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Tradable performance standards are widely used sectoral regulatory policies. Examples include the US lead phasedown, fuel economy standards for automobiles, renewable portfolio standards, low carbon fuel standards, and—most recently—China's new national carbon market. At the same time, theory and experience with traditional cap-and-trade programs suggest an important role for price limits in the form of floors, ceilings, and reserves. In this paper we develop a simple analytical model to derive the welfare comparison between tradable performance standards and a price-based alternative. This model works out to be a simple variant of the traditional Weitzman prices-versus-quantities result. We use this result to show that substantial gains—perhaps 50% or more when prices are low—could arise from shifting two programs, China's new national carbon market and the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard, to a price mechanism. This finding will generally be true when the coefficient of variation in the price under a TPS is larger than 50%. We end with a brief discussion of implementation issues, including consignment auctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Links between emission trading programs are not immutable, as highlighted by New Jersey׳s exit from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 2011. This raises the question of what to do with existing permits that are banked for future use—choices that have consequences for market behavior in advance of, or upon speculation about, delinking. We consider two delinking policies. One differentiates banked permits by origin, the other treats banked permits the same. We describe the price behavior and relative cost-effectiveness of each policy. Treating permits differently generally leads to higher costs, and may lead to price divergence, even with only speculation about delinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Seminal work by Weitzman [Prices vs. quantities, Rev. Econ. Stud. 41 (1974) 477–491] revealed prices are preferred to quantities when marginal benefits are relatively flat compared to marginal costs. We extend this comparison to indexed policies, where quantities are proportional to an index, such as output. We find that policy preferences hinge on additional parameters describing the first and second moments of the index and the ex post optimal quantity level. When the ratio of these variables’ coefficients of variation divided by their correlation is less than approximately two, indexed quantities are preferred to fixed quantities. A slightly more complex condition determines when indexed quantities are preferred to prices. Applied to climate change policy, we find that the range of variation and correlation in country-level carbon dioxide emissions and GDP suggests the ranking of an emissions intensity cap (indexed to GDP) compared to a fixed emission cap is not uniform across countries; neither policy clearly dominates the other. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We demonstrate that when the future path of the discount rate is uncertain and highly correlated, the distant future should be discounted at significantly lower rates than suggested by the current rate. We then use two centuries of US interest rate data to quantify this effect. Using both random walk and mean-reverting models, we compute the “certainty-equivalent rate” that summarizes the effect of uncertainty and measures the appropriate forward rate of discount in the future. Under the random walk model we find that the certainty-equivalent rate falls continuously from 4% to 2% after 100 years, 1% after 200 years, and 0.5% after 300 years. At horizons of 400 years, the discounted value increases by a factor of over 40,000 relative to conventional discounting. Applied to climate change mitigation, we find that incorporating discount rate uncertainty almost doubles the expected present value of mitigation benefits. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Using a simple analytical model incorporating benefits of a stock, costs of adjusting the stock, and uncertainty in costs, we uncover several important principles governing the choice of price-based policies (e.g., taxes) relative to quantity-based policies (e.g., tradable permits) for controlling stock externalities. As in Weitzman (Rev. Econom. Stud. 41(4) (1974) 477), the relative slopes of the marginal benefits and costs of controlling the externality continue to be critical determinants of the efficiency of prices relative to quantities, with flatter marginal benefits and steeper marginal costs favoring prices. But some important adjustments for dynamic effects are necessary, including correlation of cost shocks across time, discounting, stock decay, and the rate of benefits growth. Applied to the problem of greenhouse gases and climate change, we find that a price-based instrument generates several times the expected net benefits of a quantity instrument. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Focuses on the impact of stringent environmental policies to workers. Cause on the significant change of employment; Effects linked to labor-using factor shifts; Estimation of the demand in the market of heavy polluting industries.

The choice of discount rate has a significant impact on net benefit estimates when costs today have benefits over long time horizons. Standard U.S. government practice for cost–benefit analysis is to bound such analysis using two alternative rates. These rates are meant to represent the rate of return paid by capital investment and the rate received by consumers. Previous work has shown this approach legitimately bounds the analysis—but only when future benefits accrue directly to consumers either in a two-period model or as a perpetuity. We generalize to consider arbitrary patterns of future benefits, accruing either directly to consumers or indirectly through future investment. We derive an expression for the appropriate discount rate and show that it converges to the consumption rate for benefits increasingly far into the future. More generally, the bounding rates depend on the temporal pattern of the undiscounted dollars. As an application, we estimate the appropriate discount rate for climate change damages from carbon dioxide, finding it lies in a narrow range (±0.5 percent) around the consumer rate of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Because conventional command-and-control environmental regulation often performs poorly in developing countries, policymakers are increasingly experimenting with alternatives, including voluntary regulatory programs. Research in industrialized countries suggests that such programs are sometimes ineffective, because they mainly attract relatively clean participants free-riding on unrelated pollution control investments. We use plant-level data on more than 100,000 facilities to analyze the Clean Industry Program, Mexico’s flagship voluntary regulatory initiative. We seek to identify the drivers of participation and to determine whether the program improves participants’ environmental performance. Using data from the program’s first decade, we find that plants recently fined by environmental regulators were more likely to participate, but that after graduating from the program, participants were not fined at a substantially lower rate than nonparticipants. These results suggest that although the Clean Industry Program attracted dirty plants under pressure from regulators, it did not have a large, lasting impact on their environmental performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares, qualitatively and quantitatively, the welfare effects of emissions taxes, auctioned emissions permits, and free (grandfathered) permits, when technological innovation is endogenous. We find that there is no unambiguous case for preferring any of these policy instruments. The relative welfare ranking of instruments depends on the costs of innovation, the extent to which innovations can be imitated, the slope and level of the marginal environmental benefit function, and the number of polluting firms. We illustrate the types of situations when there can be significant welfare discrepancies between the policies and when there are not. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]