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In this paper I argue that, contrary to early claims about the Internet in authoritarian regimes, this technology does not represent an inherently liberal sphere of communication. Rather, authoritarian governments can exert quite effective control over use of the Internet by manipulating the architecture of this flexible technology and by leveraging laws, social norms, and market conditions in ways that significantly raise the cost of unfettered Internet access. However, while diffusion of the Internet in authoritarian regimes does not constitute an automatic extension of civil liberties, this technology may well prove to be an important tool for promoting another type of political reform: bureaucratization. In countries where rampant corruption threatens the effectiveness of public administration and the legitimacy of authoritarian rule, leaders who prevent use of the Internet to challenge their monopoly on power may nonetheless use the technology to promote greater accountability in the exercise of power. Throughout the paper I illustrate these conceptual and theoretical arguments with evidence from the cases of China and Saudi Arabia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper relates centrality in an informal elite network to the formation of winning coalitions to illustrate how social network analysis (SNA) can explain the internal workings of authoritarian regimes theoretically and empirically. An informal network among Chinese elites is created by noting who has been promoted under whom during their earlier career. An analysis with exponential random graph models confirm that ties between members belonging to the same faction, with the same provincial origin, or with similar pre-P.R. China experiences are significantly more likely. Network position is then used to predict who will be appointed to the inner circle of the Chinese Communist Party, the Politburo, five years later. The network approach indicates that it is the number of patrons that matter, and not just the fact of having one, as earlier studies have shown. Being well-connected to peers, i.e. having one's own clients, matter as well. Complex centrality measures that take into account the individual's overall position in the network can identify patrons and predict who will enter the inner circle even if patrons are unknown. The paper proposes a new theoretical and empirical approach to the understudied informal institutions of authoritarian regimes, and suggests a more principled, but also more nuanced way of measuring one such institution - the personal relationships between a larger set of elites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been renewed emphasis on the policy process in China. The dynamic locally-initiated experiments regarding governance issues, however, remain largely ignored by the literature. The paper argues that the diffusion mechanism is essential in understanding their impacts. Through the analysis of a game of regional diffusion and a case in X County, Shandong Province, the paper concludes that to ensure regional diffusion, a local innovation has to construct a balance between its "effectiveness" and "properness." An understanding of the diffusion mechanism sheds light on explaining the resilient authoritarian rule and the central-local relationship in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sequence of Chinese reforms has a major overall effect on the political and social landscape of the country. To some extent, economic development is certainly a push- pull factor that makes China move toward or deviate from the path of political liberalization. In the case of China, as this paper proposes, it deviates from the development experience of the four Asian tigers, where economy growth has lead to the emerging institutional basis for each country's intellectual pluralism and informal institutions. In other words, two-decades of economic reform have made China an exception that is immune to the political vulnerabilities and legitimacy crisis that most Eastern European socialist economies experienced during the transition period. The basic reason is that Chinese state-led development strategies generate unfavorable exogenous factors upon the path to democratic transition. China's dual-track system, state-led capital allocation, tax assignment system reform, and preferential treatment not only perpetuate state control, but also institutionalize state opportunism and corruption. Reform promotes the interests of the ruling elite, newly vested interest groups, and those who align themselves with the State in exchange the preservation of their special positions. For the same reason, Chinese entrepreneurs are not advocating for political change; they represent majority of the vast interest groups in pursuing of their self-interest as well as maintaining the favorable political status quo. To a large degree, China's private entrepreneurs are keen to maintain guanxi with the State to procure permits and business opportunities. From the top down, the Chinese Communist Party has shown incredible adaptability to accommodate changing societal needs and values to gain public support. In China, membership privilege is the sine qua non to ascend the political ladder. Party affiliation not only opens the door for career opportunities, but also allows access to political resources for economic gain. In all, the regime gains loyalty by rewarding those that collaborate with it. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party holds tight control over personnel appointment and the cadre system throughout government and state-owned enterprises. For the elite, the best way to climb up the social ladder is to get closer to the Party organizations. My paper argues that in the foreseeable future the Chinese Communist Party will continue to highlight the priority of the country's economic development, social harmony and stability, which enable the regime to hold a political monopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to establish a model of Chinese-Style Democracy through the process of concept construction. Concept construction involves both abstract and specific approaches, and this paper will identify and present both the abstract overarching concept and specific subtypes of Chinese-Style Democracy. If emphasis is placed on the abstract perspective, then the overarching concept of Chinese-Style Democracy can be understood to be a soft authoritarian regime, or in even more abstract terms, a hybrid regime. If a more specific conception of Chinese-Style Democracy is to be constructed, then three classical subtypes can be proposed: grassroots democracy, administrative democracy, and patriarchal democracy, as well as three diminished subtypes: intra-party democracy, consultative democracy and National People's Congress democracy. Each of these subtypes possesses its own specific traits. Finally, this paper discusses how best to define Chinese-Style Democracy, or democracy with Chinese characteristics, from the perspective of concept construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an authoritarian state aims to shape citizens' views and behavior through the means of the mass media, how successful are political leaders in this