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The sequence of Chinese reforms has a major overall effect on the political and social landscape of the country. To some extent, economic development is certainly a push- pull factor that makes China move toward or deviate from the path of political liberalization. In the case of China, as this paper proposes, it deviates from the development experience of the four Asian tigers, where economy growth has lead to the emerging institutional basis for each country's intellectual pluralism and informal institutions. In other words, two-decades of economic reform have made China an exception that is immune to the political vulnerabilities and legitimacy crisis that most Eastern European socialist economies experienced during the transition period. The basic reason is that Chinese state-led development strategies generate unfavorable exogenous factors upon the path to democratic transition. China's dual-track system, state-led capital allocation, tax assignment system reform, and preferential treatment not only perpetuate state control, but also institutionalize state opportunism and corruption. Reform promotes the interests of the ruling elite, newly vested interest groups, and those who align themselves with the State in exchange the preservation of their special positions. For the same reason, Chinese entrepreneurs are not advocating for political change; they represent majority of the vast interest groups in pursuing of their self-interest as well as maintaining the favorable political status quo. To a large degree, China's private entrepreneurs are keen to maintain guanxi with the State to procure permits and business opportunities. From the top down, the Chinese Communist Party has shown incredible adaptability to accommodate changing societal needs and values to gain public support. In China, membership privilege is the sine qua non to ascend the political ladder. Party affiliation not only opens the door for career opportunities, but also allows access to political resources for economic gain. In all, the regime gains loyalty by rewarding those that collaborate with it. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party holds tight control over personnel appointment and the cadre system throughout government and state-owned enterprises. For the elite, the best way to climb up the social ladder is to get closer to the Party organizations. My paper argues that in the foreseeable future the Chinese Communist Party will continue to highlight the priority of the country's economic development, social harmony and stability, which enable the regime to hold a political monopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China decentralized in the 1980s, many provinces received the latitude to implement their own strategies and approaches to economic development. Not surprisingly, such strategies varied regionally as provinces with different levels of wealth and resources implemented different approaches to achieving economic development. Yet, some of these examples are quite puzzling, with provinces that share many similarities implementing markedly different strategies. Moreover, some provinces not only implemented different approaches to economic development, but adopted entirely different goals - interpreting the very definition of economic development differently. To explain these differences, China scholars have focused on different factors, including constraints and opportunities from the center, characteristics of the provinces themselves, and attributes of individual leaders (e.g., Li 1997, Huang 1996, Chung 2000, Zeng 1991). While these explanations are able to explain some of the more straightforward cases, puzzling exceptions remain. Moreover, how the provinces interact with lower levels administrative units remains under researched. Focusing on Guizhou and Yunnan, two provinces with similar geographies, institutions and natural resource endowments, this paper updates previous research in asking why provincial leaders adopted markedly disparate economic strategies. Using data from fieldwork and secondary sources, it focuses on the three political factors listed above that are purported to explain differences in provincial policy. I argue that while the center constrains and encourages certain actions and approaches in the provinces, the experiences and background of individual provincial leaders further affects the choice of strategies implemented there. While emphasizing the importance of characteristics of local leaders and their relationship with the center, the paper questions the assumptions on which research focusing on elite characteristics has so far been based, and suggests alternative approaches. In addition, since Li Zhanshu was appointed as Guizhou's CCP provincial secretary in 2010, the overall direction for that province's policy changed markedly. This allows us to examine the degree to which new leaders with different commitments and ideas can fight against the forces of path dependency and inertia to stake out different directions. The paper also explores the shifting relationships between provincial level governments and the lower level, highlighting different patterns for each case. The results have implications for our understanding not only of decentralization, central- provincial relations and the origins of the economic policies of Chinese President Hu Jintao, Guizhou's previous leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is growth good for the poor? In theory, yes. But exceptions give us pause. This paper examines two poor, neighboring Chinese provinces that are exceptions to the hypothesis that increasing economic growth should reduce rural poverty. Starting in the early 1990s, Guizhou saw significant declines in rural poverty despite moribund growth, while Yunnan's poverty rates stagnated despite robust growth. This paper argues that the volume, distribution and structure of roadways, migration and coal mining that contributed to this puzzling outcome. The results have an impact on our understanding of the relationship between development and poverty reduction, the role that the state plays, as well as poverty reduction in China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes departure from most of current writings on China's regionalism: whether China is seeking power projection in Asia by promoting regionalism. Rather, the paper provides a systematic account for the evolution of China's regional policy since 1978. The paper argues that China's regionalist policy since 1997 was caused more by domestic consideration of stability and development than international counter-balancing, specifically changes in developmental agenda, domestic coalition politics, and intellectual thinking. