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My study examines the conditions under which middle power states, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway, may exercise effective leadership in the realm of human security. I hypothesize that a middle power-led human security initiative is more likely to be successful if the initiative does not threaten the fundamental principles of the superpower. My paper demonstrates that although it is possible for a human security initiative to overcome American opposition that is based on political or military interests, an initiative will be less likely to succeed if it challenges the core principles of the United States. I test the hypothesis by conducting a qualitative analysis of four cases of human security initiatives where the middle powers have played leadership roles. The cases include the endeavor to create a United Nations rapid deployment peacekeeping force, which led to the formation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) in 1996; the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, which resulted in the 1997 Ottawa Convention; the struggle to establish the International Criminal Court, which came into existence in 2002; and the unsuccessful attempt to regulate the legal trade in small arms and light weapons. The United States has taken different positions on these issues. The U.S. approved of the idea of a standby UN rapid response force, but did not participate in the establishment of SHIRBRIG. Washington objected to the Ottawa Convention on the basis of a conflict with U.S. military interests, and opposed the International Criminal Court due to the influence of certain groups in the American foreign policy establishment. Finally, the U.S. rejected the adoption of restrictions on the licit small arms trade due to a clash with an American principle protected by the U.S. Constitution: the right to bear arms. By illustrating that smaller states can assume leadership on global security, my paper counters the trend in international security studies of focusing almost exclusively on great power leadership, a tendency which has been reinforced by the decades-long predominance of the realist approach to international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: This paper seeks to understand the dilemmas and constraints facing leaders as they seek to manage their military's participation in multilateral operations. The problem of caveats—national restrictions—has been a central concern in Afghanistan, limiting the ability of various countries to contribute to the effort. We develop some implications from principal-agent theory to understand the challenges facing civilian and military leaders. We then focus primarily on the case of Canada in Afghanistan since it has participated in both the unilateral ad hoc Operation Enduring Freedom and the multilateral, NATO International Security Assistance Force. We consider how command and control have evolved over time with commanders on the ground having varying levels of discretion and authority. We find that the key influence on any military officer is the home country, even if the troop contributing nation has the most robust rules of engagement and delegates the most authority to the operational commanders. All coalitions are, ultimately, of the willing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of Canada-U.S. continental security relations since September 2001. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of the Canada-U.S, continental security relationship since September 2001. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]