endeavor? This paper studies this research question based on a study of legal mobilization through the mass media in China. Since the 1990s political leaders are building a "rule of law" in China. Legal reform is intended to appease the losers of economic reform and to ensure social stability through the use of laws and courts. Thus it substitutes for more radical political change. The development of Chinese labor law, in particular, has been advanced in response to increases in incidences of worker unrest in recent years. The central government has responded by providing citizens with a National Labor Law that signals protection to alienated citizens, establishes a new social contract between workers and the state, and is aimed at channeling workers' grievances into state institutions. Dissemination of legal news through the media constitutes an important part of legal reform. The state relies on "thought work" in order to actively create and shape a legal consciousness. The underlying assumption is that people believe what is written in the news and that a person's way of thinking directly translates into behavior. In this paper we examine how successful Chinese political leaders are in creating perceptions of the law as an effective "weapon of the weak" through the means of the mass media. Content analysis of news reports reveals that the mass media portray the labor dispute resolution process in an overly positive light. News reporting on this issue is relatively uniform across media sources. Statistical analysis of a randomly sampled survey conducted in four Chinese cities in 2005 demonstrates that exposure to news reporting about labor law-related issues successfully promotes the image of a pro-worker bias in the law among citizens, thus encouraging them to participate in the legal system. The state is able to achieve its political goal because of the lack of conflicting sources of information and lack of previous experience with the reformed legal system among citizens. However, as more citizens participate in labor dispute resolution, skepticism toward media reporting on labor dispute resolution and general dissatisfaction with the legal system is likely to grow since experiencing arbitration or litigation leads to more realistic appraisal of the legal system and better understanding of the limitations of the Chinese legal system. However, even these more knowledgeable and experienced citizens are influenced by media messages. We conclude that commercial liberalization of the media can co-exist with authoritarian political control and resilience. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we propose that despite a dearth of democracy, authoritarian regimes may still prioritize good governance and rule of law at least in so much as it serves their ends. We find support for this idea by examining rule of law measures in predicting top-level promotions in such regimes. Existing theories of promotions in authoritarian regimes have either emphasized promotions based on factional allegiance or economic growth. While these are probably important factors that an authoritarian regime considers when promoting subordinates, governance that maintains social order is the foundation of authoritarian rule. We examine China, an ideal test case for this hypothesis. The results of our test indicate that provincial Chinese leaders have been promoted based partly on rule of law concerns, a result that has significant implications for theories of authoritarian regime behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will China become democratic? This is a critical question highly debated among scholars and pundits. While optimistic proponents suggest that China is experiencing a gradual or inevitable democratic transition, pessimists argue that China is either stagnating in its "trapped transition" or becoming a "resilient authoritarian regime." One of the key issues of the debate focuses on different perceptions of the role of Chinese leaders in China's democratization. This paper intends to shed some light on this widely debated question by exploring the belief systems of Hu/Wen. Using operational code analysis from political psychology, I examine public speeches and statements delivered by Hu and Wen especially regarding domestic issues from 2005-2007. I suggest that Hu and Wen as the fourth generation of China's leadership share a similar belief system especially regarding domestic issues. Both of them have democratic-oriented beliefs perceiving a tolerant and cooperative political universe. In addition, both Hu and Wen are inclined to use cooperative and democratic means to achieve their political beliefs. However, both of them are weak in terms of implementing their political goals. China's future as a democracy depends on whether Hu and Wen can consolidate their political power and strengthen their beliefs in order to lead the political transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When an authoritarian regime reforms the state media, how does it affect the ability of the state to manipulate public opinion? A number of authoritarian regimes have deregulated local media markets since the late 1970s. This paper studies the relationship between newspaper deregulation, political news content, and public opinion in China. Interviews with Chinese media experts and content analysis show that media deregulation is associated with greater variation of news content, but alternative mechanisms of control keep diversity within narrow boundaries. At the same time, however, media deregulation makes a great difference to audiences. Data from the Beijing Area Study reveal that readers are more susceptible to news messages when newspapers are deregulated. If news content can be synchronized through alternative mechanisms of control, media deregulation is conducive to regime stability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article challenges a popular argument in authoritarian politics that informal in-stitutions often undermine formal institutions. We show that the state bureaucracy is able to penetrate layers of connections built by firms that aim at capturing the state and seeking rents from an imperfect market. We test this by compiling and analyzing a large, original, and panel dataset of 150 Chinese listed real estate firms from 2003 to 2012 matched with 90 real estate policies. Event studies show that political connections are largely ineffective in resisting the impact of the policies implemented by high-authority state organizations. Policies enforced by strong state bureaucracies produced a significant cumulative abnormal return of -0.016% around the 5 days of the announcement of the policy. Using hierarchical linear modeling, we find a universal effect of strong state policies on firm values regardless of political connectedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role of political instrumentality and other factors in the rise of judicial power in authoritarian system, with reference to the expansion of judicial power in China. It focuses on the broadening of the rule-of-law rhetoric, and reduction in powers of institutions. It focuses on the strategic bargains between the judiciary and the executive or the legislative branch, and how it affects empowerment of the judiciary

