Search

Political scientists often consider constitutions and their various designs as key variables for explaining a wide range of relevant outcomes, such as the stability and quality of democracy, economic performance, or the rate of policy change across political regimes. The validity of this claim rests on the assumption that constitutions are a stable set of rules that become self-enforcing over time. Constitutional stability, however, is subject to variation across time and space. I argue that this variation depends both on institutional configurations and on the relative stability of the political environment that the constitution is supposed to regulate. Using a duration analysis of constitutions in 18 Latin American countries between 1946 and 2000, this paper shows that while the lifespan of constitutions is negatively affected by political and social instability, some of the institutions that prevent the concentration of power and protect the constitution as a "fundamental law" decrease the risk of constitutional replacement. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]