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we propose that despite a dearth of democracy, authoritarian regimes may still prioritize good governance and rule of law at least in so much as it serves their ends. We find support for this idea by examining rule of law measures in predicting top-level promotions in such regimes. Existing theories of promotions in authoritarian regimes have either emphasized promotions based on factional allegiance or economic growth. While these are probably important factors that an authoritarian regime considers when promoting subordinates, governance that maintains social order is the foundation of authoritarian rule. We examine China, an ideal test case for this hypothesis. The results of our test indicate that provincial Chinese leaders have been promoted based partly on rule of law concerns, a result that has significant implications for theories of authoritarian regime behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The determinants behind the political selection of officials in China have been the subject of great debate. Although factions and political connections play an important role, China's stellar economic performance since 1978 suggests that the Communist Party's cadre management system is still able to select and promote at least some competent individuals to hold important government positions. This paper evaluates the extent to which the Party uses economic performance, namely the growth of local fiscal revenues and GDP, as the indicators of competence when promoting local politicians. We argue that economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at the lower administrative level of government than higher level officials in China. This strategy allows the ruling elite to balance between loyalty and competence among subordinates in order to maintain political survival. Using a novel panel dataset of provincial, prefectural, and county-level Communist Party secretaries and government executives between 1999 and 2007, we find supporting evidence for our argument. We also find that even when we suspect that local officials attempt to manipulating fiscal or GDP data, their odds of promotion remain unaffected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do autocrats build clean courts? This paper seeks to address this question in a Chinese context. I argue that foreign investors who hold mobile assets and have a strong preference for a fair legal system are major players in pushing Chinese local governments to build clean courts. Chinese local officials, on the other hand, are induced to tie their own hands and become guarantors of judicial integrity when they rely on foreign capital to promote economic growth because their political careers hinge on economic performance. I then test this theory quantitatively using a cross-sectional data set of 102 Chinese counties. The implication is that rule of law may not be the result of external imposition (Acemoglu et al. 2001) but may actually develop from the internal incentive structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of social capital are still exploring and debating which type of social capital plays what kind of role in shaping economic development and government performance in different economic and political systems at various levels. To contribute to this important exploration and debate, this paper examines the impacts of two types of social capital- generalized and particularized-on the performance of grassroots self-government institutions in urban China based on an original survey of 144 urban neighborhood communities in China's three major cities. The findings indicate that the generalized social capital embodied in the indiscriminative trust and inclusive social networks positively affected the performance of the self-government institutions, while the particularized social capital as manifested in discriminative trust and exclusive social networks negatively impacted such performance. These findings help clarify some theoretical issues and shed some light on the prospects of the local self-government system in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, through a comparative, empirical study of the role Chinese and Indian diasporas play in the political economy of their respective ancestral homelands, explores the relationship between diaspora and homeland development and how this dynamic relationship affects economic growth and foreign relations of the homelands. The author argues that the significant roles of Indian and Chinese diasporas in their respective homelands' development and foreign relations consistently reflect, and are heavily influenced by, their home countries' economic development strategies and political history and culture. The contributions of Chinese and Indian diasporas to their homelands provide a unique perspective in the comparative study of Chinese and Indian political economy. The research concludes that as globalization deepens, the role of diasporas will become more salient in international political economy, and that the international community needs to pay more attention to the two diaspora groups that are closely linked to the two rising Asian powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A hallmark of political-economic leadership in the world economy is ample and privileged access to sources of energy. A relatively inexpensive energy source is critical to literally fueling technological and economic growth that outpaces, for a time, the rest of the world. The Dutch had peat, the British had coal, and the United States had petroleum. What should we expect next? The question is particularly compelling if we are in the early days of a political-economic transition with China possibly surpassing the United States at some point in the century. Or will the United States preserve its lead with the aid of the advent of a newly heralded period of energy independence? The potential compounding of transitions - both energy and political-economic - draw attention to energy supply and access questions. Answers about energy transitions may provide major clues to the future shape of systemic leadership transitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study which examines the public goods and public support in China. The correlation between regional economic prosperity and public satisfaction with the local and central governments is explored. The variations in the provision of public goods in urban and rural areas are highlighted.