Political scientists and policy makers' conventional wisdom holds that democracies listen to their populations, while authoritarian governments do not. As such, we expect that democratic countries with free media to be responsive to scandal, but do not have the same expectation of authoritarian states. This conventional wisdom, however, does not hold true in many countries. Using case studies of two aberrant cases, China and Kenya, we show how authoritarian China is more responsive to public pressure to clean up scandals than democratic Kenya. Argue that while democracy and free media are important for government responsiveness to scandal, they are not sufficient conditions. Public expectation and a functional judicial system are also necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the adoption of the authoritarian regime on the Internet commentator system in China. The establishment of the "Fifty Cents Army" at the Internet industry in the country is discussed. Also tackled is the effort of the Chinese government in manipulating the state censorship within the cyberspace.

The article examines the role of Confucianism in Singapore, South Korea, People's Republic of China and Taiwan. It explores the widespread attachment to Confucian values in each of the countries and examines the ideology played in the four societies. It highlights the difference in democratization where Singapore and China are authoritarian regimes, while South Korea and Taiwan have made transition to democracy with authoritarian past.

This article provides an interpretivist-structuralist account to analyze the Chinese party-state's perception of and policy adaptations to the Color Revolutions of 2005-2007. China's leaders and established intellectuals perceived the Color Revolutions as a series of contagious and illegitimate political changes in Eurasia, instigated by three major factors: raging domestic grievances, electoral politics exploited by the opposition, and Western powers' intervention for geo-strategic interests. This perception and interpretation of the Color Revolutions gave rise to a collective sense of external threat and prompted the Chinese regime to strengthen its coercive capacity. The result was the communist party's increased control over liberal and critical media, political activism, civil rights advocacy, and Sino-Western civil exchanges. The Chinese state's policy adaptations to the Color Revolutions attested to its long-term model of authoritarian developmentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research of the central-local relations of the authoritarian state of China is gaining increasing attention, particularly in the area of the research of contemporary China in Japan. Preceding studies have drawn a comparison between the periods following the 1980s in which the central government introduced its Reform and Open-door Policy and the period preceding that under the rule of Mao Zedong. These studies showed a real interest in the autonomous obtainment of benefits by regional governments and discussed changes in the relations between regional and central government. They also examined demands made by regional governments on the central government to increase benefits, also covering autonomous activities against the central government and how regional governments fought for a certain level of autonomy. This research focuses on the Local People's Congress, (which is) a democratic institution of China, which itself is an authoritarian state of China. The research attempts to understand the nature (reality) of central-local relations. To be more specific, this study analyzes the bills put forward to the Local People's Congress by its deputies. Deputies of the Local People's Congress put forward the interests of constituencies from where they have been elected in the form of "Bill", and the Local People's Congress acts as a platform of managing various regional interests put forward by the deputies of the Local People's Congress. In other words, the Local People's Congress in China is a place where "Interests" between central and local governments collide and reach a settlement stage. I would like to use this research to obtain some insights for studying central-local relations in an authoritarian state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article attempts to develop the concept of authoritarian deliberation from within democratic theory, but in a way that is responsive to a subset of normative potentials for democracy within Chinese political development. Four kinds of interrelated claims are developed, beginning with the paradoxical qualities of the Chinese case and ending with a stylized account of political development. The characteristics of authoritarian deliberation in the Chinese context are cited.

The article develops a formal model that illustrates that significant press freedom may be desirable to an authoritarian central government as a check on difficult-to-control local officials and examines how this model may be applied to the government of China. It provides an overview of the media policy of China. It discusses the role of a central government, officials and citizens under the proposed model. It describes the concealing media policy of China since the 1990s.

Why have large volumes of FDI streamed into China even though its political institutions seem not able to credibly commit on any long-term policy? Why have special zones been enduringly popular among foreign investors? I argue that China attracts massive amounts of FDI partly because of the authoritarian system that gave political elites the flexibility and capacity to initiate the special zone policy to attract FDI. But China's continuing success in attracting higher quality FDI owes much to the government's credibility of maintaining this policy. Both the central and local governments have strong political motivations to maintain the policy, which creates a self-enforcing solution to this credibility problem. FDI patterns over time reflect foreign investors' response to the change in policy credibility in China. At the initial stage of the open-door policy, foreign investments were mostly small, labor-intensive, and low-tech. When the Chinese government gradually built up credibility on the special zone policy, foreign investors were more involved in large-scale operations in the technology-intensive sectors aimed at penetrating the domestic market. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the dynamics of legal reforms in China that have led to a series of institutional innovations, particularly the possibility to seek the advice of legal aid offices and seek redress in court, including in cases of administrative grievances. It is hypothesized that the policy negotiability of the disputed issue, the resources that individual can monopolize, and the breadth of institutional choice that is available to citizens determine transform grievances against the state and the choice of strategy of dispute resolution.