclusion of new-generation bilateral investment agreements. This Insight examines the recently adopted EU-Angola Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreement (EU-Angola SIFA) as the first of this new generation of investment agreements. Specifically, this Insight points out that, while the agreement is not yet in force and it will take several years to gauge whether it successfully serves as a stimulus to attract sustainable investments, it can already be considered a further attempt to balance the necessity to attract private capitals indispensable for the green transition with the preservation of States’ regulatory powers.

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Fault injection attacks are a serious concern for cryptographic hardware. Adversaries may extract sensitive information from the faulty output that is produced by a cryptographic circuit after actively disturbing its computation. Alternatively, the information whether an output would have been faulty, even if it is withheld from being released, may be exploited. The former class of attacks, which requires the collection of faulty outputs, such as Differential Fault Analysis (DFA), then either exploits some knowledge about the position of the injected fault or about its value. The latter class of attacks, which can be applied without ever obtaining faulty outputs, such as Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks (SIFA), then either exploits a dependency between the effectiveness of the fault injection and the value to be faulted (e.g., an LSB stuck-at-0 only affecting odd numbers), denoted as SIFA-1, or a conditional propagation of a faulted value based on a sensitive intermediate (e.g., multiplication of a faulted value by 0 prevents propagation), denoted as SIFA-2. The aptitude of additive masking schemes, which were designed to prevent side-channel analysis, to also thwart fault attacks is typically assumed to be limited. Common fault models, such as toggle/bit-flip, stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 survive the recombination of Boolean shares well enough for generic attacks to succeed. More precisely, injecting a fault into one or multiple Boolean shares often results in the same, or at least a predictable, error appearing in the sensitive variable after recombination. In this work, we show that additive masking in prime-order fields breaks such relationships, causing frequently exploited biases to decrease exponentially in the number of shares. As a result, prime masking offers surprisingly strong protection against generic statistical attacks, which require a dependency between the effectiveness of an injected fault and the secret variable that is manipulated, such as SIFA-1. Operation-dependent statistical attacks, such as SIFA-2 and Fault Template Attacks (FTA), may still be performed against certain prime-field structures, even if they are masked with many shares. Yet, we analyze the corresponding cases and are able to provide specific guidelines on how to avoid vulnerabilities either at the cipher design or implementation level by making informed decisions about the primes, non-linear mappings and masked gadgets used. Since prime-field masking appears to be one of the rare instances of affordable countermeasures that naturally provide sound protection against side-channel analysis and certain fault injection attacks, we believe there is a strong incentive for developing new ciphers to leverage these advantages.

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Fault Injection (FI) attacks, which involve intentionally introducing faults into a system to cause it to behave in an unintended manner, are widely recognized and pose a significant threat to the security of cryptographic primitives implemented in hardware, making fault tolerance an increasingly critical concern. However, protecting cryptographic hardware primitives securely and efficiently, even with wellestablished and documented methods such as redundant computation, can be a timeconsuming, error-prone, and expertise-demanding task. In this research, we present a comprehensive and fully-automated software solution for the Automated Generation of Fault-Resistant Circuits (AGEFA). Our application employs a generic and extensively researched methodology for the secure integration of countermeasures based on Error-Correcting Codes (ECCs) into cryptographic hardware circuits. Our software tool allows designers without hardware security expertise to develop fault-tolerant hardware circuits with pre-defined correction capabilities under a comprehensive fault adversary model. Moreover, our tool applies to masked designs without violating the masking security requirements, in particular to designs generated by the tool AGEMA. We evaluate the effectiveness of our approach through experiments on various block ciphers and demonstrate its ability to produce fault-tolerant circuits. Additionally, we assess the security of examples generated by AGEFA against Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and FI using state-of-the-art leakage and fault evaluation tools.

Copyright of Artuklu Akademi is the property of Artuklu Akademi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Fluorine-18 ( 18 F) is undoubtedly one of the most frequently applied radionuclides for the development of new radiotracers for positron emission tomography (PET) in the context of clinical cancer, neurological, and metabolic imaging. Until recently, the available radiochemical methodologies to introduce 18 F into organic molecules ranging from small- to medium- and large-sized compounds were limited to a few applicable protocols. With the advent of late-stage fluorination of small aromatic, nonactivated compounds and various noncanonical labeling strategies geared toward the labeling of peptides and proteins, the molecular toolbox for PET radiotracer development was substantially extended. Especially, the noncanonical labeling methodologies characterized by the formation of Si- 18 F, B- 18 F, and Al- 18 F bonds give access to kit-like 18 F-labeling of complex and side-group unprotected compounds, some of them already in clinical use. This chapter will particularly focus on silicon-fluoride acceptor (SiFA) chemistry and cover the history of its conceptual design and its translation into the clinical practice., (© 2024. The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.)