1. An explanation of anomalous behavior in models of political participation
- Author
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Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt
- Subjects
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,Sociology and Political Science ,Comparative statics ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Limiting case (mathematics) ,Collective action ,Dilemma ,Noise ,symbols.namesake ,Simple (abstract algebra) ,Nash equilibrium ,Voting ,Political Science and International Relations ,Economics ,symbols ,Social psychology ,Mathematical economics ,Caltech Library Services ,media_common - Abstract
This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a “quantal response” equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.
- Published
- 2005