The article discusses the comparative study related to the economic and political structures in India and China. It mentions the factors of the comparative study which measures the both countries structural form on economic growth, reforms and inequality. It notes on the comparative study on inequality in India by the international standards. It also highlights the results on the economic inequality in China due to its revolutionary government.

The article discusses the approach of China to foreign crisis and international affairs. It mentions the call of Chinese officials for the country to take a more prominent role in world affairs. It notes the aspects that are considered to underpin the country's strategy to world affairs, such as a drive for great power status and a need for a stable environment which can support Chinese economic development. It also emphasizes the win-win principle in Chinese foreign policy discourse.

The article offers information on the economic and technological progress of China since 1979. The official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, said that the space scientists should be held as a model of professionalism for all of society. China's space program highlights the ability to mobilize economic, technological and human resources.

Stock markets around the world do not conform to a single model, but systematically vary according to the types of companies listed, the composition of investors, the role of the state as a regulator and/or a participant, and the political foundation for their creation and operation. This study analyzes stock markets in China and Taiwan to explore the hypothesis that political regime type strongly influences the type of stock market institutions that are created in a given country. In both cases, stock markets were established under authoritarian regimes with developmental emphases. Comparing China against Taiwan allows me to examine the effect of socialist versus non-socialist authoritarianism on the nature of political imperatives that shape stock market institutions. I find that the role of the party-state in domestic financial markets differs substantially in China and Taiwan. While in China the state is a key participant in stock markets, in Taiwan the role of the Kuomintang party eclipses the role of the state. This trend has been reinforced since Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s. Finally, this article asks what, if any, have been the contributions of stock market financing to economic development in these cases? The East Asian developmental state model places a higher emphasis on the role of bank-led finance in development. To date, this expectation continues to hold in the Chinese case. The stock market in Taiwan, however, has begun to move toward a more important role in allocating capital in the post-developmental state era. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexander Gerschenkron's notion of "late-developer" economic development contends that in a late-developing country, the state normally plays a more important role than does the state in an early industrialized country. Consistent with this critical notion, it has been argued that the state plays a decisive role in creating such new social classes as the new middle classes, and hence in shaping their socioeconomic and political traits. In a late-developing country, therefore, the middle class is most likely to support the state and the political system that is sanctioned by the state. To explore this proposition, this study examines the levels and sources of the Chinese middle class's support for a set of democratic values and institutions, based on data collected from a representative-sample survey conducted in three Chinese cities. The findings are consistent with the proposition and have important political and theoretical implications. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the self-identity and social consciousness of the new middle-income stratum in China. China, with its sustained economic growth, has become the most dynamic developing area of the world today. China's GDP, between 1978 and 2003, grew by 9.3 percent every year, three times faster than the U.S. economy, and its per capita income more than quadrupled from $231 to $940. A far-reaching impact on social transformation was produced by this economic development. The Chinese society has been shaped into multiple strata, if not classes.